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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses cultural policy. It proposes that the creative city urban 
development paradigm is a useful perspective from which cultural policy can be 
analysed in order to reveal the imperatives, pressures, contingencies and deficits within 
it and the state, vis-à-vis the market. The thesis, therefore, rests on three analytical 
pillars: the general field of cultural policy, the specific construct of the creative city 
paradigm, and an investigation of relations between these domains through a study of 
policy texts in Scotland, Finland and Ireland. Using Michel Foucault’s discourse 
formation theory and Jurgen Habermas’s concepts of lifeworld, system, legitimation and 
colonisation, the dissertation demonstrates that instrumental discourses like the creative 
city are used to legitimate cultural policies by providing tangible rationales for 
investment in culture and by addressing local state issues, though this process ultimately 
works to delegitimate cultural policy. The thesis also shows that cultural policies 
typically deploy conflicting and dual discourses that appeal to the interests of the state 
and the public, as well as obfuscating prevailing state ideologies. It is argued that this 
characteristic has developed because of difficulties with defining culture, the weakness 
of the policy sector and the state’s interest in sustaining itself. From the case material, 
therefore, it is firstly demonstrated that cultural policy does not have a tangible policy 
mandate, is not a sui generis area of public policy, and is primarily used to address 
central government agendas and other policy sectors. It is further shown that this 
understanding of cultural policy is held at the highest political levels and therefore 
constitutes the a priori purpose of contemporary cultural policy. Secondly, using Peter 
Sloterdijk’s concept of cynical reason, this thesis demonstrates that the dependency and 
perpetual case-making of the cultural sector evident in rational instrumental discourses 
like the creative city, leads to a cynicism amongst the stakeholders of cultural policy 
 ii 
which impacts on the functioning of their relationships. Thirdly, though instrumentalism 
is endemic to all policy, cultural policy’s dependency, weak status and relationship to 
the market are reflexively linked and lead to a structural or cyclical instrumentalism in 
cultural policy. This cycle of instrumentalism exacerbates difficulties amongst 
stakeholder relationships, and can result in a colonisation or imbalance between 
political-economic and socio-cultural imperatives in a policy sector that is already in 
deficit, with implications for the state. This analysis, therefore, results in a new 
consideration of the role and implications of the creative city paradigm in relation to 
cultural policy, public policy and the state. 
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“These are my principles. If you don’t like them I have others.”  
Attributed to Groucho Marx (1890 – 1977) 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Cultural policy has been described as a “marginal” (Vestheim, 2007, p. 217; Bennett, 
2006, p. 118; Raunig, 2005, p. 16) and “marginalised” policy sector (European 
Commission, 2006a, p.10) carrying “little [electoral] weight” (Gray and Wingfield 
2010, p. 7). Despite this, an investigation of cultural policies via its discourses,
1
 
narratives or bodies of meaning, can reveal the wider imperatives and pressures of not 
only the politics of culture,
2
 but also the contingencies of governments and the state 
itself. This may be surprising to those lacking awareness as to why states have cultural 
policies in the first place or in relation to what cultural policies are putatively for. 
However, while an investigation of the discourses of cultural policies might struggle to 
ascertain the purpose of cultural policies, it can reveal the perpetual search for new and 
ever more persuasive stories to tell about the role of culture and the state, to the state 
itself and the outside public. These stories embody and expose profound contradictions 
and deficits at the heart of cultural policies and liberal democratic governments.
3
 
                                                           
1
Discourse is central to this dissertation (see Chapter Two) and can be described in a number of ways: as 
a “linguistic practice that puts into play sets of rules and procedures for the formation of objects, speakers, 
and themes” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 330); a “single utterance or speech act” as part of a “systematic ordering 
of language involving certain rules, terminology and conventions” not limited to any one format such as 
text, talk, or image, etc. (Tonkiss, 2004, p. 373), but is more specifically interpreted via Foucault’s 
discourse theories. This interpretation comprises discourse as varied systems of power and meaning-
generation, or “statements different in form, and dispersed in time”...which “form a group if they refer to 
one and the same object” (Foucault, 1972, p 35). Chapter two contains an extended discussion of 
discourse and the rationale for selecting text-based discourses. 
2
Culture and Art are associated terms that comprise the relationship between the whole and the part, 
whereby the former refers to the wider context in which art is created in terms of a way of life, as well as 
a system of judgment, and the latter refers to general expression (Williams, 1965, p. 57). As a result of the 
tendency for governments to use the terms art and culture interchangeably, unless otherwise indicated and 
for consistency purposes, this research uses the term culture to indicate the narrower model of culture 
typically supported by governments (i.e. the arts). See Chapter Four in general and section 4.4.10 
3
 Liberal democracy originated from the 18
th
 century European tradition of Liberalism, and coalesced 
around rights, freedoms and obligations vis-à-vis the state, and, in particular, property and the market 
(Held, 2006, p. 56). It is based on the view that the “government exists to safeguard the rights and 
liberties of citizens who are ultimately the best judges of their own interests” and “must be restricted in 
scope and constrained in practice to ensure the maximum possible freedom of each citizen (ibid., pp. 64-
65). 
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The primary focus of this dissertation, therefore, is an interpretation and analysis of 
(explicit)
4
 nominal national cultural policy, via an exploration of its relationship with a 
popular urban development discourse and paradigm called the creative city. In order to 
consider this question, the research rests on three analytical pillars comprising the 
general field of cultural policy, the specific construct of the creative city paradigm 
(resting on the strategic use of culture in the growth of cities), and an investigation of 
the under-analysed relations between these domains. This analysis takes place through a 
survey of the historical and conceptual links between cultural policy and the creative 
city, a comparative study of policy environments and texts in Scotland, Finland and 
Ireland and an examination of the implications that arise.  
 
The three northern European countries of Scotland, Finland and Ireland are not only 
typically neglected in cultural policy scholarship, but offer a number of similarities 
(similar economic and political agendas), and differences (socio-political traditions, 
languages) with which to consider and locate the specific role and value of the creative 
city paradigm within cultural policy. Specifically, the cases will show that the strategic 
use of culture represented by the creative city, via its “exchanges, its techniques, its 
values” (Foucault, 2002, p. xxii), or its situated claims to knowledge, can shed light on 
the discrete political, social and historical contexts of policy making in those countries, 
the nature of the cultural policy field itself, and the state. In doing this, the research also 
seeks to evaluate if, how and why, strategic discourses like the creative city paradigm 
                                                           
4
 Explicit cultural policy is “any cultural policy that a government labels as such” (Ahearne, 2009, p. 143) 
and is the focus of this research. Implicit cultural policy is “any [effective] political strategy that looks to 
work on the culture of the territory over which it presides” (ibid.). See also Chapter Four (4.4.11). 
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may be a helpful narrative or legitimation
5
 discourse, within continually advocating 
national cultural policies.  
 
This introductory chapter, therefore, aims to link the creative city paradigm to cultural 
policy and build a case for their mutual investigation. It will set out the main claims for 
the research, as well as key issues within cultural policy. These claims comprise the role 
of cultural policy in addressing other government agendas, the impact of this on cultural 
policy stakeholder relationships and the balance of interests in cultural policies as 
represented through the discourses of cultural policy. The Chapter will contextualise 
these claims by referring to the correlation between the complexity, contestation and 
richness of culture; the difficult position of culture within governments; the 
functionality of culture to ruling elites; and the consequent dualism, conflict and lack of 
clarity in cultural policy rationales, in the context of the relationship between the state 
and the market. Following this, the chapter will touch on key terminologies relevant to 
this research and will then outline the creative city paradigm, its strategic positioning of 
culture, its value systems and the powerful discourses on which it depends. This 
introductory chapter will conclude by outlining the main rationale for the thesis, the 
contributions of the thesis to knowledge, and a summary of the chapters.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
5
 Legitimacy and legitimation are key concepts associated with critical theorist Jurgen Habermas (1973) 
and refer to the “mass [electoral] loyalty” or systems of trust and communication on which the survival of 
political establishments depend (Habermas, 1973, p. 46). This concept will be fully explored further in 
this chapter, Chapter Two and throughout the text. 
 9 
1.2 Overview 
 
1.2.1 Cultural policy: the problem of case-making 
Cultural policy can be defined in various ways, from the “broad field of public 
processes involved in formulating, implementing, and contesting governmental 
intervention in, and support of, cultural activity” (Cunningham, 2003, p. 14), to 
“whatever it is that governments say it is” (Gray, 2010a, p. 222). However, Western 
European cultural policies such as those in Scotland, Finland and Ireland, typically use a 
range of narratives in various formats that make diverse claims about the complexity, 
value and uses of culture in society. These claims effectively comprise what gets 
constituted as cultural policy, thereby implicitly offering tangible rationales for 
democratically elected state interventions into culture.  
 
Typical cultural policy assertions, therefore, include the role of culture in: “sustainable 
economic development”, “health, wellbeing, confidence... quality of life”, (national) 
“profile” (Scotland), “multiculturalism, international cooperation ... cultural 
exportation” (Finland), and “economic returns and employment” (Ireland).6 These 
claims can be summarised into three state uses for culture based around the economic, 
symbolic (and identity-based) and social needs of societies (McGuigan, 1996, p. 51- 
55).
7
 Accordingly, cultural policy rationales are typologised as market, state, and 
                                                           
6
 See Scotland, Finland and Ireland’s Cultural/Arts Policy Ministerial websites: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/ArtsCultureSport/arts; 
http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Kulttuuri/?lang=en; http://www.ahg.gov.ie/en/Arts/ [All Accessed 18
t
March 
2013]. 
7
 Specifically, these cultural uses refer to: job-creation and direct (from cultural events) and indirect (via 
spill-over spending in cafes/shops etc.) financial returns to the exchequer via the economy; symbolic 
articulation of the collective image of the nation via national identity; and the promotion of strong 
communities and social stability via social cohesion. 
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communicative,
8
 the latter in reference to discourses of the public sphere,
9
 democracy 
and social cohesion (McGuigan, 2004, p. 35). 
 
These material accounts of culture’s uses are particularly necessary in relation to a 
policy area whose domain is constantly shifting and often described with reference to 
Raymond Williams’ analysis of it as “complicated” and difficult to define (Williams, 
1976, p. 87). As such, models of culture can refer to particular ways of living, or the 
anthropological model of culture (Williams, 1965, p. 57), hierarchically-defined 
expressive activity associated with the arts, or high culture, and finally, a standard of 
“perfection”, or the representation of absolute or universal human values (ibid.). 
Agreeing on culture, therefore, before any consideration of cultural policy, is value-
laden, political and highly contested. This contestation, a priori, means that culture as 
an area of government activity is notoriously difficult to administer (Bennett, 1998, p. 
198), is typically condensed to a more manageable (and less political) high culture 
interpretation (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 27) and is “impossible to live up to” 
(Mundy, 2000, p. 9). 
 
The consequence and cause of these difficulties, as suggested by the various social, 
economic and symbolic applications for culture, are each reflected in definitions of 
cultural policy (as above) that appear to lack any identifiable or self-evident purpose for 
the sector. Instead, cultural policy serves both “broader and more specific interests and 
agendas” (O’Regan, 2001, p. 1) and tends not to be “justified on the grounds that it is a 
good-in-itself, but rather that it yields other good results” (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 326). As a 
                                                           
8
 Communicative is a key Habermasian term concerning the use of free and unforced democratic debate 
to resolve differences and engage in the public sphere (Habermas, 1987, p. 32) and will be further 
discussed later in this chapter. 
9
 For a discussion of the public sphere, see below (1.2.1.1) and Chapter Two (2.5.1). 
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result, cultural policies’ “desired [policy] outcomes” or “goal-directed” purposes (Jones, 
2009, p. 10) rarely concern culture. As a branch of public policy, therefore, which 
typically demands (and depends for its legitimacy on) a discernable “causal story”, 
policy problem or public issue which it can be seen to address (Burstein, 1991, p. 331), 
cultural policy can be understood as lacking.  
 
Although this deficit can be linked to culture’s inherent complexities, the fragmented 
foundation period and structural differences of European cultural policy have also 
influenced current models of cultural policy (Quinn, 1998, pp. 97-99), as have changing 
policy climates and expectations. From the outset, however, these complexities and 
consequent difficulties within cultural policy have created a policy area that is patently 
different from other policy sectors, which represent more readily understood or self-
evident areas of public and social need. As such, areas like Health, the Economy, or 
even Education (with which cultural policy is often linked both conceptually and 
ministerially),
10
 speak to more tangible, and, therefore, public or policy issues. These 
factors raise questions as to why states or governments, ab initio, support culture as an 
area of administration.  
 
The economic concept of “public good” is often used to answer this question and 
describes a good that is “available to all”, “indivisible”, “non-excludable” and 
                                                           
10
 There are a number of parallels between culture and education (as demonstrated by the numerous 
references to education throughout this dissertation), not least of which is the putatively intangible and 
long-term impact of education, and consequently its approach to case-making and legitimacy-seeking. 
The Value of the Humanities is one such publication (forthcoming November 2013) by Helen Small, 
which “provides a critical account of the principal arguments used to defend the value” of education via 
the Humanities. The book makes the following claims:”that the Humanities study the meaning-making 
practices of culture, and bring to their work a distinctive understanding of what constitutes knowledge and 
understanding; that, though useful to society in many ways, they remain laudably at odds with, or at a 
remove from, instrumental use value; that they contribute to human happiness; that they are a force for 
democracy; and that they are a good in themselves, to be valued "for their own sake". Available: 
http://www.oupcanada.com/catalog/9780199683864.html {Accessed 9 May 2013]. See also Collini 
(2012). 
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“produced by the state” rather than the market, in contrast with private goods which are 
“consumed by choice” and only available to “those who pay for them” (Parsons, 1995, 
p. 10). These goods are understood as contributing to “well-being” (Moran et al., 2006, 
p. 635), despite there not necessarily being a public demand for those goods (Frey, 
2003, p. 102; Pratt, 2005, p. 37). As such, the concept of “market failure” describes the 
failure of the market (due to insufficient demand) to supply that public good or 
commodity (ibid.).  The linking of public good and well-being with culture, therefore, 
describes the value of cultural experiences, which can be enjoyed by many without a 
diminishment of the experience of others (Galloway and Dunlop, 2006, p. 46). 
Consequently, this “endangered species approach” to culture (Lewis and Miller, 2003, 
p. 4) typically frames state cultural intervention and is a common rationale for public 
policy in general.
11
   
 
However, the lack of precision around the concept of well-being, together with 
contestations around the accuracy of these theories (Parsons, 1995, p. 11), render public 
good and market failure rationales for cultural policies, problematic. The description of 
public goods in terms of well-being can also be viewed as describing a cultural benefit 
rather than a purpose for cultural policy, and may conflict with prescribed outcomes 
such as social cohesion and economic return, while simultaneously disavowing 
increasingly industrial models of cultural production (and thus its market viability). In 
light, therefore, of the role of democratic public policy as representative of the public 
(ibid., pp. 3-4), the lack of a meta rationale for cultural policy and public need that it 
might be seen to address (consistent with other policy areas), implies a lack of consent 
and identifiable public mandate. These discrepancies are deeply problematic for cultural 
                                                           
11
 For more on this, see (Frey, 2003, pp. 112- 114). 
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policy in relation to its construction and perception by the state and the public, with 
implications beyond cultural policy itself.  
 
1.2.1.1 The problem of rationale 
As a result of these complexities and the low status of culture ministries in government 
(Vestheim, 2007; Gray and Wingfield, 2010; O’Regan, 2001), therefore, cultural policy 
is a sector that needs to generate prolific, continuous and renewed accounts of culture’s 
prescribed purpose, usefulness and value to societies, leading to a state of perpetual and 
often defensive advocacy. However, over the last thirty years or so, European advocacy 
campaigns and research projects have led to the development of a highly sophisticated 
range of narratives that resemble cultural policy causal stories (and consultancies to 
deliver these stories). These stories detail a wide range of uses for culture on that basis 
that for some at least, culture is “everybody’s business—a matter for the whole of 
government” (O’Regan, 2001, p. 28) and, further, that cultural policy is the “mother of 
democratic policies” (Vestheim, 2007, p. 217).  
 
The pressure on cultural policy narratives to perform for the whole of government, be it 
cognitive development, well-being, social cohesion or economic output, has intensified 
following the latest global recession and consequent retrenchment of world-wide 
government budgets. A notable outcome of this difficult financial climate has been the 
development of policy handbooks designed to arm culture ministers with “arguments” 
or rationales to use specifically with “Finance and Prime ministers”, in order to situate 
culture as central to “combating the effects of recession” and “leading the way back to 
 14 
prosperity” (Mundy, 2009, n.p.).12 In this climate, cultural policy as understood by 
politicians, has leaned heavily on the arts’ benign symbolic properties and led to claims 
that are designed to interest both fellow politicians and any electorate seeking tangible 
uses for culture. This is demonstrated in recent political statements concerning culture’s 
ability to offer national "relationship marketing" which helps "attract investment” ... and 
“drive[s] jobs and opportunities here at home” (Higgins, 2013a, n.p.); claims that 
culture helps us be “robust in our advocacy of who we are, what we are, where we have 
come from and where we are going to” (Johnson, 2009, n.p.); and media reports 
claiming that a “reputation for cultural creativity is attractive to businesses considering 
investing” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.). 
 
Similar claims for culture are made through the policies of Scotland, Finland and 
Ireland, who respectively claim that culture is the nation’s “‘r and d’ department” 
(Matarasso, 1998, p. 4); makes regions “dynamic” (Matarasso, 1998, n.p.); contributes 
to “sustainable economic development”;13 “arouse[s] interest” in nations (Finnish 
Ministry of Education, 2008a, p 14.); and (again) attracts international investment 
(Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011a). Social claims for culture are also 
made in reports of culture as “essential to societal welfare” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2010a, p. 6), the “prevention of social marginalisation” (ibid., p. 9) and a 
“key component in defining human identity at individual, community and national 
level” (Scottish Executive, 1999, n.p.). In addition, though media accounts of culture are 
generally mixed, tangible accounts of culture’s uses have bled into reports of culture as 
                                                           
12
 The following outcomes of cultural activities typically comprise the argument for culture within 
government: confidence, rebranding, long-term revenue, transforming spaces, social support, employment 
and worker flexibility, community expression, personal empowerment, and value for money (Mundy, 
2009, n.p.). See footnote # 9above. 
13 Available: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/ArtsCultureSport/ArtsCulture/CulturalPolicy [Accessed 
5 June 2013]. 
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at the “heart” of “prosperity” (Daily Record, 2008, n.p.), giving a “significant” boost to 
a country’s economy (McDonald, 2011, n.p.), and  “linked to economic productivity 
and the growth of jobs” (Ward, 2002, n.p.). Given the putatively marginal importance of 
cultural ministries and their lack of clear mandate or (cultural) policy problem, these 
discourses provide visible legitimacy, explication, rationales or causal stories for 
cultural policies. 
 
Nevertheless, although these stories seem to be useful, offer persuasive rationales for 
publically funded culture and may appear to address or refer to a policy problem (i.e. 
the economy, or social cohesion), they do not represent a specifically cultural policy 
problem in the same way as other policies (who represent identifiable problems 
suggested by their domain). In addition, by attaching cultural policy objectives to “other 
[non-cultural] policy objectives” (Gray, 2002, p. 88), this practice raises questions as to 
whether these agendas might be better served by other dedicated policy portfolios (e.g. 
economic development or environment) and in relation to the eponymous role of the 
culture ministry. As such, the process of cultural attachment reflects a confusion 
underpinning cultural policies and has led to claims that cultural policy may a “victim of 
its own success” (O’Regan, 2001, p.1). 
 
Equally, while policy arguments for culture are primarily directed at central government 
to assure the status or budget of the culture ministry, these arguments also target 
agencies funded by government (i.e. Arts Councils who are accountable to central 
government), the public (by way of an explanation for cultural policy) and the cultural 
sector seeking funding. These discourses, therefore, can result in implicit pressures on 
cultural agencies and practitioners to either deliver the economic and social benefits 
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referred to in those policies, or to appear to, via arguments made in funding 
applications, reports and evaluations, and thus can generate a cynicism. This dissertation 
will argue that these pressures have implications for the relationships between the 
stakeholders of cultural policy. 
 
1.2.1.2 Culture, use value, rationalism and legitimacy 
Nevertheless, accounts of culture’s uses can also be linked to a number of other factors, 
both historic and contemporary. Historically, culture has always been used strategically 
(and thus politically) by ruling elites, from ancient religious and monarchical 
administrations, to later emerging nation-states (McGuigan, 1996; Yúdice, n.d.). This 
was explicitly demonstrated after the founding of European cultural policies post-World 
War II, in the attempt to rebuild the democratic concept of Europe through the 
ideological
14use of abstract art as a symbolic “bulwark against totalitarian leanings” 
(Rosler, 2010, p. 10) associated with the Cold War (McGuigan, 1996, p. 51). More 
recently, narratives of culture’s usefulness takes place in the context of increasing 
pressures and demands for policy accountability that followed the European recessions 
of the 1970s and 1980s (Bianchini, 1993; Quinn, 1998), as well as a general increase in 
the professionalisation and articulacy of the cultural sector.
15
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 Karl Marx has described ideology as based on the relations of production in society, where the “ideas 
of the ruling class [which] are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material 
force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force” (Marx and Engels, 1970, p. 64). 
Ideologists, therefore, have control over both material and “mental production” (ibid.) and express their 
“dominant idea” as “an ‘eternal law’” (ibid., p. 65). For Antonio Gramsci, ideology was “everything 
which influences or is able to influence public opinion, directly or indirectly” (Gramsci, 1985, p. 389) and 
always concerns the production of relations of domination and subordination. Ideology is strongly 
associated with hegemonies of various kinds and in capitalism, typically denotes liberalism, social 
democracy and neoliberalism. 
15
 Though there are potentially many definitions of the cultural sector, it has been described as a “rich, 
mixed economy, of large [culture-based] organisations with international horizons and commercial aims, 
through to amateur institutions with a more local focus” (Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2010, 
p. 5). 
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The narrative of culture’s use in society, however, takes place in the context of a 
historical continuum of moralising discourses on whether culture is good (“tonic”) or 
bad (“poison”) for us (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 33).16 More specifically, these 
accounts comprise a hierarchical and territorial “struggle” between competing 
discourses (Foucault, 1980, p. 83) that has been taking place since the 17
th
 and 18
th
 
centuries and concerns whether culture should have a use in the first place (Belfiore and 
Bennett, 2006).The essential imperative behind these discourses was the forging of 
hierarchical, economic and social distinctions between different types of cultural 
producers (namely artists and artisans) and was led by both cultural producers (artists) 
seeking increased status and remuneration (Stapleton, 2002, p. 145) and by those 
consuming their products (i.e. critics and the wealthy) (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, pp. 
118 – 120).  
 
The result of these dialectical debates is a binary discourse or dualism
17
 around culture, 
particularly encapsulated in 18
th
 century social and cultural movements. These 
movements have had a lasting effect on the discourses of cultural policy and consist of 
representations of culture as either the soul of the nation (and thus not for sale), 
rejecting the notion of it having any particular function (Arendt, 1961, p. 200; Moylan, 
2010, n.p.), and associated with the moral and aesthetic values of the Romantic 
movement, or a useful and adaptable commodity, concerned with its various uses 
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 Belfiore and Bennett have identified nine historic improving and disimproving instrumental discourses 
in cultural policy (though some can represent both). Disimproving discourses include: corruption, 
distraction and political instrument. Improving discourses include: catharsis, personal well-being, 
education (and self-development), and moral improvement (and civilisation) (Belfiore and Bennett, 
2006).  
17 
Dualism is a theory based on two opposing or distinct concepts or principles which represent a binary 
opposition. It is closely associated with 17
th
 century philosopher René Descartes, whose Cartesian 
Dualism, represented a theory of the mind and body as one entity that is radically divided, such that a 
person is a “thing which thinks” (Descartes, 1960, p. 84) and bodies are “not properly known by the 
senses nor by the faculty of the imagination, but by the understanding alone” (ibid.,, pp. 90 – 91). 
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(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b; Moylan, 2010) associated with the Utilitarian 
tradition.  
 
The central tension or dualism enshrined by historic and contemporary valuations of 
culture in cultural policy discourses, therefore, is the question of how culture should be 
valued. This tension translates as the proposition that culture should be valued and 
therefore funded on its own cultural merits (or intrinsically) and counter propositions 
based around the need for the funding of culture to be based on the usefulness of culture 
(or extrinsically) in relation to its non-cultural merits. This latter proposal, though 
charged in relation to interpretations of non-cultural, is fundamentally based on the view 
that publicly-funded culture should be useful or instrumental to societies in a way that is 
accountable, identifiable and putatively reasonable to the taxpayer. The dichotomy and 
delicate balance of interests within cultural policy, therefore, has serious implications 
for how it generates trust, and can be described as comprising cultural value (Holden, 
2006). The concept of cultural value essentially describes the reconciling of needs 
between “everyone involved” in cultural policy, including the public who pays for it, 
the government who administers it (and seeks quantifiable accountability), and the 
cultural sector, or the stakeholders of cultural policy (ibid., p. 59). The permutations of 
these dichotomies will be further discussed in Chapter Four.
 
 
 
As the citations above have shown, in recent decades, the appeal of use-based or 
utilitarian models of cultural policy (as demonstrated above), where culture is used as an 
“instrument to achieve certain goals” (Vuyk, 2010, p. 178) in typically “non-arts [non 
cultural] areas” (McCarthy, Ondaatje and Zakaras, 2005, p. 3), has become known as 
cultural instrumentalism. Although this term has been critiqued as redundant in policy 
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terms – as it is claimed that all policy seeks an outcome (Gray, 2007, p 205), it remains 
a key concept in European cultural policy analysis and originates from these resistant 
and historical use/non-use discourses, and as such, attempts to describe the values of 
culture. By offering a tangible use or reason for culture, cultural instrumentalism can be 
seen as responding to culture’s apparent uselessness as a policy sector and thus its 
potential policy vacuum. Nevertheless, cultural instrumentalism is also a response to 
wider policy rationalisms, or modes of public policy efficiencies which involve the 
application of reason and technique (such as culture) to address societal problems, 
which, its critics claim (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 397), obfuscates the root cause of 
those problems (such as urban development). Rationalism, therefore, is a key 
component of instrumentalism. 
 
Rationality can be understood as “purposive” actions “directed at realising the goals of 
expressed values” (Parsons, 1995, p. 278), and thus focuses on outcomes rather than 
processes. The concept of rationalism has also been linked to the conflation of public 
and private interests associated with liberal democracies (represented by many EU 
countries), and a view of the market as a self-evident “public [rather than private] good” 
(Held, 2006, p. 76). As a result, rationalism is also associated with utilitarianism and 
capitalism’s attempt to “control ... nature” through “technical rules” (Habermas, 1973, 
p. 9) and has “less to do with the possession of knowledge than with how speaking and 
acting subjects acquire and use knowledge” (ibid., 1984, p. 8). This particular theory of 
rationality is held by philosopher, sociologist and critical theorist Jurgen Habermas, 
whose work essentially concerns the use of reason and what makes laws or governing 
systems legitimate, rather than simply legally or coercively enforced. In Habermas’s 
view, means-end rationalism constitutes a form of “instrumental reason” (ibid, p. 366) 
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and leads to problems of administration and social trust, as well as problems with 
legitimacy (Habermas, 1973, p. 46).  
 
However, Habermas sees reason as double-edged, having the potential to be technical 
(instrumental) and destructive, but also democratic and offering the possibility of 
“reconciliation and freedom” through “communicative action” (ibid., 1987, p. 1). As 
such, in contrast with means-end/instrumental reason, “communicative rationality” is 
geared towards “unconstrained mutual understanding among individuals” (ibid., p. 2) 
and is borne out of socio-cultural systems that enable the necessary “cultural 
reproduction of life” and make claims to “truth” on which healthy societies depend 
(ibid., 1973, p. 5). The positive basis for communicative reason comprises an ideal 
theory of how we should act based on a rational debate designed to generate a “ritually 
secured, basic normative agreement” in society (ibid., 1987, p. 2). The imperatives 
driving both instrumental and communicative reason in general (and in policy) are 
known as the political-economic system or steering media (representing the economy 
and electoral system) and the socio-cultural lifeworld (representing society and culture) 
(ibid., p. 113) and will be further discussed in Chapter Two.  
 
Habermas’s concept of the public sphere (that arises out of civil society)18 is also linked 
to policy and discourse. The public sphere is where communicative action and discourse 
ethics are practiced through the process of deliberative democracy,
19
 and represents the 
                                                           
18
 Though considered “an almost purely Western concept” (Spurk, 2010, p. 8), civil society can be 
described as “a sphere of voluntary action that is distinct from the state, political, private, and economic 
spheres”, despite permeable boundaries (ibid.,, p. 7), giving rise to the public sphere. It is generally 
understood to refer to voluntary associations and normative ideas of the “good society”, as well as 
legitimacy, as much as describing a social process of coming together (ibid., pp 20-21). In cultural policy 
discourse, as Chapter Five will demonstrate, in addition to the public sphere, it is associated with 
democracy and citizenship. 
19 Deliberative democracy is concerned with “enhancing the nature and form of political participation, not 
just increasing it for its own sake” (Held, 2006, p. 232). 
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point at which the “sphere of private people come together as a public” (Habermas, 
1989, p. 27) without the pressures of the state or the economy. While Chapter Two (2.5) 
will outline the idealised and thus contested nature of the public sphere (Fraser, 1990, p. 
58), concepts such as the lifeworld, system and public sphere help to analyse the driving 
forces, competition and impact of cultural policy discourses on legitimacy or trust in the 
state.  
 
As such, Habermas’s concept of legitimacy (Habermas, 1973) has become increasingly 
important in policy studies (Parsons, 1995, pp. 53 – 54) and government stability (Held, 
2006, pp. 191 – 195), and is central to thinking through the function of discourse and 
reason in policy. Of critical importance in considering legitimacy in cultural policy, is 
Habermas’s view that the a priori need for legitimacy (and why crises are endemic to 
modern states) arises out of the dependence of the modern state on the (private) 
economy, which does not necessarily work in the public interest (Habermas, 1973, p. 
13). Further, Habermas views the “goal values” of the state and the economy as 
essentially “irreconcilable” and therefore in need of legitimation to the public (ibid.). To 
Habermas, trust is generated through the lifeworld and activities such as policy-making, 
which symbolically communicates the reason of the state (relationship to the economy 
or to society) to the electorate (Parsons, 1995, p. 178).  
 
This theory of legitimacy suggests that cultural policy both generates trust for 
(legitimates) the state and depends on trust for its own longevity in government. Since 
this theory also depends on reason, cultural policy’s claims for legitimacy are embodied 
in its use of reason or through its various discourses, which (as suggested), are typically 
social, economic, and symbolic. To generate legitimacy, therefore, these discourses 
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must reflect, or appear to reflect the value systems of the electorate. For this reason, 
cultural policy discourses deserve particular attention if cultural policy and the state are 
to be held to account or made “subject to public validation” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 336). 
Consequently, the theory of legitimacy is central to considering what is at stake where 
there are competing claims and reasonings in policy discourses. Equally, given the 
crisis-driven nature of the capitalist state (Habermas, 1973) and the low status of 
cultural policy, legitimacy is a basis on which to evaluate the core goals of all policy 
discourse. However, this competition between claims in policy discourses can lead to 
the domination of socio-cultural or lifeworld values by political-economic or system 
values and can take the form of a colonisation (Habermas, 1987, p. 318).  
 
In light of the close relationship between the state and the market (on whom it depends 
for taxes), and consequently discourses of culture’s usefulness (to the economy and/or 
social cohesion), the importance of rationality, reason, knowledge and cultural 
instrumentalism in policy, can be linked to the prospect of colonisation. This situation 
suggests negative consequences for both cultural policy and the state and will be 
expanded on in Chapter Seven. There are other concepts, however, with which to 
consider discourse and claims to legitimacy, and in particular, the work of philosopher 
Michel Foucault. 
 
Though Foucault’s philosophical position differs to Habermas’s and will be dealt with 
in Chapter Two (2.5), his theory of discourse formation has become central to policy 
analysis. Foucault’s theory of “discourse formation” is essentially concerned with 
identifying the sources and contingencies of political power (and thus legitimacy) in 
discourse (Foucault, 1972, p. 34). Since cultural policy is concerned with legitimacy-
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creation or claims upon the “truth” (Foucault, 1980, p. 93) as much as communicating 
plans for government action (Parsons, 1995, p. 178) or practising the use of reason (as 
above), Foucault’s interest in discourse and the history of ideas helps interpret the 
imperatives, pressures and particularly, dependencies of policy discourse.  
 
Discourse formation theory also helps to consider the use of discourse to assert who has 
the right to speak (Foucault, 1972, p. 55) and thus posits discourse as an inherently 
political and non-consensual activity that is dominating, self-sustaining and legitimates 
power-systems (Foucault, 1980, p. 81). Crucially, however, and in contrast with 
Habermas, Foucault presents discourse as data to be analysed rather than judged and 
“avoid[s]” being involved in arguments about whether discourse is “true”, or even 
whether “statements make sense” (Drefus and Rabinow, 1983, p. xxiv).  
 
In that sense, Foucault’s work offers an “interpretation” of data (ibid., p. xxvi) rather 
than a Habermasian judgment on either the process (of discourse ethics) or the 
implications of different positions. From the point of view of both Foucault and 
Habermas, therefore, policy legitimation is inescapable and domineering (Foucault, 
1972), but necessary (Habermas, 1973) and thus a complex property of discourse. In 
this respect, Foucault’s work is used to identify and interpret the object of the research 
(i.e. discourse), rather than evaluate the impacts of discourse via the balancing of 
political/economic (system) and socio-cultural (lifeworld) mandates, as Chapter Two 
(2.5) will outline. One of the most useful and legitimising cultural strategies and uses of 
reason in public policy over the last four decades, and one that offers both social and 
economic benefits, are paradigms based on culture, urban development and 
regeneration. 
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1.2.2 The creative city: key principles and modes of justification  
Though originating within urban and industrial policies, the last thirty years have seen 
urban development discourses become a central cultural policy narrative, rationality or 
claim in relation to culture’s usefulness and legitimacy within society. Specifically, 
these discourses have highlighted urban development, social and economic regeneration 
and increased private sector investment as linked to cities’ investments into culture. One 
of the most successful of these paradigms is the creative city movement (hereafter 
called the creative city), an international discourse of development and regeneration 
based on research findings from the 1980s (IFACCA, 2006, p. 7; Mulcahy, 2006, p. 
326). Though primarily an urban paradigm, the creative city model of urban 
development operates across local, regional and national levels and has an international 
reach that spans Europe, North America and Asia where it has been benignly interpreted 
by city authorities and municipalities, as well as by cultural policymakers (Røyseng, 
2008, p.  3). 
 
While there is no one model, the creative city is essentially concerned with a theory of 
creativity as “the principal driving force in the growth and development of cities, 
regions and nations” (Florida, 2005, p. 1) on the basis that “place has become the central 
organising unit of our time” (ibid., 2002, p. 6). Through place-development, the core 
aim of the paradigm is to “pursue a collective vision of a better and more prosperous 
future for all” (ibid., p. xxx). By linking the attraction of creative workers (and therefore 
work) and business to the importance and individuality of place and development, using 
creative and cultural (amenities and regeneration) strategies (Landry, 2000; Florida, 
2002), the creative city places culture and individuality of place as pivotal to 
(economically) successful cities.  
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The discourse of the creative city, essentially inverts an “older corporate-centred 
system” focusing on attracting businesses to cities in pursuit of jobs, to a “people-driven 
one” focusing on workers (Florida, 2002, p. 6). Specifically, the creative city proposes 
that by attracting and nurturing flexible, highly skilled and mobile creative workers with 
high levels of human capital,
20
 known as the creative classes (Florida, 2002; 2005), 
which can be done through developing cultural and recreational amenities and an open 
and diverse environment, cities can attract major international companies and 
investment (Landry, 2000, p. 31; Florida, 2005, p. 99). Instead of attracting investment 
as a starting point therefore, creative workers must be attracted (through the right kind 
of cultural amenities), following which investment, community development and 
economic and social regeneration will take place (Comedia, 1991, p. 31; Florida, 2002, 
pp. 281- 282). The creative city, therefore, involves a claim about culture and creativity 
(attracting workers and businesses), and a claim about the economy (the result of 
businesses investing in cities). 
 
As a result of the confluence of cultural and economic imperatives, the paradigm has 
become “entangled” (Oakley, 2009a, p. 1) within a range of dominant and powerful 
political, economic, social, urban and cultural discourses, dominated by capitalism, as 
well as cultural sociology and post-industrial theory
21
 (McGuigan, 2009, p. 292). The 
authority conferred on the creative city through these discourses rests on the bridging of 
hard (and therefore rational or economic), and soft characteristics or the “soft power” 
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Human capital is the “knowledge, attitudes, and skills that are developed and valued primarily for their 
economically productive potential” (Baptiste, 2001, p. 184).   
21 
The term post-industrial has passed into “common currency” (Bell, 1999, p. ix), and was coined by 
Daniel Bell in his seminal publication The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society. It describes the change 
from manufacturing to service industries, the dominance of professional employment, the decline of 
skilled and semi-skilled workers, the rise of meritocracies, the importance of financial and human capital, 
technology and “intellectual technology”, predicated on the “codification of theoretical knowledge and 
the new relation of science to technology” (ibid., p. xiv).  
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associated with culture (Higgins, 2013a, n.p.), legitimating and satisfying various 
constituencies in the process. Of paramount importance in the success of the paradigm 
is the meta or organising principle of capitalism and the market, central to many 
European economic policies. These capitalist/market discourses comprise narratives of: 
post-industrialism and the knowledge economy,
22
 or the “shift in class power from 
owners of capital to possessors of knowledge”  (Garnham, 2001, n.p.); subsets of the 
knowledge economy such as the digital, weightless, new, and in particular, the creative 
economy “drawing together the spheres of innovation [technological creativity], 
business [economic creativity] and culture [artistic and cultural creativity]” (Florida, 
2002, p. 201). Other discourses embedded throughout the creative city have achieved a 
significant degree of currency (and thus power) in contemporary policy, including: 
entrepreneurialism, one of the “fantasies of economic discourse” (Spicer and Jones, 
2005, p. 19); innovation, a “watchword for post-industrial economies” (Cunningham, 
2010, p. 20); and, in particular, the “rising cult” of creativity (Hesmondhalgh, 2007, p. 
558).  
 
In addition to capitalism, these discourses are situated within the master framework of 
neoliberalism, a key concept in contemporary cultural policy scholarship. Neoliberalism 
is defined as a “theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-
being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets and free trade” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). The concept or ideology of neoliberalism 
                                                           
22
 The term knowledge worker was coined by management consultant Peter Drucker in the 1960s 
(Atkinson and Easthope, 2009, p. 66). The knowledge economy describes knowledge-intensive industries 
predicated on the transfer and trade of intangibles such as information and knowledge, and is dependent 
on sophisticated societies (usually bigger cities) with high levels of education or human capital. Creative 
cities are claimed to be “cities of the knowledge economy”. Available: 
http://creativecities.britishcouncil.org/ [Accessed 15 January 2013]. 
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has been linked to a number of phenomena and discourses of the advanced or late 
capitalism
23
 of the West, including: the flexible and transient organisation of 
production, labour and accumulation in capitalist societies (Harvey, 1989); competition; 
low taxation; place-promotion; consumer choice; entrepreneurialism; a casual labour 
market; and, crucially, a self-justifying, legitimising, and self-perpetuating “ethic” 
(Thompson, 2005, p. 23).  
 
As a result of being positioned within this ideological framework, the creative city is as 
critiqued as it is successful, and as such has been described as: a neoliberal model of 
development (Peck, 2005) which uses flawed methodologies (Glaeser, 2005); an urban 
paradigm that reinforces social inequalities by privileging the professional classes 
(Peck, 2005); and that it is more concerned with understanding the “indicative 
conditions favourable to the creation of urban economic growth than it is in providing a 
critical appreciation of them” (Miles and Paddison, 2005, p. 835). In addition, artists are 
divided in their opinion on the creative city, with some viewing it as a supportive and 
benign rationale for culture and creativity (Markusen, 2006, p. 1935), and others 
protesting against its inequitable and private urban development focus, paid for by 
publicly-funded cities (Not In Our Name and the Creative Class Struggle)
24
 as will be 
detailed in Chapter Three (3.11).  
                                                           
23
 Late or advanced capitalism is the subject of much of Habermas’s work and concerns “an organized or 
state-regulated capitalism” attributed to the “advanced stage of the accumulation process” (Habermas, 
1973, p. 33). It involves the “process of economic concentration” or national and multinational 
corporations and the “organization of markets for goods, capital and labor”, the state intervening in the 
market as “functional gaps develop” and the “partial replacement of the market mechanism by state 
intervention” (ibid.). 
24
 The Hamburg-based artists group, Not in Our Name, aimed to counteract gentrification and other 
creative class policies in Hamburg. Available:  nionhh.wordpress.com/about [Accessed 1 March 2013] 
and http://www.signandsight.com/features/1961.html [Accessed 21 November 2012]. Similarly, the 
Toronto-based group, Creative Class Struggle,
 
describe themselves as a “collective who are organizing a 
campaign challenging the presence of Richard Florida and the Martin Prosperity Institute at the 
University of Toronto, as well as the wider policies and practices they represent.” Available: 
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The question of the beneficiaries and imperatives of tax-sponsored urban development 
initiatives (like the creative city) is another key source of unease (Harvey, 1989; Rosler, 
2011a). Specifically, over the last thirty years in Europe, the close relationship between 
democratic municipalities (or the state), the private sector and large-scale urban 
development and investment, has largely been fostered by liberal democratic (and 
neoliberal) regimes of public/private partnerships. Given the careful balancing of 
private with public interests as a founding principle of policy (Parsons, 1995, p. 8 - 12) 
and a core characteristic (if often unrealised) of democracy (Held, 2006, p. 275), the 
prevalent role and contingency of the creative city on the private sector, is a major 
source of criticism. Links between cultural policies and urban development narratives, 
therefore, have implications beyond artists and culture, potentially highlighting 
underlying issues within the state and models of democracy. These issues will be further 
discussed in Chapters Three and, in relation to their implications, Chapter Seven. 
 
Nevertheless, after three decades, the paradigm of the creative city remains a hugely 
successful and influential discourse of urban development that is “deeply embedded” 
(Atkinson and Easthope, 2009, p. 75) and has had a “significant” impact on 
policymakers (Miles and Paddison, 2005, p. 835). In its bridging of different concerns, 
the paradigm can be viewed as operating between industrial policy, and, through its 
positioning of culture and creativity, implicit cultural policy (e.g. cultural planning),
25
 
with whom, it has been claimed, it shares “much the same logic” (Dowler, 2004, p. 26). 
Similarities between the strategic nature of the creative city paradigm and of cultural 
policy have also been highlighted in claims of confusion between cultural and creative 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://creativeclassstruggle.wordpress.com [Accessed 25 January 2010]. See also Chapter 5 (section 5.4) 
for reference to a similar Finnish group. 
25 Cultural planning has been defined as “the strategic use of cultural resources for the integrated 
development of cities, regions and countries” (DMU, cited in Evans, 2001, p. 7). 
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city strategies (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009, p. 68). As a result, notwithstanding 
opposition from certain artists’ groups (cited above), the creative city has been 
welcomed by many cultural practitioners “because they feel it makes them visible” 
(Lloyd, cited in Oakley, 2009a, p. 4) by appearing to place culture at the heart of 
influential debates about society and development. 
 
The creative city, therefore, can be viewed as a significant source of reason and 
legitimation in cultural discourses, increasing the profile of culture, and suggesting 
tangible economic outputs and outcomes, indicative of democratic, accountable and 
efficient public returns. Similarly, the creative city provides a counterpoint to 
potentially obscure debates about culture’s innate or intrinsic values (via discourses of 
the arts) and thus rebuffs potential accusations of elitism. Further, the creative city fits 
the meta economic rationale of democratic capitalism and the market-justifying ethic of 
liberal democracies, giving it political legitimation and making it a persuasive cultural 
story that addresses a policy sector which does not meet an identifiable or visible public 
need. For that reason, although primarily situated within urban policy, the creative city 
appears to embody a constructive and useful rationale for not only local or urban 
cultural policies, but national cultural policies in general. 
 
1.3 Rationale for thesis 
Considering the similarities (claims to truth and strategic uses for culture), shared 
contingencies (the economy and state) and thus the legitimating role for the creative city 
within cultural policy, there has been little attempt to comprehensively analyse the two 
concepts in respect of each other to date. This neglect is surprising given the potential 
for rich exploration that the creative city affords cultural policy in relation to the role of 
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narrative, strategy, advocacy and obfuscation in policy discourses, and the tension 
between legitimacy and discourses of culture and utility. Although there has been a 
broad (and short) critique of the creative city in respect of cultural policy (McGuigan, 
2009), creativity, the creative economy (Oakley, 2004; O’Connor, 2007; Holden, 2007; 
Cooke and Lazeretti, 2008; Oakley, 2009a; Creative Metropoles, 2010; etc.), culture-led 
regeneration, cultural policy and economics (Rosler, 2010; 2011a; 2011b), various 
accounts of the creative city in respect of culture (Hesmondhalgh, 2007; Oudenampsen, 
2008; McGuigan, 2009; Oakley, 2009a; Vickery, 2011) and from a social 
science/geography perspective,
26
 there is a dearth of research that focuses in detail on 
the wider implications of the creative city for cultural policy specifically.  
 
More specifically, interpreting the literatures, conceptual dependencies, trajectories and 
rationales of both cultural policy and the creative city, through discourse,  can shed light 
on key questions for cultural policy, including: difficulties with establishing its meta 
rationale; the pressures on cultural policy in relation to the arguments and cases it makes 
for culture; the dualism or contested nature of culture; and the role and potential of 
utilitarian and private sector discourses to boost or legitimate cultural policy, as well as 
to potentially undermine it and the state. In short, the stakes at play in this research 
comprise: clarity over the role of cultural policy and the status of culture ministries, the 
relationship between cultural policy stakeholders who generate and are impacted by 
discourses, the impact of value systems embedded in certain models of culture (as 
proposed through discourse) and the balance of public/private interests in liberal 
democratic states.  
 
                                                           
26 Some of the most influential social sciences texts are generated by British geographer Jamie Peck. See 
Peck (2007; 2005; 2009; Peck, and Tickell, 2002). 
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Equally, though the consideration of discourse as a methodology in public policy is an 
established influence on the policy sciences (Parsons, 1995, p. 151), and a scholarly 
area of interest in public policy generally (Shapiro, 1990; Cataldi, 2004; Jones, 2009), 
the use of discourse as a tool to create understanding around cultural policy in 
particular, is an emerging field of endeavour (Barbieri, 2012). The creative city and 
discourse theories, therefore, respectively offer a useful perspective from which to 
analyse cultural policy and contribute to a growing area of cultural policy enquiry. 
Having outlined the conceptual relationship between cultural policy and the creative 
city and what might be gained from exploring both in relation to the other in terms of 
discourse, it remains necessary to outline the core contributions of this thesis to cultural 
policy studies. 
 
1.4 Contributions of this thesis to the field of study 
This dissertation aims to create  knowledge in cultural policy by creating new 
understandings of an under-theorised relationship between it and the creative city 
paradigm, using an emerging method of investigation in cultural policy, specifically that 
of discourse theory. In order to do this, the research will apply these under-used 
(Foucauldian) methods with new (Peter Sloterdijk’s concept of cynical reason) and 
established (Habermasian) concepts, which will allow for an original comparison and 
analysis of cultural policy and the creative city. The research will move beyond a broad 
analysis of key culture and cultural policy histories as outlined in this introduction, 
drawing on discourse as a shared source of meaning-production and legitimacy-creation 
within the two paradigms.  
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Specifically, this research will use the creative city paradigm to build an argument that 
there is a relative lack of clarity around cultural policy as an area of public policy 
despite a plethora of stories of culture’s uses; that instrumental discourses such as the 
creative city seem to reflect the pragmatic and often involuntary nature of policy 
making and may impact on cultural policy stakeholder relationships; that 
instrumentalism is endemic to cultural policy and can reveal its deficits; and that the 
consequences of instrumentalism may be problematic, not only for cultural policy, but 
also the state. In order to analyse these paradigms and what they can reveal about 
policy, the state and the market, therefore, the thesis will first draw on Foucault’s 
discourse formation theory (Foucault, 1972) and then call on discrete applications of 
Habermas’s concepts of lifeworld, system, colonisation and legitimacy (Habermas, 
1973, 1984, 1987) and Sloterdijk’s theory of cynical reason (1987). 
 
1.5 Summary of chapters 
Following this introduction, Chapter Two will consider the methodological framework 
used to approach the research question, and outline why the research is located within 
cultural policy studies, and is conducted using key concepts and methods from Foucault 
(establishing the object of investigation: discourse) and Habermas (analysing the impact 
of the investigation). This chapter will also detail the selection of text-based national 
cultural policies in Scotland, Finland and Ireland as situated cases, as well as looking at 
reflexive issues bearing on the research. Chapter Three offers a more detailed overview 
of the creative city paradigm, including its models, perceptions, applications, authors, 
key concepts and discursive histories. This chapter also outlines the emergence of the 
creative city as a major urban development discourse of the 21
st
 century, its flexibility 
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of interpretation, and the particular role of persuasion within it, including the implicit 
and explicit presence of the private sector.  
 
Chapter Four locates the research in the context of the key literatures and discourses of 
culture, creativity and cultural policy, looking at contested concepts, value-systems, 
rationalisms, histories, definitions, applications (including policy studies and 
governance) and critically, their intersections and links. This chapter will take a detailed 
look at how the contested and complex nature of culture creates difficulties for cultural 
policies and their definitions, and leads to instrumentalism and legitimation narratives, 
which manifest in multiple cultural rationales. Following this, the chapter will also 
outline the relatively recent economic discourse of creativity, posited as part of the 
discursive success of the creative city, and which, it is claimed, acts as a bridging 
discourse between the economic and industrial creative city and the putatively cultural 
concerns of cultural policy. The chapter will conclude with a detailed overview of 
policy in general and cultural policy in particular. 
 
Chapter Five describes the national cultural policies of Scotland, Finland and Ireland 
through the policy frame of the creative city, in order to ground the research in specific 
contexts and locations. Specifically, this Chapter involves an overview of urban 
development and marketing initiatives in Scotland, showing how creative city discourse 
occurs there as part of wider creative economy and nationalist legitimising 
(championing uniqueness) discourses, focusing on place-development, success, 
triumphalism and competition. Similarly, the creative city concept in Finland is posited 
as supporting Finland’s need to bridge its social democratic legacies with its newer 
industrial and neoliberal policies, focusing on internationalism, cosmopolitanism, 
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diversity, tolerance, talent and the creative industries. The chapter concludes by 
demonstrating that Ireland, despite geo-political similarities to Scotland and Finland, 
does not show the same level of creative city discursive transfer, though it does position 
culture as a competitive branding and re-branding tool for the country.  
 
Chapter Six analyses the discourses of the three cases with reference to discourse 
formation theory, looking at how and why this transfer has occurred. This chapter 
specifically constructs a series of conclusions about the trajectory of the discourse 
transfer that has occurred between the creative city and cultural policy and offers 
suggestions as to the sustainability of the creative city within cultural policy, touching 
on the role of cynicism in policy relationships. Following this, the chapter considers 
why the creative city has become embedded within the particular context of the three 
cases and more generally within cultural policy. This chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the role and appeal of an instrumental discourse such as the creative city 
in respect of policymakers more widely. 
 
Chapter Seven addresses the impact and implications of the creative city for cultural 
policy and what it reveals about the state, using Habermas’s concepts of lifeworld, 
system, colonisation and legitimacy. Specifically, this chapter reveals the state of 
contemporary cultural policies by considering the longer-term issues of instrumentalism 
in the context of problematics and tensions already within cultural policy, and, in 
particular, a lack of clarity over what it is designed to achieve. This leads to a discussion 
of the potential for cultural policy to be perpetually dominated or colonised by 
instrumental discourses, implications for legitimacy and the various ironies and 
paradoxes this represents. The chapter further shows how colonisation embodies and 
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underlines key criticisms of liberal democratic policies, as well as core democratic 
principles. The research reaches its conclusion in Chapter Eight, with a summary of the 
main outcomes, reiterating the contributions to knowledge, and including a 
consideration of future directions arising from the research. The dissertation finishes 
with a short reflection on the research experience and points to remaining questions 
suggested by the dissertation.  
 
1.6 Conclusions 
This introduction has identified difficulties and pressures within, as well as various uses 
for cultural policy resulting from the complex and political nature of culture. As a result 
of these difficulties (within cultural policy and in respect of culture), this chapter has 
posited that there are problems identifying the purpose of cultural policy, and thus that 
there is an enduring role for advocacy, persuasion and narrative within it, raising the 
prospect of issues around trust in relation to argumentation and advocacy amongst its 
key stakeholders. This chapter has also established the imperatives and contingencies of 
legitimising discourses in cultural policy such as the urban policy paradigm of the 
creative city, which can operate as an identifiable rationale and strategy for cultural 
investment. Finally, the case was made that research needs to look more closely at 
cultural policy discourses, rationales and instrumentalism in general, in order to 
understand the function of culture within the state, but also the nature of wider state 
activity. In order to consider the relationship between the creative city paradigm as a 
justification and legitimation of investment in culture and cultural policy, the next 
chapter will consider how this question will be interpreted, approached and designed, 
the theoretical framework drawn upon to deepen the analysis of the thesis, and in 
particular, the basis for claims to knowledge about this issue. 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter One has outlined that this research concerns an analysis of the relationship 
between the general field of explicit cultural policy and the specific mode of urban 
development known as the creative city, through a comparative study of national policy 
texts and environments. It has proposed that an investigation of the discourses of 
cultural policy, via the discourses of the creative city, can help investigate the 
operations, political imperatives, pressures and constituencies of cultural policy and the 
state itself. In order to consider this relationship, the research proposes to look at the 
historical and familial links between cultural policy and the creative city in general, 
followed by an analysis of situated cultural policies in particular, and finish with an 
investigation of what this means for cultural policy and the state.  
 
To contextualise the research question, the thesis has posited a reflexive relationship 
between the richness and malleability of culture, historic ruling-class uses for culture 
(and latterly explicit cultural ‘policies’), and confusion over the greater purpose or a 
priori aims of cultural policy as an arm of government. The stakes at play in this 
investigation, therefore, rest on: the pressures at work in determining and clarifying or 
obfuscating what cultural policy is for (the transparency of cultural policy); the impact 
of these pressures on the legitimacy, possibilities and status of cultural policy and its 
ministries; the effect of this on the communication and transparency of relationships 
between stakeholders of cultural policy; the impact of this on the diversity of cultural 
forms supported by the state (in particular the support of experimental cultural forms), 
and the stability, legitimacy and transparency of the state itself. 
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Having established the context and stakes in relation to the research question, this 
chapter will address the research’s methodological foundation, ontological approach and 
epistemology. In order to do this, the chapter will outline the main method of enquiry, 
the academic context in which the research is conducted and specifically, the approach 
to establishing the object (via Foucault’s discourse theories), analysis and implications 
(via Habermasian concepts) of the enquiry. In doing this, the chapter will describe and 
evaluate the broader conceptual framework of the research, outlining the discrete uses 
of Foucault and Habermas in the research and the rationale for that use. The chapter will 
conclude by detailing the research design and reasons behind selecting the cultural 
policies of Scotland, Finland and Ireland and address key issues of reflexivity in the 
research. 
 
2.2 Qualitative approach and interpretivism 
The ontological approach of this dissertation, concerning the a priori research 
assumptions around the “nature [and constitution] of the social world” (Seale, 2004, p. 
294), or “what can be said to exist” (ibid., p. 508), is determined by its emphasis on the 
interpretation and construction of cultural policy texts and discourses rather than the 
building of empirical and measurable evidence or facts. The decision to analyse cultural 
policy words and actions in this work, therefore, disavows a positivist, “scientific” and 
testable objective reality with measurable properties (ibid, p. 80) “which we can know” 
and are “free of value” (Parsons, 1995, p. 71). As a result, the epistemology of the 
research is based on a qualitative approach which aims to reveal insights on “culture, 
society and behaviour” (Hogan and Doyle, 2009, p. 3), helping to consider how cultural 
policy discourses “came to take the form they ultimately did” given that they could 
always be otherwise (ibid.). The research, therefore, takes a “multifaceted” approach 
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(ibid.), drawing on the policy sciences, economic theory, cultural studies and 
philosophy, lending itself to “thick” or rich description and analysis (Geertz, 1973, cited 
in Flick, 2002, p. 18). Within this approach, an “interpretivist” method is used, 
concerned with notions of reality or truths as socially (and never neutrally) constructed 
through language and shared meanings (Seale, 2004, p. 75), as will be evident in 
references throughout the policy texts consulted. The research, therefore, fundamentally 
aims to promote “insight, understanding or dialogue” (Seale, 2004, p. 72) in relation to 
cultural policy, by generating “theoretical” as opposed to “empirical” knowledges (ibid., 
p. 76).  
 
2.3 Locating the research: cultural studies and cultural policy studies 
Given the interdisciplinary questions of culture, governance (and power), legitimacy, 
and urban development in determining the relationship between cultural policy and the 
creative city, the dissertation is situated within cultural studies. Cultural studies is 
concerned with the “production, circulation, deployment” and “effects” of cultural 
forms and activities (Bennett, 1998, p. 60) and has claimed for itself a key emancipatory 
role in academia (McGuigan, 2004, p. 7) in terms of its commitment to “social change” 
(Threadgold, 2003, n.p.).  The key premise of cultural studies and one that is central to 
policy texts, is that “realities and subjectivities” as well as “power relations” are 
constructed and contested in and through language, the social and culture and that this 
activity is characterised by narrativity and thus could always be constructed differently 
(ibid.). Within the relatively new discipline of cultural studies (Hall, 1980, p. 58), this 
research is further specified as sitting within the newer interdisciplinary sub-domain of 
cultural policy studies (Belfiore, 2008, p. 24).  
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The critical intellectual study of cultural policy as an academic domain, or cultural 
policy studies, is an equally eclectic discipline to cultural studies (Gray, 2003, p. 1) and 
is “characterised by a diversity of subjects and research methods”27 which are chiefly 
framed by the humanities and social sciences. Specifically, cultural policy studies aims 
to investigate the “underlying theoretical assumptions and ideologies behind cultural 
policy and management”, eschewing predominantly descriptive, empirical, evidence-
based or instrumental approaches (ibid.) Like cultural studies, however, in spite of 
significant work undertaken over the last thirty years,
28
 cultural policy studies remains 
an under-established object of academia (Belfiore, 2008), a factor also indicated by its 
omission from general policy handbooks consulted throughout this research (e.g. 
Burstein, 1991; Parsons, 1995; Compston, 2004; Dye, 2008).  
 
A key tension in the study of cultural policy, and thus cultural policy studies, is how 
cultural policy is constituted as both an academic area of enquiry and as a professional 
and applied government sector. This gives it an “incorrigibly plural” (Gray, 2010a, p. 
226) number of analytical approaches, imperatives and disciplinary identities, which 
includes: those who research and critique it (scholars); those who explicitly plan, 
implement and evaluate it (policymakers and politicians under the rubric of the state); 
those who implicitly make it (expert cultural agencies and other government 
                                                           
27
 See The Centre for Cultural Policy Studies at Warwick University. Available:  
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/theatre_s/cp/study/phd/ [Accessed 3 October 2012]. 
28
 See Wiesand (2002) for a discussion on UNESCO’s role in commissioning cultural policy research 
from the 1970s. See also the International Conference on Cultural Policy Research (ICCPR), the 
International Journal of Cultural Policy, available: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/10286632.asp 
[Accessed 14 September 2011], Cultural Trends, available:  
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/ccut20/current#.UlqGFlBJOSo [Accessed 11 October 2013], both 
published by Routledge and think tanks such as the European Institute for Comparative Cultural 
Research/ EricARTS. Available:www.ericarts.org/ [Accessed 9 September 2013] and the European 
Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies/ EIPCP. Available:www.eipcp.net [Accessed 9 September 
2013], amongst others. 
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departments); those who shape it and are directly impacted by it (cultural practitioners), 
and critically, those in whose name it is made (the public).  
 
This tension is underlined by criticisms of cultural policy studies as “compromised” by 
its proximity to the action of government and ungrounded in both history and theory 
(Miller and Yúdice, 2002, p. 29). Academic legitimacy within (cultural) policy studies, 
therefore, is prone to ideological contest and “normative” views of the degree to which 
academics should be involved in such work (Schlesinger, 2009a, p. 9). “Disinterest”, or 
“whether or not benefits [typically financial] are sought from advice [or research]” ... or 
are a “prime motivating force”, in this case, choosing to conduct research (ibid.), is 
central to the debate over academic objectivity or independence.  In contrast to artistic 
disinterest, concerned with apparently politically and commercially independent culture 
associated with contemplating art “for its own sake” (Woodmansee, 1984, p. 46), 
disinterest does not suggest a lack of interest, but rather a critical distance from state 
imperatives. 
 
This desire for objectivity is particularly resonant in the increasingly “competitive” and 
“complex” shaping of policy (Schlesinger, 2009a, p. 8), leading to assertions that the 
“single most crucial quality that any critical cultural policy researcher ought to possess 
is ‘a built-in, shock-proof crap detector’” (Ernest Hemingway paraphrased in Belfiore, 
2008, p. 1). The concept of disinterest is also deployed to distance cultural policy 
studies from cultural policy research, an approach to cultural policy analysis that is 
viewed as less critically independent, more indebted to the social sciences, more 
concerned with “evidence” (Scullion and García, 2005, p. 120), and thus more closely 
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tied to government agendas (ibid., pp. 122-125).
29
 However, while a disinterested 
approach is the academic ideal, it can lead to the “crowding out” and down-grading of 
academics by non-academics perceived as working on more pertinent, policy-focused or 
“interested” government research (Schlesinger, 2009a, p. 9), a critical issue in a 
“climate where policy influence is considered a relevant, or even a privileged, criterion 
for the allocation of research funds” (Belfiore, 2008, p. 25).  
 
In addition, the difficulty with disinterestedness in terms of perceptions of research that 
is relevant, together with the poor status and funding of cultural policies, is that there is 
a problem with the concept of independence or objectivity in general, even within 
academia. This problem involves the tension between advocacy (which cannot claim to 
be neutral) and research (Selwood, 2002, n.p.) which originates from those seeking and 
dependent on funding from (interested) central culture ministries. Policy-based evidence 
(or research), which is concerned with shoe-horning evidence to existing policies, is 
perceived and decried in academic cultural policy circles as the opposite of disinterested 
research, and is often indistinguishable from advocacy (in terms of advocating for 
something). This approach to policy is supported by claims that “cultural statistics 
largely follow the sphere and focus of operations [as well as finances] of cultural 
policy” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009a, p. 9) and that “evidence was [is] far 
more likely to be used if it fitted [fits] with the story that was [is] already being told” 
(Stevens, 2011a, n.p.).  
 
In contrast, evidence-based policy is typically posited as the ideal with a stronger claim 
to independence or disinterestedness, through its putative adherence to objectivity. 
                                                           
29
 A cultural policy research approach is consistent with much of the policy work done in Europe 
(European Commission, 2006a, 2009; Arts Council of Ireland, 2009; Scottish Executive, 2004b; Ministry 
of Education, 2009c).   
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However, evidence-based policy is also problematic and ideological on the basis that 
someone, limited by their own perspective and context, considers particular areas 
worthy of research or funding and not others. Further, the volume and type of data 
produced as evidence has been viewed as unwieldy and “unsuitable for answering 
policy questions” (Stevens, 2011a, n.p.). Evidence-based research, therefore, is both 
suggestive of empirical and scientific measurement, has difficulty with intrinsic (and 
intangible benefit) cultural discourses and is difficult for policymakers to use.  As such, 
the key issue for this dissertation (situated within cultural policy studies), is to be 
critical and relevant to “current policy and management practice, but to remain detached 
from institutional imperatives”,30 characterised as balancing “dissidence” with 
institutional “dialogue” (Sterne, 2002, p. 72). These issues also illustrate the apparent 
lack of academic legitimacy attached to cultural policy studies and the contested and 
case-making or legitimating nature of cultural research, arising out of the complexities, 
dependencies and proximity of culture to government (funding). 
  
2.4 Establishing the object of enquiry: discourse approaches 
Having established the approach and domain of the research, it is necessary to outline 
the object of the enquiry, as determined by the work of Michel Foucault. As Chapter 
One has indicated, though discourse is an important aspect of policy analysis, and 
though there are exceptions (Barbieri, 2012), discourse formation theory is a relatively 
under-developed method of investigating cultural policy in particular. This is despite the 
necessarily political (justifying, persuading, shaping), strategic and contingent character 
of cultural policy discourses (as posited in Chapter One), and the potential of 
                                                           
30
 See The Centre for Cultural Policy Studies at Warwick University [online]. Available: 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/theatre_s/cp/study/phd/ [Accessed 3 October 2012]. 
 
 43 
“discursive formation” theory (Foucault, 1972, p. 34) to add to deeper understandings of 
the politics of culture.  
 
This theory of discourse draws on Foucault’s interest in the history of ideas, or the 
“history of the order imposed on things” (Foucault, 2002, p xxvi), specifically, how 
knowledge (through discourse) comes to be formed and accepted, and how “new 
propositions were [are] produced, new facts isolated, or new concepts built up” (ibid., p. 
xiii). The aim of Foucault’s broad approach is to expose the “fundamental codes of a 
culture”... “the hierarchy of its practices” and explore “on what basis knowledge and 
theory became possible” (ibid., p xxii) in the first instance. Foucault, therefore, is 
interested in revealing what he calls the “positive unconscious of knowledge” that 
would otherwise “elude” consciousness (ibid., p. xi) and in creating understanding about 
the “rules” for making discourses appear “coherent and true in general” (ibid., p. iv). In 
respect of this research, this refers to the emergence of certain policy discourses (i.e. 
economic) over others (social or cultural). 
 
This theory of discourse is separate to but builds on older forms of linguistic analysis 
such as structuralism and post-structuralism, concerned with the “role of language in 
shaping social life” (Filmer et al, 2004, p. 41). Post-structuralism, with which Foucault 
has sometimes been associated,  is specifically interested in the formation of identity 
and realities through language, but stresses the basis for this as understanding life “not 
as something composed of identities, objects and subjects, but of difference, complex 
relations, and instability” (ibid., p. 42). However, Foucault disavows that his work is 
structuralist or post-structuralist (Drefus and Rabinow, 1983, p. xxiv) and wrote of 
wishing to “free” himself from what he felt was an “inaccurate” label (Foucault, 2002, 
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p. xv). This disassociation from structuralism arises out of the sealed or internal nature 
of its form of analysis, in contrast with the wider discursive connections made through 
Foucault’s discourse formation theory, which are never “exclusively linguistic” (Filmer 
et al., 2004, p. 41). Unlike post-structuralism, therefore, discourse formation is more 
concerned with the institutions, regulations and relations around discourse formations 
as much as the discourse itself (ibid., p. 41).  
 
2.4.1 Discourse formation theory 
Drawing on Foucault’s general theory of knowledge, discourse formation theory 
specifically concerns “statements” (Foucault, 1972, p. 35) or “great uninterrupted 
text[s]” (ibid., p. 41) which establish the “right” to “claim a field” of knowledge (ibid., 
p. 29) and comprise and operate from an “enunciative” power (ibid., p. 55). Foucault’s 
view is that words and ideas are caught up in a “system of references to other books, 
other texts, other sentences” (ibid., p. 25) and the a priori , assumed or “already-said” 
(ibid., p. 27). Discursive statements, therefore, operate through and depend on an 
“interplay of relations within it and outside it” (ibid., p. 32), though these knowledges 
may be “different in form, and dispersed in time” (ibid., p.35). In this way, discourse 
formation theory questions the discourse’s “mode of existence, [and] what it means to 
them to have come into existence” (ibid., p. 123). 
 
The term “dispersion” is used to describe the trajectory of statements within discourse 
(ibid., p. 41) and is especially important for cultural policy in terms of the series of 
“uninterrupted” (ibid., p. 41) statements that it hosts (i.e. social cohesion, well-being, 
the economy) on behalf of broader government policies. The “field of concomitance” is 
another term within discourse formation and refers to the range of domains or “wider 
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fields” surrounding its systems of knowledge (ibid., p. 64). Equally, the concept of 
resistance, or “rupture” in discourse formation, which can be seen in conflicting and 
dichotomous policy discourses, helps to clarify the meaning of the “interstices” between 
sentences and demonstrates the transformation between one discourse and another 
(ibid., p. 36), on the basis that all discourses are always in competition with others. 
 
As such, Foucault’s work centres on the correlative or reflexive construction of 
knowledge in discourse, given that knowledge cannot exist without discursive practice 
and that “discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 201). Using discourse formation theory, policy can be viewed as a linguistic 
form of discrete knowledge, whereby “things said say more than themselves” (ibid., p. 
123) and meaning and power exist in the “relations between statements” (ibid., p. 34) 
and thus beyond the statements themselves. In considering cultural policy and the 
creative city through the framework of discourse formation theory, therefore, it can be 
inferred that the core discourses of culture, creativity and the economy depend for their 
authority and existence (and thus legitimacy) on a range of framing or meta discourses, 
which, it will be demonstrated, depend heavily on utilitarianism, romanticism, 
neoliberalism and capitalism. This network of relationships can be viewed as 
strengthening the discourse formation or authority of both cultural policy and the 
creative city, lending them a universal and assumed character, which comes to resemble 
“monuments” (ibid., p. 8).  
 
These processes can be described in terms of “archaeology”, the “archive” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 148) and “genealogy” (ibid., 1980, p. 83). Archaeology as a linguistic practice 
concerns an “abandonment of the history of ideas” and an “attempt to create a quite 
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different history of what men have said” (Foucault, 1972, p 154), rather than why and 
how they have said it. The process of archaeology, therefore, views “discourses as 
practices specified in the element of the archive” (ibid., p. 148) and speaks of 
“monuments” (ibid., p. 155) in reference to the process of sifting through the archive to 
reveal the gathering of discourse formations and knowledges over time. Archaeology is 
therefore not “interpretative” (ibid.), but is a “rewriting” of what has already been 
written (ibid., p 156) and therefore represents a general “methodology” (ibid., 1980, p. 
85) and procedure for working through discourses, artefacts and data.  
 
In contrast, Foucault’s later concept of “genealogy” (ibid., p. 83), represents the specific 
“tactics” (ibid., p.85) used within the methodology to comparatively understand the 
relation between discourses over time and how and why they are the way they are. This 
is done by “emancipate[ing] historical knowledges” from “subjection” to the 
“hierarchical order of power” (ibid., p. 85), leading to a better understanding of 
knowledge, truth and power. Genealogy, therefore, describes the “origins of a theory 
and a knowledge” (ibid., p. 78) and helps account for the “struggles” within discourses 
(or ruptures) and the processes of dispersion and union between “erudite knowledge and 
local memories” (ibid., p. 83).  
 
However, subsequent discourse theorists have argued that the “causal power” attributed 
to Foucault’s archaeological method is “unintelligible” in terms of understanding the 
influence of the social institutions central to Foucault’s’ theory (Drefus and Rabinow, 
1983, p. xxiv), and that it “did not allow Foucault to pursue the range of problems and 
concerns which informed his work” (ibid., p. xxv). For this reason, genealogy is viewed 
as an improvement of Foucault’s theory and allows discourse to “thematize the 
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relationship between truth, theory, and values and the social institutions and practices in 
which they emerge” (ibid., p. xxv). As such, a broad archaeological approach is taken in 
this research, but it is Foucault’s genealogy in particular, that provides a way to think 
through the discourses of cultural policy and the creative city, as Chapter Four will 
demonstrate.  
 
In summation, by seeking to address the relationship between cultural policy, as a meta 
body of meaning or discourse, and the creative city, discourse formation theory 
addresses their wider ecologies, conceptual dependencies, political imperatives and 
contexts, along with their governmentalities, or rational uses of knowledge and power in 
shaping behaviours (Foucault, 1994, pp. 201-207). Essentially, therefore, discourse 
formation theory helps consider “how is it that one particular statement appeared in a 
discourse rather than another?” (Foucault, 1972, p. 30), the origin of the “silent births” 
in discourse and why a particular theme might “emigrate” from one discipline to 
another (ibid., p. 154). In addition, discourse formation theory helps analyse the impact 
of discourse on “idea formation and, ultimately, on policy formulation” (Cataldi, 2004, 
p. 67). 
 
2.4.2 Power and discourse 
Though the role of knowledge in discourse formation and competing claims for 
dominance and justification are key to establishing power, Foucault is interested in 
understanding power, rather than transforming it (Kelly, 1994, p. 373). This is because 
Foucault views power as a “relation of force”, which is contingent, reflexive, “neither 
given, nor exchanged” and “only exists in action” (Foucault, 1980, p. 89). For Foucault, 
therefore, power has productive as well as oppressive potential (in being able to move 
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from one group to another) and works from the bottom up (Kelly, 1994, p. 374). This 
view of discourse/power as neither destructive nor constructive, opens up the space to 
consider cultural policy discourse as harbouring both the potential to do good, and to 
sustain or legitimate systems of power. There are other aspects of power, however, 
which Foucault brings to light and which help theorise both cultural policy and the 
creative city. 
 
These exercises comprise “sovereign” or juridical power (based on an ancient form of 
power) and “non-sovereign” or disciplinary power, which assures and secures the 
“cohesion” of the sovereign or the juridical (Foucault, 1980, p. 106). Disciplinary power 
is both coercive and discipline-forming (ibid., p. 105), takes many forms, is a central 
feature of legitimating systems such as public policy, and as above, works from the 
bottom up (Kelly, 1994, p. 374). Cultural policy, conceived as the “management of 
populations through suggested behaviour” (Miller and Yúdice, 2002, p. 14), is typically 
understood as a disciplinary power by representing a “collective public subjectivity” 
(ibid., p. 15). This refers to the incremental shaping of cultural attitudes, opinions and 
practices through various implicit and explicit government policies and underlines one 
of the key powers of policy in general and the creative city paradigm in particular and 
will be expanded on in Chapter Four (4.4.7). 
 
 However, though cultural policy and the creative city are disciplinary powers, they also 
constitute juridical powers in terms of their legal and administrative positions within 
government, which will be further explored in Chapters Five and Six. As a result, given 
the correlative relationship between knowledge and power in discourse, both cultural 
policy and the creative city can be viewed as an “instrument[s]” and “effect[s]” of 
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power (Richardson, 1996, n.p.), without which the “production, accumulation, 
circulation and functioning” of “relations of power” or legitimacy-creation in societies 
could not arise, survive or sustain themselves (Foucault, 1980, p. 93).  
 
The knowledges leveraged by cultural policy and the creative city (post-industrialism, 
entrepreneurialism, neoliberalism etc.) can also be viewed as “regimes of thought” 
(ibid., p. 81) and deliberately “positioned truths” (Gray, 2003, p. 183) which confer 
legitimation on the paradigms. The problem with regimes which are ideological and 
situated, is that they fossilise and come to “stand for and function as the truth” 
(Schirato, Danaher and Webb, 2012, p. 17), and as before, become universal 
“monuments” (Foucault, 1972, p. 8) resistant to change. This resistance leads to “rules 
of right” which legitimate sovereignty and the consent of people to be governed 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 93). In Foucault’s view, this results in a highly effective and 
impervious triangle of power, right and truth (Foucault, 1980, p. 93) whose main 
interest is legitimacy and hegemony.  
 
In addition to the influence of Foucault on policy analysis (Parsons, 1995, p. 178), other 
discourse theorists have developed Foucault’s work and include Paul Rabinow (Drefus 
and Rabinow, 1983) and Michael Shapiro (Shapiro, 1990), as referred to in this chapter 
and Chapter One. Shapiro has been particularly astute in relation to articulating the 
management and purpose of conflicting discourses, which he describes as “strategic 
containment” (Shapiro, 1990, p.332), concerned with controlling and thus managing 
“anomalies and contradictions” within ideologies (ibid., p. 333). Shapiro also stresses 
the ontological position of Foucault in opening up space “for the political analysis of 
statements” and providing a “strategic view of discourse within a metaphor of political 
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economy rather than epistemology” (ibid., p. 331). This view of discourse formation 
theory underlines the usefulness of Foucault to policy analysis in particular. However, 
the influence of Foucault can also be seen in media discourses, including a recent 
defence of criticality versus social action (a key point of difference between Foucault 
and Habermas) in claims that “you need to bring the buried argument out into the open 
in order to defeat it” (Poole, 2013, n.p.). 
 
2.4.3 Discourse analysis  
Discourse analysis offers another approach to critically evaluate cultural policy texts 
and can be used flexibly alongside discourse formation theory. The origins of discourse 
analysis lie in analytical philosophy (concerned with ridding language of rhetoric to get 
to the “truth”) and “speech act theory” (concerned with the nature of spoken language), 
as well as psychoanalysis (O’Rourke, 2009, p. 211) and it has come to be associated 
with a number of authors (Van Dijk, 1985; Fairclough, 2003; Rose, 2007).  As such, 
like discourse formation theory, discourse analysis treats “language as an object of 
enquiry” rather than a “neutral medium for communicating information” (Tonkiss, 
2004, p. 373),  is broadly concerned with “cognition, interaction, society, and culture” 
(Van Dijk, 1985, p. 10), and posits that language “produces the world as it understands 
it” (Rose, 2007, p. 143).31 In this way, discourse analysis constructs an “interpretation 
rather than revealing the truth” (ibid., p. 168). 
 
The role of “expert language” is key to discourse analysis (Tonkiss, 2004, p. 375), and 
creates self-evident “justificatory regime[s]” (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2002, p. 7) 
through conveying a “principle of justice” (ibid.) within the discourse. The 
                                                           
31
 Scotland’s New Labour discourses of enterprise/competition (representative of neoliberalism) 
alongside partnership/cooperation discourses from the 1990s (representative of social cohesion) are a 
good example of this (Fairclough, 2003, p. 128; Hewitt, 2011, p. 33). 
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identification and analysis of conflicting regimes of thought is another key feature of 
this policy analysis. These conflicting regimes concern the co-existence of potentially 
irreconcilable concepts within the same discourse, and again, point to Shapiro’s 
“strategic containment” (Shapiro, 1990, p.332). This practice which is designed to 
obfuscate conflict, leads to a “covert semantic relation” between potentially 
oppositional views, with the “performative” power “to generate particular visions of the 
world” in order to “sustain or remake the world in their [a particular] image” 
(Fairclough, 2003, p. 130). This feature can be seen in the various narratives of culture’s 
uses as described in Chapter One, whereby intrinsic (romantic) value discourses appear 
to reconcile but operate in tension with extrinsic (utilitarian) value discourses, appealing 
to two distinct mandates. As indicated in Chapter One, these juxtaposed discourses can 
also be viewed as a policy dualism (or binary paradigm), and again, reflect the struggles 
within discourses. 
 
The concept of “nominalising”, or the linguistic process that represents situated 
ideological concepts, often verbs, as distanciated, abstract, neutral and passive nouns 
(typically globalisation, enterprise, investment), without origin, agency or actors (ibid., 
p. 12), is also linked to the impact of expert language. This practice is used to disguise 
and disable accountability and obscure ideology in discourse (ibid.) and has come to be 
particularly associated with neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Neoliberalism 
embodies nominalisation by typically denying its political character and presenting 
itself as an economic rather than political (and therefore active rather than passive) or 
ideological model, and frames itself as a “metaregulation” while defining itself as a 
form of “antiregulation” (ibid., p. 400). Nominalisation is also linked to (Marxist) 
commodification, and the concept of “reification”, which transforms the social relations 
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involved in production into quantifiable things (such as money), hiding the nature of 
those relations in the market in the process (Lukacs, 1923, p. 1).
32
  
 
The key nominalisation process used in cultural policy and the creative city, however, 
as will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, is the neutralisation, or disavowal of origin and 
abjuration of human agency that results from the co-presentation of particular words and 
concepts associated with capitalism (the economy, enterprise, competition, globalisation 
etc.), rather than the transformation of verbs into nouns (also associated with the term). 
This is demonstrated in (neoliberal) references to “market realities” (Arts Council of 
Ireland, 2009, p. iii), the “new entrepreneurial culture” (European Commission, 2010b, 
p. 2), the “knowledge-driven labour market” (Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 10) 
and the “creativity labour market demand” (ibid., p. 11). These discourses suggest the 
passive existence of inanimate, de-politicised forces (the market and entrepreneurialism) 
beyond the control of government, and omit reference to any particular origin, or 
beneficiary. These discourses also personify the market, distancing it from the state and 
obscuring its contingent nature and ideologies behind it.  
 
The use and aggregation of passive nouns is also common within the policy texts and 
typically comprises the juxtaposition of concepts or the co-occurrence or collocation 
between words (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 3- 6). Chapter Five demonstrates the three cases 
emphases on culture as an attractor for international investment and discourses of 
globalised competition and investment, linking culture, the creative economy (and 
creativity/innovation) and competition. Additionally, throughout the cultural policies, 
culture is posited as a commodity (cultural policy) and is used to promote the movement 
                                                           
32
 See Chapter Four (4.2.3.2).  
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of flexible workers and investment in cities (the creative city) as self-evidently 
desirable. Again, these juxtapositions nominalise and contain the political character of 
capitalism and the choices continually being made to support and uphold it.  
 
While discourse analysis is designed to reveal the underlying assumptions and 
ideologies, as well as power and social relations in discourse (Fairclough, 2003, p. 2), 
for the purposes of this research, it is particularly useful for categorising the dualisms 
and nominalisations, as well as structuring the identification and coding of key 
concepts, vocabularies and patterns within both discursive paradigms (i.e. uses of the 
term creative, creativity, creative classes etc.). In addition, since interpretations of 
discourse analysis are “contested” (O’Rourke, 2009, p. 209) and it has no “hard and fast 
rules” (Tonkiss, 2004, p. 378), models of discourse analysis can be built to suit various 
research approaches.  
 
Having selected discourse analysis to accompany discourse formation theory as the key 
modes of analysis, therefore, it may be necessary to explain why other discourse and 
analytical approaches were not utilised. One of these is content analysis. This form of 
discourse analysis is from the empiricist and positivist tradition, posing the neutral 
position of the researcher, and concerned what is said in the text, rather than its 
relationships outside of the texts, and how it is said, or who says it, or how it is 
received, aiming to be generalisable and quantitative (Tonkiss, 2004, pp.  368-373). 
Equally, critical discourse analysis is another approach which aims to be 
“transformational” in intention or motivation (Fairclough, 1995, p. 9) and has an overtly 
political agenda (Threadgold, 2003 n.p.) as well as being normative (Fairclough, 1995, 
p. 11).  
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Since this research requires an understanding of the network of relationships and 
histories that cultural policy has built on, and because this research aims to illuminate 
areas of enquiry rather than transform the political landscape, neither of these 
approaches was suitable for this dissertation. Similarly, despite the key concept of the 
economy and a concern with the creative classes in this research, and despite 
Habermas’s debt to Marx as a student of the Frankfurt school (Thomassen, 2010, pp. 
16-18), the research does not draw on Marxist class analysis, concerned with the 
“dominant” mode of “those who can gain control of the means of production” (Held, 
2006, p. 98). This approach, it was felt, would restrict the variety of perspectives 
possible through cultural studies. However, in weighing up the benefits and weaknesses 
of particular approaches, the role of individual preference in choosing one approach 
over another is central.  
 
To conclude, the selection of discourse analysis and discourse formation theory offers 
two approaches out of many, but allows the texts to be broken down into their 
components on the one hand, while creating understanding around the emergence, 
contingencies, constituencies and subjectivities of the discourses, on the other hand. 
Discourse analysis specifically helps typologise various discourses within the creative 
city and cultural policy, identifying its core themes, vocabularies, metaphors, turns of 
phrase, repetitions and obfuscations, to create a base line of information (i.e., attraction, 
talent, harnessing etc.) as section 2.6 will demonstrate. This provides the material for, 
and a counterpoint to, the broader approach of discourse formation which follows, both 
archaeologically and genealogically. This approach helps to map the environment or 
context of cultural policy and the creative city and exposes their tensions, pressures, and 
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interdependencies. In summation, discourse formation theory and discourse analysis are 
utilised as broad interpretative guides rather than comprehensively applied analytical 
tools within the cases, working to “uncover [both] the facts” and the “larger political 
forces at work” (Cataldi, 2004, p. 65) in the discourses. 
 
2.5  Theoretical perspective and conceptual framework 
Having established the Foucauldian approach to determining the method of enquiry, it is 
necessary to outline the theoretical perspectives used to analyse the discourse material 
and return to the Habermasian concepts introduced in Chapter One. Habermas’s 
understanding of effective communication centres on his theory of discourse ethics, 
which are conducted through what he describes as competing “validity” claims within 
society, and concern an idealised claim based on the “truth”, “sincerity” and 
“legitimacy” of what is being said (Habermas, 1987, p. 26).To Habermas, therefore, the 
basis for discourse is not predicated on status, identity or power (ibid., 1989, p. xii), or 
the hegemonies that Foucault would posit as central to any discourse formation. Given 
Foucault’s conception of discourse as sui generis strategic and the role of strategy in 
cultural policy as it is, Habermas’s understanding of discourse as it might be, does not 
produce the insights needed for this research. The disavowal of discourse ethics, 
however, does not reject the potential for greater openness and communication in 
policy, however flawed the basis on which that discussion might take place, and 
consequently proposes a potentially positive (as well as negative) role for policy, as the 
later chapters will argue.  
 
Nevertheless, Chapter One outlined other Habermasian concepts which allow the 
research to consider additional features of the relationship between cultural policy and 
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the creative city. These concepts are: the role and function of cultural policy as a 
particular expression of instrumental reason (beyond routine policy rationality 
concerned with outcome),  power and the economy via the state (as representative of the 
system) and as a space of communication (via the lifeworld),  which lends it a 
legitimacy and allows the state to function (rather than a wholly coercive imperative); 
the role of culture in creating spaces for debate (via a public sphere, though one that is 
not necessarily based on consensus); the tendency of cultural policy to be dominated by 
stronger policy areas and government agendas (colonisation); the blurring of public and 
private interests in cultural discourses (colonisation); and again, the impact of these on 
the authority of, and trust in the state (legitimacy). The concepts of the public sphere, 
the system, lifeworld, colonisation and legitimacy, are, therefore, central to the analysis 
of the cases. 
 
2.5.1  The public sphere, system, lifeworld, colonisation and legitimacy 
Though critiqued (Fraser, 1990; Mouffe; 2007), the public sphere remains a central 
concept in critical theory and is key to discourses of culture’s role in providing spaces 
for debate and democratic participation that are ostensibly outside of the influence of 
the state and the market, as the cases in Chapter Four will show. As Chapter One has 
outlined, Habermas’s public sphere generates “communicative action” on which 
cohesive societies depend (Habermas, 1987, p. 126), and is a space where people can 
represent themselves, free of coercion, to the state. As a result, given the problematic 
attribution of equal conditions for participation in communicative action and discourse 
ethics (Spurk, 2010, p. 5), the public sphere is widely critiqued for its unrealistic 
“bracketing” of status as a precondition for open debate (Fraser, 1990, p. 58); its 
disavowal of the “hegemonic nature of every form of consensus” (Mouffe, 2007, p. 
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153); and its abjuration of the fact that the “origin of antagonistic conflicts” lies in the 
pursuit of different interests by different publics (ibid.).  
 
Other critiques of the public sphere concern the structure of the public sphere itself and 
comprise: Habermas’s focus on the bourgeois public sphere (ibid., p. 5); the male 
hegemony of the historical public sphere (Fraser, 1990, p. 58); and the underestimation 
of counter-publics and subsidiary public spheres (Calhoun, 1992, pp. 36-37) resulting in 
the suggestion of a singular, rather than subsidiary public spheres (ibid., p. 34).  
Habermas is also criticised for overestimating both the importance and the 
disintegration of the public sphere and the impact of the media on the public sphere 
(ibid., p. 33), the preclusion of private representation in the public sphere (Fraser, 1990, 
pp. 61 - 62) and thus the short-circuiting of important debate on the private sector, 
leading to an indirect defence of “classical liberalism” (ibid., p. 73).  
 
However, while the public sphere is a normative and a problematic construct, it can be 
viewed as a “valuable” legacy of modernity (Calhoun, 1992, p. 40) by offering a useful 
vehicle for thinking about the values of and potential for culture (via public 
deliberation) in society. In this way, the public sphere can be interpreted in a wide sense 
and links culture, cultural policy (via the role of culture) and legitimating discourses of 
democracy and civil society.  
 
Other Habermasian concepts with which to consider the relationship between cultural 
policy and the creative city, specifically, the relationship between the state, policy and 
capitalism (1973; 1987), are the political-economic system and the socio-cultural 
lifeworld. As Chapter One has indicated, the concepts of the system and lifeworld that 
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emerge from Habermas’s theory of society concern two organising and interdependent 
(but discrete) structures that need to be kept in balance (Habermas, 1987). The “system” 
represents the economic and political systems in society, or the “dominant steering 
mechanism[s]” (ibid., 1973, p. 21) representing the quantifiable interests and strategic 
imperatives of money and power (or votes), while the “lifeworld”, represents the socio-
cultural system or “horizon-forming context of processes of reaching understanding” 
(ibid., 1987, p. 135) which “defines the pattern of the social system as a whole” (ibid., p 
154). These concepts can be considered as interdependent hard (strategic) and soft 
(communicative) power systems similar to Foucault’s theory of juridical and sovereign 
powers, as embodied by the creative city and cultural policy respectively. 
 
As the system represents “capitalism and the apparatus of the modern state” (ibid., p. 
318), or economics and politics (Habermas, 1973, p. 36), it can be aligned with the 
industrial, economic and political (via neoliberalism) imperatives of the creative city. In 
contrast, as the lifeworld is the “stock of knowledge” (culture) through which 
“legitimate orders” are mediated in order to secure “solidarity” (society) through the 
“competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting”....“to take part in 
processes of reaching understanding” (personality) (Habermas, 1987, p. 138), it can be 
aligned with culture and cultural policy.  
 
Before leaving the lifeworld, however, it is important to note the sociological use of this 
term, as a construction based on communication, rather than a phenomenological 
conception of the lifeworld (lebenswelt) based on subjective lived experience, as 
determined by German philosopher Edmund Husserl (Husserl, 1970). Husserl’s concept 
of lifeworld focuses on the “field of perception” and “field of consciousness” which we 
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experience “through our living body” (Husserl, 1970, p. 108), prioritising the perceiving 
subject. This “subjective” consciousness is our “actually experienceable” perceived and 
lived world, which acts as foundation for all our experience (ibid., p. 127) rather than 
the broader communicative and deliberative frame in which trust is built (Habermas, 
1987).  
 
As Chapter One has indicated, the key research relevance of Habermas’s system and 
lifeworld concepts lies in how the terms illuminate both the hard and soft imperatives of 
and pressures on cultural policy and the creative city. The pressure of system 
imperatives on cultural policies, via quantitative and instrumental reasoning (as 
demonstrated in economic discourses), can result in an imbalance between the system 
and lifeworld (Habermas, 1987, p. 318). This rupture can erode cultural discourses of 
communication (ibid., p. 149), threatening the lifeworld and thus social and state 
stability through a “colonization” (Habermas, 1987, p. 318) which results in legitimacy 
loss for the state (ibid., 1973).  
 
An excess of instrumental reason through colonisation, as referred to in Chapter One, is 
consistent with advanced capitalism and can lead to a Habermasian “crisis of 
legitimacy” which is determined by the withdrawal of “mass [electoral] loyalty” needed 
by the political system to govern (Habermas, 1973, p. 46).
33
 A legitimation crisis 
specifically arises from the failure of existing institutions, the political order and other 
legitimising systems (such as policy) to meet the ethical (i.e., that they are just, 
benevolent and effective) rather than administrative criteria of the electorate (Habermas, 
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 There are two theories of the 1970s crises, that of the loss of authority based on the failure of output, 
instanced by perceptions of an “overloaded [welfare] state” (Held, 2006, pp 190-191) and the loss of 
legitimacy based on the failure of input (as demonstrated by Habermas), or the continuous erosion of the 
existing order’s capacity to be reproduced (ibid., p. 196). 
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1973, p. 11). These ethical criteria (rightly or wrongly) depend on the lifeworld  and 
concern the “truth and norms that require justification” (ibid.). Since trust and consent 
are needed for government and policies to be enacted (regardless of whether it is 
generated by discourse ethics or whether those policies are good or bad), and competing 
socio-cultural and political-economic claims need to be balanced, cultural policy actors 
(such as politicians, the public and cultural professionals) need to reach a common 
understanding, or a communicative action (Habermas, 1987).  
 
However, Chapter One has shown that generating collective understanding in relation to 
cultural policy is highly problematic in light of extrinsic state imperatives and different 
expectations for culture from cultural policy stakeholders (the government, practitioners 
and the public ) (Holden, 2006), and in terms of the tendency towards hegemony posed 
by Foucault’s discourse formation theory. Nevertheless, given that the necessity for 
legitimation arises ab initio from the too close alignment of the economic to the political 
system (Habermas, 1973, p. 13), whereby governments intervene in market and private 
sector regulation (typically seen in liberal democracies), policy, and thus cultural policy, 
needs to have a balance of lifeworld and system imperatives, if trust is to be generated 
and politicians re-elected (Habermas, 1973, p. 36). 
 
Before leaving the concept of legitimation, it should be noted that this research posits 
two sources of legitimation in cultural policies, external and internal. While all policy 
requires legitimation from the public, given the obscure role of culture in government 
(Vestheim, 2007; Gray and Wingfield, 2010), cultural policy ministries or departments 
particularly depend on intergovernmental support, as demonstrated by policy and media 
reports cited in Chapter One (Mundy, 2009; Higgins, 2013a). The concept of 
 61 
legitimation, therefore, though primarily referring to the input of external public trust in 
policies and the state, also refers to internal state legitimation, though this is ultimately 
linked to securing external public legitimation.  The particular implications of these 
concepts will be explored in Chapters Five and Seven. 
 
The benefits of concepts like the public sphere, system, lifeworld, legitimacy and 
colonisation, are that they allow this research to consider particular characteristics of 
both the creative city (money and power) and cultural policy (society and culture). 
These concepts also help the research to derive implications from these relationships, 
highlighting potential difficulties, as well as similarities (interdependencies) between 
them. Though legitimacy can be understood as a necessary requirement of government 
(in Habermas’s view), or a self-sustaining way of maintaining power (in Foucault’s 
view), for the purposes of this research, it is understood as having multiple rather than 
singular mandates and represents a way of securing trust or longevity in a policy, 
whether good or bad. This research, therefore, posits the potential for legitimacy and 
understanding to be reached outside of consensus-based communicative action or 
discourse ethics and focuses on the balance of competing claims or mandates within 
society as evidenced through cultural policies, rather than communicative action or 
discourse ethics. 
 
2.5.2  Specifying the terms of the discussion   
As such, while Foucault’s discourse formation theory has helped identify the object of 
study (discourse), through a broad understanding of the genealogy of power in discourse 
and its role in legitimating knowledge systems (such as cultural policy and the creative 
city), Habermas’s concepts help consider the impact of discourse on cultural policy (and 
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the creative city) and the state. Consequently, these philosophers’ approaches are 
interpreted and applied in discrete ways and given their different ontologies and 
philosophical traditions, clarification is required here.  
 
As suggested, the chief difference between the work of Habermas and Foucault 
concerns the ontological nature of discourse, reason, power and legitimation (Kelly, 
1994, p. 391) and centres on the following views: that discourse can provide a space for 
rational democratic debate, which can secure legitimacy through consensual 
communicative action and discourse ethics on the one hand (Habermas, 1987), and that 
discourse represents struggle and maintains and legitimates power systems, on the other 
(Foucault, 1972). As a result, the central dispute of Habermas and Foucault through the 
framework of critical theory,  concerns how theory or critique, in which they are both 
engaged, can dissolve and negotiate illegitimate power through dominance-free debate 
(Habermas), and how critique can create understandings of systems of legitimation, 
which are self-sustaining and dominating (Foucault) (Kelly, 1994). This speaks to the 
role of critique in universalisability and transcendentalism.  
 
Specifically, for Foucault, since there is no “free use of reason” and reason cannot “take 
the public form that it requires” (Foucault, 1984, n.p.), there is no power-free discourse 
or critique (as discourse). Discourse, therefore, cannot be used by Habermas to criticise 
and overcome power (Kelly, 1994., p. 5). As a result, Foucault views Habermas’s work 
on discourse ethics and the public sphere as based on a flawed (Enlightenment) ideal of 
reason and the inevitability of progress (affirming his normative position on discourse) 
(Kelly, 1994; Richardson, 1996).  Equally, Habermas criticises Foucault’s work in 
terms of: using discourse to transcend his own critique (Simon, 1994, p. 959); its 
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“cryptonormative” approach to theories of power (Daniels, 2002, n.p.); its nebulousness 
(ibid.); its lack of transformative capacity (Richardson, 1996, n.p.); its conflation of 
knowledge with power, its mobile power structures (i.e., not belonging to any one 
person or structure) and assertion that power is a productive as well as repressive force 
(Daniels, 2002, n.p.).  
 
The debate between Foucault and Habermas, therefore, can partly be characterised as 
ontological in terms of their different understandings of what constitutes discourse in 
the first instance, embodying both power systems and the possibility of emancipation. 
More specifically, disparities between the two thinkers can also be described as the 
difference between a universal  (Habermas) and a particular (Foucault) critique; 
contexts free from power (Habermas) and contexts of power (Foucault) (Daniels, 2002, 
n.p.); a “reforming modernist” (Habermas) and (for some) a post-structuralist (Foucault) 
(Richardson, 1996, n.p.); and, fundamentally, the “normative explication of the validity 
and acceptability of discourses” in contrast with an “investigation of the influence of 
power and bodily discipline on historical discourses” (Stahl, 2004, p. 4331).  
 
In summation,  therefore, by considering Foucault and Habermas together, this research 
takes the view that power and legitimacy can be good or bad depending on how they are 
used (Foucault), but that discourse is not solely based on consensus (contrary to 
Habermas). Similarly, the thesis views legitimacy as not necessarily concerned with 
maintaining power alone (contrary to Foucault), but that it also has the potential to open 
up a space of communication (contrary to Foucault) as part of its role in the public 
sphere (Habermas). In this way, the research disavows Habermas’s discourse ethics for 
Foucault’ discourse formation theory and takes a broad view of Habermas’s concept of 
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legitimacy and the public sphere, acknowledging the centrality of debate and dialogue 
as central to culture and discourse and the potential for policy to improve the 
relationship between the state and electorate. 
 
2.6 Interpreting discourse theories via the creative city paradigm 
Having described the overall approach to this research, the academic domain in which it 
is located, and the conceptual basis and contingencies in relation to the work of 
Foucault and Habermas, it is necessary to look at the interpretation and modelling of 
these particular methods in respect of analysing cultural policy through the discourse of 
the creative city (see Appendix). Though genealogically embedded in the historical 
discourse of urban regeneration (within cultural and urban policies), the creative city 
primary texts (i.e. those by authors like Landry and Florida) have a number of 
identifiable themes and lexicons that can be said to constitute a discrete discursive 
formation, as well as highly branded concepts specifically associated with Richard 
Florida’s model (these discourses will be more fully explored in Chapter Three).  
 
These discourses promote a number of discrete ideas and ideologies and can be 
summarised into three broad themes based on the premise that culture, creativity and 
creative workers are reflexively important for driving economies and competition, 
place-development, and attracting investment and flexible skilled workers (all of which 
are desirable situations). If these discourses can be traced through various cultural 
policies, important questions can be raised about policy development, policy priorities 
and policy assumptions. As a result, given the persuasive dependence of the creative 
city on particular discourse formations and the simplicity of its themes, the paradigm 
offers the potential to be categorised and thus to yield material for tracking and later 
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analysis. The analytical framework constructed for this research, therefore, results in the 
tracking of cultural policy texts via explicit citations of creative cities and creative city 
authors (Appendix # 1), alongside the mapping of individual discursive strands 
(Appendix # 2–4) and lexicons (Appendix # 5-9).  
 
In addition to explicit citations of the creative city such as direct references to the 
‘creative city’ or ‘creative cities’, (primary thematic # one), therefore, the main 
discursive strands comprise the following discursive truths: creative workers and 
creative environments drive economies and make them more competitive (ibid. # two); 
culture and creativity make places unique and symbolically communicate that those 
places are interesting and vibrant, as well as tolerant (ibid. #  three); and that skilled 
creative workers with high human capital are attracted to cultural and tolerant places 
and in turn attract businesses and investment who drive economies and competition 
(ibid. # four). In addition, creatives are both the source and object of attraction (Florida). 
In terms of specific lexicons and vocabularies, Florida’s branded acronym and heurism, 
the 3 Ts (talent, technology and tolerance) model of urban development (cited in 
Chapter Two) is also central, and allows for discrete keyword identification. However, 
attention is also paid to the broad vocabulary and repetition of creativity, creative class, 
attraction, harnessing, retaining and/or nurturing, talent and/or human capital, 
openness/diversity and/or tolerance (or synonyms such as diversity/openness), 
technology, place and competition/competitive (ibid. # 5-9). The use of metaphor in 
discourse, as a “trope of resemblance” and “displacement “ as much as an extension of 
the “meaning of words” (Ricoeur, 1975, p. 3), is particularly interesting in this regard, 
in respect of the concept of harnessing.  
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This term has military connotations and suggests both taking control and ring-fencing 
(and thus owning) an unwieldy talent/creativity that already exists (in tandem with 
attracting and nurturing talent/creativity, see 5.3.1, 5.4.5.2 and 5.5.6). This interpretation 
is further enriched by the view of metaphor as “grounded in a theory of substitution” 
(ibid.), and representing a “strategy of discourse” which “preserves and develops the 
heuristic power wielded by fiction” (ibid., p. 6). The use of concepts such as 
displacement, substitution, fiction and strategy in this interpretation of metaphor, 
therefore, like discourse, indicates its use in persuasion and ideology, as well as its 
potential to obscure other underlying meanings such as those suggested above. 
 
However, though there are interdependencies between these core creative city ideas, 
they occur in three broad ways throughout the texts, mobilised around economies and 
competition, regeneration and place-development (and uniqueness) and attraction of 
skilled creative workers and investment (Landry, 2000; Florida, 2002; 2005; 2007). 
These ideas are evaluated in respect of each case (see Chapters Five and Six), seeking 
both the occurrence of the thematic across different documents, and particular variations 
of it. Secondary thematics concern concomitant concepts and discourses, including: 
creativity and innovation (knowledge economy, entrepreneurialism etc.), the creative 
industries (as a central model) and finally, culture. Analysing the texts against these 
thematics and lexicons anchors the research to a wider consideration of cultural policy 
discourse, and is not an end in itself.  
 
2.7 Research design, text-based discourses and cases 
The research design for this dissertation centres on desk-based work that includes the 
collection and analysis of primary textual data (policy documents, memos, press releases, 
 67 
media reports – see Appendix), as well as secondary analytical literature. The selection of 
discourse analysis and discourse formation theory as modes of analysis, together with the 
public availability of the texts, rendered the prospect of fieldwork within the “everyday” 
situation of a given cultural policy context (Seale, 2004, p. 75), redundant. Equally, given 
the difficulties posed by the proximity of cultural policy studies to governance and the 
previous location of the researcher within the field of arts policy, an ethnographic 
approach may have compromised the distance needed to conduct the research. Despite 
this, in the early stages of the research, interviews were conducted with senior 
policymakers in Scotland, Finland and Ireland designed to ascertain senior policy views 
on the creative city phenomenon. While interesting, problems with attribution and the 
broad and anecdotal nature of the interview material led to the decision not to include it. 
 
Cultural policy texts and statements, which were explicit, traceable and publicly 
available, were selected as offering the most prevalent source of official policy 
assertions of the state’s role in culture. These texts were selected on the following basis: 
while discourse concerns a wide range of communication formats (including image), 
explicit cultural policies typically (though not exclusively) occur textually and provided 
sufficient material for the deep analysis needed (ibid.); published cultural policy texts 
were publicly identifiable, more formal, more-government sanctioned, more permanent 
and more indicative of the formal construction and reflection of ideology than the 
statements of government committees and debates. National policy texts also allowed 
the research to track and interpret the creative city’s influence beyond localised or urban 
policies, which had been the locus for other research.  
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The research also selected a number of texts to allow for comparison within each case and 
to gather sufficient data for analysis, but a limited number to allow for sufficiently deep 
interpretation (Hogan and Doyle, 2009, p. 5). Texts selected were produced between 2000 
and 2010,
34
 a period which represented the sedimentation of the creative city paradigm 
(which emerged in the late 1980s and was in use by the 1990s), spanning the publication 
of Landry’s key handbook on the Creative City (2000) through to the launch of the 
European Union’s Lisbon Agenda (which had a span of ten years to 2010). This period 
also offered a substantial timeframe in which to trace creative city discourses.  
 
In selecting three Northern European countries as the basis for this research: Scotland, 
Finland and Ireland, this dissertation addresses a number of issues. These issues are: a 
response to calls for more information on European cultural policy in general (Cliché et 
al., 1999-2001); the potential for inter-case comparison; and the creation of a new base of 
knowledge on under-researched cultural policies when compared with the “cultural 
hegemony” (McGuigan, 2004, p. 66) and scholarship surrounding other countries (such as 
Britain, France and Germany).
35
 The role of Austria as a potential case was given 
particular consideration due to its active creative economy (suggesting a creative city) 
agenda;
36
 however, its documents were exclusively available in German, which would 
have necessitated a particularly expert language facility, as well as prohibitive financial 
resources in terms of translating the large numbers of documents.  
 
                                                           
34
 In certain cases (Scotland), documents up to 2011 were consulted in order to include Creative 
Scotland’s first policy statement. 
35
 An overview of entries for the International Journal of Cultural Policy Research on 10
th
 September, 
2013 produces 144 and 28 articles for the UK and France respectively. This compares with 7 entries for 
Scotland, 12 for Finland and 4 for the Republic of Ireland. Though the journal is produced in the UK, 
given Britain’s early development of explicit cultural policy post-World War II, it has been a prolific 
producer of research. 
36
 The Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe states that in Austria, “since 2000, the 
field of Creative Industries has acquired increased importance in the cultural policy debate” [online]. 
Available: http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/index.php [Accessed 25 September 2013]. 
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Additionally, these countries had tangible creative city or city-marketing activity, 
suggesting the potential for discursive transfer between the creative city and cultural 
policy. Finally, these countries have both similarities (political systems, economies, 
nationalism etc.) and contrasts (language, culture, histories) which offer a good basis for 
considering the local contexts of discourse formation and thus provided material for 
individual and broader analysis of specific national contexts. Chapters Five and Six will 
demonstrate how this approach has delivered interesting historical and social insights that 
suggest the usefulness and flexibility of the creative city paradigm to particular countries 
with particular concerns.  
 
Though there were sufficient explicit cultural policy texts to yield information in all three 
countries (though far less in Ireland), certain implicit texts (usually Arts Council or 
industrial policy) were included to flesh out particular themes or to provide a background 
context to the analysis. These texts illuminated the discursive context around the cultural 
policy documents and helped to ascertain the thinking and discourse at a senior national 
level. Finland also provided challenges, mostly relating to those documents that did not 
have English translations, although the high number of translations available for other 
documents minimised this issue. Also, the term sample case rather than case study is 
deliberately used in the research to indicate a more interpretive approach, offering 
“puzzles and clues” for further inquiry and interpretation, rather than “accomplished 
facts” or universal truths (McGuigan, 1997, p. 182). 
 
2.8 Policy nomenclature 
One of the initial observations made by the research in relation to cultural policy 
discourses was the array of formats and functions comprising and addressed by policy 
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documents. These cultural policy vehicles represented plans, strategies, briefings, 
information, research, literature reviews, operations and annual reports. Regardless of 
names and functions, as publicly available documents, and policy communications, these 
documents were collectively interpreted as policy per se. However, given the approach to 
this research, the omission of the term policy from most of the documents’ titles was 
notable. Other than one Scottish text (Scottish Executive, 2004a) and the websites, few 
documents bore the nomenclature of policy or even used the term policy within the texts. 
Rather, policy was inferred in formats such as business plans, strategies (particularly in 
Ireland) and statements (Scotland) which were clearly informed by policy, rather than 
representing the principal policies themselves (which were equally hard to discern on the 
websites). Ireland had no designated policy documents but a lot of business plans.
37
 
Similarly, Finland had strategies for cultural policy (Finnish Ministry of Education, 
2009b), and discrete cultural policies in relation to specific agendas such as development 
or innovation (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture 2010a; Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2010b), but no explicit designated expression of its cultural policy, other than 
the statement on its website.  
 
The lack of policy nomenclature in the documents in general and the unevenness of the 
website formats, may indicate that the status of the documents as policy is implicit on 
the understanding that the documents emanate from central government (policy); 
however, the fact that these documents were described in other terms (e.g., strategy, 
plan, etc.) erroneously suggests that a policy might be located elsewhere. The exception 
                                                           
37
 There was no link to policy or visible policy heading on the Irish Department of Arts, Heritage and the 
Gaeltacht website (www.ahg.gov.ie/) on 10 October 2013. Instead policy was listed under publications. 
This contrasts with other policy areas such as the Department of Health (and Children), the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and the Department of Finance, whose policy sections are on their homepages and highly 
visible. Available: http://www.dohc.ie/; http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx and 
http://www.finance.gov.ie/ [All Accessed 10 October 2013]. 
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of Scotland in this regard in 2004 (Scottish Executive, 2004a) may relate to the self-
determination of the newly elected Scottish National Party (at this time), setting out its 
first independent cultural policies. 
 
This reluctance to use the term policy more generally, or conversely, the willingness to 
use other terms such as plans or strategies, may represent a managerialist
38
 concern with 
projecting dynamism and efficiency (as opposed to the more passive policy), but may 
also be a simple lack of willingness to pin point the state’s intentions in relation to the 
difficult portfolio of culture. Whatever the reason for this omission, the lack of policy 
nomenclature nominalises policy itself and disables accountability in the covert process 
of presenting policy, as a more distant and transient plan or strategy. This makes it 
difficult for the public to identify the political through policy, in terms of monitoring the 
work of elected governments. In addition, the omission of policy from cultural policy 
texts, may point to the “interstices” or gaps between texts (Foucault, 1972, p. 36), 
suggesting the defeat of the term policy at the hands of the more powerful plan or 
strategy. 
 
2.9 Locating the researcher: issues of reflexivity  
The “relationship between the knowledge and the knower” (Parsons, 1995, p. 71) and 
the transcendence of discourse, are central to the epistemology of the research, and have 
respectively arisen already in relation to both disinterest (2.3) and the debate between 
Habermas and Foucault (see 2.5.2). Reflexivity, or positionality, aims to avoid the trap 
of imagining the researcher “immune to the effects of their own analyses” (Bennett, 
1998, p. 6), and situates the ideological values of the researcher as central to all choices 
                                                           
38
 Managerialism is “the improvement of the efficiency, effectiveness and economy of the public sector 
by the utilisation of techniques which were once regarded as purely appropriate for the private/for profit 
sector” (Parsons, 1995, p. 38). 
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made within the research. This is particularly important in the context of the small 
policy sector and practice of culture. Reflexivity can also be described as deliberate 
“falsification” in the hope of producing “paradigm shifts” (Schirato et al., 2012, p. 17), 
through problematising (and thus helping to clarify) particular processes (such as 
research), as well as by revealing the personal biases and imperatives of the author. 
While there is a need to bracket this reflexivity in order to avoid immobility, there is 
also a need to reflect on how these influences may have affected the final research.  
 
As such and firstly, taking into account the use of discourse analysis and discourse 
theory in relation to constructions of reality and power (as outlined by both Habermas 
and Foucault), this research necessarily adds to the body of discourse and power 
relations it seeks to investigate (Rose, 2007, p. 167). The research therefore seeks to 
analyse discourse and language, through discourse and language. For this reason, the 
research avoids claims of objectivity or truth and does not aim to transcend the problem 
of its own inescapable discourse, instead offering a located view, which is simply one, 
out of many possible views.  Additionally, given that nominalisation is a key focus of 
discourse analysis, the prevailing academic style of passive sentence construction in the 
research risks being interpreted as disengagement. However, the use of passive rather 
than active language in this text is necessary to address the body of work and opinions 
preceding and outside of this particular research. 
 
Secondly, this study is produced from the perspective of someone operating within the 
artworld, and the cultural sector more broadly, with a background in the development, 
application and evaluation of art and arts policy (the Arts Council of Ireland). The 
challenge of the research, therefore, is to recognise the personal assumptions, biases and 
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power relations built up during a time of immense change in arts policy in Ireland (in 
the 1990s and 2000s), and in particular the turn to managerialism that characterised 
those changes. Equally, there is a need to challenge previously taken-for-granted value 
systems and assumptions at play in understandings of culture and the arts, primarily: 
culture and the arts being inherently and unquestioningly of value, and particular 
insights and experiences of how culture is produced and how the culture sector operates.  
 
Thirdly, the researcher’s professional background needs to be considered in relation to 
criticality, independence and career sustainability. Future ambitions to re-enter the 
professional culture sector in order to potentially “legislate” rather than simply interpret 
culture (Schlesinger, 2009a, p. 11), in the context of the precariousness of making a 
living and the clientelist nature of the culture sector in general, are a consideration in 
relation to the independence of critique within the research. This is particularly relevant 
in relation to certain implicit criticisms of both policymakers and cultural practitioners 
(including the researcher), in terms of prevalent cultural sector practices (such as 
cynical reason), despite an outline of the coercive imperatives driving these practices, 
and, it is argued, their endemic and inescapable nature, as will be discussed in Chapters 
Five and Six. Nevertheless, though the pursuit of objectivity was neither possible nor a 
goal for this research, this level of criticality indicates the distance created between the 
researcher and the research. Ultimately, by drawing these issues to attention (the 
creation of a new discourse, the position of the researcher within the artworld, the 
impact of this and career imperatives on the critical distance of the research), it was 
hoped to question and interrogate problem areas and enter in the research with as open a 
mind as was possible. 
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2.10 Conclusions 
This chapter established a way of approaching and interpreting the question of the 
relationship between cultural policy and the creative city, the implications of that 
relationship and the basis on which claims to knowledge will be made, both from the 
perspective of the academic domain and philosophically. In particular, the chapter 
addressed the use of Foucault’s discourse theories and Habermas’s key analytical 
concepts, separating out the object of the enquiry (discourse) from the implications of 
the enquiry (the philosophical framework). The next chapter will expand on the 
narrative constructed around and ideologies embedded in the creative city, in terms of 
the genealogies and strategic uses of culture and creativity. This detailed outline and 
analysis of the creative city will illuminate its compelling rationale for cultural 
investment and development, and will provide the grounds for considering its place 
within cultural policy meta discourses, particularly in terms of its positioning of culture, 
the economy and the market (private sector).  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE CREATIVE CITY PARADIGM 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Having established the methodology for this research, this chapter sets out the 
background to and genealogy of the creative city urban paradigm vis-à-vis the role of 
culture (in the narrow arts sense) in cities. This will locate the individual cultural policy 
cases of Scotland, Finland and Ireland in the context of urban development models in 
general and the creative city in particular, allowing the relationship of the creative city 
to the cases to be clearly and critically determined and to provide a basis for the detailed 
analysis in the following chapters. Specifically, this chapter will look at the various 
typologies, manifestations and “fundamental codes” (Foucault, 2002, p. xxii) of the 
creative city which underline its flexible nature and thus wide range of interpretations 
and applications. Common perceptions of the model will also be considered in order to 
highlight the successful branding and dissemination capacities of the creative city, 
alongside a genealogy of urban development discourses within the context of culture 
and cultural policy, and a description and analysis of the key discourses, linguistic 
references and legitimation principles of the paradigm. 
 
This chapter will also bring together the significant body of critique that has developed 
in response to the creative city, highlighting the role of the private sector within it 
(particularly as it relates to the state), and argue for a new and critical consideration of 
the role played by culture and cultural practitioners within the paradigm. It will be 
argued that key to the appeal and legitimation of the creative city, is the juxtaposition of 
hard (economic) and soft (creative/cultural) power, suggested and embodied by the 
flexible and productive creative worker. It will also be argued that the paradigm is the 
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latest international urban regeneration discourse to “migrate” (Foucault, 1972, p. 154) to 
cultural policy, and indicate issues raised by this, most particularly the question of who 
benefits from such a publicly funded paradigm within a putatively democratic context. 
 
3.2 The creative city: core principles 
Historically, the role of cities as the locus for the cultural, political and, in particular, 
economic life of nations has ensured continued interest in the concept of the city. In 
particular, the interest in the city as a symbolic and organising concept has been 
increasing since the 18
th
 century and the later industrial revolutions. However, the 
history of city development in general,
1
 and, critically, the marketing of cities as 
successful and competitive drivers of economies, has been of central interest to national 
policymakers, political economists, and urban strategists. More recently, the creative 
city paradigm of urban development, and in particular, Richard Florida’s paradigm 
(2002; 2005; 2007), has put an emphasis on applied creativity in cities, profoundly 
impacting policymakers (Miles and Paddison, 2005, p. 835)
 
and reputing to ameliorate 
the recession throughout the advanced capitalist world.
2 
 In particular, this model has 
impacted the Anglophone countries of the UK, Canada, Australia, the US, and 
Australasia, becoming an international brand of successful post-industrial cities that 
trade on the benign tropes of creativity and culture (e.g. Creative Helsinki, Creative 
Birmingham, etc.).
3
 Such is the success of the model (and Florida’s model in particular), 
                                                           
1 Bavaria is reported to have used culture for branding as one of the “first conscious long-term” regional 
marketing initiatives in the 19
th
 century (Lind, 2007, p. 56). 
 
2
 In January 2009, Richard Florida discussed the creative city in respect of the global financial recession, 
stating that: “regions with high scores on my creativity index, a measure of long-term economic potential 
based on the 3 Ts – technology, talent and tolerance – are much more resilient than others on average.” 
From his Creative Class Blog[online]. Available: www.creativeclass.com [Accessed 21January 2009]. 
3
 For more on Creative Helsinki, see Mustonen (2010). Creative Birmingham was announced in May, 
2012 and has commissioned KEA consultants to create the project Creative Spin, Creative Spillovers for 
Innovation. This is a “3- year URBACT project aimed at setting up tools and methods to trigger 
innovation and creativity in businesses and other kinds of public and private organisations” [online]. 
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and the attention it has generated from the academic, enterprise and cultural sector, that 
local authorities have been described as “Floridazed” (Malanga, 2004, n.p.), few places 
lack a “creativity campaign” (Knell and Fleming, 2008, p. 25), and a vast industry of 
creative city consultants has arisen.
4
  
 
Originating within the social and political sciences, and combining a number of 
domains including urban studies and geography, the creative city is essentially an urban 
and industrial economic strategy, concerned with the growth and development of cities 
in a competitive global environment, working on the premise that the city is a key driver 
of national and international economies (Florida, 2002), and that creativity is a 
“fundamental source of economic growth” (ibid., p. 317). As outlined in Chapter One, 
to Florida, creative workers are needed by cities, and attracting these workers rather 
than attracting businesses, is how to achieve success in the creative economy. This 
factor locates the paradigm within a late-capitalist model concerned with flexible 
paradigms of mobile labour or talent. Attracting the creative classes, Florida’s name for 
these workers, can be done by developing cultural and recreational amenities, as well as 
by encouraging open and tolerant atmospheres (which also involve the presence of those 
workers), securing knowledge-intensive, high-yielding businesses (ibid.). Florida 
positions these classes as the fastest-growing economic group in the world, a saviour of 
the post-industrial age and an exemplary economic model for emergent nations that are 
overly dependent on the service economy and that have few natural resources (ibid. 
2007, p. 35).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
Available: http://urbact.eu/en/header-main/integrated-urban-development/exploring-our-thematic-
clusters/innovation-and-creativity/#other [Accessed 2 July 2012]. 
4
 There are countless international agencies and companies offering creative city work, these include: 
BOP consulting (bop.co.uk), Noema Research and Planning (noema.org.uk), Creative Cities 
Consulting/Illuminomics (www.creativecitiesconsulting.com), Creative Class (creativeclass.com), 
Creative Clusters (creativeclusters.com), (the former) Creative Partnerships (creative-partnerships.com), 
amongst others [Accessed 5 June 2013]. 
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3.3 Identifying the creative city model 
Despite claims that the creative city resembles a “metaphor, [with] many 
interpretations” (Landry et al, 1996, p. 5) and that there are “many ways to be a creative 
city” (Landry, 2000, p. 66), the aims of the creative city are clear: to make a city a 
“better place to live, work and play in” and crucially, to make a “better and more 
prosperous future for all” (Florida, 2002, p. xxx). The creative city is posited as a 
“society that taps and rewards [its] our full creative potential” (ibid., p. xiii); is a 
“learning organism” responding to change (Landry, 2000, p. vi); and a city that 
embraces success, creativity, and cultural, economic and social development (British 
Council and UNESCO).
5
 These broad descriptions, as indicated by the various models 
of the creative city, illustrate a highly malleable paradigm. Typical categorisations and 
models therefore comprise:  place-marketing (synonymous with signature buildings and 
identity creation), emphasising general market development and local events directed at 
inward investment - associated with Richard Florida (Knell and Fleming, 2008, p. 25); 
policy-making, embedding creativity and culture in city decisions - identified with 
Charles Landry; and a focus on the cultural and creative industries, promoting and 
developing cultural quarters and clusters  (concerning agglomerated cultural businesses) 
as both commercial enterprises and attractive place-making initiatives (Pratt, 2008; 
Creative Metropoles, 2010).  
 
3.4 Marketing, boosterism, creative branding and urban entrepreneurialism 
Marketing, therefore, is central to the creative city, and campaigns designating 
particular cities as creative, vibrant, hip, lively and innovative places to live and work, 
are widely used to present attractive images to workers, tourists, and to a secondary 
                                                           
5 
Available: http://creativecities.britishcouncil.org/ [Accessed 27 June 2012] and 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/creativity/creative-cities-network/who-are-the-members/ 
[Accessed 11 March 2013]. 
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extent, citizens. These campaigns are particularly aimed at encouraging investors and 
companies (through the creative workers) to move to, recruit and spend in particular 
places. As such, the lineage of the creative city reaches back to the 19
th
 century tradition 
of civic boosterism,
6
 exemplified in the I Love New York campaign of the 1970s 
(appealing to pride and community, using stimulating visuals, etc.) which was credited 
with transforming negative perceptions of New York at the time. The success of this 
campaign underlines the role of branding in the “displacement” (Ricoeur, 1975, p. 3) of 
undesirable city perceptions and is enshrined in the current branding and metaphorical 
capacity of the “creative” prefix in cities names’ (i.e. Creative Birmingham, Creative 
Bradford, and Creative Helsinki)
7
. Creative (city) branding, therefore, connotes up-and-
coming places to invest in and visit and suggests success and industrial dynamism.  
 
Consequently, in addition to the various  models of the creative city, the creative 
trademark is used in a number of ways, including: urban development/branding (above); 
national branding (e.g., Creative Britain);
8
 creative industries’ and arts’ supports 
(Creative Berlin,
9
 Creative Edinburgh,
10
 Melbourne Creative,
11
 Creative Dundee,
12
 
Creativity Australia,
13
 Creative Choices,
14
 European Creative Industries Alliance
15
); 
                                                           
6
 Boosterism is a concept associated with giving something a boost or talking it ‘up’, usually in relation to 
a town or city and with the aim of attracting investment or residents. Civic boosterism is particularly 
associated with the expansion of the American West in the 19
th
 century and consequently has “long been 
a major feature of [US] urban systems”, as well as latterly associated with an entrepreneurial approach to 
city development, postmodern festival and spectacle directed at the professional-managerial classes 
(Harvey, 1989, p. 4).  
7
 See footnote # 3 as above and Creative Bradford, Available:  http://www.creativebradford.co.uk/ 
[Accessed 12 March 2013]. 
8
 Creative Britain was New Labour’s cultural manifesto from 2008 and centred on the use of creativity to 
improve social and economic issues. Available: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/CEPFeb2008.
pdf [Accessed 30 July 2013]. 
9
Available: http://www.creative-city-berlin.de/en/ [Accessed 11 March, 2013]. 
10 
Available: http://www.creative-edinburgh.com/ [Accessed 28 June 2012]. 
11
 Available: http://melbournecreative.com.au/ [Accessed 15 March 2013]. 
12 Available: http://www.creativedundee.com/ [Accessed 28 June 2012]. 
13
 Available: http://www.creativityaustralia.org.au/choirs/melbourne [Accessed 15 March 2013]. 
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creative industries and regeneration companies (Creative Europe,
16
 Creative Scotland,
17
 
Creative London,
18
 Creative Metropoles,
19
 Creative Partnerships);
20
 networks, events 
and competitive designations (European Year of Creativity and Innovation,
21
 Creative 
Sydney,
22
 British Council Creative Cities;
23
 UNESCO’s Creative Cities,24 Districts of 
Creativity
25
) and competitive creativity indices
26
 measuring various interpretations of 
creativity in cities and countries. As such, the use of the term creative (or concomitant 
terms)
27
 in the nomenclature of cities’ indicates a bewilderingly wide range of activities 
                                                                                                                                                                          
14
 Creative Choices aims to “provide knowledge, tools and support” for creative careers. Available: 
http://www.creative-choices.co.uk/ [Accessed 11 March 2013]. 
15
 The European Creative Industries Alliance produces “better policies and business supports for creative 
industries”. Available: www.howtogrow.eu [Accessed 25 April 2013]. 
16 “Europe needs to invest more in its cultural and creative sectors because they significantly contribute to 
economic growth, employment, innovation and social cohesion”. Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/creative-europe/ [Accessed 30 August 2012]. 
17
 Available: www.creativescotland.com [Accessed 11March 2013].See Chapter Five (3) for a 
comprehensive discussion on Creative Scotland. 
18
 Creative London was a “mini-agency” within the London Development Authority that emerged out of 
the Mayor’s Commission on the Creative Industries from 2003 – 2006, with a “strong focus on 
“regeneration, clusters and place making”. Available: http://directionalthinking.net/creative-
london/[Accessed 11 March 2013]. 
19
 See Creative Metropoles (2011). 
20
 Creative Partnerships was the UK’s “flagship creative learning programme running throughout 
England from 2002 until 30 September 201, when funding was withdrawn by Arts Council 
England.”Available: www.creative-partnerships.com [Accessed 5 June 2013]. 
21
 See The European Year of Creativity and Innovation (2009). 
22
 Available: http://creativesydney.tumblr.com [Accessed 15 March 2013]. 
23
 Available: http://creativecities.britishcouncil.org [Accessed 25 June 2012]. 
24
 Available:  http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/creativity/creative-cities-network/who-are-
the-members/ [Accessed 11 March 2013]. 
25
 Districts of Creativity is an international network that “unites 12 of the most creative and innovative 
regions around the world”, putting “creativity and innovation high on our agendas as multiply factor for 
sustainable growth and development” (sic) in order to “advance a creative and entrepreneurial culture, 
http://www.districtsofcreativity.org/view/nl/49999430-Districts+Of+Creativity.html [Accessed 7 
February 2012]. 
26
 See Florida’s Creativity Index measuring the overall creativity’ of a city or region and positively 
correlating it with the overall economic performance of the city/region. Available: 
http://www.creativeclass.com/rfcgdb/articles/Creativity%20Index%20Rankings%20for%20U.S.%20State
s.pdf.  See also the City and Nations Brand Index, demonstrating a city’s success or brand rather than its 
creativity. Available: www.simonanholt.com/Research/cities-index.aspx); the City Brand Barometer, 
devised by London-based Saffron Consultants, which reveals how cities rank competitively from a 
branding point of view and how their assets match their brand. Available: 
http://www.macrame.tv/storage/Saff_CityBrandBarom.pdf, and The Country Brand Index (CBI), created 
by Futurebrand, which measures a country’s overall brand. Available: 
http://www.futurebrand.com/foresight/cbi [all Accessed 17 May 2013]. 
27
 The broad marketing appeal of what might loosely be called creativity discourses (suggesting 
knowledge economy interests) has also spread to related concepts including talent, a term closely 
associated with the high human capital workers of Florida’s creative city (Hamburg, City of Talent), cool 
(Michigan’s Cool cities initiative of 2003; New Labour’s Cool Britannia of the 1990s) and culture 
(Culture Montreal  promoting “the central role of the arts and culture in all areas of Montreal’s 
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which collectively draw on the currency and appeal of the wider discourse of creativity. 
The genealogy of this discourse will be further discussed in Chapter Four (4.3). 
 
Nevertheless, the trademark of the creative city presents a number of problems: these 
are that the moniker is typically self-designated and aspirational, rather than descriptive 
or awarded, and city campaigns noted as always in the process of becoming (but never 
quite reaching) the state of being a “ ‘true’ metropolitan [or creative] city” (Palonen, 
2012, p. 11). In addition, the packaging of “too many” cities and regions as creative, not 
only “cancels each out but confuses and annoys the intended recipients” (Power, 2009, 
p. 456). The interest in the cultural marketing of cities has also resulted in tourist 
agencies (rather than cultural organisations) being the most visible champions of the 
culture of cities (Garcia, 2004, p. 316), with potential implications for the type of 
culture championed, and endorsements of the joint endeavour of place-making and 
place-marketing  (Musterd et al., 2010, p. 12).  
 
This competitive marketing of cities as “exciting, creative, and [importantly] safe 
place[s] to live or to visit, to play and consume” (Harvey, 1989, p. 9) has also become 
synonymous with “urban entrepreneurialism”, an activity typically pursued by city 
authorities in late capitalist societies who treat cities as businesses offering a series of 
opportunities to be maximised (ibid., p. 4). The success of “urban entrepreneurialism” 
depends on the leveraging of “monopoly rents” or reputational income from the sale of 
the city’s “unique and non-replicable” assets (in this case, attractive cultural and 
recreational amenities) in the form of increased property rates, as well as land and 
property values (Harvey, 2006, n.p.). Since culture reinforces and helps create 
                                                                                                                                                                          
development: economy, business, politics, land-use planning, education, and social and community life”). 
Available: http://www.culturemontreal.ca/en/. [Accessed 3March 2013). 
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marketable place identities, notions of authenticity and uniqueness embodied by culture 
exact this monopoly rent “so as to better ground their claims to uniqueness” (Harvey, 
2006, n.p.). In a reference to Ireland, Florida has described this process as a “clever and 
forward-looking strategy”... that leverages “authentic cultural assets” (Florida, 2002, p. 
302). This activity is particularly attractive to municipalities through its promise of 
generating income for cities and thus theoretically the public (purse), but is equally of 
interest to private developers and speculators assessing the potential financial return on 
one city developments or land purchase when compared with another. As a result, the 
investment of a city in cultural and recreational amenities and the marketing strategies 
tied to this (as demonstrated in creative cities) can indirectly result in greater incomes 
for private developers (as will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, section 5.3.1 in relation 
to Glasgow’s developments).  
 
Nevertheless, the pursuit of a “good local business climate” (ibid., 1989, p. 11) under 
the rubric of urban entrepreneurialism, ironically engages in the “serial reproduction” 
(ibid., p. 10) of types of cultural and recreational amenities that make cities “uniquely 
different by much the same techniques” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 73). This unsurprisingly 
results in a loss of the sought-for uniqueness and competition in those cities (Harvey, 
2006, n.p.), demonstrating the blindness of policy in recognising the way “sameness is 
reconstituted” (Dowler, 2004, p. 27). This replication of cities can be seen in the re-
creation of visual tropes of success, including commissioning landmark and large-scale 
visual projects that suggest cultural, dynamic places (such as the success of Anthony 
Gormley’s Angel of the North sculpture in Newcastle), infrastructures (e.g., Santiago 
Calatrava’s bridges) and the widespread engagement of Starchitects (the term used to 
describe the work of celebrated architects) in the mould of Daniel Libeskind, Richard 
 83 
Rogers, Zaha Hadid and Frank Gehry.
28
 As such, an ironic outcome of the widespread 
use of the creative brand, engaging the same designers and monumental scales in city 
development, is a conflation of cities and their erstwhile individuality. In order to 
further understand and identify the discrete influence of the creative city paradigm, its 
discourses, thematics and lexicons need analysis. 
 
3.5 Identifying creative city discourses  
Though there are a number of versions (and many authors) of the creative city, Richard 
Florida and the founder of the think tank Comedia, Charles Landry (formerly working 
with urbanist Franco Bianchini) have come to dominate much of its discourses, offering 
two similar, though differently emphasised typologies, to which policymakers “have 
particularly turned” (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009, p. 65). These typologies comprise 
an economic development focus in Florida’s case (place marketing and inward 
investment), and an economic, social and cultural development focus (policy-making) in 
Landry’s (Bianchini and Landry, 1994; Landry, 2000; Florida, 2002; 2005; 2007), 
though both paradigms ultimately pursue prosperity. While Landry’s work precedes 
Florida’s by at least ten years (via Comedia), Florida’s model, which reads economic 
history “as a succession of new and better ways to harness creativity” (Florida, 2002, p. 
                                                           
28
 Antony Gormley’s Angel of the North (1998) sculpture, though not the first large-scale monumental 
sculpture to brand a place, was widely perceived as placing Gateshead (Tyne and Wear, England) on the 
map. Subsequent sculptural installations have attempted to replicate Gormley’s effect and become brand 
identifiers. As such, in 2007, Dublin’s Docklands Authority received planning permission for a 48-metre 
high sculpture by Gormley before the recession resulted in these plans being abandoned (Hegarty, 2007). 
More recently, two large-scale attention-grabbing sculptures have pointed to similar spectacular 
ambitions:  Damien Hirst’s giant sculpture Verity (2012) at Ilfracombe in the south of England (BBC, 
2012) and Anish Kapoor’s Olympic Tower in London (See Higgins, 2012d). Bridge builder Santiago 
Calatrava has also created numerous, city-defining and monumental bridges around the world, including 
Newcastle, Manchester, Dublin (two), Spain, Toronto, Dallas, etc. (See www.calatrava.com). The work 
of “starchitect” and designer Daniel Libeskind, like Frank Gehry (responsible for the Bilbao 
Guggenheim), is also common in international cities. Available: http://daniel-
libeskind.com/search/node/buildings [Accessed 12 November 2012]. 
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56) has particularly captured the attention of academics,
29
 municipal authorities and 
think tanks and, this research will show, cultural policymakers. 
 
The Florida model of the creative city is chiefly distinguished by his 3 Ts correlation 
(ibid., 2007, p. 37). This is a simple moniker and acronym that represents a three-
pronged strategy for attracting mobile and skilled creative workers as well as major 
corporations, in order to develop “creative capital” in cities (ibid., pp. 37-39). The 3 Ts 
comprise: technology as a function of innovation in cities to drive industry and generate 
innovation and skills; talent (you need an educated, knowledge-based and skilled 
creative workforce); and tolerance (you need an open-minded society capable of 
accepting diverse social groups and ideas).  
 
Meanwhile, Landry’s vision of the creative city holds that culture is central to urban 
planning for quality-of-life reasons, but also business, competition (Landry, 2000, p. 14) 
and, again, attracting flexible and mobile creative workers (ibid., p. 33). For Landry in 
particular, creative cities must have an “appreciation of cultural issues” which express 
the “values and identity” of a place (Landry, 2000 p. 3) and therefore need to be 
“culturally rich” (ibid., p. 75) with a “critical mass of cultural activity” (ibid.). These 
creative cities must have creativity at their “core” and “identity, distinctiveness and 
confidence” (ibid.), in order to create a “greater chance of discovering the uniqueness 
and specialness of a place” (ibid., p. 71). This creative city must be led by “visionary 
individuals, creative organisations and a political culture sharing [a] clarity of purpose”, 
                                                           
29 
The breadth of issues comprising the creative city paradigm has given rise to a sizeable body of 
literature, mostly dominated by geographers, sociologists, urban planners and cultural economists 
including seminal work by Gunnar Tornqvist (1983) and Ake Andersson (1985), Klaus Kunzmann, 
urbanists Michael Parkinson and Peter Hall, Richard Sennett, Terry Clarke, Philip Cooke, David E. 
Andersson, Ann Markusen, Jonathan Vickery, Trine Bille, Allen J Scott, Jayne and Bell (cities, 
regeneration, cultural quarters, etc.), but also those examining new work practices and patterns in these 
cities, including John Howkins, David Throsby and Charles Leadbetter. 
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necessitating “new types of alliances” (Landry, 2000 p. 3) and “networking dynamics” 
(ibid., p. 124).  These attributes can be considered a mix of tangible or hard (location, 
skills-base, and companies) and intangible or soft (confidence, image, perception, 
workers and amenities) “creative assets” (ibid., p. 167).  Consequently, in contrast to 
Florida, Landry sees creativity as a social process as much as an economic outcome, or 
a “journey” rather than a “destination” (ibid., p. 14), demanding “open-mindedness and 
imagination” (Landry, 2006, p. 2). At the heart of this model of the creative city, 
however, the theme of cities in competition remains.  
 
Nevertheless, civil society discourses also emerge throughout Landry’s (and Comedia’s) 
texts, with the creative city posited as an artefact of community and society, a place, an 
economy and, crucially, distinguishing Landry’s paradigm from Florida’s, a “living 
organism” and “polity” actively contributing to civil society and the public sphere 
(Comedia, 1991, p. 31). “Civic creativity” (Landry, 2000, p. 69), “cooperative space[s]” 
(ibid., p. 66) and “neutral” territories for “commonality” (ibid., p. 120), according to 
Landry, will build social capital,
30
 and a tolerant, “lively” (ibid., p. 111) and, again, 
“vibrant civil society” (ibid., p. 244). This emphasis on communication in cities and the 
need for spaces for debate, marks Landry’s creative city as contributing to the public 
sphere, a concept he conflates with “public space” and  the “public realm” and  
critically, describes as a “multifaceted concept at the heart of the innovative milieu” 
(ibid., p. 119) which is “central to urban life” (ibid., p. 252).  
 
                                                           
30
 Social capital is a concept synonymous with sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and refers to a form of value 
that concerns the “aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition -
 or in other words, to membership in a group” which offers each member a “credential”” (Bourdieu, 1986, 
p. 248). See also Chapter Four for a discussion on cultural capital (4.2.2.3). 
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Florida similarly borrows community and social discourses, underlining the role of 
“sustainable” and “humane” economies, to make our lives “more complete” (Florida, 
2002, pxiii), the need for “new, more accepting” communities with the “potential to 
combine innovation and economic growth with authentic community” (ibid., p. 282), 
and the need for “new mechanisms for building social cohesion” (ibid., p. 323). Despite 
the benign connotations of this community model of the creative city, however, the 
juxtaposition of potentially conflicting goals (the economy v community) shows how 
peripheral civil society is to Florida’s economic paradigm. 
 
Nevertheless, as suggested, though Landry’s creative city may be more culture-centric, 
and more overtly references civic or civil society discourses, its dominant goal, like 
Florida’s, is competition and success, requesting that cities  reassess their “resources 
and potential” and undertake a “re-invention on all fronts” in order to compete 
internationally (Landry, 2006, p. 4). The competitive thrust of Landry’s creative city is 
also embodied in his championing of flexible creative workers. In Landry’s view, 
competitiveness is no longer to be found in “immobile, physical resources like coal, 
timber or gold, but in highly mobile brain power and creativity” (ibid., p. 33). Creative 
workers represent the “specific qualities that chime well with the needs of the ‘ideas-
driven economy’”, constituting a “highly skilled and flexible labour force [of] dynamic 
thinkers, creators and implementers” (Landry, 2006, p. 11) which provide “role models” 
on which a “cult” of the creative can be based, so that new “consumer products” can be 
developed (Comedia, 1991, p. 20). This model of the ideal 21
st
 century worker, a 
flexible, mobile, entrepreneurial, and a skilled manipulator of symbols or knowledges 
(which Florida calls the creative classes), represents a core trope of the creative city by 
drawing on the late capitalist discourse of the knowledge economy.  
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3.6 The creative classes and Floridian discourse 
However, though clearly building on the work of Landry and other urbanists, Florida’s 
particular model of the creative city foregrounds the role of creative labour or highly 
educated mobile workers, and brands them the creative classes (Florida, 2002; 2005; 
2007). The “basis” of this class is economic (Florida, 2002, p. 68), and draws on 
historical labour hierarchies aligned with the concept of skill, talent or human capital.
31
 
This interest in creative workers and specifically their grouping and clustering, reflects 
19
th
 century economic and geographic agglomeration theories concerning the deliberate 
co-location of particular businesses for “productive efficiencies”, as coined by 
economist Alfred Marshall (Florida, 2002, p. 220). The clustering of particular workers 
in “global cities” wishing to “expose their novelty to the public” (Cooke and Lazeretti, 
2008, p. 175), therefore, has had a long tradition.
32
 To Florida, the essential mission of 
these cities is to learn how to be attractive, or how to compete for this mobile talent 
(Landry, 2000; Florida, 2005). 
 
The structure of the creative classes is carefully delineated and refers to a specific, 
though disparate, grouping of mostly professional individuals who are “primarily paid 
to create” and involved in “complex problem solving” using “independent judgment and 
high levels of education or human capital”, valuing “creativity, individuality, difference 
and merit” (Florida, 2002, p. 8). These workers range from  doctors, solicitors and 
health workers, to scientists, engineers, IT workers and the more traditional creative 
occupations of artists/designers, known as the “super creative core” (ibid., p. 9).  
                                                           
31
 Capital in this respect can be viewed as “any resource which confers an advantage on those who hold it 
and which, further, can be accumulated and passed on through mechanisms of inheritance” (Bennett and 
Silva, 2011, p. 430). 
32 For further reading on cultural planning and artists clustering, see Markusen et al. (2006; 2009) and; 
Evans (2001). 
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Although Florida talks of a creative class, it is only certain less well-paid members of 
this super-creative core (artists/designers/performers), and what he calls bohemians 
(those with alternative lifestyles including artists and the gay community), who act as 
important signifiers or attractors for the rest of the better-paid creative classes. What 
artists/designers/bohemians signify, as well as create, is a “flourishing artistic and 
cultural environment” (ibid., p. 261), which indicates tolerance (diversity) and 
(consequently) economic growth, factors deemed attractive to other creative workers 
(Clifton, 2008, pp. 66-67).  For critics of the creative city, however, rather than positive 
harbingers or benign symbols of the creative economy, the arrival or central positioning 
of these creative groups has ironically come to represent a “staged gentrification” and 
softening up of neighbourhoods for raised rents and capital development (Atkinson and 
Easthope, 2009, p. 71). For many, this is indicative of “late Capitalist urbanism” 
(Deutsche, 1996, p. xiii). 
 
Ironically, despite the associations of the creative classes with the knowledge economy, 
Florida distinguishes the creative classes from the “knowledge worker”, which he sees 
as an exclusive and an inaccurate term in relation to “defining the real source of 
economic value-creation – that is, human creativity” (Florida, 2005, p. 4). For Florida, 
therefore, this creativity is not limited to knowledge, but extends to “all forms of human 
potential” (ibid., 2007, p. 61). Nevertheless, the link between the creative classes is their 
means of earning a living exclusively from knowledge rather than through manual 
labour (though as above, the living that they earn vastly differs depending on which 
creative class grouping is in question), a key hierarchical theory of cultural production 
in labour and intellectual property discourses (Stapleton, 2002, p. 145). In short, the 
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creative classes are: high-earning and yielding (with the exception of artists/designers 
etc.), semi-vocational (driven by internal motivation rather than commercial gain), 
highly mobile (adaptable), peer-motivated (self-sufficient), and hard workers that blur 
the distinction between work and home (Florida, 2002, p. 13). As such, the creative 
classes are flexible and autonomous, or ideal 21
st
 century labourers (and highly 
conscious of their identity as such). These characteristics unequivocally point to the 
attractive historical figure of the artist (independent, self-motivated etc.), but also the 
more recent and even more attractive figure of the entrepreneur, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Four.  
 
Crucially, however, though presented as wholly meritocratic, the financially and thus 
hierarchically weak position of the cultural or artistic creative classes in respect of their 
co-creative classes, is wholly ignored by Florida. The situation of these workers, who 
are chiefly important to the creative city for their symbolic value, is amplified in a 
number of late 20
th
 century critical labour terms, dominated by the precariat and the 
concept of precarity. This term refers to the analysis of flexible, insecure and vulnerable 
workers typically demonstrated within creative occupations of “self-chosen” cultural 
producers (Lorey, 2006, n.p.). These workers have emerged from the neoliberal 
capitalist reorganisation of work and class relations and the fragmentation of work 
practices (part-time/contract/insecure) since the 1970s (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2002). 
This reorganisation of work has predominantly represented the interests of the capitalist 
classes, and is consistent with an “urban entrepreneurialism” unwedded to place or 
worker (Harvey, 1989, p. 4).  
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Equally, the concept of “immaterial labour”, or the “labor that produces the 
informational and cultural content of the commodity” but which is not generally 
recompensed (Lazzarato, 1996, pp. 132-133) also represents many of the super creative 
classes.
33
 Specifically, the immaterial labourer leverages their social networks and 
tastes, as well as their creative aura for professional purposes (Arvidsson, 2007, p. 11). 
This flexible, unattached and self-employed worker, therefore, who mines their 
symbolic potential in the service of work, offers maximum flexibility with a 
diminishment of responsibility to the employer, and has few securities and rights. As 
these terms indicate, the creative class is highly contested, in terms of not only its 
disparate grouping, but also its disingenuous championing of a vulnerable and exploited 
model of labour. 
 
3.7 The lexicon of the creative city  
Having established the core concepts and tropes of the creative city, including its 
flexibility, the terms of its wide appeal (branding, symbolism, malleability) and its basis 
in and championing of educated, mobile workers, it is necessary to consider the specific 
lexicon and discursive structure of the paradigm as touched on in Chapter Two. In the 
first instance, both Landry and Florida make significant use of the broad vocabulary of 
“creative/s” and “creativity”,34  and specifically: the “creative economy” (Landry, 2000, 
p. xxi; Florida, 2002, p. 201), the “creative furnace” (Florida, 2005, p. 4), and the 
“creative age” (ibid., 2002, p. 317). However, a number of additional mobilising and 
defining creative city terms reappear throughout both of their texts. These are the 
concepts of “attracting” (Landry, 2000, p. xxiii, p. xxvi, p. xxxii, p. xxxvi, p. 31, p. 100; 
                                                           
33
 Immaterial labour is consistent with an advanced capitalism, which has “pulled off the improbable 
trick of naturalising its own forms of life by appealing not to their permanence but to their perishability” 
(Eagleton, 2000, p. 126).  
34 Since there are so many instances of these terms, in particular variations of creative/creativity, only a 
selection will be cited. 
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Florida, 2005, p. 99, p. 151; 2008, pp. 138-139), “retaining” (Landry, 2000, p. xxxix; 
Florida, 2005, p. 151
35
), “nurture/nurturing” (Landry and Bianchini, 1995, p. 1; Landry, 
2000, p. xxvi, p. xxxvi, p. 36, p. 191; Florida, 2007, p. 33),  and the metaphor of 
“harnessing” workers, talent and creativity (Landry, 2000, p. xxxvi, p. xxxvii, p. 38, p. 
116; Florida, 2007, p. 20, p. 33; 2002, p. xiii; p. 56).  
 
The term harnessing, which was touched on in section 2.6, is often used in conjunction 
with creativity, but usually with an economic context,
36
 and as a metaphor, can be seen 
as a “strategy of discourse” which “preserves and develops the heuristic power wielded 
by fiction” (Ricoeur, 1975, p. 6). “Talent” is also used as an economic term synonymous 
with the creative classes, and is a key focus (Landry, 2000, p. xi, p. xviii, p. 111; 
Florida, 2002, p. 298, 2005, p. 82). When used together, however, these concepts refer 
to the potentially conflicting (economic) capturing (harnessing/attracting/retaining) of 
pre-existing creativity or talent, as well the encouragement and shaping of new 
creativity (nurturing).  
 
3.8 Dispersions, media and public perceptions of the creative city 
The “dispersion” (Foucault, 1972, p. 42) or dissemination of creative city discourses 
such as these, have primarily worked through the “many-to-many, low-cost, 
decentralised, mutual and reciprocal interactive system” of the web (O’Brien, 2007, p. 
10). In addition and as referenced earlier (Daily Record, 2008, n.p.; Higgins, 2013a, 
                                                           
35
 In this instance a synonym (keeping) is used. 
36
 See 2012 US Presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s convention speech, September 2012. “It's the 
genius of the American free enterprise system – to harness the extraordinary creativity and talent”. 
Available http://mittromney.tumblr.com/ [Accessed 12 September 2012]. See also The Harnessing 
Creativity Project funded under INTERREG IVA. It is a “cross border initiative, to encourage new 
thinking across the creative and broader business sectors, and facilitate the effective harnessing of 
creativity for economic vibrancy in the region” Available http://visualartists.ie/jobs-
ops/jobvac/harnessing-creative-project-administrative-assistant-opportunity/ [Accessed 12 September 
2012]. See also Schwabel (2011). 
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n.p), the globalised success of the creative city has created a wholly benign and 
universal conception, that has successfully circulated beyond academia (McGuigan, 
2009; Oakley, 2009a ; Markusen and Gadwa, 2010) and policy, to media reports. These 
reports can be viewed as “representational strategies” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 329) that 
wittingly or unwittingly endorse official discourses of cultural and industrial policy. The 
prevailing media representations of creative city discourses, however, concern the 
economic, scientific/technological model of creativity, with innovation, enterprise and 
competition, as well as tourism discourses of culture (Ward, 2002; McWilliams, 2006; 
Irish Independent, 2007; Irish Times, 2008; Connolly, 2010; O’ Dwyer, 2010; Fogarty, 
2012), rather than autonomous discourses of culture’s proposed intrinsic value.  
 
These accounts typically comprise claims that: a “reputation  for cultural creativity is 
attractive to businesses considering investing”...because it “suggests a climate of 
innovation and counterintuitive thinking” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.); “the presence of ‘artists 
and bohemians’ may be linked to economic productivity and the growth of jobs” (Ward, 
2002, n.p.); English cities are “using creative industries to emerge from grim recession-
dominated pasts” (ibid.); there is a “close correlation between how receptive a region is 
to artists and its potential to create wealth” (The Guardian, 2010, n.p.); a “large, thriving 
creative community indicates a tolerant, diverse, pluralistic society, which in turn 
attracts the sort of knowledge-workers who power post-modern economies” (ibid.); 
visitors are “lured by” ... “sizzling creativity” (Connolly, 2007, n.p.);  culture makes a 
city an “interesting place to live [which] is a good prescription for economic 
development” (Ozimek, 2012, n.p.),37 and again (reporting on government views), that 
the arts help “attract investment which will drive jobs and opportunities” (Higgins, 
                                                           
37 While this article is critical of these creative city ideas, it demonstrates the pervasive dissemination of 
the paradigm amongst the media. 
 93 
2013a, n.p.).  Similarly, benign accounts of culture’s role in city regeneration are 
demonstrated  in accounts of “coffee shops, restaurants, bookstores, an aesthetically 
pleasant downtown” (Paquette, 2008, p. 307), “vibrant” places, and discourses of 
creativity as “raising and changing the profile of the city” and “rejuvenating entire 
neighbourhoods” (O’Dwyer, 2010, n.p.).38 This has cumulatively resulted in a 
meritocratic and sustainable media narrative of positive urban development, with a 
focus on liveability and optimism (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009). 
 
Further, though there has been opposition to the creative city among certain artists’ 
groups (as detailed in Chapter One: 1.2.2), the positive perception of the creative city is 
upheld by many artists and arts administrators, who, though they may not have read 
Florida’s work, appear “enthusiastic” about it (Markusen, 2006, p. 1935). Artists are 
also claimed to be appreciative of the access to international work that a creative city 
can bring (ibid., p. 1936), and acknowledge the visibility and status the paradigm 
affords them (Oakley, 2009a, p. 4). Though this approval is likely influenced by the 
dependence of artists on public subsidy and their need to maintain legitimacy in the eyes 
of the public (by appearing to be useful for city development), the active participation of 
artists and arts workers creates a wide base of policy and practitioner support for the 
creative city concept. The outlay of benefits arising from the creative city, therefore, 
essentially suggests tangible and identifiable (and defensible) uses for culture, 
increasing the legitimacy of the discourse and an apparent public return on investment.  
 
 
 
                                                           
38
 See also Starr (2008)  
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3.9 The persuasiveness of the creative city  
Taken together, in light of the creative city’s key themes (culture as attraction factor, 
investment) and historical and contemporary genealogies of post-industrialism 
(neoliberalism, the economy, society, lifestyle, well-being, creativity, development, 
innovation, entrepreneurialism, etc.), it can be viewed as operating within the meta and 
nominalising (see 2.4.3) discourse of capitalism. This meta discourse frames economic 
and market-oriented discussions of creativity in cities as neutral processes with “silent 
births” (Foucault, 1972, p. 154), comprising “already speaking” or prepared concepts 
(ibid., 1981, p. 48) without any apparent source. The genealogy of the terms investment, 
success, prosperity and mobility associated with the creative city, can be viewed as 
concomitant with the principle of accumulation embodied in the ideology of capitalism.  
 
Equally, the use of repetitive and particular lexicons (attraction, talent, harnessing, etc.) 
provide instantly recognisable and branded creative city concepts, reassuring in their 
familiarity and talismanic in their impact. These discourses also leverage often 
competing (as above) optimistic, meritocratic and neoliberal ideologies, centring on 
attracting private investment, workers and talent, through the symbolic glamour of 
culture, within a compelling and legitimising hybrid of creativity (as both a value 
system, process and a brand), the economy, society and the civic community. 
Additionally, the formulaic nature of the creative city offers an easy-to-follow and 
memorable model (i.e., the three Ts, develop cultural amenities and you will attract 
business, tourists and workers), with charismatic champions (Florida), and, compared 
with tackling embedded social problems, is cheap, ensuring a “fast policy transfer” 
(Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 397). This analysis will be further developed in Chapter Six. 
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The persuasiveness of the creative city, however, is also dependent on the genealogy of 
the creative city. 
 
3.10 Urban development discourses and histories, explicit and implicit cultural 
policies 
As such, the creative city can be viewed as part of the archaeology of city discourses 
originating in ancient Greek scholarship (e.g., Plato’s Republic) concerning the role and 
ethical life of the city and the origins of democracy and the citizen (also referred to in 
Landry’s civil society and public sphere iterations). However, the creative city paradigm 
as a model of aspirational urban life, finds expression that is more contemporary in 
moral accounts from the 19
th
 century industrial revolution in Britain. These accounts 
span Enlightenment discourses of progress and cosmopolitanism, to counter-discourses 
of chaotic, rapidly expanding and increasingly complex urban life. Moralising 
discourses of the city first arose out of fears of the massive influx of workers into cities 
that accompanied the industrial revolution and the profound social and cultural changes 
that the revolution represented (Sennett, 2006), creating a new movement of writers and 
thinkers concerned with how people should live (ibid., p. 328).  
 
As with many discourses of the time, however, these discourses were dichotomously 
positioned along romantic and utilitarian lines, chiefly characterised by disapproving 
narratives of unhealthy cities and the perceived loss of nature (in the face of massive 
industrialisation). This was reflected in “mythicised” narratives “of a dystopia in the 
metropolises and mega-cities” (Jayne, 2004, p. 135) and was amplified in discourses of 
the 19
th
 century utopian “garden city”, linking alternative ways of living to morally 
inscribed purer and better ways of life (ibid.). Both of these discourses can be viewed as 
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romantic and quasi-moral and were in competition with rational or utilitarian pro-
revolution accounts of industrial progress and benefit. More particularly, these accounts 
foreground urban planning and the benign premise and possibility of creative cities. 
 
The contemporary precursor to the paradigm, however, lies in the interest shown in 
cities following the devastation of World War II, and the consequent response to 
negative perceptions of cities as degraded, depleted and crime-ridden (as exemplified by 
New York) (Bianchini, 1993). Post-war urban devastation followed a combination of 
de-industrialisation and the exceptional growth of, the US (at first) and European 
suburban model (ibid.). In the US, the 1970s saw community development and urban 
design groups respond to this neglect by considering the wider creative potential of 
cities in community development (Cooke and Lazeretti, 2008). These movements were 
synonymous with the pioneering work of urban planner Jane Jacobs (who was highly 
influential on Florida) who proposed new ways to organise and negotiate urban space 
and buildings (ibid., p. 3). However, there were major political and economic 
developments at this time which also impacted on urban development narratives in the 
West. 
 
These were the global recessions of the 1970s and 1980s and concomitant social 
changes that reflected new consumer demands and framings of city lifestyles (Bianchini, 
1993, p. 1). The context to these changes was the emergence of neoliberalism and urban 
entrepreneurialism in the US and Europe which contributed to a renewed interest in 
cities as income generators, and reflected the demand for new spaces in which to live, 
spend leisure time, or play. This movement was met by a combination of city authorities 
working with private developers, and in some cities (New York), cultural interests, led 
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by a patrician elite who had discovered the social prestige of modern art (Zukin, 1988). 
Along with broader policy rationalisms that also emerged from the recessions, this new 
urban movement drove an interest in economic valuations of culture, and in particular, 
its strategic usefulness to cities “for the benefit of the middle and upper classes” 
(Rosler, 2010, p. 3). This new valuation was led by the recognition of culture’s ability to 
lend symbolic glamour and allure to property developers’ projects, which ultimately 
resulted in monopoly rents. This activity was characterised by the privatisation of public 
spaces through property development and slum clearances, publicly subsidised city 
development and critically, the state facilitating the generation of private sector wealth 
(Harvey, 1989, p. 7). Effectively, therefore, these events highlighted the delicate 
balance of city investment and development for the benefit of citizens and putative tax-
payers, and the private wealth-creation of developers and investors, in new models of 
public/private partnerships.  
 
 In the 1980s, this interest in the city and its economic and cultural potential (as well as 
the relationship between the two) became of central interest to municipal authorities, 
shifting from the US to Europe and then Australia (Landry, 2006; Cherbo, Stewart, and 
Wyzszomirski, 2008). Like concepts of lifestyle, new concepts such as the “night-time 
economy” (Wynne, 1992, p. 15) and “24-hour city” (O’Connor, 2007, p. 34) mobilised 
around culture, along with EU-influenced  “quality of life” discourses (Vickery, 2011, 
p. 7).
39
 The growth of urban think tanks such as Comedia also reflected this movement 
(established in 1978), and was key to the initial popularisation of the creative city 
concept in the UK, though the term itself was first iterated in Australia in the late 1980s 
(Landry, 2006).  
                                                           
39
Quality of life discourses are reputed to have been influenced by the urban regeneration policies of the 
Council of Europe in the late 1970s, through the European Campaign for Urban Renaissance: 1982 – 
1986 (Vickery, 2011, p. 7). 
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The role of the cultural industries within cities and regions was also central to the 
positioning of culture and creativity in urban and place development, particularly in the 
UK, and became representative of sustainable and entrepreneurial development, as well 
as key to place-making strategies. The growth of these industries in the 1980s and the 
role of cities in promoting them, has been linked to neoliberalism’s meritocratic 
championing of individualism, the centrality of the market, heroically-framed 
freelancers, the self-employed (such as the precariat), the growth of micro-businesses, 
and the broader enforced DIY culture of the impoverished Thatcher era (O’Connor, 
2007, pp. 26-31). This benign narrative of dynamism, professionalism and 
entrepreneurialism, therefore, was essentially born out of necessity and severe economic 
hardship (Harvey, 1989, p. 4; O’ Connor, 2007, p. 36). The result of these difficulties 
was a reassessment of the role of culture in society by policymakers and a new demand 
for a return on public investment beyond that of symbolically representing the patrician 
state. This demand drove the need for greater advocacy and research into the economic 
value of culture, which, together with the cultural industries and urban and regional 
development, fed directly into discourses of culture and the economy in city 
development.  
 
By the early 1990s in the UK, the nomenclature of the creative city had been proposed 
by think-tank Comedia (for which Landry worked), who had instigated a formal 
creative city strategy for Glasgow in 1991 to coincide with its City of Culture status 
(Comedia, 1991).  However, the EU was equally instrumental in driving (and funding) 
regional development discourses via its Structural Funds, directed at the more 
depressed parts of Europe (Evans and Foord, 1999), as Chapter Six will demonstrate. 
The place-development focus of the Structural Funds complemented the EU’s new role 
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in European cultural policy (via the Maastricht Treaty of 1993),
40
 and the central role of 
the Knowledge Economy in Europe’s Lisbon Agenda (2000). This agenda reflects many 
of the targets of the creative city (and trope of the creative worker) in aiming to make 
Europe “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion” (European Commission, 2006a, p1).41 The Lisbon treaty was also notable for 
its championing of public and private initiatives, the development of new funding 
streams and consequently the creation of semi-state bodies. More recently, the United 
Nations Agenda 21 for Culture, has aimed to make culture an “indispensable dimension 
for [sustainable] development” (United Cities and Local Governments, 2004, p. 1) and 
made a “commitment to ensure that culture takes a key role in urban policies” (ibid., 
p.2).
42
 Equally, the blueprint “Europe 2020” report, a “strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth” (European Commission, 2010a), has continued the Lisbon 
Treaty’s linking of knowledge and innovation  as part of the evolving genealogy 
between culture, creativity, knowledge, and innovation, though it omits explicit 
references to culture or the arts.
43
 These events gave added impetus to culture and 
development discourses and ensured the traction, sustainability and “dispersion” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 41) of the creative city.
44
  
 
                                                           
40 
With the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, cultural policy acquired a legal basis on a complementary 
and subsidiary basis in European policy terms under Article 151. Available:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/4_17_0_en.htm [Accessed 29 June 2011]. 
41
  See also Europe's Digital Competitiveness Report (European Commission, 2010c).  
42
 The Agenda 21 for Culture report also underlines that “culture lies at the heart of urban strategies, not 
just due to its intrinsic vocation of promoting human rights, shaping the knowledge society and improving 
quality of life for all, but also on account of its role in the creation of employment, urban regeneration and 
social inclusion” (United Cities and Local Governments, 2004, p. 1). 
43
See The Contribution of Culture to the Implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy, Conference held in 
Budapest, 28 February – 1 March, 2011, Budapest. Available:  
http://www.kulturpont.hu/culture2020/HANDBOOK.pdf [Accessed 18 September 2012]. See also 
Chapter Four (4.3.4). 
44 
More recent EU initiatives include the Livelycities project which aimed to “reclaim public space for 
public use”, funded through the EU INTERREG IVB programme. Available: http://www.lively-
cities.eu/urban-lifestyle-point-ulp-rubrique-15.htm [Accessed 31 July 2012]. 
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In aggregate, a number of factors point to the development of the creative city. These 
factors were: post-war urban revivalism;  economic pressures created by the consecutive 
recessions of the 1970s and 1980s; the growth of neoliberalism and urban 
entrepreneurialism; the development of public/private partnerships; the growth in 
consumer demand for lifestyle products and liveable cities; new concepts such as 
quality of life; the growth of community development organisations; the emergence of 
the cultural industries and regional development agenda; the emergence and influence 
of managerialism in governments; EU and UN funding-led developments, and, 
ultimately, the coalition of economic, urban, cultural and geographic discourses. By the 
late 1990s therefore, the term creative was sedimented and monumentalised within 
documents, projects and policy proposals, in both cultural and non-cultural contexts 
such that the relationship between urban and cultural policy had been described as 
“inseparable” (Worpole, 1991, p. 143, cited in McGuigan, 1996, p. 95). This took place 
in tandem with evolving concepts of culture-led regeneration, cultural regeneration and 
cultural planning (Landry, 2006), creating powerful “regimes of thought” (Foucault, 
1980, p. 81) with discursive “rules of right” (ibid., p. 93). 45  
 
By 2000 (as Landry’s seminal work “The Creative City” was published), the creative 
city paradigm was established in municipal and academic contexts as a flexible, 
persuasive and relatively cheap approach to city marketing, development and 
competition, privileging private sector investment on the pretext of innovative urban 
development and vibrant creative economies. This paradigm of urban development 
offered a tangible economic rationale for investing in culture and creativity - or a 
cultural rationale for investing in the economy - promising uniquely attractive (both 
                                                           
45
 Culture-led regeneration refers to cultural activity acting as “the catalyst and engine of regeneration.” 
Cultural regeneration, by contrast, refers to the integration of cultural activity into an area strategy 
“alongside other activities in the environmental, social and economic sphere” (IFACCA, 2006, p. 6).  
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socially and culturally) cities, with competitive and flexible workers, mobilised around 
a lucrative knowledge economy and healthy international investment. The international 
success and reach of the creative (city) brand was reflected in signposting initiatives by 
diplomatic agencies such as UNESCO’s Creative Cities Network,46 the British 
Council’s Creative Cities’ programme, and as referred to earlier, UNESCO’s Districts 
of Creativity.  The creative city, therefore, though a specific example of urban 
development, can be viewed as a specific and dominant cultural / and or economic 
discourse that aims to influence and instrumentally work on the “culture of the territory 
over which it presides” in order to create attractive places that appeal to creative 
workers and businesses (Ahearne, 2009, p. 143). As such, the creative city paradigm can 
be viewed as an “implicit” mode of cultural policy (ibid.).  
 
3.11 Key criticisms  
Despite this success and approval from certain artistic quarters, the creative city has 
generated a number of criticisms from what Florida has called “squelchers” (Florida, 
2007, p. 44). These criticisms can be categorised as social, methodological and 
economic, and come from both the political right and left. Criticisms of the creative city 
from the right, which are mainly directed at Florida, underline the equivocal and 
nominalising nature of creative city discourses and relate to what are viewed as 
implausible and unproven economic claims for cities (Malanga, 2004, n.p.). These 
claims are: that the creative city equivocates between incompatible right and left 
ideologies of free markets and competition, with investment in amenities and services, 
talking the “economic-development talk while walking the familiar big-spending walk” 
(ibid.); that it promotes  high-income jobs without lowering taxes or depleting services, 
                                                           
46 Available:  http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/creativity/creative-cities-network/who-are-
the-members/ [Accessed 11 March 2013]. 
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the “equivalent of an eat-all-you-want-and-still-lose-weight diet” (ibid.); and that the 
creative city presents “liberal havens as models of growth” (Lovink and Rossiter, 2007, 
p. 30). Many of these criticisms, therefore, concern the juxtaposing of competing but 
legitimising regimes of thought. The greatest volume of dissent, however, has come 
from the left. 
 
Central to these (left) criticisms of the creative city, is the representation of creativity as 
offering “almost any solution to perceived urban problems” and thereby glossing over 
deeper social issues (McRobbie, 2004, p. 189). Equally, the paradigm is charged with 
compounding social inequalities by its exclusion of non-creatives (Markusen, 2006, p. 
1922; Bayliss, 2007, p. 892) and that it “bowdlerises social-scientific reasoning” 
(McGuigan, 2009, p. 292). The paradigm is also criticised for its promotion of a “zero-
sum” competition for “mobile public and private investments”  (Peck, 2005, p. 761); its 
focus on the young and privileged middle classes (Bayliss, 2007, p. 892); its celebration 
of late 20
th 
century atomisation and singularity (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Atkinson and 
Easthope, 2009); its avoidance of fundamental issues of “citizenship and democracy”  
(Scott, 2006, p. 15) despite its discourse of public space and participation; its focus on 
tourists, rather than citizens (Markusen, 2006, p. 1924); its nominalised representation 
of contingent neoliberal values and processes through discourses of  urban 
entrepreneurialism, monopoly rent and tropes of “collective symbolic capital” 
(Pasquinelli, 2007, p. 20) and, given the role of culture in the paradigm, that Florida is 
“not much at all interested in cultural policy itself” (McGuigan, 2009, p. 292). 
 
This emphasis on the mining of symbolic capital in cities (Harvey, 1990, p. 256), as 
represented through urban entrepreneurialism (depending on visual architectural and 
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cultural tropes),
47
 refers to the concept of simulacra and is one of the key ideological 
criticisms of the creative city. The simulacrum is derived from Jean Baudrillard’s theory 
of simulation based on the generation of a “real without origin or reality: a hyperreal” ... 
“map” that determines and “precedes” the real (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 2).  Simulacrum in 
this respect refers to societies having lost touch with the real world due to the gradual 
replacement of reality with superficial image, where representation comes to determine 
rather than reflect the real and there is a “state of such near perfect replication that the 
difference between the original and the copy becomes almost impossible to spot” 
(David Harvey, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. 183). The simulacrum, therefore, obfuscates 
some cultural forms in favour of others.  
 
The spectacle is another key term associated with urban entrepreneurialism and was 
coined by Guy Debord (1970).
48
 In contrast to the replacement of the real and deception 
implied by the simulacrum, the spectacle refers to a distraction from the real in the form 
of mediatised social relationships, as posited by Adorno and Horkheimer’s theories of 
the spectacularisation of culture through the perpetual, and always unrealised, promise 
of mass culture (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944, p. 139).
  
 
The creative city is also criticised on epistemological grounds (as levelled by criticisms 
from the right) for its “unsubstantiated” claims (O’Connor, 2007, p. 39) and lack of  
“evidence” (Glaesar, 2005, p. 596); misunderstandings between correlation and 
causality, especially in relation to the 3 Ts (Clark, 2004, p. 15; Musterd et al., 2010, p. 
271; Ozimek, 2012); its avoidance of the question of whether attracting people to one 
                                                           
47
 See also Chapter Three (3.4, footnote #28). 
48
As a concept, the spectacle is closely associated with Guy Debord’s ‘‘Society of the Spectacle’’ 
concerned with how the “entire life” of societies that are driven by the capitalist principle of production, 
“announce[s] itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles” which distract from reality, in lieu of 
“representation” (Debord, 1970, 1). 
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place is at the expense of another (Bille, 2006, p. 1068); being simplistic or “fast” (Peck 
and Tickell, 2002, p. 397); reducing and simplifying problems of work, labour and 
capital (Prichard et al., 2006, p. 519) and “too intuitively appealing for the good of 
our[its] cities” (Jayne, 2004, p. 239).  
 
Finally, other criticisms of the creative city ironically constitute its strengths, which are 
that Florida is “skilled at combining the ideas of others” (McGuigan, 2009, p. 292) and 
his paradigm: breathes “new life into an old argument” (Malanga, 2005, n.p.); is 
successful not because it is “revolutionary” but because it is “so modest” (Peck, 2005, p. 
760) and equally, that it “would hardly be spreading like wildfire if they [it] represented 
a revolutionary challenge to the neoliberal status quo” (ibid., 2007, n.p.). This is 
particularly the case in relation to Florida’s championing of human capital through the 
creative classes (reflecting concepts such as Robert Reich’s symbol analysts, Daniel 
Bell’s information workers and Peter Drucker’s knowledge workers), the use of 
industrial clustering and agglomeration theories (originally pioneered by Alfred 
Marshall), spatial regeneration discourses more generally (Jane Jacobs and later the EU) 
and the concept of linking culture to city regeneration (earlier advanced in Myerscough, 
1988 and Wynne, 1992).  
 
An interesting outcome of this critical debate has been Florida’s rejoinder to his critics, 
in claims that their “heated rhetoric” baffles him (Florida, 2007, p. 41), but also his tacit 
though equivocal acknowledgment of social critiques of the creative city. This is 
demonstrated in Florida’s statements calling for “new forms of social cohesion 
appropriate to the new Creative age” (Florida, 2002, p. xxx) and his acceptance that 
there are inequalities in “leading creative regions” which he, nevertheless, calls 
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“externalities of the creative age” (Florida, 2005, p. 171). This equivocal recognition of 
the creative city’s problematics, in the context of persuasion and pragmatism will be 
further discussed in Chapter Six (6.3). 
 
 
3.12 Artists and culture in the creative city 
Notwithstanding these critiques, however, there are significant and under-represented 
problems with how the paradigm positions artists and culture more generally, with 
implications for how the discourse is used in cultural circles to legitimate cultural 
activity. One of the key criticisms of artists in relation to the creative city is their 
association with, if not links to, regeneration initiatives (Zukin, 1988; Rosler, 2010). 
The link between artists and regeneration has led some to focus their ire on artists as 
much as Florida, in claims that cultural workers have little connection to economic 
development or job creation, but a lot to do with gentrification, driving up the cost of 
living, furnishing “bobo-friendly49 amenities” (Malanga, 2004, n.p.), softening up the 
neighbourhood for capital development and diverting funding away from more 
deserving community funding, with the effect of polarising cultural and community 
groups (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009, p 71).  
 
Similarly, criticisms of the role of creative workers in helping to develop and prop up 
new strains of capitalism have grown over the past decades  (Zukin, 1988; Rosler, 
2010), and are exemplified in the work of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2002). These authors argue that it was partly the precarity or economic 
vulnerability of artists or cultural workers willing to support their own artistic 
                                                           
49
 Bobo refers to bourgeois bohemian or bohemian bourgeois, made popular by David Brooks in 2000 to 
refer to liberal, tolerant and corporate groups, that reconcile “the Protestant work ethic and the bohemian 
ethic” (McGuigan, 2009, p. 293). 
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production, and demanding more flexible models of labour, which led to the “New 
Spirit of Capitalism” (ibid.). This movement was characterised by self-inscribed 
autonomy, self-regulation and entrepreneurialism, represented by the precarious model 
of creative labour of the “super-creative” classes (Florida, 2002, p. 9). The result of this 
was a social transformation and new “connexionist” or “network” variant of capital 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2002, p. 9), constituting a “third form of capitalism” (ibid., p. 
4). This variant of capitalism, via the creative city, depends on precarity to make a 
profit, and produces and champions this model as a “justificatory regime” for its 
(capitalism’s) continued existence (ibid., p. 7).  
 
Nevertheless, as suggested above, though artists have supported the creative city 
concept (Oakley, 2009a, p. 4), were active in the development of the New York loft 
movement and consequently the displacement of tenants in the 1970s (Zukin, 1988), 
have often been “pressed into service” by governments (Fanning, 2011, n.p.) and have 
even “produced according to command” (Rosler, 2010, p. 10), the exception is more 
typically the case. This was demonstrated in Hamburg and Toronto through anti-Florida 
urban development groups respectively called Not in Our Name and Creative Class 
Struggle as Chapter One outlined, comprising artists and other workers protesting at 
socially inequitable regeneration initiatives and the symbolic harnessing of the creative 
brand to advance a fundamentally private sector and exclusive initiative. As such, some 
have pointed out that artists themselves are caught up in and more adversely affected by 
the rises in living costs associated with “gentrification” (Rosler, 2010, p. 6) and are 
rarely the beneficiaries of such urban strategies (Rosler, 2010); that “being conscripted 
to the creative class has not yielded to artists the economic privilege that their presence 
is said to breed” (Daly, 2004, n.p.); that “arts trophy-focused expenditures and 
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strategies” place artists at the centre of key government and municipal decision-making, 
ascribing them far greater power than they in reality possess, but that equally that they 
are “unwitting, individualized dupes” of neoliberal competitive cities (Markusen, 2006, 
pp. 1935-1936); and conversely, that “artists and art businesses do have the ability to 
enhance local economies and transform neighbourhoods” without compromising 
communities but need the right “regulatory practices to address market forces” 
(Stewart, 2008, p. 125).  
 
Other problems with Florida’s creative classes are the circular logic of positing that 
“artists are included in the creative class, as those to be attracted, but they're also 
positioned as the bait to attract themselves as part of that class” (Daly, 2004, n.p.); the 
professional disparity of the creative classes (as indicated by precarity versus stability); 
and Florida’s lack of acknowledgment of the creative class’s potential to lead urban and 
social transformation rather than merely signify it (Markusen, 2006). Ironically, 
research also suggests the super-creative classes in the US “disproportionately work and 
live in suburbs” rather than cities, further undermining Florida’s core argument (ibid., p. 
1923). 
 
Despite criticisms of the relationship between the creative city and simulacra and 
spectacle (Harvey, 1990), the exclusivity of the creative classes (McGuigan, 2009) and 
the complicity of artists and designers in private developments in relation to 
gentrification and regeneration (Zukin, 1988; Rosler, 2010), however, little critical 
attention has been paid to Florida’s attitude to culture and cultural practitioners within 
the creative city. Florida harbours a negative romanticism towards artists, of whom by 
his own admission, he lacks understanding (Florida, 2007, p. 41). This is demonstrated 
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by his view of artists as essentially uninterested in money, mainly wanting to “hone 
their skills and do their art” and “if they can make money in the process, that’s 
wonderful” (Florida, 2002, p. 201). Essentially, this shows how Florida is “content to 
imagine that artists just want to practice, without much aspiration toward a living wage” 
(Daly, 2004, n.p.), emphasising again the financially-disparate nature of the creative 
class.
50
 More critically, this factor points to Florida’s lack of interest in the 
sustainability of creativity, i.e., how artists actually make a living and how a place can 
be creative without providing professional opportunities for creatives. Additionally, by 
focusing on the outcome rather than production or process of creativity, this approach 
lacks interest in the process of cultural production.  As such, while it has been claimed 
that Florida is not “motivated at all by the usual concerns of cultural policy” 
(McGuigan, 2009, p. 295), it is not clear that the usual concerns of cultural policy are so 
different from Florida’s work. This has implications for culture which will be further 
discussed in Chapter Seven. 
 
3.13 Private development in the creative city 
While these criticisms are diverse, a significant problem with the creative city paradigm 
and thus public policy, is the political, social and democratic implications of a paradigm 
that positions culture as representing a “particular set of class interests and [a] reading 
of the world” (McGuigan, 2009, p. 298) by strategically working to achieve urban 
competition. The collusion of these interests comprising property developers and capital 
owners with marketers and public authorities (and sometimes artists), therefore,  is 
                                                           
50 Florida’s negligent attitude to artists is supported by his response to a comment on the high ranking of 
Austin (Texas) on his Creative Class website, in light of the lack of opportunities for most musicians 
there. Florida pointed out that the index only indicated the presence (or spectacle) of creativity, not what 
professional opportunities might exist for artists/ musicians, a secondary concern. Available: 
www.creativeclass.com [Accessed 20 March 2009]. 
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central to the creative city, leading many to view the funding of urban development 
programmes as constructed specifically for private, rather than public, gain.
 51
   
 
Urban development practices, urban entrepreneurialism and civic boosterim are 
typically facilitated through models of public subsidy and tax incentives, as well as 
public-private partnerships working in tandem with the process of  “flexible 
accumulation” (Harvey, 1989, p. 5). These partnerships involve the speculative 
movement of private capital, investment and workers (such as the creative classes) from 
one competing city to another. This movement of investment from city to city is 
consistent with globalisation (and businesses moving according to whichever tax regime 
suits) and the transition from location-based Fordist, to post-industrial mobile 
manufacturing or production, in the context of intense competition (from countries and 
cities) for development capital and the perceived need to create a “‘good business 
climate’ ” (ibid., p. 11).52 This process will be demonstrated to be a driving factor in the 
cultural policies of the sample cases. 
 
The speculative, unplanned, flexible and uncommitted nature of this investment, results 
in an uneven development, that devalues the city’s community assets, and, crucially, its 
public goods, as well as generally promoting diversionary “urban spectacles” and 
“display”, as referred to earlier (ibid., p. 9).  As above (see 3.4), these city spectacles are 
often delivered through cultural trophies that include Starchitecture and intentionally 
monumental, iconic and emblematic landmarks (and large in scale). Key to 
understanding problems with the concept of the spectacle (rather than simulacrum), are 
                                                           
51
 Dublin has plans for a new cultural quarter that is being largely financed by US based private 
international property company, Kennedy Wilson. See Chapter Five (5.5.2) and Reilly (2013). 
52
 Low corporate taxation directed at attracting major international knowledge economy businesses such 
as Google and Facebook, has been central to Ireland’s industrial policies and is a major source of 
criticism from the international community (also competing for investment). See Irish Examiner (2013). 
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comparisons with the “ancient Roman formula for social pacification of the restless 
plebs”, using visual displays as instruments of “social control” designed to distract, 
distort and eschew criticism (Harvey, 1990, p. 257). The role of spectacle, therefore, 
vis-à-vis private development in the creative city, is linked to creating “dramatized 
visual environments” in cities (Scott, 2006, p. 15). This frames the state as a distorter of 
reality and again, as a “facilitator” for the strategic interests of capitalist development, 
where “the public sector assumes the risk and the private sector takes the benefits”, 
rather than constructions of the state as a “stabilizer of capitalist society” (Harvey, 1989, 
p. 7). As the role of the state is to balance the rights of the public with the markets and 
private sector (Parsons, 1995, pp. 8 - 12), this precarious balancing of the state and 
market is at the heart of democratic capitalism,
 53
 liberal democracies and legitimation 
of the state, as well as debates about the creative city. 
 
This alludes to a further implication that arises from the dependence of the creative city 
on the private sector in respect of its devaluing of public goods, as indicated above 
(Harvey, 1989, p. 9).  While the “’pure’ public good” has been “subject to (growing) 
impurity” (Parsons, 1995, p. 11), one of the key principles of liberalism (and liberal 
democracies) is that those who challenge the security of property or the market threaten 
the “realization of the public good” (Held, 2006, p 76), or the freedom of the market.  
As the creative city endorses urban development and thus private interests and 
securities, the suggestion is that these entities represent a public good, despite not being 
“available to all” (Parsons, 1995, p. 10). This issue will be further explored in Chapter 
Seven. 
                                                           
53
 Democratic capitalism is defined as “a political economy ruled by two conflicting principles, or 
regimes, of resource allocation: one operating according to marginal productivity, or what is revealed as 
merit by a ‘free play of market forces’, and the other based on social need or entitlement, as certified by 
the collective choices of democratic politics” (Streeck, 2011, p. 7). 
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3.14 Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated that the creative city paradigm is a broad, flexible and 
highly successful discourse and model of urban development whose genealogy draws 
on a range of persuasive and often conflicting culture and creativity discourse 
formations and economic “regimes of thought” (Foucault, 1980, p. 81). Though heavily 
critiqued and with potentially negative implications for culture, this chapter has 
investigated the “archive” (Foucault, 1972, p. 148) of the creative city and demonstrated 
genealogically how the paradigm has built on earlier historical discourses (via national 
and EU policies) that intersect with culture. These discourses were argued to be based 
around urban and regional development narratives working in tandem with culture and 
creativity and in the context of capitalism, to create successful and competitive places 
by building attractive cultural amenities and attracting high earning creative classes and 
therefore investment. This discourse works to make culture more visible (tangible) and 
to make artists appear more useful by embedding their respective narratives within 
capitalist and neoliberal frameworks A new criticism of the paradigm’s negative 
approach to culture was also posited in this chapter, focusing on its neglect of the 
conditions necessary to sustain cultural creativity in particular.   
 
This chapter has also indicated that the power and legitimacy of the creative city lies in 
its simplicity, branding appeal, strategic and apparently progressive and enlightenment-
influenced discourses of culture, creativity and the economy (as well as attraction, 
harnessing and talent), effectively leveraging both utilitarian and romantic models of 
culture, which juxtapose conflicting values and regimes. Similarly, this chapter has 
shown how the creative city paradigm simultaneously draws on benign civil society 
creativity discourses, positing creativity as free, democratic and a “great leveller” 
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(Florida, 2007, p. 35) and is a nominalising and dominating economic discourse that 
equates private interests with the public good. This regime of thought, therefore, 
promulgates the compelling blend of (private) competitive economic development with 
(publically funded) social and cultural activity. In conclusion, this chapter has 
demonstrated that the creative city is a key urban development, post-industrial and 
knowledge economy discourse with significant benefits for a marginal policy sector in 
need of new narratives. Having established the imperatives and economic and social 
appeal of the creative city, the next chapter will consider the connections between, and 
research warrant for, the precise relationship between the creative city and cultural 
policy, vis-à-vis culture, discourses of creativity and policy/the state. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CULTURE, CREATIVITY AND CULTURAL POLICY 
 
4.1   General introduction 
The last chapter discussed the creative city paradigm in detail and introduced the 
confluence of political-economic and socio-cultural forces that led to the alignment of 
urban development discourses with implicit and explicit cultural policies. As part of 
this, the chapter described and analysed the flexible creative city narrative of culture, 
creativity, industrial development and city prosperity, outlining its appeal to various 
constituencies and legitimacy sources, in the context of neoliberal development and 
cultural investment. This chapter addresses the extent of current knowledge and debate, 
as well as the inconsistencies and gaps in relation to the three analytical pillars of the 
research: the general field of cultural policy, the specific construct of the creative city 
paradigm and the relationship between the two. In order to do this, the chapter considers 
the terminologies, discourses and contingencies of cultural policy, through analysing the 
literatures and genealogies of culture and creativity.  
 
This chapter will build on concepts introduced in Chapter One by describing the 
contested nature of culture, in order to understand difficulties in its interpretation, 
relationship to, and administration by, the state, and its role in paradigms such as the 
creative city. Following an investigation of key conceptions of culture, this chapter will 
point out the shifting discourse and trajectory of creativity, which, it is claimed, acts as a 
bridging discourse between the creative city and cultural policy. It will assert that, like 
culture, creativity offers an attractive discourse of both hard (economic) and soft 
(cultural) power. The chapter will then outline the key principles of cultural policy, with 
a strong emphasis on its varied definitions, the position of the state, the principles of 
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policy in general, the role of the private sector, and public and bureaucratic 
legitimations, rationales and uses for culture. To conclude, the chapter will consider the 
significance and inevitabilities of rational discourses, variously advocating for (and 
against) and justifying culture in different ways at different times and its relationship to 
the often compromised and cynical relationship between the state, the cultural sector 
and the public. In doing this, the chapter will highlight the complexities, shifts, and 
interdependencies between cultural policy and the creative city, contemplating what is 
at stake in their relationship, the various value systems that determine the support of 
culture by the state, and in particular, the role of utility, instrumentalism, autonomy, 
hierarchies and the private sector. 
 
4.2  Culture 
 
4.2.1  Introduction to culture 
Chapter Three has argued that the creative city paradigm speaks to a number of 
persuasive propositions around the utility of culture and creativity. It has also been 
suggested in Chapter Two, that discourses of cultural policy and the creative city 
embody dialectical and resistant discourses on questions of use and ethical value in 
relation to culture (in particular that of goods), and are driven by a hierarchical and 
political territorialism. The “struggle” (Foucault, 1980, p. 83) that this discourse 
represents contrasts a sacred (and moral), with a utilitarian, understanding of culture or 
cultural value and defines the intersection of, and stakes in relation to, the creative city 
and cultural policy. Before considering cultural policy in detail, therefore, it is necessary 
to outline the precise nature of resistance around the term culture.  
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The extraordinary collision of concepts, discourses and struggles surrounding 
understandings of culture (and creativity) is testament to the commonly cited claim that 
culture is an “exceptionally complex term” (Williams, 1981, p. 10). As such, discourses 
of culture are part of a “long-running, shifting, international discourse”1  (Kuper, 1999, 
p. ix), spanning a number of disciplines (Gray, 2010a, p. 219), as well as “incompatible 
systems of thought” (Williams, 1976, p. 87). Descriptions of culture also refer to its 
“richness” (Hall, 1980, p. 58) and multi-functionality, pointing to culture as historically 
invaluable to the ruling classes through providing malleable “vehicle[s] for government 
programs of one sort or another” (O’Regan, 2001, p. 30).  
 
4.2.2  Culture Part I: concepts of culture 
Though there are a number of models of culture, three interpretations are dominant: the 
arts or expressive culture (currently the most dominant), a way of life (customs and 
habits, etc.), and a standard of perfection (Williams, 1965).
2
 Specifically, expressive 
culture concerns the “body of intellectual and imaginative work, in which, in a detailed 
way, human thought and experience are variously recorded” (also called the 
documentary approach and consistent with the arts) (ibid., p. 57); a way of life involves 
the creation of “certain meanings and values implicit and explicit” (also called the 
anthropological or social approach) (ibid.); and, finally, a standard of perfection refers 
to the representation of absolute or universal human values or the “state or process of 
human perfection” (also called the ideal approach) (ibid.).  
 
                                                           
1 There are a number of significant historic and contemporary scholars concerned with culture, including: 
Adorno and Horkheimer (1940s), Hannah Arendt (1960s), and more recently, Terry Eagleton (2000), 
Tony Bennett (1998), and Jim McGuigan (1992; 1996; 1997), amongst others. 
 
2 Eagleton suggests that Williams had not three but four models: the arts, a way of life, a habit of mind, 
and the state of intellectual development of a whole society (Eagleton, 2000, p. 34). 
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This latter interpretation represents the moralising or ethical view (and discourses) of 
culture and is synonymous with the work of 19
th
 century English critic (and teacher) 
Mathew Arnold (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 29). Arnold viewed culture as the 
antithesis of and a necessary moral response to anarchy and the social crises of his time 
(Williams, 2005, p. 3) and his writings have had a huge impact on common 
understandings of culture as separate from the everyday and from ordinary activity. As a 
result, it has been claimed that enduring perceptions of culture as an elite term or 
practice, are linked to the “hostility” that developed in the 19th and 20th centuries 
towards Arnold’s view of culture, as well as unwelcome post-World War I associations 
with German Kultur (Williams, 1976, p. 92; Eagleton, 2000, p. 82).  
 
This view of culture as extra-ordinary, or as perfection, however, is synonymous with 
the expressive or arts-based model of culture and, as section 4.4.10 will outline, is the 
model of culture generally targeted within governments (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 
27). As a result, these paradigms are interdependent and mutually implicit,
3
 and 
typically conflate to two apparently simple models, high culture (documented 
expressions), retaining overtones of the ideal and elite approach, and culture as a way of 
life, representing the anthropological approach (Hall, 1980, p. 59). These 
understandings of culture represent common views of what culture is. 
 
Wider definitions of culture refer to its applications, benefits and characteristics, or what 
it does, though both categories (is and does) overlap. As such, many descriptions of 
                                                           
3
 The claim that Williams rejected Mathew Arnold’s view of culture as a form of human perfection is 
challenged by Bennett who says that Williams does not replace Arnold’s view of high culture, as many 
say, but situates culture as a way of life within a “social evolutionary version of the view that culture 
constitutes a norm of human perfection” (Bennett, 1998, p. 95). Eagleton also posits that “culture as a 
way of life is also a product of high art thinking – it is a product of intellectuals and represents the 
‘primordial other’ they need to revitalise their societies” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 24). 
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culture refer to its symbolic properties, and thus emphasise meaning-generation and 
communication, including: the “production and circulation of symbolic meanings” 
(McGuigan, 1996,  p. 1); “the sum of the available descriptions through which societies 
make sense of and reflect their common experiences” (Hall, 1980, p. 58); a “wide range 
of signifying practices that include the products of the media, the arts and various forms 
of government or religious display” (The International Conference on Cultural Policy 
Research);
4
 and even more broadly, a “standard of perfection, a habit of mind, the arts, 
general intellectual development, whole way of life, a signifying system, a structure of 
feeling, the interrelation of elements in a way of life, and everything from economic 
production and the family to political institutions” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 36). This 
description of culture underlines definitional difficulties, and reflects UNESCO’s 
equally wide definition which comprises “the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, 
material, intellectual and emotional features that characterise a society or social group ... 
not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human 
being, value systems, traditions and beliefs” (UNESCO, 1982, n.p.).  
 
While these definitions and descriptions of culture are diverse, they situate culture 
centrally in Habermas’s theory of the public sphere and communicative action 
(Habermas, 1987, p. 126). However, the wideness of the anthropological model of 
culture (as above) has led to irritated claims that it is “too loose to enable any actual 
rights or duties to be built upon it” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 25), needs a 
more “limited definition of aspects of some overall, aggregate culture” (EU Council of 
Europe, 1997, pp. 26-27) and is thus “slippery” (EU Council of Europe, 1997, p. 28). 
These statements point to the difficulties of government intervention in the wider 
                                                           
4 
Available:  http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/10286632.asp [Accessed 14 September 2011]. 
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cultural area and raise questions of capacity, but also political will (in terms of the 
ethnic differences, multiple cultures etc.), and thus only partly explain the common 
practice of using the narrower arts model of culture in government. 
 
4.2.2.1 Contestations around culture and culture’s dualism 
As a result of these discourses, therefore, culture lacks any one universal concept and 
has “no single, unproblematic definition” (Hall, 1980, p. 59). This nebulousness has led 
to a dialectical and ideological dualism within models of culture, again, symptomatic of 
resistance and a discursive struggle (Foucault, 1980, p. 83). The struggle within culture 
is also highlighted in understandings of culture as always facing “both ways” (Eagleton, 
2000, p. 5), embodying two apparently irreconcilable or resistant concepts. This is 
demonstrated in claims that “if politics is what unifies, culture is what differentiates” 
(ibid., p. 58), and, equally, that if culture is part of the problem, it is also part of the 
solution (ibid., p. 21) and thus “symptomatic of a division which it offers to overcome” 
(ibid., p. 31).  
 
Other framings of culture comprise: culture versus nature (Bennett, 1998, p. 78) or the 
“dialectic between artificial and the natural” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 2); culture as a spiritual 
artistic value versus culture as civilisation/a way of life, progress, and reason; culture 
versus anarchy (culture as control or civilisation and culture as resistant, both working 
for and through its resistant self against the state); high versus low culture (Bennett, 
1998, p. 78), and, for the purposes of this research, aestheticism, or a valuing of 
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autonomous culture for its own inherent qualities versus utility or functionality (Kuper, 
1999, p. 6).
5
  
 
These definitions have led to a lack of clarity around what is primarily cultural and what 
is not (McGuigan, 2004, p. 13; Gray, 2010a, p. 220), based on the acknowledgment that 
if culture is part of everything, then there is “no way in which the communication of 
descriptions, understood in this way, can be set aside and compared externally with 
other things” (Hall, 1980, p. 59), and thus that there is no such thing as cultural, or non-
cultural. As indicated in the criticisms above, this frustration has led to claims that 
cultural definitions are “disablingly wide” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 32), “immodest and 
overweening”, and that culture should be put “back into its [their] place” (ibid., p. 131).  
 
The concept of uselessness however, is central to unlocking the mobilisation, 
territorialism and uniqueness of culture. It is the (apparent) uselessness, or lack of 
singular or consensual functionality of culture, which paradoxically and simultaneously 
connotes culture’s very usefulness (and politicalness) in terms of its multiple symbolic 
effects.
6
 Though culture’s multiplicity and ability to be deployed to any number of 
functions (O’Regan, 2001, p. 30) may not represent what culture is, paradoxically, it can 
be viewed as culture’s intangible but “real” coherence (Sewell, 2005, p. 52). Together, 
                                                           
5
 This theme of dichotomy is also explored in struggles over the arts’ spiritual (universalism of culture) vs 
material values (the consumption of culture); and the arts vs science and technology (exemplars of reason 
and utility); as well as emotion vs reason (Kuper, 1999, p. 6). 
6
 The concept of art’s uselessness, and indeed the struggle between romanticism and utilitarianism, has 
interesting parallels in Oscar Wilde’s reference to the useful uselessness of art (as an aspect of culture) in 
the preface of The Picture of Dorian Gray: “the work of art is useless as a flower is useless. A flower 
blossoms for its own joy. We gain a moment of joy by looking at it. That is all that is to be said about our 
relations to flowers. Of course man may sell the flower, and so make it useful to him, but this has nothing 
to do with the flower. It is not part of its essence. It is accidental. It is a misuse” (from a letter following 
the publication of the novel).  See Letters of note (2013) http://www.lettersofnote.com/2010/01/art-is-
useless-because.html [Accessed 1 October 2013].  
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these discourses speak to culture as a flexible, porous, resistant, shifting, and ill-defined 
concept that is political, ideological, and though hugely useful, difficult for the state to 
administer, as section 4.4.1 will demonstrate.  
 
4.2.2.2 The history and genealogy of the terms culture, civilisation and art 
The genealogy of the term culture helps reveal the source of many of these tensions, and 
arises from its linguistic origin in agriculture from the Latin colere, meaning “to 
cultivate or tend nature” (Williams, 1976, p. 87). Culture, therefore, has shifted from a 
manual to an intellectual proposition (cultivating the mind) such that it traces 
“humanity’s own historic shift from [a] rural to [an] urban existence” (Eagleton, 2000, 
p. 1). The etymology of culture, which was only understood as an “independent noun” 
in the 18
th
 century (Williams, 1976, p. 88), has resulted in its close association with the 
term civilisation, originating from the civil/citizens and broadly meaning the “condition 
of organised life” (Williams, 1976, p. 48).  
 
Civilisation was another 18
th
 century term (ibid., p. 89) which connoted both the process 
and achieved state of self-development and the “general spirit of the Enlightenment” 
(ibid., pp 48 – 49). As a consequence of this understanding, the “main use” of the term 
culture in the 18
th
 century was as a synonym for civilisation in respect of understandings 
of culture as the cultivation of the mind and the “process of becoming civilised” (ibid., 
p. 89). Civilisation later became associated with the binary (us and them) and 
hierarchical approach of European colonialism (Schirato et al., 2012, p. 98), the 
patriarchal process of civilising, and later again, the concept of multiple cultures 
(Williams, 1976, pp. 87- 89). As a result, civilisation has become a central theme of 
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cultural discourses and is synonymous with positive Enlightenment narratives of 
rationalism and “progress” (Schirato et al., 2012, p. 43). 7 
 
These links have resulted in a “triad” of concepts comprising Europe (culture), 
civilisation, and progress (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 26), and, via progress, truth 
and liberty (Foucault, 1984, n.p.). More recently, progress has been linked to (liberal 
democratic) discourses of innovation and economic development (Kenny, Larkin, 
MacSíthigh and Thijssen, 2009, p. 52; Schirato et al., 2012, p. 43), which has resulted in 
discursive “monument[s]” (Foucault, 1972, p. 8) and self-justifying genealogies 
between culture, civilisation, Europe, progress, truth, liberty, innovation and, as will be 
demonstrated (see 4.3), creativity.  
 
Similarly, the term art, though now synonymous with high culture, used to refer to “any 
kind of skill” (Williams, 1976, p. 32). As such, art had an even wider range of 
applications than culture, from poetry to shipbuilding and carpentry (Belfiore and 
Bennett, 2006, pp. 18-19), to the liberal arts in medieval times (including grammar, 
logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy), before its transformation 
into its narrower meaning from the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries (Williams, 1976, p. 33). As 
suggested in Chapter One, part of this transformation rested on hierarchical “changes in 
the practical division of labour and to fundamental changes in practical definitions of 
the purposes of the exercise of skill” (ibid., p. 34). 
 
                                                           
7 
The tradition of conflating or associating culture and civilisation has continued in Scotland, where 
culture is claimed to contribute to “civilised living” (Scottish Executive, 1999, n.p.) and Finland where 
culture is repeatedly claimed to “underpin[s] civilisation” (Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 7).  
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4.2.2.3 The politics of culture: hierarchies, high culture, fine arts, art, utilitarianism 
and romanticism 
The legitimising imperatives behind the new 18
th
 century category of art, therefore, 
emerged out of defensive fine versus useful arts discourses (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, 
pp. 20-21). These discourses ultimately shaped understandings of instrumentalism as a 
moral issue for culture and comprised oppositional or dialectical narratives of 
improving, ethical or humanising (high) culture, alongside disimproving (low) 
discourses of culture (ibid., p. 179). Though originating in earlier centuries (ibid.), the 
popularisation of the term “fine arts” in the 18th century, in tandem with technological 
changes in cultural production, aimed to connote the “fruits of a special inspiration and 
of genius” and thus distinguish (and thus legitimate) artistic (connoting important, 
intellectual and moral) from “useful” (connoting unimportant, manual) cultural forms 
(ibid., p. 20). This ultimately resulted in the hierarchical separation of the (intellectual) 
artist from the (manual) artisan (ibid., Stapleton, 2002). The term high culture, 
therefore, as synonymous with the fine (moral) arts, emerged in the 18
th
 century, having 
resisted other discourses, and fragmented earlier and wider understandings of culture 
(Woodmansee, 1984, p. 24). 
 
However, the separation of the artisan, or skilled (useful) technician, from the work of 
the (intellectual) artist, was also part of this struggle and originated as early as the 17
th
 
century (Williams, 1976, p. 33). This shift away from understandings of the artisan 
followed the development of artists’ practice (rather than concept of the arts) in the 14th 
and 15
th
 centuries as part of early intellectual property discourses (Stapleton, 2002, p. 
89). By the 18
th
 century, therefore, the new hierarchy of high culture and fine art had 
bedded down, and understandings of art became tied to concepts of “disinterested” and 
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autonomous contemplation (Woodmansee, 1984, p. 22). This resulted in interpretations 
of art/high culture as the “sensuous expression of perfection” (ibid., p. 28), and the 
“creation of a beautiful object” (ibid., p. 29) irrelevant to or autonomous from its 
“reception [or use] by the audience” (ibid., p. 33). In addition, the pleasure that came to 
be considered “refined or contemplative” began to be called aesthetic (Shiner, cited in 
Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 20).  
 
Nevertheless, it wasn’t until the mid 19th century that the tacit understanding of high 
culture as referring to the “independent and abstract noun” art (as separate from fine 
art), where it describes the “the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic 
activity” become widely popular (Williams, 1976, p. 89). This was partly precipitated 
by advancements in technology which attenuated cultural territorialism, exemplified in 
Arnold’s moral and “ideal” approach to culture (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 28). As 
suggested in the history of the creative city, the explosion of technology through the 
industrial revolution, together with the influence of the burgeoning market economy, led 
to strenuous and resistant debates and struggles about beauty and morality versus 
function. These debates rested on the political dialogues of the previous century 
between the rational Utilitarians, concerned with culture’s usefulness and the “ideal” 
Romantics, who wanted to separate art from industrial capitalism and thus use (Kuper, 
1999, p. 49). These discourses came to define cultural discourses of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
centuries (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 121).  
 
Utilitarianism was originally a political and social movement which emerged in the 18
th
 
century with political thinker Jeremy Bentham, but became synonymous the following 
century with John Stuart Mill (also associated with representative democracy) (Held, 
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2006, p. 76). It was a theory based on rational debate and the principle of maximising 
utility, working towards achieving the “greatest happiness for the greatest number”, and 
was therefore associated with rationalism, science and accountability (ibid.) and later 
functionalism.  
 
In contrast, Romanticism was a disparate “Europewide phenomenon” that emerged out 
of the social, political and cultural traditions of the 18
th
 century, which theorised the 
“moral and civilising powers of art” and was concerned with the “pleasure that contact 
with the arts gives men” (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 121) rather than “the baser and 
less noble pleasures” (ibid., p. 122) of use. The romantic model of art, therefore, posited 
the artist as heroic and moral, and, critically, ethical rather than functional. The 19
th 
century “art for art’s sake” movement carried on this romantic tradition through artistic 
stereotypes of the bohemian outsider and purveyor of higher truths (Belfiore and 
Bennett, 2006, p. 172).   
 
These 19
th
 century hierarchical and ideological interpretations of culture ultimately 
pitted high culture and art against craft, entertainment and the popular arts, cultural 
forms more associated with the artisan (ibid., p. 20) and later, the working classes. The 
discourses also marked the final rhetorical separation of art from utility and contributed 
to exclusive discourses of taste and distinction, using culture to legitimate and maintain 
the ruling classes (in patronage) and later the developing bourgeoisie. The creation of 
social distinctions between classes through culture was sustained through the concept of 
“cultural capital”, which further aligned art and high culture with hierarchies, social 
class, distinction, taste and refinement (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 7). These polarisations and 
dichotomous discourses, therefore, are marked by utilitarian views of art/high culture as 
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useful commodities on the one hand, and romantic views of the artist (synonymous with 
high culture) as a noble “truth teller” (Oakley, 2009b, p. 281) and “authentic producer” 
of the “highest cultural objects”, providing a “lasting testimony of the spirit” (Arendt, 
1961, p. 200), on the other. 
 
4.2.3 Culture Part II: culture and the economy 
 
4.2.3.1 Popular culture, mass culture and the 20
th
 century 
Utilitarian and romantic discourses were also responsible for other discursive 
“struggles” (Foucault, 1980, p. 83) which developed in the early 20th century, with 
implications for culture’s position within the creative city. The first of these discourses 
was the concept of “popular culture” (often conflated with commercial culture as well 
as low and “mass culture”), a concept pejoratively referring to “inferior kinds of work”, 
work that sets out to “gain favor” and work that is simply “well-liked” (Williams, 1976, 
p. 198). Similarly, “mass culture”, which emerged as a response to 19th and 20th century 
industrialisation and the growth of technology as it applied to culture (e.g. cinema, 
music), led to debates over culture’s economic role within industry and capitalism. Mass 
culture specifically concerned culture produced for, rather than by, a mass public, 
originating with sociologists and theorists Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer from 
the Marxist-influenced Frankfurt School of philosophy (Adorno and Horkheimer, 
1944).  
 
The work of Adorno and Horkheimer on the commercialisation and industrialisation of 
cultural production in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, and the development of the culture 
industry (and culture as a market and consumer good like any other), reflected what 
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they saw as a mass deception and illusion perpetrated on the public by the growth of 
entertainment-oriented and passive culture (exemplified by music and cinema), which 
was driven by technologically-driven capitalism (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944, p. 
121).
8
 In their view, mass culture was inseparable from the machinery of corporate 
domination and thus represented “the coercive nature of society alienated from itself” 
(ibid.). The result of mass culture, therefore, was claimed to be cultural homogeneity 
(ibid., p. 121), a withdrawal from the world and ultimately, cultural “impoverishment” 
(ibid., p. 124). These ideas align mass culture with concepts of the spectacle and 
cultural simulacra referred to in Chapter Three (3.11), cheating “consumers of what it 
[they] perpetually promise[s]” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944, p. 139).  
 
These discourses can be viewed as romantic in positing culture as separate from, and 
crucially, more important than, utility. As such,  Adorno and Horkheimer ‘s work has 
been highly critiqued, chiefly from the perspective that culture has always and 
consciously served a power, function or utility, and that commodification in the 20
th
 and 
21
st 
century was and is simply the latest function or use for culture (Belfiore and 
Bennett, 2006).
9
 Nevertheless, Adorno and Horkheimer defended their critique of 
cultural commodification by pointing out that their concern was with the willingness of 
culture to accept its commodified status, rather than the commodification itself (Adorno 
and Horkheimer, 1944, p. 157). Adorno and Horkheimer, therefore, continue to be 
hugely influential (Lash and Urry; Flew; Arendt; McGuigan), and the concepts of 
                                                           
8
 This process was later called Technocapitalism, as coined by Douglas Kellner to describe the happy 
marriage between technology and capitalism (McGuigan, 2004, p. 28). 
9
 Other criticisms of Adorno and Horkheimer concern: their underestimation of the criticality of 
consumers; the inappropriateness of the singular term culture industry (O’Connor,  2007, p. 21; O’Regan, 
2001, p. 18) given the range of processes and production systems involved in the culture sector; the elitist 
presumption of high culture in their work (Garnham, 2005, p. 18); their “cultural pessimism” (Cowen, 
2000, p. 1), or Kulturpessimissmus (Eagleton, 2000, p. 124); their lack of understanding (and 
consequently appreciation) of newer artforms (such as Jazz and cinema), and for taking the view that an 
artwork cannot have cultural value and be entertaining.  
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alienation, degradation, simulacrum and spectacle (which they linked to mass culture) 
remain key to discourses surrounding the creative industries (the latest manifestation of 
the cultural industry), utilitarian views of culture, as well as the cultural strategies of 
urban developments.  
 
Various historic discourse formations, therefore, essentially reclassified culture and 
cultural workers (from artisan to artist, fine artist, etc.), fore-grounding discourses that 
would later become associated with the “aesthetic dematerialisation” of art in the 1960s 
when art entered its conceptual phase (Stapleton, 2002, p. 145). This dematerialisation 
further separated the artist from technical or utilitarian skills through exclusive 
intellectual, knowledge and economic discourses (ibid.). As such, contestation over the 
perceived purpose of culture, as embodied in the creative city, is embedded in recurring 
dialectical discourses of different (improving and disimproving) kinds of culture, 
fundamentally driven by status and legitimacy-seeking, remuneration, ideological 
positions on technology (usually anti) and defensive or resistant responses to other 
discourses. 
 
4.2.3.2 Use, exchange value and reification 
One of the chief discursive resistances in relation to culture is the economic concept of 
commodification. This concept is linked to the marketisation or thingification of culture 
(Oakley, 2009c, p. 406) associated with mass culture and spectacle. The making of 
something into a commodity, or commodification in Marxist terms, when applied to 
culture, reduces its “sign value” (the symbolic or pure meaning-making value of 
something), to use value, and then to “economic exchange value, in the pure form of its 
general equivalent, money” (Baudrillard, 1981, p. 1). Since sign value is primarily 
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associated with “ideological labor” ( ibid.), the recasting of culture from sign, to use, to 
exchange value, essentially represents a historical development mirroring earlier shifts 
and struggles in relation to reclassifications around intellectual and manual labour. The 
difficulty with attaching culture to utility and/or the desire for profit, concerns the 
obscuring of (typically unequal) social relations and conditions under which culture or 
its commodities are produced, assuming the “fantastic form of a relation between 
things” instead of people (who had made them) (Lukacs, 1923, p. 1). This process is 
known as “reification” (ibid.) and was claimed to deceitfully deprive “men of precisely 
that liberation from the principle of utility which it should inaugurate” (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1944, p. 158) and to lead to a deformed and “rationalised” lifeworld 
(Habermas, 1987, p. 147). 
 
4.2.3.3 The cultural and creative industries 
Industrialisation, commodification and reification are key concepts in discourses 
surrounding the cultural and creative industries. These industries, increasingly referred 
to as simply the creative industries (though the former typically denotes both subsidised 
cultural activities and unsubsidised creative and commercial sectors), represents a 
hugely successful discursive construct currently “circling the globe” (Schlesinger, 
2009a, p. 11) and is central to models of the creative city. The coining of the “creative 
industries”, popularly defined as “those industries which have their origin in individual 
creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation 
through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property”,10 was driven by the 
desire to ring-fence a wide variety of cultural activities within a “key organising 
                                                           
10
The full list of the creative industries comprises: advertising, architecture, arts and antique markets, 
crafts, design, designer fashion, film video and photography, software computer games and electronic 
publishing, music and the visual and performing arts, publishing, television and radio. Available: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.culture.gov.uk/reference_library/publications/463
2.aspx [Accessed 25 June 2012].  
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concept” (Flew, 2009, p. 1). This imperative originated through the cultural sector and 
political establishment in the UK, who both wanted to increase the traction of the sector 
in the context of increasing economic pressures, by leveraging “the unquestioned 
prestige” of the  information society11 and “any policy that supposedly favours its 
development” (Garnham, 2005, p. 20).  
 
Paradoxically, however, despite the conflation of the commercial with the non-
commercial or subsidised cultural/creative sectors which was inferred through the 
creative industries, the term was also designed to differentiate the former from the more 
cushioned and less powerful “subsidised” cultural sector (Cooke and Lazeretti, 2008, p. 
1). Though the term, therefore, lacks “specificity and distinctiveness” (O’Connor, 2007, 
p. 44), it has been particularly adept at allowing cultural policymakers “to legitimize 
their concerns” at national level and instrumentally promote a “much larger and more 
significant part of the economy than would otherwise have been possible” 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2007, p. 9). This is demonstrated in the use of creative industries 
statistics and its leverage in arguments developed by Arts Councils, despite their 
funding of only a small percentage of the implied sectors (Arts Council of Ireland, 
2009). 
 
Similarly, another concept which is larger than but often conflated with the creative 
industries and central to the creative city, is the creative economy (Florida, 2002, p. 
201). The creative economy is defined as a “set of knowledge-based economic activities 
with a development dimension” (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 4), which generate “tremendous 
                                                           
11
 The information society is based on post-industrial theories developed by Daniel Bell. It concerns the 
move from capitalism and industrialism “based upon the exploitation of matter and human energy to a 
post-industrial stage based upon the exploitation of what Bell called “organised knowledge’” with 
resources “shifted from monetary capital to knowledge” (Garnham, 2001, n.p.). 
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innovative, wealth-creating, and productive promise” (Florida, 2005, p. 171), and is 
described as an “evolving” concept which is wider than the creative sector with which it 
interacts (UNCTAD, 2008, p. iii).
12
 This concept is genealogically linked to other post-
industrial and knowledge economy discourse formations, including the thin air economy 
(Leadbetter, 1999); the copyright economies (Howkins, 2001); Daniel Bell’s 
information economy (Bell, 1999); Robert Reich’s 1990s “symbol analysts” (symbolic 
economy) (Rosler, 2011a, p. 3); and the weightless and dematerialised economy of the 
1990s (Stapleton, 2002, p. 140). 
 
4.2.4 Binaries, oppositions and instrumentalism 
These discourses of artist (intellectual), artisan (manual), high culture, popular and mass 
culture, use, sign value and reification, the culture industry/industries/creative 
industries, and knowledge/creative/copyright economies, cumulatively point to the 
dialectics and “binary” (McGuigan, 2004, p. 115) modes of aesthetic versus utilitarian 
or functional characterisations of culture, and again, the discursive “struggles” that 
define accepted knowledges (Foucault, 1980, p. 83). This binary model is especially 
significant in relation to understanding the politics and difficulties of culture as 
managed within the reason of state
13
 (as well as industrial policy) and reflects the tonic 
and poison/ “positive” and “negative” discursive tradition (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, 
                                                           
12 The creative economy encompasses “designer products, ‘experiences’ and services that have captured 
increasing proportions of consumer surplus through ‘distinction’” (Evans, 2009, p. 1030), as well as 
denoting immaterial and intangible (or “thin air”) economic models, where wealth is derived from the 
free movement of knowledge where “nothing [that] can be weighed, touched or easily measured” 
(Leadbetter, 1999, p. vii).  
13
 The Reason of State was defined by 16
th
 century Italian thinker Giovanni Botero in his book of the 
same name in response to Machiavelli’s The Prince, describing it as  the “knowledge of the means by 
which [a state]such a dominion may be founded, preserved and extended.” See Natural Law, Natural 
Rights, and American Constitutionalism. Available: http://www.nlnrac.org/critics/machiavelli/primary-
source-documents/the-reason-of-state[Accessed 3April 2013].  
 131 
p. 10) referred to earlier.
14
 It is out of this tradition, chiefly responses to 18
th
 and 19
th 
century discourses surrounding the fine and useful arts and 20
th
 century theories of 
rationalisation (as indicated above), that the key concept of instrumentalism, arises, 
which will be discussed in section  4.4.12.  
 
4.3 Creativity 
 
4.3.1 Introduction to creativity 
More recently, however, another concept has arisen within the utilitarian discourses of 
culture’s usefulness which links cultural policy to the creative city. This concept is 
creativity, about which it has been asserted, “no word in English carries a more 
consistently positive reference” (Williams, 1965, p. 19). Creativity can be defined as the 
capacity of individuals to “think inventively and imaginatively and to go beyond 
traditional ways of solving problems” (Howkins, 2001, p. 13), or simply “the capacity 
to generate new ideas” (European Commission, 2009, p. 74). However, there are 
thought to be four distinct creative models which outline the histories, genealogies, 
trajectories and imperatives of creativity: scientific, cultural, technological and 
economic (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 3). As will be discussed below, these understandings and 
uses for creativity underline the extreme flexibility of the term and how their sectoral 
values work with each other to increase the overall value of generic uses of the term. 
However, this range of models also illustrates the successful discursive campaigns 
wrought by each competing sector, culminating in the dominance of the economic 
sector. 
                                                           
14
 Culture’s intellectual history has also been described as coming from both an “honourable” and 
“dishonourable” tradition, in reference to the enlightened European tradition ”from modernism onwards” 
and the social engineering experiments conducted by Fascist Europe in the early 20th century (Belfiore 
and Bennett, 2006, p. 10). 
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As such, like culture, the adaptability of the term and wide range of uses to which it is 
put, together with its etymology in religion, has led to claims that creativity occupies a 
“central role in contemporary capitalist society, with a genealogy in processes of 
secularisation and the emergence of a modern subjectivity” (Miller, 2007, p. 510).  As a 
wholly positive and quasi-cultural/quasi-economic term therefore, creativity can be 
viewed as a legitimising and bridging discourse between culture and the creative city 
(and cultural policy). However, though central to competitive city discourses, and, it 
will be demonstrated, cultural policy, creativity is distinctly new to the “continuum” of 
traditional cultural policy (O’Regan, 2001, p. 1). 
 
4.3.2  Creativity discourses, shifts and use values 
Though create/creative was originally an exclusively religious concept (pre 16
th
 
century), the process of Western secularisation led to  its application within an artistic 
(post 17
th
 century) and scientific context, which came to dominate understandings of 
creativity in the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the 20
th
 century 
(Williams, 1976, pp. 82-85). From the mid 20
th
 century, however, creativity became 
strongly associated with another use, that of business, managerial and capitalist or 
economic applications (Sternberg, 1999, p. 5). More recently, these applications have 
linked creativity to wider discourses of innovation, copyright, and the global creative 
economy (Caves, 2000; Howkins, 2001). These concepts have in turn been influenced 
by 19
th
 and 20
th
 century theories of agglomeration and clustering, concerned with the 
deliberate co-location of businesses for mutual benefit and increased competition 
(Porter, 1990). “Creative destruction” is another key creative term of the 20th century 
and was coined by Joseph Schumpeter to refer to the necessary breaking and making 
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comprising business cycles under capitalism, a process that for many is synonymous 
with neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005, p. 3). 
 
In this way, over the last twenty years or so, discourses of creativity have settled less on 
cultural creativity,  and more on economic, industrial and entrepreneurial creativity 
(Sternberg, 1999, p. 5; Miller, 2007, p. 510), with Landry exhorting us to get “beyond 
the idea that creativity is the exclusive domain of artists” (Landry, 2000, p. xv). These 
events have made creativity a master signifier for the economy in general,
15
 as well as 
presaging the adoption of creativity as a solution to a variety of issues relating to 
declining industrial societies, the central premise on which the creative city is based (as 
critiqued above). As described in Chapter Three, today creativity is central to discourses 
of city development, urban planning, marketing (such as the creative city paradigm), the 
creative industries, cultural policy (leveraging its industrial applications), and, latterly, 
post-industrial knowledge/information society agendas, with the EU (and its Lisbon 
agenda) particularly active in its discourse (European Commission, 2006a, 2009, 2010a, 
2010b). From a discursive point of view, therefore, the use of creative within policy or 
public nomenclature invokes both a benign and utilitarian/economic application. 
 
Despite this, the ubiquity of positive creative discourses has led many to criticise the 
unquestioning nature of these benign interpretations, with claims that creativity is 
destructive as well as constructive (Vickery, 2011, p. 12), and that the current 
“fascination” with creativity results in a tendency to “discard projects and people before 
they achieve their potential” (Bilton, 2012, n.p.). Also, as a result of the many utilitarian 
                                                           
15
 The discourse of creativity continues to be of interest to the economic community. See Sommer, J 
(2013) Strategies; Getting Creative with the G.D.P., The New York Times, 27 July [online]. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/your-money/getting-creative-with-the-gdp.html?_r=2& [Accessed 
29 July 2013]. 
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applications of creativity, cultural discourses have sought to uncouple creativity from 
culture, in claims that creative skills are not necessarily consistent with artistic (or 
cultural) processes, which often depend on “intuitive” and ...“quite uncritical leaps” 
without much heed to contributing to the “desirable, [and] socially acceptable norms” 
often associated with creativity and innovation (Czerkawska, 2010, n.p.). 
 
4.3.3 Models and politics of creativity 
As Chapter Three has outlined, Florida’s single-minded focus on the activities of the 
(mostly) middle (class) and professional creative classes, has added to this positioning 
of creativity as “exclusive”, class-based, “dangerous” (Markusen, 2006, p. 1924), and 
part of the bourgeoisie’s “capitalistic appropriation” (Harvey, 2006, n.p.). This has 
raised questions as to whether creativity is a socially-driven and collective process (to 
be nurtured), or is innate to particular individuals and even countries (and thus can be 
harnessed). Though the creative classes undoubtedly proscribe a narrow view of 
creativity, Florida has pointed out, somewhat equivocally, that creativity cannot be 
“owned in the traditional sense” (Florida, 2002, p. xiv), is a “basic element of human 
existence” (Florida and Tinagli, 2004, p. 11), that it is “biologically and intellectually 
innate” to everyone (ibid., 2005, p. 4) and that it is the harnessing (implying existing 
creativity) of this creativity (for economic purposes) that matters.  
 
Florida therefore suggests a free creativity that requires “little” (ibid., 2008, p. 122), and 
only needs to be ring-fenced (or harnessed), indicating that creativity is a renewable and 
“non-rivalrous” resource that is available to all (Howkins, 2001, p. 120). This free 
source of potential capital is a critical factor in the success and appeal of creativity 
discourses, creating a new source of value and public good. Creativity discourses within 
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the creative city, therefore, are collectively defined in terms of key legitimising tropes 
such as democracy and equality.  
 
However, as suggested above, there is a tension between Florida’s creative class thesis, 
the positing of creativity as “biologically and intellectually innate” (Florida, 2005, p. 4), 
and the discourse of collective creativity and “nurture/nurturing” (Landry and 
Bianchini, 1995, p. 1; Landry, 2000, p. xxvi, p. xxxvi, p. 36, p. 191; Florida, 2007, p. 
33). Equally, the nomenclature of the creative classes, and the need to attract them, 
necessarily indicates that creativity is not innate to everyone (suggesting the uncreative 
classes), but is particular to some. Further, the designation or branding of one city as a 
creative city has the implication that another is not (i.e., with no designation or 
branding). As Chapter Five will demonstrate, the positioning of creativity in national 
cultural policies as competitively particular to one country (the most creative country 
etc.), suggests a dichotomy between its collective positioning (belonging to every 
human being and needing to be nurtured) and particular (limited to certain countries) 
characterisations.  
 
Though not mutually exclusive, the view of creativity as both belonging to the creative 
classes and as belonging to everyone, would seem to suggest two diverging models of 
creativity: creativity as a resource and process located and to be nurtured in the 
collective, and a biologically, intellectually, geographically or professionally 
determined individual attribution. Though this obfuscation over where creativity is 
located reflects a wider disagreement as to “whether creativity is an attribute of people 
or a process by which original ideas are generated” (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 9), these 
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discourses can be viewed as strategically containing and comprising covertly conflicting 
concepts (Fairclough, 2003, p. 128). 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the use of creativity in business and economic contexts has tended 
to favour the democratically-framed, process-driven, socially-networked or collective 
model of creativity (Oakley, 2004, p. 70). This paradigm has been described as the 
“semiotic/network” variety, in reference to the location of creativity between networks 
of individuals (Stapleton, 2002, p. 12) and directly challenges artistic concepts of 
located uniqueness or originality. However, this model is not socially or benignly 
driven, but aligns itself with industrial and scientific (and thus economic) applications 
for remunerative and legitimation reasons. The networked or “structural” model of 
creativity consistent with collaborative creativity structures (such as the creative 
industries), is intended to engender or promote creative environments rather than 
individuals (Bilton, 2010, p. 258) which avoids intellectual property (remunerative) 
issues linked to individual creativity (Stapleton, 2002, p. 12). 
 
In contrast, artistic discourses of innate creativity (Anholt, 2007, p. 36) are based on 
concepts of originality and invention, and have been described as the “heroic” 
(Stapleton, 2002, p. 135) and “rhetorical” model of creativity (ibid., p. 2), aligned with 
the romantic tradition. The coexistence and simultaneous disavowal of tension between 
the rhetorical and semiotic/network model of creativity typically seen in cultural 
policies, and demonstrated in the following chapter, has been particularly linked to 
maintaining the “identity” of the knowledge economy (ibid., p. 12) and thus the 
intellectual property rights status quo as well as more romantic autonomous models of 
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production. There are other terms however, which occupy the hinterland of creativity 
discourses and which have equal claims to economic legitimation. 
 
4.3.4  Knowledge economy discourses of creativity, entrepreneurialism and 
innovation 
One of these terms is the discourse of entrepreneurialism, a primarily economic term 
that shares a reflexive genealogy with creativity and culture, as indicated by its uses in 
1980s discourses of freelance cultural practitioners (O’Connor, 2007, p. 35) and 
connotations of (Joseph) Schumpeterian creative destruction. The popular usage and 
traction of entrepreneurialism in a variety of settings has led to it being described as one 
of the “fantasies of economic discourse” (Spicer and Jones, 2005, p. 19), which like 
creativity, has a potency arising from its promise of a “solution” to both economic and 
social problems (ibid., p. 1).  In addition to the economy, entrepreneurialism operates as 
a “master signifier” of democracy and freedom, suggesting independence, self-
determination and merit, but with a moral value associated with the good life
16
 (ibid., p. 
3). The origin and specific value of the entrepreneur, however, lies in its representation 
and creation of a new, free and discrete (economic) value system, separate to (and 
sitting between) the historical labourer, land-owner and capitalist (ibid., p. 12). 
 
Recently, however, there has been another shift in discourses of creativity consistent 
with claims that the creative classes are “at the very heart of the process of innovation 
and economic growth” (Florida, 2002, p. 6). While by the early 2000s, cultural policy 
and cultural industries’ discourses had begun to replace or accompany the term culture 
with creative (Cunningham, 2010, p. 20), creativity has latterly been conflated with, as 
                                                           
16
 Though it originated through Aristotle, the concept of the “Good Life” or the life worth living (which is 
distinguished from the virtues of civic life, with good citizens separate from good persons) is often 
associated with citizenship (Knell and Taylor, 2011, p. 36).  
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well as partly replaced by, the more commercial, applied and industrial term 
“innovation” (Oakley, 2009c, p. 406). This term, which has been described as the 
“visible tip of the iceberg of everyday creativity” (Caves, 2000, p. 202), has come to 
represent one of the most powerful and persistent economic concepts to have emerged 
in recent years, particularly in the context of the ongoing global recession.  
 
However, the “overlapping” (The Work Foundation, 2007, p. 6) of the concepts of 
creativity and innovation has led to attempts to distinguish between the two. This is 
demonstrated in descriptions of creativity as “not so much the production of new 
worldly objects, but simply an innovative action  ... both process and product” (Smith 
and Warfield, 2007, p. 287). Other characterisations underline the contingent and 
nebulous nature of the concepts, in claims that “creativity is the mythical process of 
inspiration and cognition, while innovation is the copyrighting and marketing” 
(Carrotworkers Collective, 2008, n.p.). This view of innovation recalls the claim that “if 
culture can be ‘thingified’, innovation enthusiasts are keen to “thingify it as speedily 
and efficiently as possible” (Oakley, 2009c, p. 406). 
 
The shift from discourses of creativity to innovation (Oakley, 2009c, p. 404) and the 
role of innovation as an outcome of creativity can also be seen in EU and UN cultural 
policy documents. The cultural sections of these international bodies have expended 
significant effort in gathering evidence and reports to demonstrate that culture (and the 
creative industries) creates economies and can work to economically or industrially-
focused creativity and innovation agendas (UNCTAD, 2008; European Commission, 
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2010d),
17
 a factor underlined at the EU’s recent launch of the Creative Europe Fund 
(see Chapter Three, footnote #16).  
 
Examples of creativity and innovation discourses include the following statements: the 
“European vision of culture, creativity and innovation” (European Commission, 2010b, 
p. 4); creativity is a “positive word in a society constantly aspiring to innovation and 
progress” (European Commission, 2009, p. 3); “the role of culture in supporting and 
fostering creativity and innovation must be explored and promoted” (European 
Commission, 2007a, p. 9); creativity is “a key resource in the knowledge economy, 
leading to innovation and technological change and conferring competitive advantage 
on businesses and national economies” (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 202); culture is a “motor of 
economic and social innovation” and “culture-based creativity” “nurture[ing]s 
innovation” (European Commission, 2009, p. 3).  
 
Other EU reports cite the need to “put in place the right conditions for creativity and 
innovation to flourish in a new entrepreneurial culture” (European Commission, 2010b, 
p. 2), again making the point that culture and creativity are distinct but interlinked 
entities, that creativity and innovation can be nurtured and that the subsidised cultural 
sector is part of the ecology and food chain of creativity. In addition, innovation is often 
positioned threateningly, in relation to how “essential” the innovation agenda is, in 
terms of how we can’t afford not to pursue innovation agendas (O’Connor, 2007, p. 44), 
a core persuasive feature of discourse. 
 
                                                           
17
 The Horizon 2020 Research framework for Europe 2020 initiative has designated creativity as a key 
rubric under the ‘Inclusive, Innovative and Secure Societies Challenge’. See (European Commission, 
2013). 
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These discourses also occur in Europe’s economic policies (European Commission, 
2010a; 2010b), national development agendas (Government of Ireland, 2010), and 
national arts policies (Arts Council of Ireland, 2002).  However, innovation remains 
more typically and closely tied to industrial policies of science and technology 
(European Commission, 2009, p. 8; European Commission, 2010b; Hazelkorn, Ryan, 
Gibson and Ward, 2013, p. 8), with serious consequences for the cultural sector.
18
 The 
importance of linking culture with industrial policies was highlighted recently by the 
response to culture’s omission from the Europe 2020 Strategy (European Commission, 
2010a). This response involved unsuccessful retrospective attempts to insert culture into 
the strategy under the rubric of innovation in order to legitimate the EU’s cultural 
agenda, through a conference specifically designed to produce evidences of this 
(Kulturpont Hungary Conference, 2011). The perception of innovation as a primarily 
industrial or scientific (and therefore non-cultural) term, has serious policy (political) 
and funding consequences for those making the case for cultural innovation.  
 
Discourses of creativity, therefore, demonstrate and emerge from a number of paradigm 
shifts and applications, from religious creation, to artistic and scientific applications, 
and, finally, in the 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries, to predominantly technological and 
economic applications (particularly in policy contexts). Like culture therefore, the 
appeal and authority of creativity depends on a historic genealogy of artistic or symbolic 
discourses working with scientific and knowledge-economy discourses, connoting the 
promise of entrepreneurialism and economic outputs. This discursive appeal adds to the 
creative city’s “apple-pie” phenomenon (Bayliss, 2007, p. 893; Peck, 2007, p. 765), 
prompting the question of who would not want their city to be creative? Equally, the 
                                                           
18 See also the Irish Forfás reports 2010a, b, 2009b, 2007a, b, 2006a, b. Government of Ireland, 2010; Mc 
Sweeney, 2009; Government of Ireland, 2008. 
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combination of heroic or “rhetorical” discourses of creativity (Stapleton, 2002, p. 2) 
with collective or “networked” models, gains maximum legitimacy with a focus on 
intellectual property benefits (ibid., p. 12). 
 
Conversely, though the turn to economicism may have led some to uncouple creativity 
from culture, as suggested above (Czerkawska, 2011, n.p.), in cultural policy, the 
continued coupling of culture with  (industrial) creativity is a central preoccupation 
(Oakley, 2009c, p. 404). While creativity and innovation are key to linking culture with 
industrial discourses for the political sake of culture, therefore, culture and the arts are 
equally deployed in industrial discourses of creativity (and culture) to lend currency and 
allure (Forfás, 2010a; 2010b; Government of Ireland, 2010). Consequently, the use of 
culture, creativity and innovation discourses in national and international industrial 
policies (as seen above), inverts cultural legitimation (in an industrial context), and 
suggests the exoticised appeal of the other in legitimation narratives, a factor illustrated 
in the next chapter. Having looked at the dualisms and genealogies of culture and 
creativity, in respect of strategy, argument, justification, and legitimacy in policy, this 
chapter must now turn to these factors as they apply to cultural policy.  
 
4.4 Cultural policy 
 
4.4.1 Introduction to cultural policy 
The dichotomies and discursive legacies of culture, creativity, entrepreneurialism and 
innovation have demonstrated the value systems, historic tensions, territorial stake-
making and genealogy of legitimations in relation to culture’s role in state utility. It has 
particularly highlighted the role of justification and struggle in discourse and the 
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parasitic nature of discourse in general (and cultural policy in particular), seeking 
conceptual alignments with stronger sectors and ideologies. The legitimation in these 
discourses underline a deeply governmentalised and dependent cultural sphere such that 
it is difficult and “makes no sense” to talk of culture (particularly high culture) outside 
of government and thus political involvement (McGuigan, 1997, p. 54).  
 
Much has been written about the nature and purpose of government intervention in 
culture, or, more specifically, the politics of culture (McGuigan, 1996, p. 1; Belfiore and 
Bennett, 2006, p. 29; Sar, 2009, p. 52), including: the “tension” of shoe-horning such a 
complex activity within the “requirements of bureaucratic calculation and 
measurement” (Bennett, 2007, p. 112); the management of culture using “norms not 
inherent to it” (Adorno, cited in Bennett, 2007, p. 113); the administration of a sector 
which stands “opposed to planning in [its] their innermost substance” (Bennett, 2007, p. 
114); and how wide interpretations of culture (from a government point of view) are 
“deeply irritating” and “impossible to live up to” (Mundy, 2000, p. 9). While some of 
these claims reflect a degree of romanticism in proposing the impossibility of managing 
an ethical activity, the shifting and political/apolitical nature of culture provides 
particular challenges for the state. In order to look at cultural policy as a bureaucratic 
state action and how it relates to the creative city, therefore, a broad understanding of 
policy in general is necessary, as well as historical resonances underpinning the term. 
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4.4.2 Principles of governance and government  
The term policy derives from early distinctions between the core realms of the public or 
“res publica”, and the private, “res priva” (Parsons, 1995, p. 3).19 Specifically, policy 
emerged from the ancient Greek Polis or city-state, which came to mean the civilised 
and free life “that only existed in the city” (Vincent, 1987, p. 167). The Polis as an 
entity, therefore, specifically referred to a higher order of (male) citizens, where private 
individuals came together to form a public (Habermas, 1989, p. 3). This was 
exemplified in Plato’s Republic, which was concerned with the organisation of society, 
where the virtue of the individual was consequent with the justice of the state (Plato, 
1955) and significantly (in relation to discourse), good was the “ultimate object of 
knowledge” (ibid., p. 299). 
 
In addition to public debate, key to the development of policy and the polis, is the 
“problematic of government” as an exercise of organised, though transient, knowledge 
and power, and an enactment of the principle (or art) of governance (Foucault, 1994, p. 
201). This separates governance/government from the universal and more permanent 
state. Foucault identifies contemporary understandings of government as originating in 
the application of a secular version of Christianity or pastoral power, and part of the 18
th
 
century’s development of organised knowledge systems (Smart, 1985, p. 132). 
However, the central question of “how to be ruled, how strictly, by whom, to what end, 
by what methods” (Foucault, 1994, p. 202) can be interpreted around two 
understandings of government, one as a force for good and the other as a coercive and 
self-sustaining power.  
 
                                                           
19 Politics and policy also constitute the same word in a number of European countries (French, German, 
Italian, Portuguese and Spanish). 
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The first of these understandings is the representation of government as “society’s better 
self” (McGuigan, 2004, p. 35), working towards the “welfare of the population, the 
improvement of its conditions, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health” (Foucault, 
1994, p. 217), a place where conflict can be “harmoniously reconciled” (Eagleton, 2000, 
p. 6), and a body working for the collective common good.
20
 While the liberal 
democratic goal of government (consistent with the utilitarians) may seem to reflect this 
common good model in its concern for the pursuit of “subsistence”, “abundance” and 
“equality”, in liberal democracies, these principles are contingent on the “security of 
[private] goods and wealth” and minimal state interference (Held, 2006, p. 76).  
 
However, liberal democratic models of government also contrast with what might be 
described as a second model of government, which represents a strong and coercive 
government (or greater state) whose power is “constituted by men and things” (Smart, 
1985, p. 128). This view of government represents “obedience to the law” (Foucault, 
1994, p. 210) and thus coercion, “if only the coercive use of the taxing power” (Moran, 
Rein and Goodin, 2006, p. 624). For Foucault, as a form of discourse, the concept of 
governance necessarily involves a soft and hard coercion and concerns the management 
of relations between different interests, including the public (society and community), 
the state (or government) and the market (Foucault, 1994, p. 201). This management of 
                                                           
20
 There are both positive and negative models of the common good, where it is conceived of as the “best 
law” as described through the Nordic legal tradition (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 42) on the one hand, 
and the securing of individual rights and freedoms, on the other hand (Skinner, 1992, pp. 213-222). In 
addition, Foucault writes of the common good as “submission to the sovereign” (Foucault, 1994, p. 210). 
These models arise from the Aristotelian tradition and liberal individualism. Though somewhat reflexive, 
the former broadly posits that there is some objective concept of the Good, and thus common good, which 
must be pursued for a healthy public life and the latter that there can be no common good without the 
securing of individual rights and freedoms. There is also the view that these premises are interdependent. 
Recent liberal and neoliberal views have equated the common good with assertions of individual rights 
over collective rights or goods, rendering the common good an equivocal term (Skinner, 1992, pp. 213-
222). 
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relations gives rise to core debates on democracy, legitimacy, the common good and 
good governance.
21
 
 
4.4.3 The principles and apparatuses of policy 
The knowledges and technologies exercised by government are called policies and can 
be defined in a number of ways: as a deliberate “plan of action to guide decisions and 
achieve desired outcomes” (Jones, 2009,  p. 10); as a “neutral” (Parsons, 1995, p. 16) 
and “rational basis for action or inaction” (ibid.,  p. 14); “what governments do, why 
they do it and what difference it makes” (Dye, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. xv); the “public 
and its problems” (Dewey, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. 6); issues amenable to human 
solution where social gain is maximised beyond the costs (Burstein, 1991; Jones, 2009, 
p. 11); an “expression of political rationality” (Parsons, 1995, p. 15); and  “authoritative 
decisions made by government to tackle societal issues which clog up its agenda” 
(Quinn, 1998, p. 15). Clearly, therefore, the uses of policy are administrative, pragmatic 
symbolic, and rational, representing the public reason of state. 
  
The “complex form of power” enlisted and embodied by the state, through the rational 
use of knowledge by government, with the population as its target, has been called 
governmentality (Foucault, 1994). This term represents a disciplinary power that works 
on shaping behaviours, and contrasts with (hard) coercive sovereign or juridical power, 
                                                           
21
 Good governance has been described by UNESCO as involving: participation (informed and 
organised), rule of law, transparency (decisions taken and enforced following procedure), free and 
accessible information, responsiveness (serving public in timeframe), consensus, equity and 
inclusiveness, efficiency and effectiveness and accountability. Available: 
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=5205&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html [Accessed 29 July 2013]. However, 
like democracy, good governance is normatively posited in Western government contexts as an 
apparently meritocratic and descriptive term, which has come to connote neoliberalism through its move 
into benignly positioned discourses of global governance by international (but mostly Western) neoliberal 
organisations (e.g., the International Monetary Foundation, World Trade Organisation (Peck and Tickell, 
2002, p. 391) as well as managerial discourses of accountability and equity (Fairclough, 2003, p. 129).  
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deriving from the 18
th
 century developments in political economy (Foucault, 1994, pp. 
219-220). To Foucault, governmentality is core to the development of policy as part of 
governmental “apparatus[es]” designed to create obedient citizens, by approaching 
those citizens as a resource to be managed through the production of knowledge about 
those citizens (Foucault, 1978, p. 86). The view of policy as knowledge is key to the 
development of the policy sciences which followed World War II, and aimed to enlist 
policy to address the  new “intelligence needs” of that time (Parsons, 1995, p. 18) to 
bring about a “less distorted, more rational decision-making process in conditions of 
growing [i.e. post-war] complexity” (ibid., p. 445).  
 
Policy analysts such as H. D. Lasswell and John Dewey were hugely influential on the 
development of the policy sciences and stressed the technical efficiencies and scientific 
experimentalism possible through policy, while also viewing policy as the formation of 
values whose “true source and focus [was] in the personal and in the self” (ibid., p. 
614). This paternal policy championing of reason and knowledge toward informed, 
educated citizens, is synonymous with economist John Maynard Keynes’s “progressive 
modernist” agenda (Moran et al., 2006, p. 4), viewing policy as a series of “technical 
questions which were resolvable by the systematic application of technical expertise” 
(ibid.).  
 
Other functions of policy are linked to the concept of public goods and market failure 
(as detailed in Chapter One) and aim to reconcile and balance the rights and freedoms of 
the private individual against the public collective, “so as to deal with those aspects of 
social and economic life which markets were[are] no longer capable of solving” 
(Parsons, 1995, p. 6). This consideration of the constitution of the public and private in 
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government, the virtuous and coercive imperatives at work, and governmental and 
policy reliance on knowledge systems, points to the importance of representation and 
discourse formation in policy and thus the role of policy discourse in government 
legitimacy.  
 
4.4.4 Policy, discourse, symbolism and legitimacy 
As discourse, therefore, policy is primarily a “linguistically constituted ‘activity’” 
(Laffin and Young, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. 177) which is deemed “essential to 
understanding what is going on” (Parsons, 1995, p. 181). As such, by the 16th century, 
policy had been linked to disciplinary apparatuses and the securing of consensus 
through a “set of technologies and institutions responsible for internal security, stability 
and prosperity” distinct from diplomatic or military control (Schirato et al., 2012, p. 72). 
Other historical references to policy (from Shakespeare’s play The Jew of Malta) refer 
to it as a kind of craftiness, a manipulation of facts and a creator of political illusions 
(Parsons, 1995,  pp. 14-15), made by “symbol specialists” such as politicians and 
policymakers (ibid., p. 178). The symbolic discourse of policy, therefore, suggests the 
potential for manipulation, where “problems are ‘constructed’ in order to justify 
solutions” (ibid., p. 180) and its prospective role is as a “placebo[s]” or an “illusion” to 
“public concern” through its creation of “condensational or emotional symbols” (ibid., 
p. 180).  
 
This view effectively charges policy with conferring a sense of safety and well-being in 
the electorate and illustrates how policy has/had “more to do with [managing] our 
personal and collective need for security and order than with our desire for solutions” 
(Parsons, 1995, p. 612). This again reveals the ability of policy to both distort and 
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conceal (ibid., p. 178),
22
 recalling the covert and often conflicting symbols with which 
discourse analysis is concerned (Fairclough, 2003,  p. 130). As suggested in Chapter 
Two therefore, in this understanding of discourse, distortion is available for all to see, 
and in that sense cannot be revealed (Foucault, 1972, p. 123), a factor that the next 
chapter will demonstrate.  
 
As a disciplinary or governmentalised power, therefore, policy “cannot be sustained 
purely with [juridical] force” (Parsons, 1995, p. 14) but critically, is a “theory upon 
which a claim for legitimacy is made” (ibid., p. 15), often “after the decision” has taken 
place (Jones, 2009, p. 11). Consequently, policy regulates an irrational world by 
representing the “orderly state” and provides a visible rationale for politicians and 
government decisions (Dye, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. 612). For that reason, policy 
operates as an exceptional, symbolic but substantive embodiment of power, ideology 
and legitimation (Parsons, 1995, p. 178).
23
 
 
The role of policy as legitimation and consensus therefore, whether those policies are 
working towards the collective common good and can be viewed as legitimate or not, 
underlines the role of policy in the lifeworld (though it also has a role in the system). As 
Chapter Two has outlined, the loss of legitimacy can arise from policy distortions or 
imbalances (between system and lifeworld imperatives) if they lead to a colonisation or 
domination of policy (Habermas, 1987). In considering policy at its simplest, therefore, 
the concept comprises a number of conflicting (and covert) principles, including ab 
initio, a representation of the polis or public (and what constitutes that), the use of 
                                                           
22
 Parsons cites Francis Bacon here, or the “founding father” of policy analysis, here (Parsons, 1995, p. 
178). 
23As suggested in Chapter Two, Foucault has influenced the policy sciences and Parsons cites Murray 
Edelman as a specific and influential example of Foucauldian policy analysis (Parsons, 1995, p. 180). 
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reason, knowledge and technical problem-solving processes, the reconciling of public 
and private interests, the not-for-profit imperative, and the simultaneous distortion of 
information and conferring of legitimacy/security through symbolism and explication.
24
 
Having considered key policy principles, a more detailed discussion on the nature of the 
public, as invoked through policy, is necessary in order to preface a consideration of 
cultural policy. 
 
4.4.5 The constitution of the public and private 
The concept of the public, as suggested through the etymology of policy, is claimed as 
the “starting point” for any discussion of governance or public policy (Parsons, 1995 p. 
2). Given that the public is inextricably bound up with the private, the constitution of 
the public is highly contested, despite being normatively invoked (and leveraged) in 
democracy discourses (Held, 2006, p. 14). Within this context, the public has been 
described as: the “sphere or domain of life which is not private or purely individual, but 
held in common” (Parsons, 1995, p. 3); the “collective life” that exists “outside of 
market transactions and power” (Giorgi et al, 2006, p. 5) and in Habermas’s public 
sphere, is “open to all, in contrast to closed or exclusive affairs” (Habermas, 1989, p. 1). 
Like the public sphere, the concept of the “common good” or “common life” (Pericles, 
cited in Held, 2006, p. 14) in theories of government (Foucault, 1994, p. 210), is also 
conceptually aligned with the public, though it can connote both an idealised conception 
of “general will” (Held, 2006, p. 47) and the less noble aggregation of personal desires 
associated with liberalism (Skinner, 1992, p. 215). 
 
                                                           
24
 Other bureaucratic understandings of public policy arise from philosophical differences and can be 
viewed from managerial and utilitarian (is it efficient), social justice (is it fair or equitable, whether this is 
viewed as equality of opportunity or of outcome?) or neoliberal/minimal state perspectives - does it lessen 
or extend individual rights? (Parsons, 1995, p. 521).  
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This focus on distinguishing between and separating the interests of the public and 
private has been referred to in Chapter Three as a central critique of the creative city and 
is a key focus of Habermas’s work (1989). The concern to separate the interests of the 
public and private stems from 20
th
 century Western fears of the state’s increasing role in 
the life of its citizens (Parsons, 1995, p. 5). As such, the relationship between the public 
(where harm could be done and therefore defined appropriateness for 
policy/government) and the private (which in essence defines it) is central to Foucault’s 
interest in apparatuses of state security, the growth of political economy, government, 
governmentality (Foucault, 1994, p. 17) and the administration of hitherto private areas 
such as birth rates (ibid., 1978, p. 140). Foucault called this 18
th
 century technical 
application of knowledge on the body “biopower” (ibid.), which treated the public as a 
singular and “knowable” resource to be managed and quantified (rather than a 
fragmented and contested construct) and which could be defended through discourses of 
the “public interest” (Parsons, 1995, p. 171).  
 
The importance of knowledge-focused policy-making and the bureaucratisation that 
followed World War II, further added to this view of the public as representative of a 
discernable “body of views held to a defined group” to which the state knew and 
attached “significance” (ibid., p. 111). Cumulatively, the model of a known and discrete 
public remains the foundation for most administrations and service (consumer) models 
of (public) value, disavowing the public as an “indeterminate, empirically 
counterfactual body” (Fraser, 1990, p.  66). The passive and nominalising view of the 
public that is inferred by these representations, can be seen in typical (policy) framings 
of the public as “responsible citizens” (Scottish Executive, 2006a, p. 31) and (via the 
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media) more passively, “conscientious receivers of public investment” (West, 2012, 
n.p.).  
 
4.4.6 The public and its terminology 
Tensions surrounding discrete understandings of the public also apply to other popular 
(public) terminologies including that of public opinion. Despite Habermas’s prescription 
for equal status as a basis for communicative reason (Habermas, 1987, p. 126), he has 
described the singular interpretation of public opinion as a “fiction” (Habermas, 1989, 
p. 245), which can necessarily only be attributed to members of the “same social group” 
(ibid., p. 241). For Habermas, this term is negative and works to “modify or preserve the 
structures, practices, and goals of the system of domination” (ibid., p. 245), in other 
words, invoking public opinion, legitimates hegemonies. As suggested in Chapter One 
(1.2.1), the concept of the public good, though equally normative, is similarly 
problematic, essentially “ideological” and thus invariably “beneficial to one social 
group but detrimental to another” (Hewitt, 2011, p. 20). The concepts of knowledge, the 
public and the common good, therefore, while problematic, underpin understandings of 
policy and legitimacy. 
 
In light of the normative principles of policy, therefore, it might be assumed that as an 
arm of government, cultural policy represents (at least aspirationally): culture (and or 
the culture sector); the public (and not the private) and public goods (freely available to 
all and non-rivalrous); the collective and common good (not the individual good); 
problem solving through expert knowledge and reason (rather than obfuscating and 
distorting); a not-for-profit ethos; the neutral mediation of  public and private interests; 
and the explication of government decisions and actions. Chapters Five and Seven will 
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test these suppositions. However, having evaluated the imperatives and principles of 
policy more generally, it is important to look at how cultural policy is more specifically 
understood. 
 
4.4.7 Concepts and understandings of cultural policy  
As a branch of public policy, cultural policy can be defined in a number of ways, 
including: the “cultural knowledges and practices that determine the formation and 
governance of subjects” (Miller and Yúdice, 2002, p. 2); a “field of social management” 
(T. Bennett paraphrased in O’Regan, 2001, p. 30); the “regularization, promotion, and 
discouragement of practices and values by institutions and individuals, public and 
private” (The International Conference on Cultural Policy Research);25 and more 
explicitly, “technologies” of domination, determining the “conduct of individuals” 
(Bennett, 1998 p. 71). These definitions draw on Foucauldian theories of 
governmentality (exemplified historically by the policies of Fascist Italy and Nazi 
Germany which aimed to shape the thinking and behaviour of their populaces through 
exhibition, civic monumentalism and censorship) and explicitly refer to the discipline-
forming features of culture. For some, however, this view of cultural policy is hard to 
reconcile with the pragmatic and often pedestrian nature of policymaking in practice 
(Gray, 2010a, p. 222) and confers excessive power on a weak policy sector (Gray and 
Wingfield, 2010; Mundy, 2000). For this reason, Foucauldian models of cultural policy 
might be viewed as more pertinent to implicit (non-stated) models of policy. 
 
Other descriptions of cultural policy emphasise the administration or management of 
culture and include: promoting the “public and private exploration[s] of culture, in all 
                                                           
25
 Available: https://www.jyu.fi/en/congress/iccpr2010 [Accessed 6 October 2011].  
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its forms and variations” (Mundy, 2000, p. 8); carefully managing and stewarding 
culture through democratic frameworks (balancing past and present cultural forms) by 
helping the “cultural sector do its job as seamlessly as possible” (ibid., p 18); and as in 
Chapter One, the “broad field of public processes involved in formulating, 
implementing, and contesting governmental intervention in, and support of, cultural 
activity” (Cunningham, 2003, p. 14).  
 
Another interpretation of the “concerns” of cultural policy is the implication that it 
should “facilitate something differently pleasurable and meaningfully better for most 
people than the usual produce of [commodified] cool capitalism (McGuigan, 2009, p. 
299). While this interpretation is open to interrogation as to what the terms different, 
pleasurable, meaningful, or better might mean, more prosaic descriptions of cultural 
policy infer the transient nature of political and policy processes in the claim that it is 
“whatever it is that governments say it is” (Gray, 2010a, p. 222) and that ultimately, it is 
a “series of ‘texts’ that are subject to the interpretations of the individual analyst rather 
than a set of concrete organisational practices to be analysed” (ibid.). These statements 
underline the disciplining, contingent, symbolic and management function of cultural 
policies, but also the lack of consensus as to the greater purpose of cultural policy per 
se. As such, these statements might be understood as detailing the outcomes, tasks, 
characteristics or concerns rather than state principles behind cultural policies, a factor 
which will be returned to in Chapters Seven and Eight.  
 
This missing policy rationale or principle is reflected in the interstitial location of 
cultural policy as a subset of public policy, between sectoral policy aimed at specific 
sectors such as transport and communications etc. (in contrast with what might be 
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considered pure economic policies) and social (health, education) policy, though it can 
also be viewed outside of these alongside sport and religion (Compston, 2004, p. 2). 
Cultural policies can also be described as explicit, or, like the creative city, implicit, 
depending on whether they are stated as cultural policies or not (Ahearne, 2009). As 
Chapter One has intimated, the relative nebulousness of where cultural policy sits 
within government and the policy sector, is of central importance in how culture is 
viewed by government, and may explain the variety of uses to which culture is put, as 
well as difficulties with cultural policy rationales. This situation is reflected in the claim 
that cultural policy is “not a national public policy category as such” but only exists in 
its fragmented format via other policies, i.e. arts policy, media policy, sport policy etc. 
(Vickery, 2011, p.13). 
 
4.4.8 The development of cultural policy and culture’s usefulness to the state 
The variety of uses to which culture is put in cultural policies is a legacy of historically, 
administered or managed culture (and latterly education), which has always been an 
instrument of disciplinary power through public consent (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 
10; Yúdice, n.d., n.p.). As Chapter One has indicated, this is borne out by the 
deployment of symbols, buildings and artefacts in the service of legitimacy, instruction 
and the communication of divine power by various religions, and later national unity 
and identity in 15
th
 and 16
th
 century monarchies and secular states (Miller and Yúdice, 
2002, p. 5). By the 17
th
 and particularly 18
th
 centuries, Enlightenment France had a 
paradigm of proto cultural policy-making (Ahearne, 2003, p. 128) which worked from a 
paternal noblesse oblige or “duty of care” approach conferred by position and status 
(Miller and Yúdice, 2002, p. 5). This approach was concerned with the transformative 
or “tonic” powers of culture (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p 33).  
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Equally, from the 19
th
 century, the perceived spiritual, moral and civilising (perceived) 
functions of culture grew with developments in political economy and cultural 
governmentality, and were exemplified in the Victorians’ deployment of state 
apparatuses aimed at subduing (distracting and entertaining) the mass public. Following 
the further decline of colonialism in the early 20
th
 century, and coinciding with the rise 
of nation states, as well as the Great Depression of the 1920s, culture was harnessed to 
create unified and homogenous self-images and articulations of nations, which skilfully 
bypassed “social and economic barriers” (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 141).26 
 
For many, however, Britain’s establishing of the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB) 
in 1945 was the first explicit European cultural policy as a legitimate arm of official 
government and had a lasting effect on the development of international cultural 
governance. The creation of the ACGB initially came out of the realignment of values 
that followed the ravages of World War II and was driven by a number of factors: the 
desire for a new egalitarianism and healing of divisions (McGuigan, 2004, p. 33; 
Matarasso, 2010, p. 3); the need to rebuild the infrastructure and democratic idea of 
Europe (ibid.); and the necessary replacement of questions of “material entitlement” 
with questions of “identity and social belonging” (McGuigan, 2004, p. 34). Key 
concepts such as democratising culture, or the mass distribution and availability of 
culture developed during this time and reflected the new welfare state ideology which 
had begun to permeate all aspects of public policy (Edgar, 2012a, n.p.). Though 
benignly conceived, these imperatives were led by the same patrician (and noblesse 
                                                           
26 The most egregious application of this governmentalised use of culture was the “reengineering” of 
citizens (Yúdice, n.d., n.p.) in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 32). 
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oblige) and romantic values of transforming, civilising and improving culture as 
France’s noblesse oblige. 
 
As Chapter One suggested, the emergence (and sedimenting) of explicit cultural policy 
at this time of crisis, has been described as fraught and even “ludicrous” (Quinn, 1998, 
p. 97), giving rise to a view of the field of cultural policy as “doomed” from the outset 
(ibid., p. 98).
27
 Confusions around the purpose and target of the first arts councils, as 
well as their location (at the time) outside of central ministerial policy-making, has also 
been perceived as making cultural policy different to other policy areas (ibid. p. 26) and 
therefore that it could never assume the same status as other policy sectors in 
government.  
 
4.4.9 Shifting historical models and uses 
From the 20
th
 century onwards, and in particular from World War II, cultural policy can 
be categorised into three phases. These phases concern historic uses and the 
development of cultural value systems, and comprise: the post-war period to the 1960s, 
characterised by the creation and growth of social and cultural agencies, promoting 
“excellence and democratisation” (Menger, 2012, n.p.), the nation, sovereignty and 
diplomacy
28
 and known as the “national prestige” (McGuigan, 1996, p. 51), “great 
nation” (Szántó, 2010, n.p.), “welfare state” and “Good Neighbor” period (Yúdice, n.d., 
n.p.); the period spanning the 1960s – 1980s, characterised as a mapping-oriented phase, 
concerned with gathering data on the size and scope of cultural activities, pressures to 
increase audience numbers as a measure of relevance, as well as decentralisation, and 
                                                           
27 
These problems will be covered in Chapter Seven but consist of a lack of government knowledge of the 
arts, lack of a public mandate, lack of clarity over a definition of the arts, lack of clear target 
(artists/public), lack of clarity over how decisions are made, lack of evaluation frameworks, and 
(originally) a lack of role for civil servants (Quinn, 1998, p. 243). 
28
 Cultural diplomacy continues in various state initiatives, see Taylor (2010) 
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known as the “access” period (Bianchini, 1993, p. 2); and the period that emerged out of 
the 1980s alongside the growth of managerialism and neoliberalism, with an emphasis 
on accountability, evaluation and the free market (Menger, 2012, n.p.), and known as 
the “economic” (McGuigan, 1996, p. 51) or “competitiveness society” (Sakarias and 
Kangas, 2007, p. 185) period.  
 
This last characterisation has been re-described as the “industrial” policy phase of 
cultural policy (O’Regan, 2001; Menger, 2012, n.p.), pointing to the wholesale change 
in culture as no longer perceived as either high culture or as a way of life, but as a form 
of industrial policy and thus not a policy area in its own right. This covert change from 
cultural to industrial policy can be interpreted as reflecting the “increasing pressure” of 
counter-discourses “through which states reproduce their political and economic 
practices” through other policies, and typically arises where the “policy operates on 
behalf of specific commercial interests” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 331).  
 
This current economic and industrial period, therefore, has been perceived as a “crisis”, 
undermining previous Western “assumptions of aesthetic authority and hierarchy” 
(McGuigan, 2004, p. 94), and reflects a general unease with publicly funded culture that 
is no “longer self-evidently justified” (ibid.). Through the introduction of public private 
partnerships and new privatised ways of funding culture, this period has been criticised 
as representing an apolitical and market-centred consensus on culture, where the Fall of 
the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union (which had been associated with 
prestige policies) and the opening up of Western European influences has led to a view 
of culture as no longer being “a contested political issue” (McGuigan, 2005, p. 230).  
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These periods essentially illustrate a shift in culture’s “use-values” (Lukacs, 1923, p. 2), 
from the engineering of citizens, social control and governmentality (19
th
 and early 20
th
 
centuries), representations of sovereignty, identity and power (15
th
 century to the early 
20
th
 century), international relations and diplomacy (early 20
th
 century to World War II), 
decolonisation and sovereignty (1950s to late 1970s), to globalisation (from the 1970s 
onwards), industrialisation and the economy (Yúdice, n.d., n.p.). These latter uses also 
represent a further shift from use to exchange value. More importantly, however, these 
shifts in uses, exchange-values, policies and rationales, demonstrate that using culture as 
an instrument to achieve something else, i.e. instrumentalism, is endemic to the state’s 
relationship with culture, and may be a cultural policy default, rather than a “crisis” 
(McGuigan, 2004, p. 94). 
 
4.4.10 Government, cultural policy and arts policy 
Further legitimations, hierarchies and difficulties with interpreting the terms culture and 
the arts, are pointed to in the nomenclature and models of culture supported by cultural 
ministries. As indicated earlier, publicly-funded cultural institutions and programmes 
remain predominantly mobilised around high culture or the arts (Bennett, 1998, p. 90; 
Higgins, 2012a, n.p), leading to enduring accusations of elitism and “class-bound 
aesthetics” (McGuigan, 2003, p. 175). Critiques of overly reverent and traditional 
models of high culture typically claim: that it represents the concerns of a “tiny 
proportion of men and women” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 16); that the “greatness” to which it 
aspires is facilitated “by virtue of not being embedded in the urban everyday through 
which social reproduction is mediated” (Vickery, 2011, p. 14); and that it occupies a 
“pointlessly self-delighting existence as a silent critique of exchange-value and 
instrumental rationality” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 16). This has led to the view that 
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“attempting to entice the public into the art world is not a rationally defensible 
objective” (Vickery, 2011, p. 14). 
 
Despite these claims, cultural agencies have been active in disavowing any association 
with elitism, claiming that they have “considerably broadened its [their] view” of 
culture and have “moved beyond” ... “elitist” associations (Scottish Arts Council, 2004, 
p. 3). This determination to appear beyond elitism may have contributed to the popular 
references to (though not applications of) the anthropological and diplomatic model of 
culture embodied by UNESCO, as demonstrated in the cultural policies of Scotland and 
Finland (as will be more fully explored in Chapter Five). The references to ordinary or 
everyday culture rather than the arts in these cultural policies, suggests democracy (in 
terms of its implied inclusivity), but also make way for the inclusion of the 
economically seductive and much wider creative industries (see 4.2.3.3), benefitting 
from two legitimations despite the covert/overt support of high culture.
29
  
 
Though these statements undoubtedly increase the democratic mandate for cultural 
agencies and align their policies with a more powerful agenda (ordinariness and the 
creative industries), as Chapter Four (4.2.2) has outlined, “problems” with the word 
culture, and “general perception[s]” of elitism persist (in a Scottish context), and are 
acknowledged as a “barrier” for most people (Bonnar Keenleyside, 2000, p. 3). 
Ironically, therefore, the replacing of arts policies/ministries with cultural 
                                                           
29
 Though Scotland uses the definition (Scottish Executive, 2000a), like its former culture ministry, the 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport, its funding relationships continue to balance subsidies to high 
culture with developmental support to the creative industries. Available: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/ArtsCultureSport/arts/CulturalPolicy [Accessed 6 December 2012]. 
See also Finland, which uses the UNESCO definition of culture, but whose cultural portfolio is much 
narrower, comprising “national cultural institutions; publicly funded and subsidised museums, theatres 
and orchestras; local cultural provision; and subsidised organisational and civic activities.” Available: 
http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Kulttuuri/?lang=en [Accessed 6 December 2012]. 
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policies/ministries in recent decades, is an attempt to move away from lingering 
perceptions (of elitism), and increase legitimacy.
30
 The reasons for this are complex, but 
again, revolve around legitimation, complexity and confusion as to the role of either arts 
or cultural ministries.  
 
4.4.11 Understanding the terms: values; purposes; benefits; rationales; intrinsic and 
extrinsic value 
One of the key challenges in understanding cultural policy, and in particular, why states 
have cultural policies, is the array of policy terms and uses of terms in relation to its 
positioning and valuing by the state. This refers to the relative conflation of concepts 
such as value, role, purpose, benefit and rationale. While some of these terms aim to 
address what cultural policy is, more often than not, they constitute what cultural policy 
does, leaving a gap in relation to what might be called policy principles. For example, 
the use of concepts such as value, an a priori economic concept, is typically used to 
describe a feature or characteristic of cultural policy that is personally held. Similarly, 
policy purposes/functions (to either have use or not have use) are often used 
interchangeably with policy benefits to describe an outcome of culture or cultural 
policy.  
 
However, as used, these terms do not clearly articulate the policy principles behind 
culture as an arm of government and are both imprecise and contingent. As such, social 
and economic legitimation discourses within cultural policies demonstrate a value 
                                                           
30 
The use of the arts in ministerial nomenclature in Europe continues in Scotland (under cultural policy), 
Northern Ireland, Austria and the Republic of Ireland. Ireland’s cultural ministry adopted the term culture, 
as opposed to arts, for the first time in 2010, when it changed from the Department of Arts, Sport and 
Tourism to Dept. of Tourism, Culture and Sport. In 2011, after a general election, it changed back to the 
Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht. In the UK, arts policy was replaced by cultural policy in 
1997 (Bennett, 2006 p. 122). 
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system that infers a “justificatory” (Chiapello and Boltanski, 2002, p. 7) rationale 
behind investing in culture, but also articulates the benefits of culture to societies. 
Though Jesuitical, while these concepts might be viewed in aggregate as inferring the 
principle or purpose for cultural policy (or what cultural policy is), discrepancies can be 
determined between the philosophical basis on which culture is funded (arguably the 
moral or series of values on which cultural policy is based), the benefits of culture to 
societies (the advantages or profits of culture), and the purpose of cultural policies or 
what they are designed to do as public policies (the ultimate aim or function of cultural 
policies). This use of these terms, therefore, illustrates the difficulties with generating 
more precise understandings of government support of cultural policy. 
 
In addition, further categorisations of cultural values/uses/benefits into extrinsic, 
external or secondary, and intrinsic, internal or primary, and contestations around those 
terms, compounds these complicated characterisations of cultural policy, as Chapter 
One has outlined.  To illustrate this, it is worth reconsidering descriptions of the nature 
of these value systems. Extrinsic value discourses are usually associated with 
instrumentalism and have been linked to the non-personal, secondary “externalities” 
(Towse, 2003, p. 22), benefits, outcomes, or spill-over effects of culture (Banks and 
Hesmondhalgh, 2009, p. 422). However, while intrinsic value has been described as the 
“subjective experience of culture, intellectually, emotionally and spiritually” (Holden, 
2006, p. 14), confusion arises where it is defined as embodying three separate benefits: 
as purely “private”, with benefits for the individual alone; as having “spill over” and 
extended benefits to the public; or as purely “public”, with direct and publicly beneficial 
outcomes (McCarthy et al., 2005, pp. xv – xvi).  
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 These categories, particularly the last one, highlight difficulties with separating out the 
characteristics of culture as either intrinsic or extrinsic. As such, the capturing of 
various characteristics which may seem intrinsic (i.e., cognition, health, social, 
communication), can equally be viewed as a strategic output with spill-over public 
benefits and, critically, at some level has a measurable economic value. Aesthetic 
benefits (often equated with intrinsic values) have also been described as “artistic 
instrumentalism” (Knell and Taylor, 2011, p. 18) which offer “individual and societal 
outcomes”, as well as “public good instrumentalism” (ibid., p. 23), further 
problematising distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic.  
 
Policymakers and theorists have responded to these debates by asserting that as all 
values are “socially constructed”, it is “unsustainable to argue that objects, practices or 
institutions have intrinsic qualities that subsist within them” (DCMS, 2010, p. 20) and 
that instrumentalism, closely associated with extrinsic values, is simply an 
“interpretation” (Røyseng, 2008, p. 5). Equally, it is also claimed that policy problems 
arise where intrinsic values are interpreted in a strictly romantic, autonomous and 
artistically disinterested tradition (rather than the strategic ones listed above), in light of 
policy’s de facto role as a public instrument (as indicated historically) putatively 
pursuing public value (Vickery, 2011). Discourses around intrinsic value, therefore, are 
a “consistent philosophical [and political] problem” for cultural policy (ibid., p. 21) and 
are central to debates between Arnoldian moralising fine arts (see 4.2.2) and functional 
economic and social interests.  
 
While for some, therefore, romantic discourses represent the benign intention to 
“insulate art from demands that it be useful”, an “unintended” consequence of romantic 
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values, as indicated above, has been the perception of the arts as elite and thus “remote, 
esoteric, and removed from life” (McCarthy et al., 2005, p. 38). These struggles are 
reflected in calls to find the “necessary language” (Tusa, 2011, n.p.) to describe or 
evaluate culture in terms that cultural practitioners and policymakers can support, 
though there is an emphasis on the cultural sector’s “own terms” and search for its 
“unique language of the arts” (ibid.). What the “unique language of the arts” is, remains 
unclear, but is hinted at in moves for cultural practitioners to avoid “alien” (economic 
and social) valuations which “belong to a different world” (ibid.) and represent the 
“language and function” of others (Variant Editorial Group, 2011, n.p.). It can be said 
therefore, that intrinsic and extrinsic discourses of culture are interdependent and 
emerge from a genealogy of reflexive, historical and defensive categorisations of 
culture, and latterly, the need for legitimation of publicly funded culture. As such, 
intrinsic and extrinsic value discourses appeal to different mandates and constituencies, 
and when used together, draw on the persuasive power of covertly conflicting 
discourses (Fairclough, 2003, p. 128).  
 
4.4.12 Positive and negative instrumentalism, and legitimation 
Multiple rationales, purposes, benefits and values, necessarily raise the prospect of 
instrumentalism once again, a term unavoidably linked to the search for legitimacy and 
thus the weak status of cultural policy. The emergence of cultural instrumentalism from 
18th and 19th century discourses was explicitly articulated through the Victorians’ 
concern with public order and the skilful use of culture to support it (Nisbett, 2013, p 
85). Instrumentalism, therefore, has been perceived as a particularly UK preoccupation 
(Sar, 2009) and like extrinsic and intrinsic discourses, understandings of it are complex 
and often divided - often within the same commentator/statement. The source of this 
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division essentially concerns whether instrumentalism is simply a description of how 
things are in policy, and/or whether it is a moral position describing how things should 
be, vis-à-vis the potential for putting culture to work.  
 
By far the greater force of scholarship has been directed at the “well rehearsed” 
(Nisbett, 2012, p.  2) critiques of instrumentalism that focus on its “harmful aspects” 
(ibid.), viewing it as essentially driven by pernicious market forces with negative 
consequences for culture (McGuigan, 2009; Rosler, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Vestheim, 
2007, etc.). Negative views of instrumentalism involve claims that expectations for and 
pressures on culture to deliver economically and socially, contribute to a number of 
harmful scenarios. These scenarios are claimed to be: the funding of mainstream, 
unchallenging and homogenous culture, which reduces cultural democracy as well as 
cultural or creative career opportunities (O’Connor, 2007, p. 52; Vestheim, 2007, p. 
218); the promotion of “conservative values of prudence, anti-innovation and a 
nervousness of being disruptive” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 71); the dulling of the critical 
capacity of culture (O’Connor, 2007, p. 52; Vestheim, 2007, p. 218; Gray, 2008; 
Hewitt, 2011, p. 10); the indifferentiation of the market to the “specific quality” of 
culture (O’Connor, cited in Flew, 2009, p. 4); the co-opting of artists into “already 
settled” cultural planning processes (O’Regan, 2001, p. 16); the presentation of the city 
as a space of uncontested, passive and manufactured consumption (Pasquinelli, 2007; 
McGuigan, 2009; Rosler, 2010, 2011a, 2011b); and the promotion of creative initiatives 
at the expense of  projects directed at “poorer social groups”  (Atkinson and Easthope, 
2009, p. 72).  
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Equally, the often “defensive” justification of culture (Belfiore, 2012, p. 103) associated 
with instrumentalism is primarily concerned with the outcome rather than process of 
cultural activity and specifically, quantifiable and managed outcomes (Belfiore and 
Bennett, 2006, p. 33). In this way, instrumentalism can be viewed as a form of 
instrumental reason, treating people and things (in this case culture) as a means to an 
end (usually social or economic), concerning the use of knowledge for particular ends 
(Habermas, 1984, p. 8).  
 
There are other problems with instrumentalism, however. It has been claimed that the 
emphasis on quantitative measurement and evidence-based policy in instrumentalism 
not only undervalues culture, but is unable to deal with the “thorny” issue of the greater 
value of culture in society and political life (Belfiore, 2012, p. 105). Further and 
critically, it is also claimed that arguing for, or depending on, “non-cultural benefits that 
are meant to flow from [the] investment” makes it harder to justify specifically cultural 
spending (Mundy, 2000, p. 23). This is a key factor in the political positioning of 
culture and highlights the dangers of framing and judging it in terms of other “already 
crowded” (Gray, 2002, p. 87) ministerial agendas. This situation also raises the question 
of whether non-cultural outcomes are better addressed through other government 
portfolios and suggest that if cultural policy is “merely a reflection of other areas”, there 
are questions as to the “role and purpose” of the ministry or department in the first place 
(Nisbett, 2013, p. 97).  
 
Over the past decade or so, however, in response to this overwhelmingly negative view 
of instrumentalism (and mirroring the utilitarian/romantic debate), counter discourses of 
positive instrumentalism have developed. These discourses invert “traditional” (ibid., p. 
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97) views of instrumentalism by combining a pragmatic acknowledgment of it, with 
supportive and positive rationales. This view has been acknowledged as “unorthodox” 
(ibid., p 84) and is aligned with the view of instrumentalism as a “constructive and 
creative attempt[s] to elaborate a coherent theory of art and an intellectually 
sophisticated view of the effects of the arts on individuals and societies” consistent with 
the understanding that art/culture has always served a ruling class agenda (Belfiore, 
2012, p. 103).  
 
This discourse underlines the role of instrumentalism in fulfilling a function in society, 
and how it facilitates culture being “pressed into service” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.). This 
view also works off the basis that the “attribution of cultural value” is to a certain extent 
dependant on instrumentalism (Belfiore, 2012, p. 105) and that “ideology-free policy-
making”, or policy-making without values and purpose, is a myth (ibid., p. 107). This 
assessment is supported by claims that policy is endemically and intrinsically 
instrumental, given that it is clearly “designed to achieve something” (Gray, 2007, p. 
205) and that instrumentalism is inevitable in a bureaucratic context (McGuigan, 2004, 
p. 53).  
 
In addition, some argue that instrumentalism is simply a useful discursive construct that 
gives “certain initiatives in cultural policy a name” (Røyseng, 2008, p. 5), and that the 
“diagnosis” of instrumentalism in cultural policies is a positive and resistant act, which 
calls to attention key issues and operates as a kind of “cleansing process” (ibid., p. 12). 
It is also claimed that discourses of instrumentalism in cultural policy are exaggerated 
and distracting (ibid., p. 11), (as above) confined to English language countries (Sar, 
2009, p. 54), lead to a “sterile dichotomy” (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 7) and need to 
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be tested “against empirical evidence”, rather than debated “abstractly” in scholarly 
journals (Nisbett, 2012, p 17). Some also feel that the issue is not instrumentalism per 
se, but the particular function to which the arts (or culture) is put (Vuyk, 2010, p. 178).  
 
This concept of positive instrumentalism, though clearly a legitimation of particular 
cultural practices (i.e. working with other government agendas), is closely linked to the 
concept of attachment policies (Gray, 2002), as introduced in Chapter One.
31
 
Attachment policies are a “mechanism for achieving policy ends” (ibid., p. 81) by 
attaching “solutions to other sets of policy objectives which are seen as being more 
worthy or which have higher levels of political importance” and can shift to suit 
“differing sets of priorities over time” (ibid.). Critically, these strategies are a 
“conscious approach to the fulfilment of long-term plans which could not otherwise be 
achieved”, aim to secure the “necessary political support” for the sector (ibid.) and to 
provide “parameters for the assessment of the validity and utility” of cultural objectives 
(ibid., p. 80). The concept of attachment derives from a policy vacuum in UK local 
government cultural policies, whereby there were no “clear set of priorities for the 
[cultural] sector as a whole” so that in pursuing other local objectives, cultural priorities 
could be left to national cultural bodies (ibid., p. 79). Attachment, therefore, is presented 
as a conscious and it is suggested, voluntary strategy of a weak sector in need of 
legitimation. 
 
While some view instrumentalism as inevitable but either largely or potentially negative 
(i.e. McGuigan, Belfiore respectively), therefore, others view it as a wholly positive 
mechanism that offers “highly beneficial” artistic opportunities for practitioners, 
                                                           
31 This concept follows Oliver Bennett’s concept of the “attachment of the arts to a governmental agenda 
in the XIX century” (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 145). 
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allowing them to “forge partnerships, generate income” and expand artistic possibilities 
(Nisbett, 2012, p. 1), as suggested in the concept of attachment. Consequently, it can be 
argued, that there are two or perhaps three types of instrumentalisms, a pragmatic view 
of its inevitability, a negative instrumentalism and a positive instrumentalism. Whether 
instrumentalism is viewed as a pragmatic response to non-negotiable pressures from 
central governments, a genuine engagement with the possibilities of other agendas, or a 
negative and limiting force in cultural policy, however, it is a central process in 
legitimacy-creation, a factor acknowledged by linking it to “self-protection” and 
“survival” (Nisbett, 2013, p. 97). Equally, a positive or negative approach to 
instrumentalism is determined by ideological factors, and, it is argued, the level of trust 
in and perceived independence (from outside pressures) of those making policy. The 
issue of trust (amongst the stakeholders), autonomy or voluntarism (in terms of 
attaching non-cultural agendas to cultural policy), is a key consideration in relation to 
instrumental and attached discourses like the creative city and will be discussed below.  
 
Nevertheless, given the dominance and normative status of the economy in most policy 
discourses, as the following chapter will demonstrate, there are questions as to whether 
attachment or instrumentalism is always conscious (given the now normative status of 
instrumentalism) or voluntary (given the dependency of culture on wider political 
approval). As the concept of attachment implies, cultural practitioners are typically 
indentured to other government ministries and priorities, as well as the general 
precariousness of changes in political administrations. Equally, it has been 
acknowledged that attachment may “imply the absence of any clear long-term Strategy” 
for cultural policy, that it involves an element of “band-wagon jumping” (Gray, 2002, p. 
80) and that it may not represent a “workable solution” (ibid., p. 82). Similarly, since 
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attachment has migrated from local to national cultural policies, there is a vacuum in 
cultural policymaking. 
 
The continued lack of autonomy of cultural policy has been underlined in recent 
comments from the UK’s culture secretary who spoke of the need to use economic 
arguments for culture in order to get “traction” (or legitimacy) from the Secretary’s 
other colleagues, as much as the “country at large” (Higgins, 2013a, n.p.). This 
comment reflects other views of the need for culture ministries to make stronger 
arguments to more important “Finance and Prime Ministers” (Mundy, 2009, n.p.). This 
deferral to other government colleagues introduces a second group from whom 
legitimacy must be secured, that of central government, as referred to in Chapter Two. 
This lack of voluntary engagement with other government agendas is an important 
consideration in relation to the endemic nature of instrumentalism and the question of 
cynical reason (Sloterdijk, 1987).  
 
4.4.13 The structure and cycle of instrumentalism and cynical reason 
One of the outcomes of pressures on cultural policy and thus instrumentalism and 
attachment, is the cyclical and self-reinforcing nature of justificatory narratives in 
cultural policies. As Chapter Five will indicate, like all government ministries, 
departments of culture are expected to tie their policies to national plans (e.g. 
Government of Ireland, 2009; Scotland’s National Performance Framework),32 which 
exert downward pressures on those funded by culture ministries (ie Arts Councils or 
national cultural institutions), as well as further down, other funded organisations and 
artists. This downward chain of pressure, though putatively democratic, is driven by 
                                                           
32 Available: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Performance/scotPerforms/indicator/culture [Accessed 
31 August 2012]. 
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legitimation and results in not only instrumentalism, but a cyclical discursive effect 
whereby instrumental discourse formations are reflected back up to those from whom 
they originate, in order to achieve legitimacy and a better chance of funding. The 
dependency of most cultural practitioners on state funding and the intense competition 
for this, means that many approach funding with a necessary expediency and 
pragmatism, and are careful to use the right language or discourse to frame their 
proposals (and avoid the wrong language). This process can at best occlude the 
(primary) cultural or artistic motivations behind projects, and at worst, instrumentally 
modify their proposals and compromise their funding relationships. 
 
This discursive exchange can be viewed as a mutual deception, disingenuousness, or 
even “performance” (Paquette, 2008, p. 298) that moves up and down the hierarchical 
policy chain according to how “fruitful” (ibid.) the discourses prove to be. The longer 
the argument is reflected upstream, the more normative it becomes, creating a cycle of 
expectation and a self-justifying instrumentalism. Although this process is usually 
involuntary, given the pressures on cultural policy and in particular cultural 
practitioners, this situation can be described in terms of cynical reason, a central 
concept in the work of German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk (1987).  
 
Sloterdijk’s concept of cynical reason refers to the phenomenon of a “modernized, 
unhappy consciousness” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 5) or “chic bitterness” (ibid.) associated 
with survival, that has increasingly afflicted the discontented Western world. This 
process has been linked to the change from the “naive consciousness” of ideology to a 
“cynical wisdom” (Zizek, 1989, n.p.) characterised by those who “know what they are 
doing, but they do it because, in the short run, the force of circumstances and the 
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instinct for self-preservation are speaking the same language, and they are telling them 
that it has to be so” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 5). Those engaged in cynical reason via 
structural instrumentalism, are both those administering and applying for cultural 
funding who are aware of the game, but uphold and maintain an “ideological mask” 
(Zizek, 1989, n.p.) in a “well mannered rationality” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 3).  
 
This capitulation, as demonstrated in references to “self-protection” and “survival” 
(Nisbett, 2013, p. 97) in relation to attachment and instrumentalism, is driven by the 
“self-preservation” to which Sloterdijk refers. Moreover, this emphasis on survival 
further indicates how involuntary attachment and instrumentalism is, reflecting an 
extreme pragmatism driven by the competitive and precarious conditions of the cultural 
sector, and ultimately the desire of policymakers for the state or government to endure. 
Sloterdijk writes of cynical reason, therefore, as an “enlightened false consciousness” 
(Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 6), driven by a “compulsion to survive” despite the “better 
knowledge” that those practising cynical reason have of “preestablished relations” 
which they find “dubious” (ibid.).  
 
Consequently, the attribution of cynical reason to the cultural sector must be understood 
in relation to the extreme financial pressures on and disempowered state of the sector in 
general. Though these practices may seem like bad faith on the part of both 
policymakers and funded practitioners, they are simply a response to a sector which is 
“hostage to instrumental concerns” that they have “limited control over” (Gray and 
Wingfield, 2010, p. 11) and thus where instrumental benefit-arguments represent the 
only game in town. Though these pressures have been viewed as providing cultural 
practitioners with the opportunity to diversify (Nisbett, 2012, 2013), it is questionable 
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whether, given the choice, other more creative or at least independent cultural choices 
would not be made (and thus how beneficial they really are).  
 
These questions further support the view of both policy and indeed funding applications 
as purely legitimation and symbolic devices, rather than effective mechanisms for 
planning or influencing behaviour. At best, cynical reason can be viewed as a utilitarian 
pragmatism and compromise, and at worst, a disempowerment, coercion, 
disingenuousness, and example of extreme cognitive dissonance. Cynical reason, 
therefore, is essentially borne out of a lack of power and support for the culture sector, a 
lack of trust between policy stakeholders, but also a lack of agreement on what cultural 
policy is for. The impact of this will be returned to in Chapter Seven 
 
4.4.14 Value systems: public value and cultural value 
The other question at the heart of justifications, legitimations and cynical reasonings, is 
the question of how instrumentalism putatively pursues public value, the “ultimate end 
of public policy” (Moran et al., 2006, p. 390). Public value is a key legitimation 
discourse in public policy and often appears concomitantly with equally legitimising 
terms such as public services, public goods, the public domain (“citizenship, equity and 
service”), the public interest, and of course, the public sphere (Parsons, 1995, p. 12). 
Public value, however, is typically and tautologically described (via the Work 
Foundation) as simply “what the public values” (Oakley et al., 2006, p. 2), but also the 
willingness to pay via “contingent valuation” (Frey, 2003, p. 20) and the capability and 
legitimacy of a service (Keaney, 2006, p. 13; Lee, Oakley and Naylor, 2011, p. 291). 
Given the contested nature of the public ab initio, the concept has been described as a 
“messy hybrid” (Oakley et al., 2006, p. 3) and as “chronic” (Vickery, 2011, p. 21).  
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The term originated in the US during the 1990s (and later the UK) as part of the New 
Public Management project (NPM), which aimed to deliver efficiency and effectiveness 
to public services, reflecting a wider notion of value beyond measurement (Keaney, 
2006, p. 3). Like policy and rationalism, however, NPM reflected managerial 
approaches which viewed problems as technical, rather than deeply rooted, social and 
political issues and as a result the term public value has suffered a “backlash” in recent 
years (Lee et al., 2011, p. 297). For some, therefore, public value has come to represent 
the “new planetary vulgate” of neoliberalism (McGuigan, 2005, p. 233), techniques of 
upbeat and “’postmodern’ business” (ibid., p. 237), and from the point of view of 
cultural policy in particular, has been strategically “embraced by think tanks, politicians 
and cultural organizations” as part of the “restless marketplace” of policy (Lee et al., 
2011, p. 297).  
 
The concept of cultural value has similarly emerged from bureaucratic attempts to 
determine value outside of simple measurement, and specifically, the need for an 
identifiable value system for cultural policy “commensurable with other calls on the 
public purse” (DCMS, 2010, p. 9). The term was developed in the early to mid 2000s 
and, like public value, has a “relativism” (ibid., p. 21) that makes it “difficult to define 
or codify” (Oakley, 2004, p. 74). Holden’s concept of cultural value relies on the 
securing of legitimacy through an agreement between what he claims are the 
[instrumental] needs of the politician and the policymaker, the [intrinsic] needs of the 
cultural practitioner and the [audience] needs of the public (Holden, 2006, p. 59).  
 
This definition of cultural value aligns with economist David Throsby’s account which 
rests on a balance between economic value and (tautologically) cultural value (Throsby 
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referenced in Keaney, 2006, p. 31). Throsby defines the cultural component of cultural 
value with reference to putatively intrinsic characteristics, including “aesthetic, 
spiritual, social, historical, symbolic and authenticity value” as well as “pricelessness” 
(Throsby referenced in Keaney, 2006, p. 31). 
33
 In summary, therefore, models of 
cultural value like Holden’s or Throsby’s, create an “acceptable” framework for funding 
decisions (DCMS, 2010, p. 5) and as with public value, create legitimacy for cultural 
policy. 
 
The pitting of intrinsic against extrinsic values of culture (and to an extent positive and 
negative instrumentalism), and cultural value systems, though somewhat inconsistent 
and ultimately ideological, again highlights the tensions at play in relation to cultural 
policies when compared with other areas of government. Though intrinsic cultural 
values have been demonstrated as problematic and extrinsic values have obvious policy 
appeal (or public value), Holden has convincingly argued that cultural engagement is 
rarely driven by the latter (i.e. for social or economic reasons), which underlines the 
problem with advocacy and campaigns that are solely based on extrinsic value 
arguments (Holden, 2006). The ultimate implication of these complicated valuations of 
culture is the separation or separateness of cultural policy from other policy sectors, 
regardless of how policy analysts might want to disavow this (as indicated in comments 
by Selwood, cited in DCMS, 2010, p. 13). This issue will be further considered in 
Chapter Seven. 
 
 
 
                                                           
33 These views of cultural value contrast with models which emphasise cultural rights (ethics) and 
sustainability (Reeves, 2002, pp. 36-37; Ministry of Education and Culture 2010c). 
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4.3.15 Conclusions 
This review has outlined a genealogy of terminologies, trajectories and “silent births” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 154) within the discourses of cultural policy and the creative city. It 
has described their shared histories and understandings in relation to utility and 
argumentation vis-à-vis culture, creativity and cultural policy, and illustrated the stakes 
at play in relation to choosing one model over another. This genealogy has been 
conducted in the context of discourse, legitimation, instrumentalism and cynical reason. 
In doing this, the chapter has suggested that political and ideological conflicts over the 
utility, strategic use, and ownership of culture and creativity, particularly in respect of 
the economy, are historical and have created resistant and dichotomous discourses 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 83) that are deeply embedded in the specific trajectories and 
histories of each term. This chapter has also shown that the consistently positive 
resonances of creativity and culture, armoured by links to discourses of innovation and 
entrepreneurialism (as well as science, technology and economics), embody apparently 
progressive and rational economic and knowledge (or creative) economy values, which 
play a major part in the success, longevity, apparent public value and legitimacy of the 
creative city paradigm. This has created clashing and dual systems of 
intrinsic/sign/autonomous/romantic and extrinsic/use/instrumental/utilitarian values, 
which continue to resonate in discourses of both the creative city and cultural policy and 
impact on legitimation and trust between the stakeholders of cultural policy.   
 
This chapter has also demonstrated the ideological, contested, dependent, and self-
perpetuating nature of instrumentalism and its positive (tangible, accountable policies) 
and negative (cynical, exploitative) interpretations. The concept of cynical reason has 
been raised in respect of questions over the autonomy, agency and consequently 
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sincerity of instrumental discourses such as the creative city, with potentially serious 
implications for legitimacy (in terms of Habermasian consensus). Moreover, this review 
has suggested that the malleability and richness of culture and creativity in relation to 
both cultural policy and the creative city, has facilitated their appropriation for historic 
and emerging models of the state, knowledge and the economy, driving and resulting in 
instrumental discourses and difficult stakeholder relationships, raising questions over 
the public function of cultural policies.  This is particularly profound in the context of 
the dependency of urban development on the private sector and the beneficiaries of 
policy in putatively democratic societies.  In order to locate this context and creative 
city discourse as it relates to cultural policies, through the lens of culture, creativity and 
cultural policy, this dissertation must now turn to the discrete and located cases of 
Scotland, Finland and Ireland. What follows, therefore, is a discourse analysis of three 
national cultural policies as a basis for later consideration of the state, capital and 
colonisation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE CASES OF SCOTLAND, FINLAND AND IRELAND 
 
5.1 General introduction 
The last four chapters have outlined the rationale, approach and context of the research 
question. Specifically, these chapters have underlined the role of legitimation in 
discourse and indicated what is at stake in the relationships between the creative city, 
culture, creativity, cultural policy and the state (hierarchies/status, ideologies, 
relationships). This chapter comprises a detailed consideration of the national cultural 
policy discourses of Scotland, Finland and Ireland, typologising their general and 
specific characteristics vis-à-vis discourse formation theory and the creative city. It will 
demonstrate the prevalence of conflicting discourses, the lack of any one clear rationale 
for their cultural policies other than to meet localised and discrete government agendas, 
the consequent lack of control they have in relation to wider government priorities and 
the containment strategies and survival tactics deployed to deal with this.  
 
Key to the exploration of creative city discourses within these cases will be a 
consideration of the struggle of discourse, the concepts of flexibility and usefulness of 
narrative, the fit with national priorities and political/historical contexts, the 
simultaneous endorsement and disavowal of claims to truth (like the creative city), the 
role of trust and legitimation in policy, and the state’s representation of public and 
private interests. Essentially, this chapter will establish to what extent and how the 
creative city has emigrated to (Foucault, 1972, p. 154) or materialised within the 
discourses of specific, located cultural policy documents, grounding the work of the 
previous chapters and providing material for analysis and extrapolation. 
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The cases constitute three national cultural policies of Northern Europe, two 
predominantly English-speaking countries historically tied to the British model of 
cultural policy (Scotland and Ireland), and one Nordic country
34
 with a very different 
social and cultural tradition (Finland). Each case is introduced with a brief outline of its 
political, economic and social context, in order to gauge prevailing ideologies and 
approaches to culture, creativity and the state, and to identify other potentially 
influencing factors. The first case will explore Scotland, the second Finland and the 
third Ireland, attempting to locate the particular circumstances and manifestations of 
their individual cultural discourses, and then specifically situate the creative city 
paradigm amongst them.   
 
Each case will look at particular issues in those countries, including: self-determination 
and identity, the creative economy vis-à-vis the knowledge economy, place-
development and boosterism, privatisation and the need for workers and residents (in 
the case of Scotland); the reconciliation of political and social traditions with industrial 
positions (Finland); countries’ dependencies on international reputation; and pejorative 
political attitudes to the culture ministry (Ireland). This chapter will conclude with an 
overview of how creative city discourses constitute normative policy narratives in 
Europe. 
 
5.2 National contexts  
Scotland, Finland and Ireland are small countries on the Northern periphery of Europe, 
with modest populations of 5.2,
35
 5.2,
36
 and 4.5
37
 million respectively. Politically, 
                                                           
34
The Nordic countries or “Norden” are associated with a significant “measure of ethnic and religious 
homogeneity; their militaries are small; their foreign relations are pacific and are distinguished by high 
per-capita levels of humanitarian assistance to the international community” (Mulcahy, 2004, p. 157). 
35 
Available: http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/press/index.html [Accessed 18 June 2012]. 
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despite Finland’s Nordic legacy and social democratic38 and welfare principles, these 
countries represent liberal democracies, with neoliberal approaches to economic issues. 
As such, each country has an open mixed economy,
39
 and follows a knowledge 
economy model with a competitive interest in attracting international investment and 
skilled labour.
40
 There are a number of other historical and social factors, however, that 
have also had a profound impact on all three policies. 
 
The role of nationalism and self-determination arises in all three cases (and in Scotland 
and Ireland in particular) and can be linked to the decline of empire-building, the impact 
of colonisation (O’Brien, 2007, p. 5) and the rise of nation states. This is reflected in 
Scotland’s uneasy constitutional monarchy, and relationship to the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, despite its devolved independence and the 
ascendance of the Scottish National Party government since 1999.
41
 In contrast, Finland 
and Ireland constitute independent republics, having respectively achieved different 
forms of independence, following Finland’s assertion of autonomy from the Kingdom 
                                                                                                                                                                          
36
 See CIA World Factbook. Available: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/fi.html [Accessed 13 February 2013]. 
37 
See the 2011. Available: http://www.cso.ie/en/statistics/population/ [Accessed 5 March 2012]. 
38 
Social democracy, which is the reconciling of ideals of social justice with capitalism, associated with 
the welfare state and economic democracy, is strongly associated with the Nordic countries (“an essential 
part of Nordic legal tradition and ethical orientation”) and in Finland is historically linked to the “people’s 
general sense of justice” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 42). 
39
 Scotland, “as a small open economy, has extensive trade links with not only the rest of the UK, but also 
with the global economy” (Scottish Government, 2002, n.p.). “The Republic of Ireland has become one of 
the most open economies in the world” (O’Brien, 2007, p. 1).  For Finland, see http://www.euro-
challenge.org/doc/Finland.pdf [Accessed 2nd August 2013]. 
40
 Available: www.culturalprofiles.net/scotland/Directories/Scotland_Cultural_Profile/-5386.html 
[Accessed 12 June 2012], and http://www.scotland.org/facts/business-and-economy/ [Accessed 7 
February 2011]. Also, Scotland’s knowledge economy is part of the greater UK knowledge economy and 
is set out in the Scottish Executive’s Framework for Economic Development in Scotland. Available: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/158281/0042858.pdf [Accessed 28 January 2013], and the 
Smart, Successful Scotland reports (Scottish Executive, 2001). 
41
 Through devolution, Scotland has its own government (formerly called the Scottish Executive) taking 
charge of “day-to-day” portfolios of health, education, justice, rural affairs and transport, as well as 
economic development, housing, environment, agriculture, tourism, culture and the arts. Available: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/ [Accessed 12 June 2012]. 
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of Sweden (19
th
 century) and ultimate independence from Russia (1917)
42
 and the end 
of British rule in Ireland (1921).
43
 Like Scotland and to an extent Finland, nationalism 
in Ireland has been a defining and complex force throughout the 20
th
 century, which 
continues to impact on its politics/policies. 
 
Similarly, although all three countries have significant intellectual histories, Scotland’s 
key role in the Enlightenment,
44
 as well as the industrial revolution and large-scale 
urbanisation, population growth and the subsequent decline that accompanied it (Kidd, 
2011), has had a major impact on its national psyche and urban development policies. 
Specifically, the social (depopulation) and economic devastation that followed 
Scotland’s urbanisation in the 19th century exacerbated into the 20th century and has 
defined Scotland’s urban-focused industrial policies, helping to resurrect Scottish 
nationalism
45
 but leaving social and economic scars.  
 
Likewise, Finland’s management of its relationship with its former rulers and extremely 
powerful neighbours (Sweden and Russia) profoundly informs its national self-image 
and sense of pride, and is deeply embedded in its current diplomatic and cultural 
relations (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c),
46
 as well as its diversity policies 
                                                           
42 
See the (UK) Foreign and Commonwealth office website section on Finland 
(http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-
profile/europe/finland?profile=history [Accessed 2 November 2011]. 
43
 After the civil war, partial independence was achieved in 1921 and consolidated in 1937 when the Irish 
constitution was established. In 1998, as part of an agreement with Britain, the claiming of sovereignty of 
the whole country was relinquished, signalling an accord with Britain and a new political and cultural 
reality for Ireland. 
44
 Key Scottish Enlightenment figures (amongst many) comprise philosophers David Hume and Frances 
Hutcheson, economist Adam Smith, writer James Boswell and sociology pioneer Adam Fergusen. 
Available: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scottish-18th/ [Accessed 11 October 2013]. 
 
45
 Scottish nationalism re-emerged in the 1920s after the founding of the National Party of Scotland, and 
was augmented by the discovery of oil off the coast of Aberdeen (late 1960s/70s) and the 1998 Scotland 
Act, culminating in devolution and partial independence within the State of Great Britain in 1999 
(Hibberd, 2008, p. 10). 
46See also Ministry of Education (2005) Russia programme in art and culture [online]. Available: 
http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Julkaisut/2005/taiteen_ja_kulttuurin_venaja-
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(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2006b, 2009b, 2009c, 2010b). Moreover, since the 
1980s and early 1990s, despite a persistent monoculturalism in Finland, recent 
immigration and the arrival of the New Finns (non-ethnic or indigenous Finnish 
residents who have settled or have citizenship in Finland) , coupled with the mix of 
indigenous Finns, Swedes (the second national language) and to a lesser degree the 
Saamis (who are culturally autonomous and have protected status), has made Finland 
more culturally diverse, and has therefore had a major impact on its diversity politics.  
 
More recently however, though Finland’s Nordic tradition depends on and stresses legal 
protection and a “common commitment to equality, egalitarianism, and equity” 
(Mulcahy, 2004, p. 157), the position and approach of the social democratic welfare 
state has changed, along with recessions and the rise of the nationalist True Finns.
47
 As 
such and following a general rise in Finnish nationalism and the decline of social 
democracy across Europe, there has been a weakening of Finland’s newly integrationist 
policies
48
 (Ward, 2011, n.p.). This rise in nationalism has resulted in tensions between 
Finland’s older and highly prized social democratic and collaborative model and newer 
exclusive discourses from the “conservative right” brought on by the latest recession’s 
“profound crisis of neo-liberal capitalism” (O’Toole, 2012, n.p.). This change can be 
seen in reversals of earlier, more open policies, as well as media reports of an increase 
in negative attitudes to immigration more generally (Helsinki Times, 2011a, 2011b). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ohjelma?lang=enandextra_locale=en [Accessed 14 March 2011] and Report on the Kindred Peoples 
Programme [online]. Available: 
http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Julkaisut/2005/selvitys_suomen_sukukansaohjelmasta?lang=enandextra_loca
le=en [Accessed 14 March 2011 
47
 In 2007, the Social Democrats went into opposition for the first time in many years, ceding to a 
coalition. This situation changed in May 2011 when the nationalist True Finn party won almost a fifth of 
the election vote, but declined to participate in government following a pro EU bailout agreed by other 
parties (Ward, 2011, n.p.).  
48 The handling of refugees in Finland has been described as “restrictive” (Koenis and Saukkonen, 2006, 
p. 7). 
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Like Finland (in terms of Sweden and Russia), despite independence, Ireland remains 
socially, economically, politically and culturally tied to its closest neighbour and former 
ruler, maintained through its English-speaking population and its historical “replication” 
of “British structures and ideologies” (O’Brien, 2007, p. 5). Though described as a 
“nationalistic, conservative and insular country on the margins of Europe” (Boyle, 2006, 
p. 411), however, Ireland has undergone a significant transformation over the last 
century, from a historically agricultural, rural, Catholic and monocultural, to a 
predominantly urban,
49
 increasingly secularised,
50 
 less homogenous, and relatively new 
country and state. More recently again, Ireland has moved from “one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world”,51 with “full employment and for the first time in over 
150 years, population growth and immigration” (Kerr, 2007 p. 112),52 to one of the 
worst international recessions of the recent economic downturn and since the foundation 
of the state.
53
  
 
Notwithstanding these historic factors, the economic policies of all three countries have 
had a defining impact on their national and specifically cultural policies. Scotland’s 
history as a major centre of the industrial revolution has meant that it has long been a 
post-industrial country, demonstrated more recently in its strong creative economy and 
                                                           
49
 Ireland is now a predominantly urban country, with more than 25 per cent of all residents living in its 
capital city and an additional 7.5 per cent in the cities of Cork, Galway, Limerick and Waterford. Dublin 
has a population of nearly 1.2 million and Cork, Galway, Limerick and Waterford have cumulative 
populations of approximately 300,000. Both figures from Irish Census 2006 [online]. Available: 
http://www.cso.ie/census [Accessed 23 June 2011]. 
50
 Though “secularism is a relatively recent development for Ireland”, in the 2011 census, “269,800 
people declared themselves as having ‘no religion’, an increase of 44.8 per cent on the 2006 figure” 
(Grimes, 2012, n.p.). 
51
 Available: http://www.gov.ie/en/essays/twentieth.html [Accessed 23 June 2011]. 
52 In 2012, it was reported that “those born outside the State account for some 17 per cent of the 
population”. See Irish Times (2012a). 
53
 Ireland has been the worst hit of the three countries by the latest international recession. With rising 
emigration (Nicholl, 2009, n.p.), and unemployment rates between 15 per cent in 2011 (O’Brien, 2011, 
n.p.) and 13.6 per cent in 2013 (O’Brien, 2013), it is in significant debt to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the EU (Reuters, 2011, n.p.), leading some to surmise that “anything resembling 
democracy [in Ireland] will be effectively suspended for many years” (Streeck, 2011, p. 25). See also 
Flynn (2011). 
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creativity agenda (Scottish Government, 2009a). This places Scotland’s post-
industrialism within a historical, as much as, economic and political frame and 
distinguishes it from Finland and Ireland, who have only latterly, though 
enthusiastically, adopted knowledge economy and service industry models 
(Government of Ireland, 2008; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010a). Like 
Ireland, Finland’s shift from a primarily agricultural to a highly industrialised and 
mixed economy in the mid 20
th
 century, has centred on technology and the information 
society (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010a, 2010b). Equally, innovation 
policies and the drive for skilled knowledge labour have been particularly influential 
agendas in Finland since advanced manufacturing processes began to move to China 
(Comedia, 2010, p. 16), and have been a national strategy/priority since the mid 1990s 
(Hautamäki, 2002; Himanen, 2004). 
 
Similarly, Ireland has moved from a predominantly agricultural economy (for most of 
the 20
th
 century), to a knowledge and service economy dominated by a local variant 
called the Smart Economy,  highly dependent on the science and technology sector.
54
 
Neoliberalism has been particularly central to Ireland’s economic development, 
promoting an unrestricted pursuit of inward investment characterised by a pervasive 
“ideology of low [corporate] taxation” (O’Brien, 2007, p. 2), as well as poor social and 
health services, and the general embrace of an Anglo-American corporate model.
55
 
Ireland is thus a highly globalised
56
 country, with a well-educated and English-speaking 
                                                           
54 
 The Smart Economy is defined as one which “…combines the successful elements of the enterprise 
economy and the innovation or ‘ideas’ economy while promoting a high-quality environment, improving 
energy security and promoting social cohesion” (Government of Ireland, 2008, p. 7). 
55
 In 2011, Ireland was ranked as the 29
th
 most competitive and 11
th
 most prosperous nation in the world 
as well as the 7
th
 strongest economy for entrepreneurship and opportunity (increasing from 12
th
 in 2009). 
See the Legatum Prosperity Index. Available: http://www.prosperity.com/ [Accessed 29 July 2011].   
56
 Ireland took second place in the globalisation index of 2010 on the basis of “its openness to global 
trade, global capital movements, global exchange of technology and ideas, global labour movements and 
cultural integration” (Hennigan, 2011, n.p.). 
 184 
workforce (opening up a number of English-speaking markets), offering “speedy 
delivery of information-rich and design-rich goods and services in the network-based 
economy” (ibid., p. 8). The relative success of Ireland in pursuing this agenda is 
evidenced by choice of the country as the location for the headquarters of major US 
technology giants such as Google, Twitter, Apple and Facebook,  the latter of whom 
described Ireland as a “great hub of international tech talent” (Irish Times, 2013, n.p.).. 
 
All three countries, therefore, share a particular relationship to nationalism and to a 
degree, colonisation, with patchy economic histories, resulting in issues of confidence, 
self-esteem and the importance of diplomacy. Equally, the cases have developed strong 
cultural identities and traditions, are small in population (and thus seek residents and 
workers) and occupy a relatively peripheral geo-political location in northern Europe. 
Of greater importance in relation to analysing the cases in respect of the creative city, 
however, is the shared political and economic models and national agendas of the three 
countries (neoliberalism and the knowledge economy), of increasing importance since 
the onset of the international recession. 
 
Taken together, these factors have resulted in a series of cultural policy discourses that 
will be shown to comprise: nationalism, competition, knowledge-building, creativity, 
the creative economy (and post-industrialism), welfare, civilisation, place-development, 
mobile workers, international investment, tolerance, reputation and national branding. 
In order to look more deeply at these discourses and how these factors have specifically 
impacted on urban development discourses and cultural polices in each country, it is 
time to turn to Scotland, beginning with an overview of city branding and marketing 
there. 
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5.3 Scotland 
 
5.3.1 Introduction to the creative city in Scotland: city branding, future-casting and 
reinvention 
Over the last thirty years, the global interest in urban regeneration initiatives and 
discourses, in the context of Scotland’s continued economic and population decline, has 
led to a number of place-development and uniqueness (of place) discourses in 
Scotland’s policies. As such, Scotland’s cities have been exemplars of city marketing 
and development campaigns, expressed in a wide-ranging programme of social, cultural 
and tourism events. Specifically, Scotland has been awarded two international 
UNESCO creative city designations (literature and music), and hosts a plethora of 
national, city and place-branding initiatives,
57
 national and international cultural 
events,
58
 and other creatively branded projects.
59  
Particular to Scotland however, and 
                                                           
57
 Some of these initiatives include: The Merchant City brand, which has been associated with 
gentrification and privatisation, commemorating the colonial past of Glasgow’s former landlords (Gray, 
N., 2009). See also: http://www.merchantcityglasgow.com/ and http://www.seeglasgow.com/about-us/ 
[Accessed 12 June 2012]; Glasgow, Scotland with Style. Available: http://www.seeglasgow.com/ 
[Accessed 22 January 2013]; and in relation to Edinburgh, Inspiring Capital, describing Edinburgh as 
“one of the most attractive places in the UK to visit, invest, live, work and study” and a “hub for tourism, 
talent and trade”. Available: http://www.edinburgh-inspiringcapital.com/ [Accessed 14 June 2012); 
Scotland, Creative Nation, which aims for a Scotland with “creativity reaching into every home” and for 
Scotland to become “one of the world’s most creative nations” by 2020 and to be “recognised as a leading 
creative nation – one that attracts, develops and retains talent, where the arts and the creative industries 
are supported and celebrated and their economic contribution fully captured, a nation where the arts and 
creativity play a central part in the lives, education and well-being of our population”. Available: 
http://www.creativescotland.com/about/our-plans/corporate-plan [Accessed 9 August 2011]; the Year of 
Creative Scotland. Available: http://www.creativescotland.com/news/year-of-creative-scotland-2012 
[Accessed 7 March 2012]; Scotland’s Most Creative Places, celebrating the “hard work and imagination 
that contributes to the rich cultural life of a community, as well as its social and economic well-being”. 
Available: http://www.creativescotland.com/news/2012-creative-place-award-winners-announced-
24012012 [Accessed 7 March 2012]; the Year of Natural Scotland, supported by Creative Scotland, 
which aims to “highlight our great natural assets and celebrate our reputation as a land of outstanding 
beauty”. Available: http://www.creativescotland.com/investment/year-of-natural-scotland-open-
fund?dm_i=FES,Z5TF,3CP6US,2Y9A2,1 [Accessed 10 October 2012]. 
58
 There are a number of promotional cultural tourism events in Scotland including: the Cultural 
Olympiad, which was part of Glasgow’s participation in the 2012 Olympics. Available: 
http://www.creativescotland.com/explore/2012-2014/london-2012-cultural-olympiad); Glasgow’s 2014 
Commonwealth Games and participation in the UK/Derry’s 2013 City of Culture. Available: 
http://www.glasgow2014.com/ and http://www.discovernorthernireland.com/walledcity/signatureproject/ 
[All Accessed 15 September 2012]; the Hogmanay festival, celebrating the Scottish New Year. Available: 
http://www.visitscotland.com/see-do/events/hogmanay); Burns Night, celebrating Scotland’s “national 
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defining much of this activity, is a focus on both traditionalism (looking to the past) and 
modernity (looking to the future), and thus an emphasis on identity, invention and 
reinvention. This activity is represented by a range of Enlightenment narratives with an 
emphasis on the theme of the imagination, tasked with national progress and renewal 
and attempts to shape perceptions in and of Scotland through community think-ins. This 
alliance between local, national and cultural initiatives, it will be demonstrated, is a 
defining feature of Scotland’s cultural policies. 
 
Scotland’s Futures Forum is one of these projects, and was established (by the Scottish 
Executive in 2005) as a scenario-building project aiming to inspire new thinking about 
Scotland’s future, civic agency, democracy, and sustainability, within a cultural 
context.
60
 Similarly, the “mass imagination exercise” of Glasgow 2020 (Hassan, 2007, 
n.p) devised by think-tank DEMOS (a major contributor to creative city discourse), 
aimed to use stories or narrative to explore “the possibilities of people thinking, 
conceiving and developing their own futures” (ibid.). This project culminated in the 
publication, The Dreaming City and The Power of Mass Imagination (2007), though 
like many urban projects, it had been discussed in the context of the dangers of 
"formulaic city regeneration” (Leask, 2007, n.p.). Additionally, the 2009 project A 
Scottish Wave of Change (part of the Cultural Olympiad), also run by DEMOS in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
bard” Robbie Burns. Available: http://www.edinburgh.org/see-do/events/burns-night, and The 
Homecoming, where “everyone’s invited to come and help us celebrate and reconnect with all that makes 
Scotland truly great”. Available: http://www.homecomingscotland.com/ [all Accessed 13 February 2013].  
59
 Other creative marketing events comprise Creative Dundee (http://www.creativedundee.com/ 
[Accessed 28 June 2012], regeneration projects such as Dundee (http://www.dundeewaterfront.com/) and 
Speirs Lock (http://www.glasgowarchitecture.co.uk/speirs_locks_development.htm), creative city-themed 
lectures and conferences such as the Edinburgh Lectures Talking Cities programme, Scotland Naturally. 
Available: http://www edinburghlectures.wordpress.com [Accessed 28 March 2010]and dedicated 
academic programmes such as St Andrews Institute for Capitalising on Creativity which offers a course 
based on “one of the fastest growing economic sectors”, the creative industries . Available: 
http://www.standrews.ac.uk/icc/research/grantprojects/esrccapitalisingoncreativity/ [Accessed 21 
February 2012].  
60
Available: http://www.scotlandfuturesforum.org/index.php?id=55 [Accessed 20 November 2012]. 
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partnership with a number of public service organisations, echoed these projects, and, 
like Glasgow 2020, was described as a “mass imagination project” aimed at “people 
bringing about change.”61 More recently, these exercises have been joined by initiatives 
such as the British Council’s Urban Ideas Bakery and Future City Game, an offshoot of 
its branded British Council Creative Cities programme (as referred to above). This 
initiative ran in Stirling (2010), and urged “innovative” communities to “bake urban 
ideas”, turning them into “practical solutions to improve the quality of life in cities”.62  
Scotland is also a member of the Districts of Creativity network, claiming that the 
country is a “world-class contributor in the spheres of innovation and creativity.”63 
 
These collective imagination projects, together with aggressive city and regional 
marketing campaigns, are aimed at creating positive perceptions of Scotland to itself, 
and critically, to the outside world. However, these events are equally directed at 
erasing negative stereotypes of Scotland as depressed and economically depleted, and in 
this way share a lineage with earlier urban marketing/development initiatives from the 
1980s. The Glasgow’s Miles Better campaign (1983) is an example of this and was 
directly inspired by New York’s 1970s (I love NY) reinvention project. This project 
represented an urban entrepreneurialism that centred on correcting outdated ideas of 
Glasgow as dangerous, dilapidated and dirty in an effort to generate and attract tourism, 
business and investment, and more specifically, to “make Glasgow more attractive to 
commercial and residential developers” (Tretter, 2009, p. 121).  
 
                                                           
61
Available: http://imaginingscotland.com/ [Accessed 20 November 2012]. See also People Making 
Waves (2013). 
62
 Available: http://creativecities.britishcouncil.org/urban_co-design_tools/urban_ideas_bakery [Accessed 
20 November 2012]. 
63 See Districts of Creativity [online]. Available: http://www.districtsofcreativity.org/view/50137670-
Scotland.html [Accessed 7 February 2013]. 
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However, like many boosterist initiatives, views are divided between benign 
assessments of the campaign (mostly by the Council who devised it), as a major plank 
of the “cultural renaissance” of Glasgow City Council, designed to “attract dispersed 
businesses and inward investment” 64 and negative assessments aligned with the “fast 
policy” criticisms of the creative city (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 397). From this 
perspective, key problems with Glasgow’s Miles Better was the event’s obfuscation of 
deeply entrenched problems within the city (Gray, N, 2009), its raid on and enclosing of 
the city’s commons (or collective wealth), and the plundering of Glasgow’s cultural 
infrastructure in order to “revalorise property values and land rents” (ibid., 2010, n.p.), 
in other words, urban entrepreneurialism. 
 
Equally, the Glasgow Garden Festival of 1988 aimed to promote Glasgow (in highly 
creative city mode) as a place to “invest in, visit, live or work”,65 and prepared the 
ground for Glasgow’s 1990 City of Culture. This benchmark event catapulted 
Glasgow’s status as a cultural centre and galvanised countless national and international 
regeneration discourses around the compatibility and possibility of culture, the 
economy, industrial policy, tourism, branding and transformation. The divisiveness 
which characterised responses to Glasgow City of Culture eclipsed even that of 
Glasgow’s Miles Better. As such, the event was positioned, on the one hand (again by 
officials), as an acclaimed model of culture-led urban regeneration, a “magnificent 
success”, a “revolutionary model”,66 responsible for “setting future agendas for city 
change” (European Communities, 2009, p. 16), receiving sustained positive media 
                                                           
64
 Significantly, in reference to the aim behind Glasgow’s Miles Better, it was reported that “not only did 
this [negative image of Glasgow] lower the morale of its citizens, but it greatly hampered efforts to 
generate a tourist industry” Available: http://www.glasgow.gov.uk/index.aspx?articleid=3705 [Accessed 
13th June, 2012]. See Muriel (2012) and The Herald (2012) in respect of The Glasgow Effect. 
65 Ibid. 
66
 Ibid. 
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attention (BBC Newsnight, 2011), academic studies and comment,
67
 and, on the other, 
an egregious example of expense, uneven development, with ”questionable” 
regeneration benefits (Hibberd, 2008, p. 30).  
 
Equally, from a political point of view, the organisation set up to bid for it (Glasgow 
Action), was pejoratively referred to as the “first clearly defined public-private 
partnership in Scotland” (Boyle cited in Gray, N., 2010, n.p.) and made up of “local 
business personalities, many of them with direct ties to local banks and other real-estate 
related industries” (Tretter, 2009, p. 120). These claims raised questions around the uses 
of and influences on public funding in cities. Despite these criticisms, however, the 
dispersed impact of this campaign continues to resonate in the media, in reports of 
Scotland as “one of the UK's leading ‘creative hotspots’” (Fergusen, 2010, n.p.), and 
claims that Glasgow hasn’t lost its “creative edge” (Brennan, 2010, n.p.). 
 
This range of place-development and marketing activity, linking the private sector and 
the economy, with culture and creativity discourses, is embodied and exemplified in 
Glasgow Life, Glasgow City Council’s devolved culture department.68Also known as 
Culture Services Glasgow (CSG), this new model of devolved public service was 
rebranded as Glasgow Life in 2009 (Gordon Nesbitt, 2011, p. 17). As a putatively 
public service body, the nomenclature of Glasgow Life was significant and took a “bit 
of coming to terms with” (ibid., p. 16), ultimately being viewed as a deliberately 
“generic” signifier that would “facilitate trading” (ibid., p. 17). Like the other 
campaigns, the development of Glasgow Life was intended to “make Glasgow more 
                                                           
67
 See Garcia (2009) and Palmer/RAE Associated (2004). This latter report involves a number of key 
authors who have studied the impact of Glasgow’s City of Culture, including its chief author, Robert 
Palmer, Beatrice Garcia, Rod Fisher and Francois Matarasso.. See also weblinks 
Available:http://www.beatrizgarcia.net; www.impacts08.net [Accessed 31 August 2012]. 
68
 Available: www.glasgowlife.org.uk/[Accessed 12 March 2013]. 
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vibrant” (ibid., p. 16) and counteract images of its “world-beating inequality” (ibid., p. 
17) by creating new and more positive images of Glasgow. However, the new agency 
quickly became a source of controversy in relation to accusations of “cronyism” ( ibid., 
p. 15), political patronage, corruption, a disregard for local activities in favour of 
international business and brands, a “deprioritisation of the people of Glasgow” and, 
again, a primarily “entrepreneurial attitude towards culture” (ibid., p. 17). The 
conflation of public/private interests within Glasgow Life was explicitly underlined in 
City Council statements stressing Glasgow’s need to “develop a new model for 
delivering public services in partnership with the private sector” (Glasgow City 
Council, 2006, p. 2). Like Glasgow Action, therefore (above), these statements 
conferred the sense of a “private company” (Gordon Nesbitt, 2011, p. 15), which to 
some suggested a lack of “democratic accountability” (ibid., p. 18).  
 
The history, frequency and range of these marketing events, designations, imagination 
exercises, cultural festivals, and public-private models of cultural delivery in Scotland, 
collectively point to an active neoliberal urban entrepreneurialism, adept at 
manipulating Scotland’s profile in the service of national as well as international 
consumption. More so, however, these campaigns point to a deficit, national 
defensiveness or need for reinvention, in order to legitimate, address, or possibly 
reframe, the country’s prevailing social and economic issues. One of the key sources of 
this deficit, in Glasgow at least, has been the impact of the Glasgow Effect, a name 
given to the ongoing health problems, long-term poverty and social degradation of 
Glasgow.
69
 Nevertheless, the enlightenment tone of the projects (signifying progress, 
the future, internationalism etc.) also reflect Scotland’s intellectual legacy (as well as 
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 See Muriel (2012) and The Herald (2012). 
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Landry and Comedia’s creative city consultancy work there: Comedia, 1991; Landry et 
al., 1996).
70
 Taken together, therefore, the entrepreneurial approach to culture and city 
development in Scotland can be interpreted as located in its intellectual and industrial 
history as well as Scotland’s subsequent economic and demographic decline.   
 
5.3.2 Nationalism, national psyches and cultural policies 
Before outlining the development of cultural policy in Scotland, it is important to return 
to the role of nationalism in the Scottish psyche with a view to considering its influence 
on Scotland’s cultural policy discourses. Scotland’s devolved independence in 1999 
created a fragmented and contested political situation, resulting in three changes of 
government, four first ministers (as premiers), and ten culture ministers to date.
71
 
However, recent changes in the independence movement, spearheaded by the SNP, in 
power since 2007 and a majority government since 2011, have led to the prospect of 
complete independence from the Union through a referendum planned for 2014 (Press 
Association, 2012, n.p.; Irish Times, 2012d). Like many countries subjected to external 
administrations, therefore, nationalism is a recurring and contested discourse in 
Scotland, fed by an “aberrant identity code of fake Celticism” (McCrone, 2001, p. 146), 
prone to “regressive” (ibid., p. 139) and romantic tropes of “tartanry” and myth, and 
19
th
 century “appropriation[s] of highland symbolism” (ibid., p. 132). These national 
tropes and discourses arose as a way to address fears of the mass industrialisation of 
Scotland in the 19
th
 century, and the view that its “economic, social and cultural identity 
was ebbing away” (ibid., p. 135).  
                                                           
70 This publication details a seminal creative city workshop held in Glasgow in 1994, involving Comedia, 
Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society, Peter Hall from the Bartlett School 
Demos, Klaus R. Kunzmann at the University of Dortmund and Lia Ghilardi (Landry et al., 1996). 
71
 Available:  http://annebonnar.wordpress.com/2012/01/02/indicators-of-the-scottish-governments-firm-
commitment-to-culture-2011-roundup// [Accessed 10 October 2013]. 
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As a result of the emigration that followed industrialisation, Scotland’s diaspora has 
become a major part of its identity construction, leading to narratives of “romanticism, 
self-invention and a measure of ignorant assumption” (Kidd, 2011, p.5). Equally, 
Scotland’s “Anglophobia” and “toxic” “anti-English feeling” (Higgins, 2013b, n.p.) is 
symptomatic of its fraught relationship with Great Britain and the United Kingdom, and 
has in some way come to define Scotland through an ongoing “inferiorism” (McCrone, 
2001, p. 140) and an oppressive mode of what has been described as “self-colonisation” 
(ibid., p. 146).  
 
Scholars view this relationship with England as having given rise to images of Scottish 
culture as “deformed” (McCrone, 2001, p. 131) and resulting in an enduring cultural 
pessimism as well as a subsequent fragmentation (ibid., p. 138) within the national 
psyche. The divided nature of this position is characterised by the desire to project 
modernity with a contemporary identity, alongside an obsession with tradition and the 
past (ibid.). In turn, this rootedness in the past has led to a “standardised and idealised 
model” of Scottish life (Humes, 2011, n.p.) and an essentialist and “internalist” reading 
of Scotland to itself (McCrone, 2001, p. 145). The result of these factors is a 
complicated self-image defined by a pessimism (and inferiorism) mixed with a 
bombastic nationalism, and the development of a binary past/present discursive 
typology. This typology, therefore, is driven by a mode of national self-protection that 
speaks to a Scotland that is “post-national” but not “post-nationalist” (McCrone, 2001, 
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p. 148) and moreover, speaks to Scotland’s self-colonisation (ibid., p. 146). These issues 
will be shown to have had a profound impact on Scotland’s cultural policy.72 
 
A positive outcome of nationalism in Scotland has been the high degree of autonomy it 
has traditionally had in relation to cultural matters, despite being historically bound to 
the UK (Chávez-Aguayo, 2010). This autonomy was apparent in the establishment of 
the Scottish Advisory Committee in 1942 as part of the Council for the Encouragement 
of Music and the Arts (CEMA), the Scottish Committee of the Arts Council of Great 
Britain (ACGB) in 1945, the Local Government (Scotland) Act of 1948, and the 
Scottish Arts Council in 1994 as part of the dissolution of the ACGB (Quinn, 1998, p. 
260). Between 1999 and 2010, however, despite devolution and a degree of national 
autonomy, as well as frequent changes in government, there has been some dependence 
on, and a continuity of, central UK cultural policies, as will be demonstrated via 
Scotland’s continued focus on the creative industries agenda (i.e. Creative Scotland).  
 
This dependence refers to the continuation of New Labour’s erstwhile creative 
industries agenda. Like many post-industrial countries, the interest in the creative 
industries is a response to Scotland’s industrial dispossession after the closure of its 
formerly successful dockyards, and the subsequent place-development agenda that 
aimed to reverse this. However, the SNP’s persistence with the creative economy73 has 
                                                           
72
 Broadcasting as a reserved power has caused particular issues for Scottish nationalism (as well as 
cultural policy) and highlighted the irony of Scottish attempts “to establish a national cultural strategy 
without including a discussion of the most popular and influential cultural forms of the twentieth century” 
(Hibberd, 2008, p. 37).  
73
 The founding of Cultural Enterprise Office in 2002, establishing of Cultural and Creative Cultures 
Scotland (dedicated the North East of Scotland) in 2006, the continued work of the Scottish Enterprise 
Office and the Highland and Islands Enterprise office, together indicate the significant (and for many 
confusing) support for the creative industries in Scotland. Available: www.culturalenterpriseoffice.co.uk/ ; 
www.creativeculturescotland.co.uk/ ; www.scottish-enterprise.com/; www.hie.co.uk [Accessed 10 
October 2013]. 
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been critically perceived as an imported English cultural agenda (Scullion and Garcia, 
2005, p. 119), that undervalues the historical role played by artists in driving 
independence (Hamilton and Scullion, 2002, n.p.) and Scotland’s former cultural 
autonomy.  
 
Though the closeness between former Labour policies and Scotland is changing with the 
longevity of the SNP and the independence movement, the consensus between Scotland 
and central Westminster  (via New Labour) over the last twenty years has been 
described as the greatest “accord” between Scottish and wider UK politics “than at any 
other time” (Hibberd, 2008, p. 12), an alignment of “policy and style” (Schlesinger, 
2000, p. 318) and more pejoratively (in relation to Scottish cultural policy), as reeking 
of “New Labour’s wrongs” (Mulholland, 2008, p. 41). For some, therefore, Scotland’s 
interest in the creative industries has reflected the desire to retain devolution as an 
“undisguised tactic for keeping the union in being” (Schlesinger, 2000, p. 314).  
 
For others, however, the creative industries have represented a “genuine route to meet 
the aspirations of Scotland’s distinct [and reinvented] ‘civil society’” (ibid.) or more 
simply, the product of a “coherent, coordinated” national policy (Knell and Fleming, 
2008, p. 6). Whether a way to increase the link with the central (at least currently) 
source of UK power or an attempt to reinvigorate civil society, both interpretations of 
Scotland’s interest in the creative industries suggest the importance of legitimation to 
the state. That importance is, legitimating Scotland as a central part of the United 
Kingdom, and/or legitimating Scotland as an independent state. The persistence of the 
creative industries agenda in Scotland has taken a dramatic turn in the last couple of 
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years with the development of Creative Scotland, Scotland’s first arts and creative 
industries agency. 
 
5.3.3 Creative Scotland and government agendas: an overview 
The long-awaited arrival of Creative Scotland in 2010 signalled both change and 
continuity in Scotland. Specifically, this new agency, representing both the creative 
industries and the subsidised arts, signposted the end of the Scottish Arts Council and 
traditional post-war model of high culture-focused support (change), in favour of a 
development agency for the creative economy that championed the “unique contribution 
of places to a creative Scotland” (continuity) (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 36). As a bold 
though contested model of cultural development and management, Creative Scotland 
represents a watershed in the first ten years of independent cultural policy in Scotland 
(1999 to 2009), as well as European cultural policy more generally and symbolises the 
culmination of political, economic and cultural change.   
 
Like Glasgow Life, the development of Creative Scotland has been a drawn-out and 
heavily contested process, critiqued in both the media (Hutcheon, 2006; Macaskill, 
2008; Macleod, 2008; Various artists, 2009; Kane, 2010; Sweeney, 2010a; Higgins, 
2012b) and the blogosphere.
74
 In particular, as suggested above, Creative Scotland has 
been viewed as ideologically English, adopting unreflexive (Schlesinger, 2009a) and 
“ready-made” (ibid., p. 11) strategies for making creativity more profitable. However, 
Creative Scotland has also put a primary focus on place-development and private 
sector/investment and return, while explicitly aligning itself with central government 
(non-cultural) priorities and strategies. It will also be argued that this activity has 
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 Available: http://creativescotland.blogspot.com [Accessed 4
 
June 2013]. 
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contributed to a profound crisis within the body recalling a Habermasian crisis of 
legitimacy (1973).  
 
In order to understand the origin of some of these criticisms, however, it is necessary to 
look at how Creative Scotland has emerged and developed. A new body amalgamating a 
number of existing cultural agencies in Scotland was first mentioned in 2004 (Scottish 
Executive, 2004a, p. 1) as part of discussions over the need for cultural reform and 
fewer cultural quangos and the proposal for a National Council for the Creative 
Individual (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 149), a name that already indicated the 
growing change in discourses of culture to the broader concept of creativity. In 2006, 
however, a proposal for Creative Scotland emerged as part of plans for a development-
oriented agency charged with helping cultural delivery organisations specifically 
leverage the “contributions of the private and voluntary sectors” (Scottish Executive, 
2006a, p. 54).  
 
From the outset, this agency was expected to position culture as an “important 
contribution to the Executive’s top priority of growing the economy, through the 
creative industries” (ibid., p. 31), as well as to play a “central role in delivering the 
Executive’s wider cultural policy”, which was essentially to work “with business to 
realise the benefits of the arts and culture in the private sector” (Scottish Executive, 
2006b, p. 7). By 2007, after the election of the SNP, few changes were made to the 
proposal for Creative Scotland and its reliance on the private sector was reasserted.  
 
This private sector agenda was indicated in iterations from the new Scottish government 
which comprised market-led conceptualisations of cultural subsidy and discourses of 
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“non-repayable grants” and “loans” (Scottish National Party, 2007, p. 55). These 
statements also concerned the government taking a “stake in the artist’s next work” 
(ibid.). This was followed in 2009 by the (pre) Creative Scotland Innovation Fund, 
based on a £5 million “investment” in various cultural initiatives (Creative Scotland, 
2010a, n.p.). By 2010, Creative Scotland had been established under the auspices of the 
ex chief executive of the Newcastle Gateshead urban development initiative. The 
appointment of an urban development specialist as the head of Creative Scotland, had a 
significant symbolism in the context of traditional cultural policy models, as well as in 
relation to Scotland’s history of urban marketing, and, it will be shown, had a major 
impact on the discourse, direction and interim fate of the body, before his resignation in 
2012.
 75
 
 
Though there have been many criticisms of Creative Scotland, one of the key issues has 
been (and continues to be) how it represents an apparent loss of cultural independence 
from government, and in particular, the [double] arm’s length principle historically 
enjoyed by the country (Chávez-Aguayo, 2010). The arm’s length principle, which is 
now a staple of European cultural policies (although routinely challenged), was 
developed by economist John Maynard Keynes (an economist and first chairman of the 
new Arts Council in Britain in 1945) in order to safeguard freedom of expression and to 
discourage political interference (and avoid their culpability) in artistic judgements 
about quality (Schlesinger, 2009b, pp. 5-6). Though Scotland’s historic cultural 
autonomy had already receded by 1997 with New Labour’s establishing of the central 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), devolution brought about an 
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 Andrew Dixon was appointed Director of Creative Scotland in early 2010 after much speculation about 
the role. Available: http://www.scottisharts.org.uk/1/latestnews/1007015.aspx [Accessed 31 August 
2012].Dixon later resigned in 2012, and in a change of direction for the body, has been replaced by Janet 
Archer, an arts manager, dancer and choreographer. See (Miller, 2013) and below 5.5.3. 
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increased urge for ministerial control of cultural matters. As the former Scottish Arts 
Council had originally been a committee of the ACGB (and thus doubly independent 
from government), its dissolution meant that the double autonomy of Scotland’s cultural 
policy had eroded (Garcia, 2004; Chávez-Aguayo, 2010). 
 
However, the loss of independent cultural judgment associated with Creative Scotland, 
also stems from the 2006 proposal to transfer support for the national performing 
companies previously affected through the SAC to the Scottish Executive (Scottish 
Executive, 2006a, p. 29). This development coincided with Executive attempts to rein in 
what was perceived as the chaotic development of the nascent agency (Chávez-Aguayo, 
2010), but was also a desire to control an increasingly disparate cultural body without 
being seen to do so (as below). As a result of this, justifications, mixed messages and 
equivocation characterised government statements in relation to its role in Creative 
Scotland.  
 
This was demonstrated in political claims that Creative Scotland needed a “close 
relationship[s] with Ministers” and was subject to directions which must be followed 
(Scottish Executive, 2006b, p. 7), on the one hand, and an acknowledgment that 
“Ministers will not use such powers to intervene in the decisions of Creative Scotland 
that are essentially about artistic judgement” and would “remain strongly committed to 
the principle that decisions of this kind should not be taken by them” (ibid.), on the 
other. Equally, ministers demanded that Creative Scotland “pursue a consistent 
strategy” (suggesting a claim on that strategy) and asserted directional powers “which 
they must follow” (ibid.), while again claiming non-interference in “artistic judgment” 
(ibid.). This equivocation, as well as the enforced closeness between the ministry and 
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artists, was made apparent in SNP statements on taking a share of artists’ “profits”, as 
referred to above (Scottish National Party, 2007, p.55), a concept suggesting the 
creative industries rather than subsidised cultural model (which would be unlikely to 
yield profit). 
 
The erosion of the arm’s length principle, although reaffirmed in 2007, was ultimately 
acknowledged as leaving the cultural sector in Scotland “closer to Ministers and 
politicians than had ever previously been the case” (Scullion and Garcia, 2005, p. 120), 
and quashed earlier hopes for Creative Scotland to be an “important voice expressing 
what the arts can achieve in their own right” (Scottish Arts Council, 2009, p. 36). In 
addition, despite media reports of ministerial claims that Creative Scotland and artists 
“will have the freedom and power to determine their own creative direction – a firm 
sign from this government that we will not interfere in artistic decisions” (Daily Record, 
2008, n.p.), proximity to government objectives has become a hallmark of Creative 
Scotland. This is demonstrated in the robust assertion of the agency’s primary role in 
delivering the Scottish Government’s programme, vis-à-vis Scotland’s National 
Outcomes (Creative Scotland, 2011, pp. 55-56), and its fit with other SNP government 
priorities, as will be discussed below. 
 
However, there have been other criticisms of Creative Scotland beyond its proximity to 
government. These criticisms are: the lack of “meaningful consultation” prior to its 
establishment (Various Artists, 2009, n.p.); its use of the “discredited” creative 
industries model and its emphasis on an economically-oriented championing of 
intellectual property (Gordon Nesbitt, 2009, n.p.);
76
 its “ill-conceived” decision-making 
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 Though Creative Scotland has robustly rebutted these criticisms, claiming that they simply want to 
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and obscure corporate language (Higgins, 2012b, n.p.); its US-modelled philanthropic 
(Creative Scotland Blogspot, 2010, n.p.) and rights-sharing venture capitalism model 
(Kane, 2010, n.p.), congruent with privatisation and the language of investment and 
(profit) return;
77
 its general instrumentalism (Holloway, 2008); and this research would 
assert, its move to dissolve funding responsibilities in the move from grants to loans as 
suggested in the SNP’s manifesto (2007). Equally, there have been criticisms that 
Creative Scotland is “vague and confused”, that its progress is slow and painful 
(Sweeney 2010a; 2010b), that it is overly promotional (e.g. Creative Places), and, in a 
potentially hierarchical mode, that its wide interpretation of culture is populist.
78
  
 
These criticisms have led to an “unbreachable rift” between Creative Scotland and the 
Scottish arts community, who have characterised the body as showing a “lack of 
empathy and regard for Scottish culture” (Higgins, 2012b, n.p.). Some of these 
responses have been strongly framed by romantic (or at least intrinsic value-led) views 
of the artist’s independence from the workings and concerns of the state, comprising 
criticisms of: Scotland’s erosion of the “right of pure artists to maintain a creative 
distance from their funders” (Kane, 2010, n.p.); its eschewal of the “ultimate function” 
of funding “creative imaginations” by freeing them from “the usual pressure of 
consumer or investor expectations” (ibid.), on whom, it is ironically asserted, “the 
nation's hopes of economic recovery rest” (Gordon Nesbitt, 2009, n.p.).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
“ensure that the country's creative professionals can profit from their talent” and “protect their intellectual 
property”, some commentators have demurred (Roy, 2010, n.p.). 
77
 Investment is defined by Creative Scotland as devoting “time, effort or resources to a particular 
undertaking with the expectation of a worthwhile result” and is used as “the basis” for a range of 
objectives (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 5) and levers “more resources into Scotland” (Creative Scotland, 
2011, p. 28). “Investment” is also a key heading on its website (though in most cases it refers to arts 
funding), as well as former management terms such as “investment portfolio”, “resources” and various 
references to corporate plans. Available: http://www.creativescotland.com/ [Accessed 6 October 2012]. 
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This refers to the inclusion of cooking and nature in Creative Scotland projects. Available: 
http://www.scottishreview.net/KennethRoy12.shtml?utm_source=SignUp.toandutm_medium=emailandut
m_campaign=275308-The+TV+cookery+show+bankrolled+by+a+Scottish+public+body+ [Accessed 31 
August 2012]. 
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These discourses clearly place the state in the traditional role of patron (funder) and 
simultaneously invoke the idealised tradition of the artist as holder of the nation’s soul, 
disavowing the pragmatic and strategic aspects of policy-making. However, despite 
Creative Scotland’s assertions of its continued role in subsidising traditional artforms, 
these discourses signal unease with its explicit development approach and marketing 
language in the context of an increasingly declining subsidy environment, raising 
concerns as to whether these artforms and the creative industries could be equally 
prioritised.  
 
The cumulative significance of these statements has been the gradual but sustained 
undermining of the agency’s legitimacy in the eyes of practising artists and managers, 
with the result that its “embattled” (and first ever) Chief Executive was forced to resign 
in 2012, just two years after his appointment (Higgins, 2012c, n.p.). The “fatal lack of 
trust” generated in Creative Scotland (Miller, 2012, n.p.) can be viewed as the critical 
failure of necessary lifeworld input (from the sector) and was indirectly acknowledged 
by the (ex) Chief Executive who outlined regret that he had not secured the necessary 
“respect and support” of the arts community (Higgins, 2012c, n.p).  
 
The impact of this overwhelming negativity has been the appointment of a new Chief 
Executive from an artistic (dance) rather than development background, a restructuring 
of the staff of Creative Scotland ,
79
and a modification of its public discourses. However, 
there has been an equivocation characterising these changes.  While Creative Scotland’s 
                                                           
79
 See Faull (3013) Creative Scotland to undergo a major management shake-up, says newly appointed 
head Janet Archer, The Drum, 2 October [online]. Available: 
http://www.thedrum.com/news/2013/10/02/creative-scotland-undergo-major-management-shake-says-
newly-appointed-head-janet [Accessed 4 October 2013]. 
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new plan is now called an Annual rather than Corporate Plan and aims to “reset the 
overall purpose of Creative Scotland and our values in line with the feedback we have 
received” (Creative Scotland, 2013, n.p.) in critical recognition of past events, there has 
also been a re-assertion of the need to “make the best use of the fantastic resources of 
intellectual and human capital available”...to “unlock talent, drive opportunity, and 
grow artistic and cultural capital for this amazingly ambitious nation"(Miller, 2013, 
n.p.). While the consequences of the failure of trust create a difficult future for Creative 
Scotland, its reflection on the effectiveness of Scottish government appointments and 
decisions in light of the fractious emergence of Creative Scotland in the first place, is 
damaging and has been described as “embarrassing” (Miller, 2012, n.p.), indicating the 
importance of the lifeworld and the broader reach and impact of its withdrawal. 
 
Notwithstanding these criticisms and this interim instability, Creative Scotland, though 
to some extent a New Labour agency, skilfully reconciles economic with nationalist 
(SNP) objectives, most particularly the marketing of Scotland’s culture, as part of a 
nationalist triumphalism and boosterism.
80
 By putatively bridging tradition (in the form 
of supporting high culture) with apparently progressive creative economy discourses 
(and industries), Creative Scotland epitomises a central feature of broader Scottish 
policy referred to earlier, that of simultaneously projecting the past (including the visual 
discourse of its logo)
81
 alongside tropes or rhetorics of modernity (McCrone, 2001, p. 
135), progress, cosmopolitanism, innovation
82
 and the future (Creative Scotland, 2011, 
                                                           
80
 “Scotland’s incredible influence on the world has encouraged invention, inspired creativity and fired 
imaginations for generations” [online]. Available: http://www.creativescotland.com/ [Accessed 6 October 
2012]. The UK’s policy focus on “Britain’s international prestige”, ’and 
“British talent” as part of a general “Britain is Best” thematic, has also been noted in Nisbett (2013). 
81
 A traditional moonlit and mountainous landscape invoking the past is embodied in the logo of Creative 
Scotland [online]. Available: http://www.creativescotland.com/about/our-brand [Accessed 13 February 
2013]. 
82 See also the Innovation Fund. Available:  
http://www.creativescotland.com/explore/showcase/innovation-fund [Accessed 3 July 2013]. 
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p. 3). More significantly, the discourses of Creative Scotland are directly linked to key 
national priorities, with an emphasis on urban development and investment, and a 
recognition of “places and their contribution to a creative Scotland”.83 The next section 
will contextualise these criticisms, in respect of the creative city paradigm.  
 
5.3.4 Scottish cultural policy discourses 
5.3.4.1 The past/present dichotomy and cosmopolitanism 
Before considering how the creative city influences Scottish cultural policies as a 
specific variety of place-development discourse, it is necessary to consider the range of 
discourses operating within Scotland’s cultural policy texts. A key influence on 
Scotland’s cultural policies is the country’s first autonomous cultural policy statement, a 
pre-devolution text setting out aims and priorities for Scotland in its newly devolved 
state (Matarasso, 1998). From the outset, this document states the need for culture and 
creativity to lobby at this critical (decision-making) time in Scotland (just prior to 
devolution), for fear that “cultural affairs may appear less important” than other 
political portfolios (ibid., n.p.).  
 
In setting out the argument for cultural policies, the text also draws on a number of 
discourses: culture as a competitive national asset, marking out the distinctiveness and 
autonomy of Scotland; culture as a way to reconcile the past with the present (by 
presenting tradition with modernity); culture as a way to cope with relentlessly 
advancing change; culture as an support to democracy and citizenship (the latter two 
typical of New Labour discourses);
84
 creative societies, culture and creativity; 
                                                           
83
 Available: http://www.creativescotland.com/ [Accessed 6 October 2012]. 
84 This report was completed by consultant Francois Matarasso, who had worked on a number of other 
public reports during New Labour’s time in power, including the think tank Comedia. Available: 
 204 
innovation and competition; and specifically, culture as “the nation's R and D 
department” (Matarasso, 1998, p. 4). Within these themes and statements are clear 
evidences of discursive “struggle[s]” (Foucault, 1980, p. 83) in the reconciling of 
complicated positions on Scotland, such as identity, history and authenticity (looking to 
the past or present for inspiration and finding a unifying or discrete culture to celebrate 
Scottishness) and in terms of models of creativity (already existing or needing to be 
developed and for individual social benefit or for the economy). 
 
These discourses (modernity, cosmopolitan, change and the future) embody the 
“struggle[s]” (Foucault, 1980, p. 83) involved in Scotland’s historical “obsession with 
what has ended” (McCrone, 2001, p. 143) and thus draw on the juxtaposition of 
potentially conflicting discourses (Fairclough, 2003, p. 128). This dialectic is 
particularly present in images of Scotland as a bridge between the past and the present, 
simultaneously host to “tradition and innovation” (Matarasso, 1998, p. 2), “giving due 
emphasis to Scotland's indigenous traditions” (Scottish Executive, 1999, n.p.), being a 
“modern, dynamic and forward-looking society” (Scottish Executive, 2000a, n.p.) and 
positing culture as about “Creating Our Future … Minding Our Past” (ibid.; 2000b).  
 
As section 5.3.4.1 has outlined, this represents a discourse of the future and the 
Enlightenment and is particularly linked to internationalism and the trope of 
cosmopolitanism. The theme of cosmopolitanism is another key Scottish discourse 
demonstrated in the desire to establish a “culturally cosmopolitan Scotland” (Scottish 
National Party, 2007, n.p.; Scottish Government, 2009b, n.p.) and to
 be a “vibrant, 
cosmopolitan, competitive country” (Scottish Executive, 2004a, p. 1). Though ideals of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://web.me.com/matarasso/one/consultancy_files/Matarasso%20CV%202011%20web.pdf [Accessed 
14 June 2012].  
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modernity and the future have also been linked to New Labour discourses (Mulholland, 
2008, p. 35), the binary paradigm suggested by discourses of 
improvement/modernity/cosmopolitanism, as well as tradition and history, reflects a 
specific post-nationalist “fragmentation” in Scotland (McCrone, 2001, p. 138).  
 
 
5.3.4.2 Defensive and competitive nationalism and identity discourses 
This dual emphasis on tradition and modernity and Scotland’s strong concern with its 
image, is strongly linked to Scotland’s meta discourse of nationalism in general and its 
competitive brand of nationalism in particular. As such, these statements can be seen as 
legitimations of Scottish independence both before and after the rise of the SNP in 
Scottish government, and draw on culture’s symbolic or sign value in claims that: 
Parliament is a “cultural act responding to the unique character of Scots identity, values 
and creativity” (Matarasso, 1998, n.p.); culture contributes to the “distillation of 
historical identity and the expression – social and economic – of contemporary Scottish 
society” (ibid., p. 1); Scottish culture is “dynamic”; full of “richness and diversity” 
(Scottish Executive, 1999, n.p.); culture is the “key component in defining human 
identity at individual, community and national level ...  the sense of being a whole 
person and a whole people” (Extract from the Charter for Culture, ibid.); culture has the 
ability to “generate self-respect, win the respect of others and contribute to civilised 
living” (ibid.); Scotland needs to “maintain and strengthen [its] our Scottish base, not in 
the interests of parochialism, but to nourish the particular as a means of giving 
universal expression to what is uniquely Scottish” (ibid.); and that culture and the arts 
are central to promoting “Scotland’s identity” (Scottish Arts Council, 2009, p. 36). 
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However, in addition to policymakers, politicians in Scotland have been vocal in their 
desire to explicitly and publicly leverage culture to a particular political agenda, notably 
Scottish independence. To illustrate this, a 2009 newspaper interview with a former 
culture minister reported his view of the “entwined” links between Scotland’s political 
and cultural identities, calling on artists to embrace the SNP's independence agenda, or 
in his words, the “National Conversation”, and appealing for them to “work more 
closely” with Scottish ministers, adding that “as a country we all need to be vigorous 
and robust in our advocacy of who we are, what we are, where we have come from and 
where we are going to” (Johnson, 2009, n.p.). This is a rare insight into how politicians 
view the role of artists in society and not only seamlessly ties cultural policy to a core 
political and government agenda, as reiterated in other reports (Scottish Executive, 
2006a, p. 3), but conflates Scotland’s political identities/identity (which is transient) 
with Scotland’s national identity (which is arguably less transient), as well as assuming 
and brokering consensus around that through the use of “we”. 
 
Defining a “national culture” for Scotland was also part of the founding rationale for 
Creative Scotland (Earle, 2009, p. 4), and resulted in a view of it as: any “form of 
creativity which adds to our collective understanding of our distinctive national culture 
in its broadest sense – as a way of life” and which “describes, explores, responds to and 
sometimes challenges Scotland’s culture” (ibid.). Though broad ranging, this exercise 
involved an essentialising of culture in Scotland, aimed at legitimising the independent 
identity of the nation by reflecting a discrete image of Scotland to itself, and raises 
questions over interpretations of collective understanding. This idea of a national 
culture has been critically linked to the proposition that a discrete culture lays “waiting 
to be discovered” rather than something that is essentially dynamic (McCrone, 2001, p. 
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142). However, although cultural practitioners objected to this term, preferring the less 
exclusive “cultures of Scotland” (Earle, 2009, p. 8), its legacy remains in the hyperbole 
of Scotland’s current cultural policies.85 
 
A particularly triumphant and competitive nationalism is exemplified in the seminal 
2003 St. Andrew’s Day speech, by the then, new First Minister, Jack McConnell. This 
speech outlined how successful, imaginative, diverse, contemporary and creative 
Scotland is, positing her potential to be a “creative hub”, “a powerhouse of innovation” 
and describing the “extraordinary creativity of Scots” (McConnell, 2003, n.p.). This 
manifesto was followed by equally triumphant cultural policies referring to the fact that 
Scotland is “recognised as one of the world's most creative nations – one that attracts, 
develops and retains talent, where the arts and the creative industries are supported and 
celebrated and their economic contribution fully captured” (Scottish Government, 
2009c, section 4), that its “diverse and vibrant cultural life, with its international 
reputation, is a defining feature of a successful and confident nation” and a “vital 
ingredient in [its] our success, here and abroad” (Scottish Executive, 2006b, p. 2), and 
that Scotland is “renowned for our [its] research and innovation” (Scottish Government, 
2008, p. 5).
86
  
 
This discourse explicitly places creativity as sourced and located in Scotland as a 
competitive asset and again, is one of the tropes of a cosmopolitan nation, which in turn 
boosts and legitimates a sense of Scottish national identity, increasing the legitimacy 
and economic viability of the Scottish Government. As such, discourses of the talent, 
                                                           
85
 Simplistic attempts to develop criteria for national status and national qualities were also posited for the 
national cultural institutions (Scottish Executive, 2006a; 2006b) though this was later dropped. 
86 This sentence is repeated verbatim in Scotland 's Creative Industries Partnership Report (Scottish 
Government, 2009a, n.p.) and Creative Scotland’s 2011 Corporate plan (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 20).  
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creativity and the attractiveness of Scotland (Scottish Government, 2008, p. 5; Creative 
Scotland, 2011, p. 10, p. 20), and, in particular, boosterist descriptions of Scotland as 
“culturally minted” (Scottish Government, 2010a, p. 34), and more recently, “rich [in] 
creative talent” (Miller, 2013, n.p.), point to a rhetorical or located model of creativity 
(in Scotland), as well as the role of culture in facilitating the globalised competition for 
mobile and flexible workers and businesses, as much as creating a strong national 
identity. These statements essentially appeal to indigenous local traditions and political 
affiliations, a competitive international cosmopolitanism, and an investment-led 
industrial agenda. 
 
Discourses such as these also represent the triumph of “ideological arguments and 
developmental imperatives that couple cultural sovereignty with political sovereignty” 
(Mulcahy, 2008, p. 4) and are again, symptomatic of resistant discourses dealing with 
Scotland’s historic subjugation to England. Also embodied within these statements are 
neoliberal values, positing countries as competing, tradable places (representing the best 
of culture and creativity), needing to win over people (legitimacy), business and money 
as much as independence or authenticity. This appeal to discourses of responsibility (the 
artist’s, as suggested above), uniqueness, difference (Scottish Executive, 2000b, p. 2; 
Scottish Government 2008, p. 8), talent (Scottish Executive, 2004a, p. 4, p. 10), success, 
heroism, authenticity, prosperity and confidence, as well as triumphalism (Scottish 
Government, 2009b, n.p.; 2010a, p. 34; Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 8, p. 12), can be 
viewed as a specific discourse of competitive nationalism in Scotland. 
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5.3.4.3 The creative economy, culture and the economy and competition discourses 
Other dominant discourses in Scottish cultural policy show how culture is tied (or 
attached) to wider ministerial imperatives, and most specifically the economy. In the 
discourse of culture as an economic catalyst and national brander, therefore, culture: is a 
“driver[s] of change”; (as before) represents the nation’s “R and D department” 
(Matarasso, 1998, p. 4); makes Scotland “one of the most dynamic regions of Europe” 
(ibid., n.p.); creates “successful and sustainable [creative] communities” (ibid., n.p.); 
responds to a “changing world” (ibid., p. 1); and offers Scotland the “best chance of 
success” (ibid., p. 1). More recently, Scotland’s main cultural policy website continues 
to claim that culture is “where our creative community is supported and their 
contribution to the economy is maximised”, helps “raise the profile of Scotland at home 
and abroad”, and makes the “strongest contribution that we [Scotland] can to 
sustainable economic development.”87 The central positioning of the creative industries 
within Creative Scotland and the culture ministry is the Executive’s “top priority” 
(Scottish Executive, 2006a, p. 32) and central to growing the economy (McConnell, 
2003, n.p.; Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 6; Scottish Government, 2009b, n.p.; Scottish 
Government, 2009c, section 44). 
 
5.3.4.4 Creativity discourses 
The frequency of creativity discourses in Scottish cultural policy, however, dwarfs even 
that of the creative industries. In the majority of documents under consideration, there is 
a liberal and at times obsessive and repetitive use of the creative prefix.
88
 Creativity is 
                                                           
87
 Available: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/ArtsCultureSport/arts [Accessed 5 July 2013 and 
throughout the research period]. 
88
 Specifically, within Scottish cultural policy over these years, we see the following variations of creative 
nomenclature too numerous to include the individual pages. These are: ‘the creative economy’ (Scottish 
Arts Council, 2009, the Scottish Executive 1999 and 2004, The Scottish Government, 2009c); 
descriptions of creative attributes: ‘creative spirit’ (Scottish Arts Council, 2004), ‘creative potential’ 
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also posited as intrinsically (in terms of the needs of the individual) and extrinsically 
(the needs of the state) key to the “future” of children and young people, in dual 
discourses claiming that creativity can: benefit “significantly Scotland’s business and 
enterprise sectors” (Scottish Government, 2010b, p. 1), give “children the best possible 
start in life and ready[ing] them for future success as creative individuals”, and produce 
“well-rounded individuals” with  “ imagination” and “capacity for original thought and 
understanding of meaningful innovations, contributing effectively to the world at large” 
(ibid., p. 2). These statements skilfully align positive and (intrinsic) discourses of 
children’s development and welfare, with their (extrinsic) ultimate contribution to the 
Scottish economy. Government ministers are also keen to endorse creativity through the 
media (conflating it with culture), in claims that it is at the “heart of the nation’s life” 
and that the government is “committed to putting culture at the heart of our[its] plans to 
develop Scotland’s overall prosperity” (Daily Record, 2008, n.p.).  
 
However, as above, the creativity that is posited in Scottish cultural policy is 
competitively situated in Scotland in particular, with the implication that it is not located 
in other countries (O’Connell, 2003, n.p.; Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 3; Scottish 
Government, 2009c, section 4). Creativity therefore, simultaneously belongs to and 
benefits the Scottish community, nation and society (Scottish Executive, 1999, n.p.; 
Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 5; Scottish Executive; 2006b, p. 5). Many of these 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(Scottish Arts Council, 2009), ‘creative impulse’, ‘creative qualities’, ‘innate creativity’, ‘creative drive’, 
‘creative energy’; creative groups:  ‘creative community’ (Scottish Arts Council, 2009; Scottish 
Government Website; Cultural Commission, 2005; Scottish Executive, 2006; Scottish Government, 
2009b), ‘creative nation/s’ (usually referring to Scotland), ‘creative society’, ‘creative organisations’ 
(Scottish Arts Council, 2009), ‘creative entrepreneurs’ (Scottish Arts Council, 2009, Scottish Government 
2009a), ‘creative businesses’, ‘creative companies’; individual models of creativity: ‘creative 
individuals,’ ‘creative talent’, ‘creative people’, ‘creative class’,  ‘creative workers’; development models: 
(encouraging) the ‘habit of creativity’, ‘creative development’, ‘creative learning’, ‘creative future’, 
‘creative direction’;  descriptions of creative networks: ‘creative hub’,  creative sector’, ‘creative centres’, 
‘creative infrastructure’;  creative substances: ‘creative material, ‘creative content’;  and creative places: 
’creative city’, ‘creative environments’. 
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creativity discourses use the rhetorical model of creativity typically associated with the 
artist in references to “individual creativity” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 189), 
“talented individuals” (ibid., p. 1, p. 10), the “creator” (ibid., p. 11), and specific 
reference to “individuals who originate” (ibid., p. 140). These terms are conspicuous in 
their avoidance of the term artist, and therefore connote a wider group of creative 
workers. The use of words such as “innate” in reference to (creative) spirit, energy and 
drive (ibid.; McConnell, 2003, n.p.), also draws on artistic tropes by pointing to a 
divinely appointed creativity, and thus again, that creativity competitively belongs to 
one specific group (such as the Scottish creative nation) and not another.  
 
Other discourses consist of nurturing creativity, suggesting the need to create a context 
for creativity to occur and invoking the collective model of creativity. This is seen in 
words such as fostering/supporting/building/stimulating/protecting (Cultural 
Commission, 2005; Scottish Government, 2010a, 2009c), as well as more dynamic 
terms such as driving, maximising and investing, all of which suggest the construction 
of creativity (Scottish Executive, 2000b; 2006a; Cultural Commission, 2005; Creative 
Scotland 2011). As a result, there is a straddling of both individual and collective 
models of creativity, maximising persuasion by appealing to different constituencies, 
those interested in collective models of creativity for intellectual property reasons 
(governmental interests) and those ideologically wedded to the singular artistic and 
romantic model (as detailed earlier). In this respect, like culture, creativity is posited as 
part of intrinsic and internal development, recalling the positive concepts of individual 
benefit, but has external benefits to the state via economic output. Creativity is also 
located in particular places (like Scotland), but at the same time can be fostered.  Many 
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of these discourses, therefore, rely for their effectiveness on the apparent balancing of 
positions. 
 
5.3.5 The creative city and Scottish cultural policy discourse 
Cumulatively, the creative economy, creativity, competition and uniqueness of 
place/nationalism discourses, as demonstrated, against the backdrop of traditionalism 
and heritage, contextualise the explicit urban development narratives that run 
throughout Scottish cultural policies. While these narratives might fit a generic creative 
economy model, as well as reflect older urban discourses (the role of cultural amenities, 
the competitive identity of cities, regeneration through culture, etc.), they are 
accompanied and amplified by specifically Floridian discourses of attraction and talent, 
competition, investment, and human capital, tied to place-development, uniqueness and 
identity. The most explicit and numerous references to the creative city paradigm take 
place in 2005 (Cultural Commission, 2005) and 2008 (Scottish Government, 2008), a 
period which coincides with New Labour’s administration and a key point in creative 
city publishing (Florida, 2005; 2008).  
 
The Cultural Commission (2005), a consultation group of cultural practitioners, has 
been a major contributor to creative city discourses in Scotland, producing a key report 
on culture in Scotland for the Scottish Government.  This document set out an explicit 
argument for Creative Scotland, making sustained use of creative city discourses 
(Cultural Commission, 2005, pp. 18-19), the creative class (ibid., p. 6, p. 13), Richard 
Florida (ibid., p. 6, p. 13, p. 189, etc.), Charles Landry (ibid., p. 171), as well as, more 
broadly, cultural planning (ibid., p. 169) and regeneration (ibid., p. 24 etc.). The report 
is evangelical about culture’s role in wider government and proudly claims that 
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“Scotland’s economic success in the long term will rest on the creativity, innovation and 
entrepreneurial spirit of its workers” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 68).The  
significance of these discourses lie in the fact that they originate from cultural 
practitioners (albeit ones that are dependent on government funding) and show the reach 
of economic rationalism beyond policymaking circles, the drive for legitimacy, a kind 
of self-instrumentalisation akin to attachment (underlining the difficulty of separating 
out those concepts), and the suggestion of cynical reason. The advocacy-based Culture 
Counts (similar to National Campaigns for the Arts),
89
 has been involved in similar 
discourses and reflects these similar pressures to be on-message in terms of central 
government objectives.  
 
5.3.5.1 Discourses of success, competition, attraction, place development, investment, 
human capital, and harnessing 
One of the key creative city discourses within Scottish cultural policy, however, is the 
lexicon of attraction, creative workers and investment, reaching a high point mid-decade 
with the Commission’s report (2005) and again more recently, Creative Scotland (2011, 
p. 5). This is demonstrated in references to “attracting and retaining gifted” (Scottish 
National Party, 2007, p.55; Scottish Government, 2009b, n.p.), as well as “innovative 
and creative people” (Scottish Executive, 1999, n.p.) in one of the first instances of a 
thematic that continued to grow throughout the decade (Scottish Government 2009a, b, 
c).  
 
                                                           
89Culture Counts was set up in 2011 and is a group of “arts, media, culture, heritage, cultural industries 
and museums” representatives “positively and progressively highlighting the value of arts, culture and 
creative industries”. They aim to ensure that the importance of culture is “reflected in the stated policies 
and objectives of both the Scottish Government and local government.”  Available: 
http://culturecounts.wordpress.com/home/ [Accessed 11 October 2013]. 
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This theme is further amplified and linked to explicit branding discourses in claims that 
the Scottish government “wants to see a culturally cosmopolitan Scotland, capable of 
[again] attracting and retaining gifted people, where our creative community is 
supported and their contribution to the economy is maximised” (Scottish National Party, 
2007, p. 55; Scottish Government, 2009b, n.p.); that “with creativity as a driver, the 
ability of nations to compete becomes increasingly tied to their ability to attract, retain 
and develop creative people” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 6); that “a place becomes 
more attractive to international partners and new talent when it has a thriving creative 
sector, and can provide a high quality cultural infrastructure and diverse recreation and 
participation opportunities” (Scottish Government, 2008, p. 5);  and a corollary of this 
thematic, that “the arts and their more commercial counterparts face financial 
constraints that make it difficult to keep talent in Scotland” (Scottish Arts Council, 
2009, p. 8). 
 
The related metaphor of harnessing or controlling this attractiveness or creativity 
(suggesting the individual model of creativity) is also a key creative city metaphor and 
is present in statements of how “vital” it is that Scotland can “harness the power of 
culture and creativity” (Scottish Government, 2010a, p. 23) and that “culture’s 
contribution is harnessed in all departments of local government” (Scottish Executive, 
2006a, p. 18). Again, the discourse of “talent” is also located in claims that “new ideas 
and talented people are essential to a dynamic and healthy creative sector” (Creative 
Scotland, 2010c, n.p.).These discourses represent culture as a national asset and 
resource that needs to be managed, controlled and monetised. 
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The use of culture and creativity to attract international investment (and presumably 
other events) is also present in claims that culture: makes places “more attractive to 
international partners” (Scottish Government, 2008, p5); helps Scotland to “build a 
strong cultural brand and compete globally in the creative economy” (Scottish Arts 
Council, 2009, p. 8); can “attract and develop the necessary number and quality of 
creative entrepreneurs and creative companies” (Scottish Government, 2009c, section 
14), and enhances “the attractiveness of Scotland as a place to live, work, learn and 
visit” (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 10). 
 
This discourse of attraction hosts internal and latent contradictions: it posits that 
Scotland wishes to become more attractive through its cultural offer, and at the same 
time that it is already an attractive place (in fact the most attractive place) and deserves 
(or needs) international recognition. The discourse, therefore, points to a future Scotland 
which: aims to be a “globally attractive location”, working towards increasing numbers 
of those who choose to “live and work in Scotland” (Scottish Executive, 2001, p. 12, p. 
13); wishes to “foster the creativity and ingenuity of all its people” (Scottish Executive, 
2000a, n.p.); will use culture to give Scotland the “edge we [they] need in a competitive 
world” (Scottish Executive, 2004a, p. 5); and to ensure that Scotland “can exploit its 
advantages to attract international events” (Scottish Executive, 2000a, n.p.).  
 
The need for international recognition is also key to the discourse of attraction and is 
reflected in the following statements: that Scotland needs to “play on the world stage” 
(Scottish Executive, 2000b, p. 2); to be “recognised as one of the world's most creative 
nations” (Scottish Government, 2009c, section 4); to be a “vibrant, cosmopolitan, 
competitive country and an internationally recognised creative hub” (Scottish 
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Executive, 2004a, p. 1); to have international acknowledgement of the “creativity of 
[the] Scots” (ibid., p. 5); and to “increase the appreciation and celebration of Scotland's 
cultural achievements and rich creative talent, both in this country and internationally" 
(Miller, 2013, n.p.).  
 
This desire to be more attractive is then contrasted with other discourse formations set 
in the present tense suggesting Scotland is already attractive and is in fact: the “most 
attractive place for doing business in Europe” (Scottish Government, 2008, p. 5),  with a 
“long-established talent for innovation and entrepreneurial skill” (Scottish Executive, 
2006a, p. 35);  a “leading creative nation” (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 5); “one of the 
world’s most creative nations” (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 20); a country with  “talent 
in abundance” (Scottish Government, 2009b, n.p.); and is “culturally minted” (The 
Scottish Government, 2010a, p. 34). These sentiments follow the unprecedented 
creativity thematic and competitive nationalism seen in the St. Andrew’s Day speech of 
2003, claiming the “extraordinary creativity of the Scots” (McConnell, 2003, n.p.). 
Ultimately, in positing how Scotland is the most attractive (and entrepreneurial) country 
in the world (for business), these statements demonstrate Scotland’s use of discourse to 
“remake the world” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 130), in its desired rather than actual image, a 
view supported by the statement that Scotland is in fact one of the “least entrepreneurial 
parts of the UK” (Smith, 2013, p. 4). 
 
5.3.5.2 Place development discourses 
While it has been demonstrated that discourses of culture’s role in attracting workers 
and businesses is a key part of Scottish cultural policy (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 
3, p. 6, p. 13, p. 24; Scottish Government, 2008, p. 5), and one of Creative Scotland’s 
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central rationales, this narrative also reflects Scotland’s culture and regeneration 
discourse from the 1980s as referred to earlier. The discourse of culture in place 
differentiation occurs throughout Scotland’s cultural policy documents, most 
specifically in references to: the “key part played by culture in creating vibrant 
communities, and driving and enlivening economic and social regeneration” (Scottish 
Executive, 2006a, p. 11); the “key role [of culture] as part of the economic drawing 
power which is central to the transformation of an area” (Scottish Government, 2008, p. 
5); discourses of “talent, ideas, education and places” (Creative Scotland, 2010d, p.1); 
specific place-development initiatives (Creative Places
90
and Place Partnerships); and the 
need for “conversations to identify the unique contribution of places to a creative 
Scotland” (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 36). 
 
More recently, Creative Scotland has endorsed the “contribution that places make to a 
creative Scotland” (ibid., p. 30, p. 36), the “significant role that creativity plays in 
Scotland’s major cities by redefining a city’s – and its residents – identity” (Dixon, 
2010, n.p.),  claims that Creative Scotland will “deliver a more strategic engagement 
with the geography of Scotland and work closely with local authorities and others to 
realise the potential of all parts of Scotland” (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 30) and that 
creativity is the “essential ingredient for successful cities, it’s what makes them unique” 
(Dixon, 2010, n.p.).  The strategic alliance with local authorities referred to above 
reflects Creative Scotland’s “key role” to “inform and influence national Policy” 
(Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 26). This demonstrates the fit or attachment of Scottish 
cultural policy (and urban discourses) with central (and local) government agendas. 
                                                           
90
 Creative Places is a competitive award system designed to “celebrate the value of creativity to the 
social and economic wellbeing of smaller communities across Scotland.” Available: 
http://www.creativescotland.com/explore/2012-2014/year-of-creative-scotland-2012/creative-place-
awards [Accessed 13 June 2012]. 
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5.3.5.3  Scotland, government agendas and instrumentalism 
This aggregation of nationalism, competition, identity, creativity, economy and urban 
development discourses, in light of approaches to the various (extra-cultural) needs of 
the state, therefore, can be seen as an attached or instrumental approach to culture (see 
4.4.12). In effect, despite the equivocation shown in relation to whether ministers should 
or shouldn’t be involved in decision-making within Creative Scotland, the explicit 
delivery of government priorities through culture, and, specifically, how culture (needs) 
to make “common cause in negotiation with government” (Cultural Commission, 2005, 
p. 2), is a dominant theme in Scottish cultural policy (Matarasso, 1998; McConnell, 
2003). More recently, cultural policy in Scotland has tied itself (or been tied) to the 
delivery of government plans more closely than ever (Scottish Government, 2008; 
Creative Scotland, 2011; Culture Counts, 2013). This is reflected in discourses of 
culture’s contribution to Scotland as based on “sustainable economic development”, 
“health, well-being, confidence and quality of life”, raising the “profile of Scotland at 
home and abroad” (Scottish Government, 2009b) and contributing to a “successful and 
prosperous Scotland” whose “success story” can contribute to the “opportunities for all 
of Scotland to flourish” as part of Scotland’s national plans (Scottish Government, 
2008, p. 2).  
 
Creative Scotland has been particularly active in this regard by outlining its plans as a 
central part of Scotland’s National Performance Framework (which monitors the 
government’s progress)91 and explicitly endorsing the “various roles” appointed it by 
government (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 3). Creative Scotland also claims that culture 
                                                           
91 Available: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Performance/scotPerforms/indicator/culture [Accessed 
31 August 2012]. 
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delivers and maps itself against “many of the national outcomes” (ibid.) and that the 
nation is its “primary customer” (ibid.), referencing both the delivery of non-cultural 
services (and suggesting these are what the customer wants) and the impact of 
managerialism.  
 
More recently, in 2012, the representative group Culture Counts (set up in 2011 to lobby 
for cultural organisations), successfully campaigned for culture to become a National 
Indicator under the theme “cultural engagement” as part of Scotland’s National 
Performance Framework. This indicator was aimed at measuring the level of general 
“well-being” and “resilience” in Scotland, as well as pointing to benefits in learning and 
education, health and satisfaction with life, cultural tourism, Scotland's creative 
economy, “maintaining and growing [its] city economies” and, in keeping with earlier 
themes of cosmopolitanism, promoting Scotland “on an international stage as a modern 
dynamic nation”.92 This activity on the part of Creative Scotland and Culture Counts, 
again demonstrates the development of justificatory regimes in respect of culture’s 
internal government legitimacy. 
 
The lobbying activity in respect of the cultural indicator is particularly interesting. 
Though the indicator can be viewed as positive instrumentalism and/or strategic 
attachment and was perceived as a “coming of age of culture” in cultural policy in 
Scotland, finally putting culture “on a par” with other government portfolios,93 the 
dependence of the sector on the legitimacy conferred by the indicator raises questions as 
to the voluntary nature of this attachment, and thus the issue of structural 
instrumentalism and cycle of expectation (see 4.4.13). The acknowledged success of 
                                                           
92
Ibid. 
93 Available:  http://annebonnar.wordpress.com/2012/01/02/indicators-of-the-scottish-governments-firm-
commitment-to-culture-2011-roundup// [Accessed 10 October 2013]. 
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linking culture to the health and well-being discourses of the National Indicator suggests 
that for some, these discourses represent the “necessary language” to describe the value 
of culture (Tusa, 2011, n.p.).   
 
Both Creative Scotland and Culture Counts therefore, endorse the view that cultural 
policy should serve other policy sectors and that all policy is necessarily instrumental 
(which are not necessarily the same thing), a situation underlined during the foundation 
of Scotland’s first independent cultural policy. This founding text stated that the 
“priorities of Parliament and people can be addressed through cultural action” 
(Matarasso, 1998, n.p.), though at least the use of “can” makes this statement less 
prescriptive than later statements. A few years later, First Minister Jack O’Connell went 
further and outlined his vision of cultural policy as an unequivocal instrument for other 
policy sectors, stating that “this is about how Ministers use arts and culture to achieve 
more effectively their policy objectives. It’s not about the arts and culture being a 
different policy objective” (McConnell, 2003, n.p.). This was followed in 2005 by an 
approving comment from the Cultural Commission (representing the cultural sector) 
stating that “cultural activity has been increasingly used to deliver the policy objectives 
of other areas of government” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 8) and, the following 
year, a comment on the “positive impact culture can have in every area of Government” 
(Scottish Executive, 2006b, p. 2).  More recently, the last culture minister joined with 
these statements by calling for “artists to work more closely with Scottish Ministers” 
and articulated culture’s central role in advancing Scotland’s “aspirations for 
constitutional change” (Johnson, 2009, n.p.).  
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In light of McConnell’s speech, illustrating the contingent nature of cultural policy, the 
contemporaneous response from senior cultural practitioners is revelatory. To 
understand its impact, it is worth quoting at length from the blog spot of senior 
consultant (and former transition director for Creative Scotland) Anne Bonnar. She 
describes those in the arts as being “flabbergasted to hear our senior politician 
committed and passionate about the importance of culture, having spent years 
advocating to seemingly deaf ears” and added that: “the centrality of the arts, creativity 
and culture to Scotland is now a truth, forming a core part of political manifestos before 
the last election and is promoted by the First Minister. Our creative talent and our 
engagement in arts and culture are vital elements of our global and local success, for the 
expression of our cultural identity and the competitiveness of Scotland’s creative 
economy (Bonnar, 2009, n.p.).” Though there are questions as to whether McConnell’s 
speech concerned culture in the first place (as opposed to nationalism), the greater issue 
would seem to be how “passionate” and “committed” a minister could be in relation to 
culture (ibid.), given his statement that culture should not have its own policy objective. 
This view appears to undermine the very premise of a Scottish cultural policy.  
 
Other non-ministerial cultural bodies are also notable for making “common cause” with 
government (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 2). Though now defunct, in the years 
immediately preceding its dissolution, the Scottish Arts Council referred approvingly to 
the “major business sector” of the arts (Scottish Arts Council, 2004, p. 4), remarked on 
“the social and economic benefits that accrue” from culture (ibid., p. 3), the need for a 
shift from grants and supports to “subsidy to investment” (ibid., p. 5), the “need to 
consider the returns” from culture (ibid., p. 10), for incentive schemes linking grants 
with assets and resources, and, most significantly, suggestions that an endowment could 
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replace central Scottish Executive funding (ibid., p. 11), relinquishing Scottish 
administrations from traditional funding responsibilities. Additionally, this report also 
proposed a wider definition of the arts, and added that “only some” artforms required 
“public funding” (ibid., p. 7).  
 
Again, this is significant for acknowledging not only difficulties with maintaining the 
traditional scope of the arts vis-à-vis cultural policy (as part of the creative industries), 
but also the advent of more dominating and legitimating political-economic agendas 
(e.g. the creative industries and enterprise). These statements may reflect the soon-to-
be-disbanded Arts Council’s unsuccessful ambitions not to be left behind in the 
development of a new (creative industries) and more alluring (than high culture) policy 
area, and its simultaneous desire to distance itself from perceptions of elitism, given the 
increasingly predatory development of Creative Scotland at the time.
94
 However, in line 
with other competing discourses and equivocations, the Scottish Arts Council (through 
the Artist’s Charter) also champions the guaranteeing of the artist’s “right to choose to 
engage, or not to engage, with social, economic and political agendas” (Scottish Arts 
Council, 2004, p. 16). In light of structural instrumentalism, the strategic nature of 
policy and the Council’s own apparent lack of independence, there is a question of how 
independent any cultural or artistic decisions are, or can be, from politicians or central 
government plans. 
 
These creative city discourses are also significant in relation to how unreflexive they are 
vis-à-vis critiques of the paradigm prevalent at that time (Daly, 2004; Malanga, 2004; 
Glaeser, 2005) and even within government itself (Rogerson et al., 2006; Scottish 
                                                           
94 The appointment of a creative industries specialist to the SAC was made in 2007 (Scottish Arts 
Council, 2009, p. 8) and might be interpreted as a defensive attempt to stay policy-relevant.  
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Government, 2009a). In 2006, Florida’s work was described in a government report as 
“criticised on a number of grounds, not least in terms of whether migrants really do 
come to places for their culture as much as for their capacity to offer career 
opportunities” and in terms of how it promotes “overly simplistic readings of how 
culture might be utilised to promote local economic development” (Rogerson et al., 
2006, p. 34). Florida’s creative city was also acknowledged as “widely critiqued” in a 
key document from 2009 (Scottish Government, 2009a, p. 8). 
 
It is difficult to know whether this equivocation is a deliberate obfuscation of 
difficulties with the creative city model in order to embrace certain aspects of Florida’s 
thesis, but it does recall once again the strategic containment (Shapiro, 1990, p. 332) of 
uncomfortable compromises (disagreeing with Florida’s work but nevertheless using his 
paradigm), and thus cynical reason. In this light, Scottish creative city discourses clearly 
and deliberately make “common cause” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 2) with central 
government agendas, despite fears of their potential “inability” to do so (ibid.), and offer 
conscious, strategic, and cross-cutting integrations of culture into other ministerial briefs 
(or justification for other government briefs). While these outcomes are undoubtedly 
positive for Scottish cultural policy in the short-term, the discourses detailed here can 
also be described as contradictory, defensive, involuntary, cynical, and potentially, self-
defeating responses to rationalising governments who view cultural policy as a toolkit 
for other government departments. 
 
5.3.6 Scotland conclusions 
This section has outlined a prolific and contested history of urban development, 
marketing and reinvention initiatives and discourses in Scotland, with a focus on 
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Enlightenment and boosterist narratives of a sophisticated, cosmopolitan and 
international country which is a good location for business, workers and residents (and 
will be even better soon), and which values its heritage. The materialisation of creative 
city discourse in Scotland’s cultural policies was demonstrated in: explicit references to 
Richard Florida; the creative city itself and the creative classes; the narrative of 
attraction and retention of talent (though not the promotion of tolerance or technology); 
the promotion of private investment and businesses as a result of cultural investment; 
the competitive branding of culture; the creative industries  (and its exemplar Creative 
Scotland); a broader economic rationalism; and the general lexicon of creativity. 
Equally, discourses promoting the cosmopolitanism/internationalism, as well as 
uniqueness, difference and creativity (and attractiveness) of Scotland, though indicative 
of neoliberalism and the regional promotion associated with the creative city, also read 
as a competitive discourse consistent with Scotland’s nationalist movement and a 
response to the “lack of confidence to which Scots can be disposed” (Scottish 
Executive, 2006a, p. 3).  
 
This narrative has been posited as: a riposte to Scotland’s economic and social 
problems; a fragmented self-image and lack of confidence in relation to its autonomy 
from England; the need to satisfy different electoral mandates or potentially to avoid 
making difficult choices; and the need for Scotland to prove itself both nationally and 
internationally. This case has also considered the role of contradictory discourses and 
struggles as part of cultural policy’s legitimacy-creation and as part of an explicit 
instrumentalism. In particular, this chapter has detailed the role of Creative Scotland in 
cultural, industrial and local development policy and put forward the argument that it 
operates (or has operated) as a bridging agency between a place-development and 
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creative industries agenda, and a more traditional model of (high) cultural subsidy. It 
was also demonstrated that Creative Scotland operates as an agent of government, 
seeking to deliver government objectives in line with groups like Culture Counts, and 
that this has threatened the legitimacy of the body and led to a change in its 
administration.  
 
Specifically, the case of Scotland has shown the overwhelming endorsement of both the 
wider creative economy and of creativity rhetoric in the UK, and the utilisation of 
creative city discourses as an authoritative but locally-constituted, economic and 
nationalist/boosterist paradigm. These themes will be taken up in the following 
chapters. In order to further enrich understandings of cultural policy and urban 
development discourses in Europe, and to address the question of whether social 
democratic countries take a different approach to economic instrumentalism, the case of 
Finland will be considered next. 
 
5.4 Finland 
 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Finland is a northern European country that has received significant international 
attention as a small but successful nation. Specifically, Finland is synonymous with the 
international “brand” of Scandinavian design (Power, 2009, p. 45) and associated with a 
“stable egalitarian democracy, a relatively sound economy, an advanced platform of 
technology and innovation and a deep well of popular goodwill” (Comedia, 2010, p. 
58). This success is an outcome of Finland’s economic transformation since World War 
II (from an agricultural economy), and following its last recession in the 1990s, can be 
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viewed in relation to its competitive industrial agenda,
95
 high degree of economic 
freedom
96
 and its emphasis on export and innovation.  
 
Discourses in Finland link these economic, social and cultural achievements to 
Finland’s: “high-level education, research and creativity” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2003a, n.p.);  emphasis on “education, well-being, democracy and 
creativity” (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010c, n.p.); “individual self-
determination” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 12); “national culture, 
parliamentarianism, democracy, equality and tolerance” (ibid.); and critically claim that 
these factors result in a “welfare society resting on world-class knowledge and know-
how and on a strong innovation system” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 
14).
97
 These statements reflect Finland’s self-perceptions, but also international views of 
Finland as: an “international leader” in education (OECD, 2010, p. 117); a successful 
innovator (Florida and Tinagli, 2004, p. 122; Comedia 2010, p. 27);
98
 a country of 
“successful international traders” (Comedia, 2010, p. 10) and a place where “economic 
thinking” is a national characteristic (Power, 2009, p. 447). This case will show that 
                                                           
95
 In 2011, Finland ranked as the 7
th
 most competitive and 3
rd
 most prosperous nation in the world (falling 
from 1
st
 in 2009) as well as the 4
th
 strongest economy for entrepreneurship and opportunity (increasing 
from 9
th
 in 2009). The “Legatum Prosperity index is the world’s only global assessment of wealth and 
well-being”, which ranks countries by “actual levels of wealth, life satisfaction or development” “to help 
drive economic growth and produce happy citizens over the long term.” See the Legatum Prosperity 
index. Available: http://www.prosperity.com/ [Accessed 29 July 2011]. 
96 
Available
: 
http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Europe/Finland/economic-freedom [Accessed 10 
October 2013]. Also, Florida has asserted that “economic freedom is tied to material economic and social 
conditions”, ... that “richer countries are, on average, freer”, ...that this freedom is “tied to post-industrial 
economic structures”, ...a “larger creative class”... and that “economic freedom goes hand in hand with 
higher levels of happiness and life satisfaction.” See, Free, Tolerant, and Happy, 20 April 2010. 
Available: http://www.creativeclass.com/creative_class/2010/04/20/free-tolerant-and-happy/ [Accessed 
28 July 2011]. 
97
 “Countries like Finland, South Korea, Israel and Taiwan have made innovation a priority” (Westlake, 
2012, n.p.). See also the Global Innovation Index 2012 produced by the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO), where Finland ranks fourth globally in terms of innovation, based on human 
capital and research, infrastructure, market sophistication and business sophistication as well as 
knowledge and technology and creative outputs. Available: 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/economics/gii/gii_2012.pdf [Accessed 8 
October 2012]. 
98 Finland’s reputation as innovative has been linked to the success of Nokia. See (Ali-Yrkk and 
Hermans, 2002). 
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these internal and external discourses speak to Finland’s dual mandate in terms of its 
complex representations of the welfare-state and social democracy on the one hand 
(openness, diversity and tolerance; and civilisation, social democracy and 
egalitarianism), and competition, internationalism, investment, human capital and the 
economy, on the other.  
 
5.4.2 Introduction to the creative city in Finland: city branding, internationalism, 
social democracy and trade 
Before looking at the impact of these factors on Finnish cultural policies, however, 
Finland’s urban marketing activity reveals attachments to urban development 
paradigms. Like many countries, Finland is host to a number of city and regional 
branding initiatives (directed at international investment), including Creative Helsinki 
(Mustonen, 2010; Fortune, 2012),
99
 Creative Tampere,
100
 design-rich public/private 
developments using discourses of well-being and happiness,
101
 international 
designations such as World Design Capital in 2012
102
 and City of Culture in 2011,
103
 
                                                           
99
 Helsinki’s innovation strategy (Culminatum Innovation Ltd., 2005) emphasises the role of the city-
region, and the small size and insularity of Finland in its competitiveness and rests its innovation strategy 
on the knowledge economy/information society, the knowledge base (education and research), culture 
(including city marketing) and internationalisation. In addition, it stresses the need to “globalise the 
Helsinki Region” (ibid., p. 8), creating an “atmosphere that is tolerant and conducive to international 
activity” (ibid.., p. 10) and the need for “diversified, pluralistic and increasingly international cultural 
provisions [so] that foreigners will also come to appreciate that the Region provides a satisfying living 
environment” (ibid., p. 22). 
100
 Creative Tampere, or Inova Tampere is a project whose themes include the creative industries, 
innovation, entrepreneurship and an attractive city. Available: http://www.luovatampere.fi/eng [Accessed 
15 November 2011]. 
101
 The Arabianranta development, a new and highly ambitious residential and business area in Helsinki, 
fits a cultural development and clustering model as well as representing a major public/private 
partnership. See also, the Jätkäsaari, Kalasatama, and Finlandiapark developments. Available: 
http://www.hel2.fi/taske/Dynamic_Helsinki/Arabianranta.html [Accessed 25 November 2011]. 
102
 Available: http://www.wdc2012helsinki.fi [Accessed 15 November 2011]. 
103 
Turku, in conjunction with Tallinn in Estonia, was granted capital of culture status for 2011 and cited 
its goals as “well-being, internationalism, and the commercial export of creative enterprise and culture.”  
Available: http://www.turku2011.fi/en/s/turku-european-capital-of-culture-2011_en [Accessed 6 
December 2012].  
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and (like Scotland) participation in the British Council Creative Cities
104
 and the 
international Districts of Creativity networks.
105
 This promotional activity can be 
viewed as part of Finland’s national creativity strategies, and more specifically Creative 
Finland (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2006b),
106
 but is also reflected in its 
participation in the Creative Metropoles (Public Policies and Instruments in Support of 
Creative Industries)
107
 and ACRE research projects (Accommodating Creative 
Knowledge-Competitiveness of Metropolitan Regions) aiming to assess the impact of 
Florida’s creative class in Europe.108 Creative Helsinki is a key force in this creative 
drive, branding Helsinki as inherently creative and cool, as well an innovative, exciting, 
diverse, and a cultural place to do business, visit and live (Fortune, 2012).
109
   
 
Not surprisingly, therefore, Finland has been lauded by creative city authors (Landry, 
2000, p. 28; Comedia 2010),
110
 as one of the key northern creative nations, with a 
creative class membership of nearly 30 per cent of its overall workforce in 2004 
(Florida and Tinagli, 2004, p. 5), and by 2011, one of the highest percentages in the 
                                                           
104
 The aim of this is to share “experience across Europe on the ways creativity, entrepreneurship and 
innovation can help to improve people’s lives - making cities better places to live, work and play.” The 
project involved was in Dodory. Available: http://www.britishcouncil.org/czechrepublic-projects-
creative-cities.htm [Accessed 15 November 2011]. 
105
 Finland’s District of Creativity is Tampere. See Districts of Creativity. Available: 
http://www.districtsofcreativity.org/view/50137680-Tampere.html [Accessed 7 February 2013]. 
106 
Creative Finland or Luova Suomi appears to have been incompletely made public, and is still not 
available on the Ministry’s website. The copy referred to by this author was directly emailed from the 
Ministry following its citation in another document and a direct request. 
107
 Available: http://www.creativemetropoles.eu/city/helsinki [Accessed 15 November 2011]. 
108
 ACRE was a four-year EU research project which stands for Accommodating Creative Knowledge-
Competitiveness of Metropolitan Regions within the Enlarged Union. It was funded under the priority 7 
Citizens and Governance in a knowledge-based society within the Sixth Framework Programme of the 
EU. Available: http://acre.socsci.uva.nl/ [Accessed 8 October 2012]. The project was designed to research 
the creative class thesis in relation to a number of European cities, including Helsinki. 
109
 This is Finland is a Finnish government website aiming to provide “an attractive window on Finland 
for everyone interested in our country, its culture and its people”. See That’s Finland for you: Cool, 
creative, contrasting and credible. Available: http://finland.fi/Public/default.aspx?contentid=178504 
[Accessed 14 November 2012].  
110
 Comedia’s report speaks of concepts of tolerance, creativity and innovation, “talent attraction and 
retention” (Comedia 2010, p. 20), “civic innovation” (ibid., p. 27), and diversity, branding and 
“cosmopolitanism” (ibid., p. 18). 
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world (between 40 and 45 per cent).
111
 Equally, Helsinki has consistently scored high 
on Florida’s creativity index, including a recent ranking as “best for technology and 
talent” (Helsinki Times, 2011c, n.p.). As referred to above, Finland’s internationally 
respected education system (linked through creative city discourse to talent, human 
capital and the creative classes) has also been praised by Florida, helping Finland to 
“churn[ing] out stellar products” (Florida 2004, p. 122) by creating “distinctive assets 
with which to compete” (ibid., p. 5) and making Finland “well-positioned to compete in 
the Creative Age with a high level of overall creative competitiveness”  (ibid., p. 6).  
 
Finland’s emphasis on city marketing has not avoided criticism however. Helsinki’s 
failed and controversial bid for the Katajanokka Design Hotel as part of the World 
Design Capital event in 2012, and its subsequent unsuccessful negotiations concerning 
the use of the site as home to one of the “galaxy” (Vogel, 2011, n.p.) of brand-heavy 
Guggenheims (Palonen, 2012), underlines a particular form of urban 
entrepreneurialism.
112
 Like many developments, the project to create a Helsinki 
Guggenheim was intended to attract tourists (despite the lack of uniqueness in this 
cultural offer) and offer “significant regeneration” benefits to Helsinki (Vogel, 2011, 
n.p.). However, like events in Scotland, this proposal created tensions between those 
who viewed it as an accolade for the city on the one hand (ibid.), and empty city 
marketing, focused on optics and an economic focus, rather than meeting indigenous 
cultural needs (Chayka, 2011, n.p.) on the other. Much of this dissent was led by artists’ 
opposition group Checkpoint Helsinki,
113
 who were set up to oppose what they 
                                                           
111 See Richard Florida’s Creative Class Blog, The Revolt of the Creative Class, 4 March 2011,   
Available: http://www.creativeclass.com/creative_class/2011/03/04/the-revolt-of-the-creative-class/  
[Accessed 28 July 2011]. 
112
 See Guggenheim Museum (2011). See also www.investinfinland.fi [Accessed 4 June 2013]. 
113 Checkpoint Helsinki was “initially born out of opposition to the Guggenheim foundation’s intent to set 
up shop in Helsinki” based on what they felt was the city’s paying for a tired “global brand”, which 
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perceived as a blatant internationalism (at the expense of localism), branding focus and 
a lack of concern for Finland’s indigenous cultural sector. While this movement 
provides a counterbalance to accusations of artists being complicit in these 
developments (see 3.10), it can also be viewed as symptomatic of Finland’s culture of 
self-determination and its pride in the locale, a tradition reaching back to the struggle 
for Finnish independence throughout the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century. 
 
5.4.3 Finnish nationalism and development of early cultural policies 
The tradition of nationalism that emerged in the 18
th
 century in Finland, where ideas of 
Finland and Finnishness were mobilised around an idealised “folk education ideology”, 
primarily aimed to promote an “idealised conception of the people as part of the nation 
state project” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 33). This movement deployed a 
“linguistic nationalism”114 to assert Finland’s geographic and cultural difference from 
its former rulers, despite the assertion of Swedish rights as co-founders of the nation and 
Russia’s tolerance of the Finnish language movement at the time (Saukkonen and 
Pyykkönen, 2008, p. 53). Over the following century, the “first generation of 
intellectuals” together with the development of “Fennoman” politics (a political 
movement promoting the Finnish language and traditional agrarian values) created a 
new national ideal, and were perceived as “keepers of the national flame” (Sakarias and 
Kangas, 2007, p. 189). Language, education, culture and folk politics (via the concept of 
civilisation) became interwoven with the granting of independence and later the creation 
of an autonomous Finnish cultural policy.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
offered little to artists in Finland. Available: 
http://www.schoolvoorjournalistiek.com/europeanculture/?p.=7536, and 
http://www.checkpointhelsinki.fi/en/ [Accessed 21 November 2012]. This is a similar initiative to the Not 
in Our Name campaign and Toronto’s Creative class Struggle, see Chapter One. 
114 
Available: http://countrystudies.us/finland/11.htm [Accessed 3 September 2012]. 
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The emergence of the new Finnish state and the project of building a cohesive nation 
and culture, specifically rested on 19
th
 century discourses of a homogenous Finnish 
“common culture”115 (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p.31). This common 
culture, as suggested by linguistic nationalism, was intended to serve as the nucleus of a 
Finnish “cultural policy ethos” (ibid.) and was based on the concept of harmony, co-
operation, civilisation and Finland’s self-proclaimed “civilising ethos” (Sakarias and 
Kangas, 2007, p. 190), which linked culture to public enlightenment and education. This 
emphasis on civilisation has remained in Finnish policies and has resulted in a 
“legitimized idea of culture and hegemony in society” embodied in a high culture 
model, designed to articulate what is “genuinely Finnish” (Sakarias and Kangas, 2007, 
p.191).  
 
In more recent times, the emphasis on a common culture in Finnish cultural policy has 
given way to a focus on the “competitiveness society” (ibid., p. 185), the “late 
modernist” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 34),116 or the “economic and 
political colonisation” period (1995 – 2007) (Dueland, 2008, p. 14). In a similar move to 
the development of Creative Scotland, this change has been demonstrated in the shift 
from The Arts Council of Finland (originally set up in 1968) to the Arts Promotion 
Centre Finland (2013).
117
 This period, therefore, by the government’s own admission, 
has been viewed as consistent with “cultural consumption and paying consumers” 
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 34), and reflects the changes in Finnish 
political and social culture via neoliberalism. This shift concerns the disintegration of 
the welfare state (in line with other European countries), the decline of the social 
                                                           
115 
The idea of common culture was reflected in the Maastricht treaty (Evans and Foord, 1999). 
116
 In this respect modernism refers to extreme rationalisation in relation to policies. See (Dueland, 2008). 
117 See The Arts Promotion Centre Finland, http://www.taike.fi/en/web/taike/frontpage [Accessed 23 
September 2013]. 
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democratic model, the growth of privatisation, and the concomitant withdrawal of the 
state from the cultural sector in Finland (Kangas, 2001, p. 63). More broadly, the 
Finnish competitiveness society period can be viewed as part of the international reach 
of economic rationalism and post-industrial discourses of the knowledge economy (and 
in Finland, the information society), as well as the growth of creative industries policies, 
in part financed and influenced by EU Structural Funds in Finland (European 
Commission, 2010d). These imperatives have profoundly shaped Finland’s branding, 
creative industries, and creative city discourses, as will be demonstrated in the next 
section. 
 
5.4.4 Finnish cultural policy discourses 
A broad typology of Finnish cultural policy comprises three sets of over 90 documents 
produced between 2000 and 2010, most of which are also available in English. These 
documents represent strategies across the arts and creative industries (Finnish Ministry 
of Education, 2003a, 2006b, 2009b; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010a-
d; 2011), research and information (reports) concerning particular art forms and issues, 
and annual reports.
118
 The “commercialisation of culture” is a dominant discourse and is 
usually presented as a legitimate mechanism driving Finland’s success through 
generating “ethical benefits” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 104). Intrinsic 
discourses of (high) culture’s (and in particular the artist’s) value, though subservient to 
other discourses, also persist, and are reflected in claims that culture “cannot be 
                                                           
118 
One half of the research documents concern particular and specific areas of interest based on discrete 
issues (e.g., architecture or visual art) and strategic policy issues (e.g., media, regional access, sign 
language, etc.), and another third are those more broadly linked to a creative economy and internationalist 
agenda. Specifically (in order of their predominance), they break down as follows: 1) measurement and 
evidence-based reports, cultural tourism, 2) cultural advocacy, surveys of economic impacts,  
internationalism, 3) cultural exports, the creative economy, and 4) singular research on cultural issues 
such as cultural rights, multiculturalism, legal issues, copyright and heritage. Other documents concern 
culture as foreign policy (7), strategy documents concerning libraries, the creative economy and cultural 
policy (4), culture as spatial policy (2), annual reports (5), broad cultural policies (2), and an arts policy 
document (1).  Nine are left uncategorised. 
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measured in financial terms” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009a, p. 7) and must be 
“financed in absolute terms” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 35). These 
intrinsic discourses often co-exist with benign narratives of civilisation, education and 
democracy. 
 
Other thematics within Finland’s cultural policies serve and are “successfully exploited” 
by Finland’s national agenda (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 16) and can be 
categorised as follows: the creative economy, creativity and the creative industries 
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c; p. 83, 2009a, 2009b) via industrial policy 
(Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010a, 2010b; Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2006a, 2006b, 2010b, 2009b); foreign policy (Finnish Ministry of Education, 
2009c); cultural export and tourism (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003b, 2005, 
2008a); immigration and diversity/multiculturalism (Finnish Ministry of Education and 
Culture, 2009b; 2010a); cultural rights, welfare and civil society (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2003a, 2006a, 2007, 2008b, 2009a); the concept of Finnishness and identity  
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 30); and again, the status of artists and high 
culture  (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003a). How these discourses occur, conflate, 
interact and struggle against one another, will be considered next. 
 
5.4.4.1 Internationalisation and branding discourses 
The use of culture to internationalise the “image and brand” of Finland (Finnish 
Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 13) and to diversify its “international influence” as the 
centre of the information economy in Europe (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2006c, p. 
1), is a key narrative within Finnish cultural policy. This is a discourse of promotion 
designed to sell Brand Finland, as much as Finnish products, and may be addressing 
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commercial fears that Finland’s image is too “clinical, clean and safe” (Nordic 
Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 57). This concern with how Finland is perceived 
internationally is demonstrated in a number of claims that state: the “success of a state is 
increasingly dependent on its ability to manage its brand” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2008a, p. 14); that Finland’s cultural exportation is “not so much to make 
business as to make Finnish culture known and to arouse interest in Finland and 
Finnishness” (ibid., p. 15); and (in explicit creative city mode) that the Nordic region in 
general needs to present itself “internationally as a place that is receptive to new ideas; 
is tolerant, indeed embracing, of diverse cultures” (Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 
38). Like Scotland, this interest in internationalism is clearly economic, but may also 
reflect the strong travel culture in Finland (Wright et al., 2012, p. 6) and the consequent 
interest in cosmopolitanism amongst its young, well-educated and “high status” citizens 
(ibid., p. 13), a factor attributed to Finland’s isolated location and small population.  
 
5.4.4.2 The creativity economy, creativity and the creative industries discourses 
Creativity, along with the creative economy, is another key discourse and a central 
feature of Finland’s competitiveness society period. Though creativity is widely 
interpreted,
119
 it is usually linked with knowledge (Finnish Ministry of Education, 
2009b, n.p; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010a, n.p.), and the creative 
economy and creative industries are core cultural export strategies that promote 
Finnishness (see 5.4.3). These industries are described as being: in a phase of “robust 
development” with “significance for the Finnish national economy” (Finnish Ministry 
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 Creativity is defined as “self-expression, every-day life, creative professions, working life, education 
and training, communality, the state of culture, operational environments and the creative economy and 
innovation policy”(http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/?lang=en [Accessed 13 February 2013]. 
 235 
of Education and Culture, 2011);
120
 a key arm of Finland’s diplomatic affairs (ibid.); 
increasing Finland’s regional and international competitiveness (Finnish Ministry of 
Education 2010b, p. 4); and powered by the “engine[s]” of the “art industries” (Finnish 
Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 12). The Creativity Strategy Finland (Ministry of 
Education, 2006b) uses social definitions of creativity as part of “day-to-day life”, a 
“resource of work communities” (referencing the collective/networked model, see 
4.3.3), and states that creativity is “intrinsic to human beings” (ibid., n.p.), but also 
serves the “growing demand for competitiveness and efficiency” (ibid.).  
 
5.4.4.3 Creative welfare society and citizenship discourses 
The “covert hierarchy” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 128) represented by these social and 
economic discourses of creativity is further amplified in the Finnish concept of the 
“creative welfare society” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003d, p. 5; Finnish Ministry 
of Education, 2009b, p. 23). The concept of the creative welfare society is a central 
legitimising discourse in Finnish cultural policy that skilfully bridges state, 
communicative and market narratives by mobilising key terms (creative, welfare and 
society). In line with discourses cited above, this concept leverages Finland’s social 
democratic ethos (and state identity) and its industrial innovation and commercial 
agenda by leaning on a number of compelling genealogical factors. 
 
Firstly, as Chapter Four has demonstrated, though the term creative straddles culture 
and the economy, it has developed predominantly economic connotations which place 
the concept of the creative welfare society within an immediately industrial context. 
Secondly, and in contrast, the emotive symbolism of welfare, as part of the egalitarian 
                                                           
120 See Cultural Exportation section. Available: 
http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Kulttuuri/kulttuurivienti/?lang=en[Accessed  June 2013]. 
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state (stressing social cohesion and responsibility), is specifically linked to the 
production of social capital in Finland (Hietala, 2002, p. 1), and is invariably enveloped 
in discourses of the state as protector and promoter of [active] citizenship and citizens’ 
“well-being” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003a, n.p., 2007, p. 5, 2009a, p. 7, 
2009b, p. 15, 2010a, p. 7; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010d, p. 6). The 
concepts of creativity and welfare are therefore part of wider welfare/prosperity 
discourses, citing the importance of culture and creativity as both a “pillar of national 
welfare and success” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 4), that aligns with 
Finland’s “high-level quality of life [and one] that is accessible, sustainable, and 
representative” (Mulcahy, 2004, p. 157).  
 
Completing the symmetry of these three compound words, and thirdly, the use of 
society rather than state in the creative welfare society, is not accidental. Society used in 
this context, stands as a deliberate and resistant construct in opposition to the concept of 
the state, connoting transience and impermanence on the one hand, versus the universal, 
responsible and stable protector/provider of the state on the other. The welfare society, 
therefore, represents a move away from the original ethos of the welfare state and by 
implication, towards the private sector. This link is supported by claims that the creative 
welfare society model aims to target efficiencies, that public “services can be provided 
best by parties other than the public sector” (Himanen, 2004, p. 13) and, that there is a 
need for more “open competition” as a response to increased “global competition” and 
an “aging population” (ibid.). Finally, the creative welfare society has been described as 
“version 2.0” of the (old) welfare state, guaranteeing the “future of the welfare society” 
(ibid.), which brings in a reference to the digital, information, and global information 
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society.
121
 The creative welfare society, therefore, essentially represents a particular 
Nordic hybrid, straddling the ideological divide between social democracy and 
neoliberalism. This, it will be demonstrated, is a recurring feature of Finland’s policies 
in general.  
 
5.4.4.4 Cultural rights discourses 
Another legacy of social democratic discourses concerns the concept of cultural rights 
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p.19). These rights are asserted as the foundation 
or “basis for national cultural policy” (Finnish Ministry of Education 2007, p. 40) and 
are claimed to be part of Finland’s “economic, social and educational” system of rights 
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b, p. 12), bound up in general discourses of 
cultural ethics, sustainable development (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 
2010b) and cultural diversity and equity (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007; Finnish 
Ministry of Education and Culture, 2011).
122
 Though part of a wider European 
phenomenon since UNESCO’s 2001 and 2005 diversity conventions123 (though this 
appears to be waning now), cultural rights are particularly resonant in Finland, and 
again, are congruent with its relationship to Sweden and Russia, its history of social 
democracy, its aboriginal population of Saamis, and its recent wave of immigration. 
 
 
 
                                                           
121
 Pekka Himanen, who wrote about the creativity welfare society, claimed that it was he who suggested 
that “Finnish expertise and the Finnish innovation system should be developed” via Florida’s concept of 
the creative economy (Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 35). 
122
 This interest in cultural rights cites developments in Scottish cultural policy, suggesting the influence 
of Scottish policy on Finish policy. 
123 
On 12 June 2006, the Parliament of Finland approved Finland's adherence to the UNESCO Convention 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions and the President of Finland 
confirmed this adherence by signing the respective national Act on 29 June 2006 (Ericarts, 2013, n.p.). 
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5.4.4.5 Civilisation and civil society discourses 
Civilisation and civil society discourses are also consistent with Finland’s independence 
and latterly its interest in cultural rights, forming a discursive link between (high) 
culture, education, civilisation and democracy (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 
8). In Finland, therefore, civilisation represents the “future” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2003a, n.p), a standard or “ideal” (Finnish Ministry of Education and 
Culture, 2010a, n.p.), involves the “cultivation of spirit and intellect” (Finnish Ministry 
of Education, 2007, p. 8), and must be cherished or valued (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2003d, p. 5, 2005, p. 3, 2009b; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 
2010a, n.p., 2011, n.p.). Civilisation is also charged with shaping Finland’s “national 
identity” and (conversely) “works purposefully in international interaction” (Finnish 
Ministry of Education, 2003a, n.p.) and is concomitant with Finland’s branding. In this 
way, civilization (again as a trope for national autonomy) is a key concept in Finland 
and resembles the German concept of Bildung, or the whole and ongoing cultural and 
education development of a person. 
 
Correspondingly, civil society discourses in Finnish texts also claim benign and 
legitimising associations for culture through their contribution to the public sphere, 
concomitant with progress, rationalism, truth and liberty (see 4.2.2.2). This is 
demonstrated  in statements which underline a vision of culture as central to the 
lifeworld, asserting that: culture is a “dynamic part of democracy, good governance, 
human rights and civil society programmes” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 
68); one of the “pivotal definers of humanity and citizenship” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2010a, p. 17); the “emblem of a civilised society” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2009c, p. 10) and creates “actively participating citizens” (Finnish Ministry 
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of Education, 2009b, p. 23). These concepts of creative welfare society, cultural rights, 
civilisation, culture, social welfare, democracy, equality and civil society can be viewed 
as collectively working to affirm Finland’s social democratic brand and self described 
ethos through the socio-cultural lifeworld, but also serve (and legitimate) its 
competitiveness society model through appeals to the political-economic system.  
 
5.4.4.6 Nationalism discourses 
In parallel with the discourse of civilisation, nationalist discourses are also present in 
Finnish cultural policy, and, it has been claimed, affirm the link between the “Finnish 
state, society and [the] cultural community” (Koenis and Saukkonen 2006, p. 8). As 
such, the cultural ministry has asserted that “Finnish art and cultural policy is marked by 
a strong national cultural identity” (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010c, 
n.p.) and has emphasised the role of its “common culture” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2007, p. 31). Despite the positive connotations of this term, however, 
Finland’s “common culture” has been interpreted in an exclusive and essentialising way 
through (now defunct) proposals for a Finnish “cultural canon” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2007, p.29). This proposal for a cultural canon (as part of its common 
culture) involved bringing together artworks considered to represent the best of 
Finnishness, with the aim of “sustaining and strengthening Finnish culture against other 
cultures and preserving the Finnish identity amidst increasing cultural diversity and 
internationalisation” (ibid., p. 30), in order to create the “impression of a homogenous 
nation and culture” (ibid., p. 31). Though the canon never materialised, this strategy is 
patently at odds with Finland’s multicultural and civil society agendas, its principles of 
cultural rights, and its expressed desire for an open and European model of society 
(Koenis and Saukkonen 2006, p. 13).  
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A more localised and arguably benign mode of nationalism was demonstrated in 
discourses (national versus international) over the proposed Guggenheim museum in 
Helsinki, presented as the defence of local needs over international brands (as above) 
(Chayka, 2011, n.p.; Palonen, 2012). Other forms of nationalism occur in grandiloquent 
statements about Finland’s achievements and identity, in claims that: although Finland 
has only “officially been a member of the Nordic family since the 1950s”... “culturally 
we [they] have always belonged there. We share the same values, which have evolved 
over centuries” (Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 12); that Finland is “one of the most 
democratic states in the world”, with a history of “Western culture and legislation” 
(ibid.), and that Finland is an “advanced society” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 
2006b, p.8).These statements are clearly intended to reflect a Nordic and Western (i.e. 
non-Russian) Finnish identity back to the electorate, thus reinforcing Finland’s 
autonomy and collective pride. 
 
5.4.4.7 Conflicting value systems  
The contradiction between an exclusive cultural canon and Finland’s discourses of 
openness and diversity (as will be demonstrated), in addition to the tensions present in 
Finland’s other discourses (creative economy, citizenship, cultural rights, and 
particularly its creative welfare society), point to a particular feature of cultural policy in 
general and cultural policy in Finland in particular, that of a Finnish hybrid discourse. 
This term refers to the increasingly familiar policy use of “covert semantic relation[s]” 
(Fairclough, 2003, p. 130), between conflicting or potentially conflicting discourses that 
obfuscate state ideologies and to appeal to different legitimations. This feature occurs 
across a range of Finnish policy documents, as well as within the same statements, and 
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is exemplified in the concept of the creative welfare society.  The ministry has also 
noted conflicting cultural discourses in Finland, but distancing itself from them in 
claims that “public debate in society often juxtaposes art and culture as activity[ies] of 
intrinsic value and as profit-generating instrumental activity[ies]” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2010a, p. 9). Likewise, economic agencies in Finland have commented on a 
similar feature of Finnish discourse in noting how Finland is “innovative” in how it 
“conceptualises economic growth as an outcome of social capital” (The Nordic 
Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 38).  
 
These conflicts are also demonstrated in intellectual, artistic, civic and social 
understandings of value, in line with communicative discourses which claim that 
culture: “underpin[s] civilisation and promote[s] plurality” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education and Culture, 2011, n.p.); “cannot be measured in financial terms” (Finnish 
Ministry of Education, 2009a, p. 7); is essential to the human being and human 
existence (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 6); enriches “human and social life 
in many ways“ (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003d, p. 5); and, critically, stands in 
opposition to “market-driven art”  (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 7). 
However, these discourses also claim (as part of a market discourse) that culture is: part 
of the “soil for creativity” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 16); a “channel for 
creativity” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 10); has an “earning’s logic” (ibid. 
p. 83); and can enhance “Finland’s competitiveness, tourism and export industries in the 
international market” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 27).  
 
The most common discursive conflicts occur within the same statements, bridging (and 
again legitimising) discourses of social welfare or cohesion (or communicative) and 
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economic and competitive (market) rationales. This is demonstrated in assertions that 
culture is: a “significant factor in the implementation of welfare, regional and 
innovation policies” (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2011, n.p.); an 
economic system in its own right that is “built on intellectual capital and trade in 
commodities and services, which can be used to promote societal development” 
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 16); and one of the “basic elements of 
intrinsic value in human existence and essential to societal welfare and to the economy” 
(ibid., p. 6). Equally, similar dualism occur in claims that Finland is a “welfare society 
resting on world-class knowledge and know-how and on a strong innovation system” 
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 14) and that the “development of the creative 
industries and internationalisation will improve the national innovation environment, the 
economy and citizens’ life satisfaction. This in turn will strengthen culture and art and 
their funding base” (ibid., p. 13).  
 
Notwithstanding the translated nature of these statements, their tone connotes culture’s 
provisional social versus definitive economic contributions. Different meanings can be 
derived from the tentative and doubtful enunciations such as can, implying the 
possibility but not certainty of a societal outcome from culture, in contrast with the 
certainty of the term essential and will in relation to culture’s role in the economy. The 
use of can also implies that there are other values attending to culture, and that societal 
development is simply one of many, while the more affirmative use of will in relation to 
welfare and the economy, essentialises the values of culture as economic. 
 
More explicit tensions are found in other statements, such as: the “arts and culture live 
on their own terms” and at the same time contribute to “welfare and tolerance or 
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boosting innovation potential or economic development” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2009c, p. 10);  cultural practitioners “must find their own voice”  but that  
“culture is an important player in external relations policy” (ibid., p. 12); and that 
“creativity capital” is not sufficiently appreciated and “put to appropriate use” in 
different societal activities (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b, p. 15).  
 
An interesting characteristic of these juxtapositions is the false consciousness (see 
4.4.13) suggested within the ministry itself. This is the acknowledgement by the 
ministry of problematic positionings of intrinsic with extrinsic value discourses (Finnish 
Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 9), in the same document and series of statements 
arguing for culture’s contribution to social values (amongst many others) and the 
creative economy, technology, communications, environmental conservation and even 
the preparation for crisis situations (ibid., pp. 8-9). This contradiction is also apparent in 
a key document on cultural ethics (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007), which 
provides a framework for Finland’s subsequent (cultural) diversity policies (Finnish 
Ministry of Education, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, etc.; Finnish Ministry of Education and 
Culture, 2010b).  
 
This document contains thinly veiled criticisms of Finland’s instrumental cultural 
policies in general (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 105), and refers to: 
“tensions” between the “intrinsic” values of art (known as the freedom ethos in Finland) 
and “instrumentality and economic output” (known as the benefit ethos) (ibid.);124 the 
fact that the “ethical premises of cultural policy” are no longer “in harmony” (ibid., p. 
36); and in a reference to nominalisation in economic discourses (see 2.4.3), that 
                                                           
124 Intrinsic value is asserted as a core value on the Ministry’s website. Available: 
http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Kulttuuri/kulttuuripolitiikka/?lang=en [Accessed 5 March 2012]. 
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economic values are “not value-neutral but are clearly ethically charged” (ibid., p. 35). 
This document further asserts that the recent “neoliberal hegemony” depends on 
“instrumentality and economic applications of art” (ibid., p. 37) and that the “concept of 
citizenship, previously based on cultural rights” has become about “consumption and 
paying consumers” (ibid., p. 34). This report also contains criticisms of Richard Florida 
and raises awareness of the “ethical” problems posed by his model of the creative city 
(ibid.), foreshadowing a later report cautioning against a wholesale adoption of 
Florida’s thesis (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 8). 
 
However, though this particular document (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007) does 
not engage in contradictory discourses in relation to its criticisms of instrumentalism 
(unlike the other document), since it is produced within the ministry, in the context of 
other highly rational and economic discourses of culture, to which it refers and 
criticises, it must be seen as contradictory. Similarly, the document’s claims that 
“discussion on and around” the creative economy is “fairly problematic in ethical terms 
when seen from the perspective of cultural human rights” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2007, p. 34) is equivocal in light of the centrality of the creativity economy 
and creative industries to other Finnish cultural policies. Moreover, its assertions that a 
“class society based on the concept of creativity may conversely paralyse creativity and 
innovation in society” and that there is a tendency to use a “narrow conception of the 
nature of creativity” (ibid.), jar with the extent of Finnish creativity discourses as well as 
narrow interpretations of culture within them (i.e., as the arts) (ibid.). 
 
However, by appearing to operate outside of the commissioning ministry, the report 
skilfully manages to strategically contain (Shapiro, 1990, p.332) potential criticisms 
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and disavows its own position within Finnish instrumentalism. This disavowal lends the 
document an objectivity and critical distance which is hard to reconcile with its function 
as policy, even if it also functions as a research document. These discourses, therefore, 
neutralise the instrumental policies of which they are a part and of which they are 
critical and can be seen as part of the “instinct for self-preservation” (Sloterdijk, 1987, 
p.5) in terms of seeking legitimacy from the culture sector, as much as wider 
government. This ultimately points to a lack of control over policy discourses. Whatever 
the imperatives behind these discourses, they recall those who “know what they are 
doing” but still do it (Sloterdijk, 1987, p.5).  
 
5.4.4.8 Finnish dualism 
Conflicting value systems, intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomies, or Nordic hybridities, can 
therefore, be viewed as central to Finnish legitimacy and embody the struggle at the 
heart of Finnish politics, the reconciling of social democracy with neoliberalism. These 
dualisms can be summarised as follows: a competitive creative economy agenda using a 
broad interpretation of culture and extrinsic value discourses (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2009a, 2009b, 2010b; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010a), 
alongside high culture and intrinsic-value discourses (Finnish Ministry of Education, 
2003d, 2009b, 2010a); critiques of Florida’s work (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, 
p. 34; Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 13, p. 37), with endorsements of it (Finnish 
Ministry of Education, 2005; 2009b; 2010b); and cultural rights, diversity, openness, 
multiple identities, hybrid cultures (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009a; 2009b), and 
internationalist discourses of exports and external relations (Nordic Innovation Centre, 
2007; Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a), alongside nationalist and exclusive 
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discourses of a universal common culture (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007; Finnish 
Ministry of Education, 2009c). 
 
Chief amongst these struggles, however, and as demonstrated earlier, are the conflicts 
that occur within the same statement, usually that of culture in economic 
competitiveness and social justice (and civilisation/education). While this hybridization 
is symptomatic of covert discourses and justificatory regimes in general, it particularly 
suggests the dual mandate and tensions particular to Finnish policies and is underlined 
in Comedia’s advice for Finnish policymakers not to throw out the (social democratic) 
“baby with the [neoliberal] bathwater” (Comedia, 2010, p. 11), as well as perhaps the 
more pragmatic avoidance of difficult policy decisions.  
 
A mild nominalisation occurs in Finnish texts which involves the passive juxtaposition 
of the concepts of globalisation and competition, as well as to a lesser extent the 
creative economy. These juxtapositions are common to international media discussions 
of the economy, but are nevertheless present in Finland’s references to: the pressures of 
“global competition” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 3); being “competitive 
actors in the global economy” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p.10); the 
“globalised world of rapid and wide communication” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 
2009c, p. 10);  and the “global creative economy (The Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007, 
p. 11). These statements eschew the purpose behind each of these contingent systems 
which could always be otherwise (globalisation, competition etc.).  
 
The creative economy is also linked to social justice (underlining the Finnish equation 
of economic development and well-being) in statements asserting that: “culturally 
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sustainable development and just global wealth distribution are fundamentals in the 
paradigm based on the principle of sustainable development”; the “increasing reach of  
globalisation and multiculturalism is creating unprecedented opportunities for 
strengthening intercultural exchange“ (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 
2010b, p. 3); and that “diversity can be a central source of innovation and renewal, 
which are essential factors in globalisation” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 
79). These juxtapositions and nominalisations again work to legitimate these concepts 
within a neoliberal context.  
 
5.4.5 The creative city and Finnish cultural policy discourse 
Though the thematics and discourses discussed above (creativity and the creative 
economy, cultural rights, civilisation and nationalism) are concerned with economic and 
market rationales consistent with creative city discourses (the creative economy, 
neoliberalism, competition, innovation etc.), more discrete discourses linking Finnish 
cultural policies to the creative city can also be identified. These discourses are broken 
into three sub-discourses: culture’s role in attracting workers, investment and tourists 
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005; Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007; Finnish 
Ministry of Education, 2010b),  through its contribution to place, competitiveness and 
applications of creativity (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005, 2009b, 2010b); 
culture’s contribution to openness, diversity and tolerance (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2006a, 2009b, 2010b); and the privileging of human capital or talent (as part 
of attraction discourses). 
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5.4.5.1 Creative cities, creative classes and authors 
Like Scotland, despite Landry’s work for the city of Helsinki (Comedia, 2010), most 
creative city discourses in Finnish cultural policies refer to Florida’s model, and peak in 
the middle, and at the end of the decade. Explicit citations of creative cities include 
generic references to the “development of urban areas into ‘creative cities’” (Finnish 
Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 10), and more specific references to the creative 
classes (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 28), the 3 T’s theory (ibid., p. 31), and 
Florida’s competitive creativity indexes (ibid., 34, 2010b, p. 8). Accompanying these 
explicit discourses are regional development narratives with an information society 
emphasis citing the importance of “innovation environments and innovation 
ecosystems” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 8), the use of “creative milieus” 
(ibid., p. 11), and like Scotland, cautions against a strict adoption of Florida’s thesis 
(ibid.).  
 
The Nordic Innovation Centre Green Paper on the creative economy (Nordic Innovation 
Centre, 2007) is notable for criticising the tendency for cities to adopt wholesale 
international ideas of urban development, and simultaneously affirming these (creative 
city) ideas as a response to what it claims, is the Nordic region’s “fierce competition 
from growing overseas markets” (ibid., p. 10) and “mobile, knowledge-driven labour 
market” (ibid., p. 11), i.e. a market that might not choose to stay in Finland.  The report, 
therefore, states that: city development needs a “more considered approach” and that the 
creative industries should not be burdened with the “sole responsibility of resolving 
every economic or social issue” (ibid., p. 13); that policymakers who are overselling 
their city as rich in cultural “assets”, are in “error” when it is more “desired” than a 
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reality; and that this “can undermine the credibility of genuine efforts to deliver on 
cultural, creative and knowledge agendas” (ibid., p. 37).  
 
In contrast, the report goes on to claim that: the “availability and quality of local cultural 
resources and their cultural offer, can determine whether or not people think their area is 
a “good place to live’” (ibid., p. 13); there is a need for a “Nordic Creative brand” (ibid., 
p. 17) to “attract inward investment” and to provide “new skills and identities that are 
hoped will bring with them a unique, competitive edge” (ibid., p. 12) and that these 
skills will help the “construction of vibrant, creative places” (ibid.). The report also 
stresses the need to recognise that the “assets of any region are its people, their 
individual creativity, skill and talent” (ibid., p. 9), and that the “Nordic Region is a 
global leader in policy approaches to building creative places. Nowhere else is there 
such appetite for, knowledge of, and commitment to, creativity and cultural planning” 
(ibid., p. 36). More explicit citations of the creative city continue in references to mobile 
and high human capital creative classes.  
 
5.4.5.2 Discourses of attraction, creative workers, investment and human capital 
As such, well-educated or high human capital creative workers the “greatest assets of 
any region” (ibid., p. 9), the “real scarce resource in the world”, and are likely to be 
found in “creative environments, [and] world-class knowledge clusters” sought by 
“companies thirsting after innovations” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 6). 
Equally, creative workers are described as “top doers” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 
2005, n.p.), have a “direct impact on inward investment” (Nordic Innovation Centre, 
2007, p. 13), act as a “glue” for the “retention/re-attraction of creative 
businesses/individuals” (ibid., p. 58) ), provide “new skills and identities” and bring 
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with them a “unique, competitive edge” (ibid., p. 12). The metaphor of harnessing is 
also used in relation to ensuring that creativity is grasped and retained (Finnish Ministry 
of Education, 2010b, p. 51). Further, in a key reference to the impact of the creative 
classes and to cultural capital and hegemonies, cultural amenities are asserted as the 
“things that professionals appreciate” (ibid., p. 10).  
 
These discourses essentially reflect the central creative city premise of the link between 
creative workers and businesses, in statements that “companies consider even more 
carefully than before where they locate their operations” (ibid., p. 6) and that “the 
movement of capital, the attractiveness of investments and capital, the movement of 
goods and services, the movement of work and the movement of people” are key factors 
impacting on and predicated by culture and the creative economy (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2005, p. 31). The imperative behind these statements of flexible 
accumulation, like Scotland, may be falling confidence in Finland’s “ability to attract 
international business as a location” (ibid. p. 34), and claims that Finland is acutely 
aware of competition from other countries, most particularly China (Comedia, 2010, p. 
16).  
 
The importance of culture to branding is also part of Finland’s internationalisation 
strategy, and more specifically, its need “to arouse interest in Finland and Finnishness” 
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 15). This marketing of Finland is done 
through cultural exports which are: an “important part of the image Finland projects 
abroad” ... , “can enhance Finland’s competitiveness” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 
2010a, p. 27); and are useful for building “an image of an interesting creative economy 
region in the international marketplace, which in turn could attract international 
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investment” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 49). Culture is also claimed to be 
where Finland is most likely to find its “next success” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 
2005, n.p.) and a sector whose significance “will continue to grow” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2009b, n.p.). Despite this emphasis on image, however, Finnish cultural 
policy also rejects the idea that culture is about “image polishing” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2009c, p. 10), or is a “soft” sector (ibid., p. 15), or a “mere attraction factor” 
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 7) or an “embellishment” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2009c, p. 10), instead suggesting that it offers “innovativeness” (Finnish 
Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 7). 
 
5.4.5.3 Tolerance discourses 
In addition to attraction and human capital discourses, Florida’s concept of the links 
between openness, tolerance, diversity and success (and the links created between then), 
also occur in Finnish texts. These discourses are present in: calls for a “more tolerant 
value and attitude climate” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2006b, p. 2); claims that 
people who are “open to new ideas” are a “fundamental asset in inter-regional 
competition” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 8); and statements that 
“innovation activity is higher than average in tolerant places” (ibid.). These ideas are 
also expressed alongside discourses of diversity,
125
 positing immigrants as a new source 
for “creativity and talent” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b, p. 16) and claiming 
that diversity is “an opportunity – a knowledge resource – that can deliver profit … and 
a central source of innovation and renewal” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 
79). Though this may point to Finland’s ethnic context, egalitarian ideals, and general 
reputation for tolerance (Comedia, 2010, p. 11), as well as its “cooperation culture” 
                                                           
125 Cultural diversity in Finland has been defined as the “coexistence of world cultures, the protection and 
promotion of existing cultures and respect for other cultures” (Ministry of Education, 2007a, p. 11). 
 252 
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 13), the linking of multiculturalism to 
diversity and innovation also situates this discourse in a creative city context.
126
 
 
Despite explicit criticisms of the creative city paradigm in Finnish policy, therefore, 
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 34; Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 12, p. 
36), discrete discourses of the creative classes, creative indexes, attraction, investment 
and tolerance, illustrate an awareness of the international value of creative city 
discourses. This view is endorsed in statements that acknowledge the role of the creative 
city: in helping to make culture a “subject of debate” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 
2005, p. 32); as “among the most quoted and utilised concepts” in promoting the 
Finnish creative economy (ibid.); in emphasising the “innovation capacity of the 
creative sectors” (ibid.); and creating a “positive circle or vortex of creativity” (ibid., p. 
3). These texts also confirm criticisms of Finland’s “uncritical devotion” and wholesale 
“Floridaesque belief on [in] creativity’s unhindered potential” (Karo and Muukkonen, 
2007, p. 67), consistent with the positive connotations around creativity (free, non-
rivalrous, panacea-like) as outlined in Chapters Three and Four. 
 
While these discourses may indicate a broader assimilation of urban development, a 
post-industrial emphasis on skilled workers against the threat of job and investment loss 
(in workers and human capital discourse), and as above, a new multiculturalism, they 
also represent a specifically Finnish interpretation of the creative city paradigm. 
Specifically, the application of this paradigm addresses Finland’s legacy of social 
democracy and the importance of its tolerant image, with its newer competitive 
economic policies, reconciling and legitimising a distinctly Finnish and newly 
                                                           
126
 In contrast, and in contradiction to other Finnish discourses on diversity and innovation, a City of 
Helsinki document has linked innovation and creativity to monoculturalism, positing that homogenous 
cultures ensure good communication, which help the “spread of innovation” (Karvinen, 2005, p. 12). 
 253 
neoliberal sensibility. This combination of ideas points to a significant, and localised, 
creative city discursive transfer in Finnish cultural policy.  
 
5.4.5.4  Postscript on Finland’s cultural policies 
Before concluding, it is worth noting the prolific nature of Finnish policy-making and 
the extent of its availability in English, in the context of Finland’s interest in the 
internationalism of the creative city. The volume of cultural policy documents available 
in Finland firstly highlights a hugely ambitious though bureaucratic country, which 
values culture as a central and useful arm of government, but also suggests the 
international branding capacities of culture, and potentially, its role in underlining 
Finland’s separateness to Sweden and Russia (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, 
Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a). Secondly, as English is the diplomatic language 
of the EU, the free availability of Finland’s policies in English enables a small nation 
with a discrete language to disseminate Finnishness throughout much of Europe and the 
Western world.
127
 
 
 It can be argued, therefore, that the range and number of Finnish documents speak to a 
number of issues: the historical place of education, common culture and the “civilising 
ethos” of Finland (Sakarias and Kangas, 2007, p. 190); an increased need for 
advocacy/research/policy as a response to the global recession; ten years of rapid 
political turnover (and administrations wanting to put their stamp on policy); the multi-
linguistic abilities of the Finns; Finland’s strong travel culture (Wright et al., 2012, p. 6, 
p.12); and concomitantly, Finland’s keen interest in internationalism and self-
promotion, particularly within the EU (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c).  These 
                                                           
127 There is a culture of translation already in Finland based on its ethnic mix and multi-lingualism 
(Wright et. al, 2012, p. 12). 
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factors, and in particular the internationalism projected by the creative city, are key to 
Finland’s use of the paradigm and will be further considered in Chapter Six.  
 
5.4.6 Finland conclusions 
This section has demonstrated that Finland, though it carries a wide range of discourses 
within its cultural policies, demonstrates a specific link to creative city discourses, and 
uses them in a local way to emphasise and legitimate key historic (social 
democratic/egalitarian) and contemporary (neoliberal) government agendas. It has been 
demonstrated that Finnish cultural policies specifically leverage the paradigm’s lexicon 
of attraction (workers and to an extent investment), human capital (see 5.4.5.2), 
tolerance, openness and innovation (though this might demonstrate older social 
democracy ideals) (see 5.4.5.3), and directly references the creative city, the creative 
classes, and creative city authors (chiefly Florida) (see 5.4.5.1). 
 
Specifically, this chapter has shown that Finland has had and maintains a strong national 
identity as a Nordic social democratic country, with a high value placed on 
egalitarianism, tolerance, cooperation, culture, education and diversity 
(multiculturalism), in tandem with an international outlook and fiercely competitive 
economic agenda. Finland is also a country with strong city marketing, 
commercialisation and enterprise activity that is often linked with innovation 
discourses. This results in apparently seamless economic, civil society and social 
democratic discourses, as well as intrinsic and extrinsic discourses of culture’s value. It 
is argued that this seamlessness represents a dualism, nominalism and a discursive 
strategic containment of competing mandates for cultural policy both in Finland and 
 255 
more generally, seeking legitimation through appeals to more self-evident areas of 
policy. 
 
The use of culture to promote Finland as an international brand and Finnishness in 
general is particularly important. This branding is argued to be a response to Finland’s 
peripheral location, small population, distinctiveness from its former rulers and its need 
to compete for investment. In conclusion, we can say that Finland’s cultural policies 
demonstrate on the one hand, a social democratic and civil society ethos, and on the 
other a desire to position itself as a commercial, innovative, cosmopolitan, autonomous 
and international country, and an active member of the EU and Eurozone. Having 
established the manifestation of the creative city paradigm in both Scottish and Finnish 
cultural policies, and the role of nominalisation, containment, dual legitimacies and state 
imperatives, it is necessary to turn to the final comparative case. This case is that of 
Ireland, a small island on the edge of Europe with a growing interest in urban matters, a 
fragmented history of explicit cultural policy, and an equal if not stronger need to create 
and maintain a strong national brand. 
 
5.5 Ireland 
 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The case of Finland shows how creative city discourses occur within a non-English 
speaking and Nordic cultural policy context, and specifically, how the creative city 
aligns and legitimates culture with Finland’s national economic, industrial, political and 
social agendas. The last of the cases under consideration is the Republic of Ireland, a 
formerly colonised country, which, like Finland and Scotland, has historically used 
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culture to assert its independent identity, and, latterly, to assert itself within a 
competitive international context as a response to its peripheral location and enduring 
political and economic problems.
128
 Given Ireland’s “high reputation” for culture 
internationally (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 122) and its reputed cultural 
“legacy” (Florida, 2002, p. 301), it is not surprising that culture in Ireland has long been 
aggressively promoted to creative a “favourable image” of the country (Fanning and 
Henry, 2012, n.p.). Culture in Ireland has also been central in delivering “Brand 
Ireland” internationally (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 29; Fanning and 
Henry, 2012, n.p.). However, this case will show that the latest global recession has 
created unprecedented pressures on Irish cultural (arts) policy to deliver reputational 
and foreign investment benefits to Ireland.  
 
In order to contextualise this activity, the case will begin with an overview of creative 
branding and creativity discourses in Ireland, paying particular attention to discourses of 
industrial creativity and innovation. This will illustrate the leveraging of cultural 
discourses of creativity within industrial policy contexts, as a corollary of economic 
discourses occurring within cultural contexts. Following this, and as an introduction to 
Irish cultural (primarily arts) policy, key Irish cultural policy discourses of Brand 
Ireland, reputation enhancement (and rescue), and international investment will be 
outlined, concluding with a consideration of why creative city discourses have only 
marginally impacted Ireland’s cultural policies. 
 
 
                                                           
128 The history of the Republic of Ireland is entangled with civil wars and economic hardship, stemming 
from the partition and subsequent political struggles for the island of Ireland.  
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5.5.2 Introduction to the creative city in Ireland: designations, national promotion 
and innovation 
Ireland has been particularly active in “leveraging” its “authentic cultural assets” 
(Florida, 2002, p. 302) by promoting itself as a uniquely cultural destination, and 
typically describing itself as a “world leader” in culture (Department of Arts, Sport and 
Tourism, 2008b, p. 24; Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011b, n.p.). In 
recognition of this, its capital (Dublin) has been awarded UNESCO City of Literature 
(2010)
 129 
and routinely trades on literary tropes of 19
th
 and 20
th
 century writers who 
lived or were born there (James Joyce, Oscar Wilde, WB Yeats, Patrick Kavanagh, and 
Brendan Behan amongst others).  
 
Dublin has also been active in hosting or seeking to host international events aimed at 
showcasing the capital to tourists and businesses, including the City of Science (in 
2012),
130
 the shortlist (subsequently won by Helsinki) for World Design Capital (2012) 
and WOMEX/World Music Expo (2013), UNESCO’s Creative Cities’ network, and 
various urban regeneration and city (cultural) marketing campaigns.
131
 These 
regeneration initiatives include Dublin’s Temple Bar district, one of the first and most 
“successful cultural quarter development[s]” in Europe (Bayliss, 2004, p. 499), 
described as a “model of culture-led regeneration” (McCarthy, 2008, p. 271) and (by 
Florida) an “authentic cultural district” (Florida, 2002, p. 301). Despite this acclaim,  
Temple Bar is as locally critiqued as Glasgow’s 1990 City of Culture (see 5.3.1),with 
                                                           
129
 Available: http://www.dublincityofliterature.ie/ [Accessed 20 June 2012]. 
130 
Available: http://www.dublinscience2012.ie/ [Accessed 20 June 2012]. 
131
 Dublin has run many promotional campaigns. These include: the creative consultation exercise What’s 
Dublin For? from 2010’s Brand Dublin project, and direct branding initiatives such as Dublin City 
Council’s Love the City  project form 2010 as part of the social creativity project Designing Dublin. 
Available: 
http://www.dublincity.ie/Press/PressReleases/PR2010/June10/Pages/LovetheCityApplicationsopenforasix
monthlearningprojectaimingtoeffectrealchangeinDublinsCityCentre.aspx [Accessed 20 June 2012]. 
 258 
reports that it is “best summed up by the placards advertising lapdancing clubs, the hen 
parties tottering precariously across the cobblestones, and the lakes of vomit” 
(O’Connell, 2013, n.p.).132  
 
However, Ireland’s industrial policies have also capitalised on creativity and innovation 
discourses (as well as talent, human capital etc.) which are present in the seminal Smart 
Economy report - a local version of the knowledge economy - (Government of Ireland, 
2008), the Innovation Island brand (Government of Ireland, 2010),
133
 events such as 
Dublin Innovation week,
134
 Dublin as an Open City for Innovation,
135
 and conferences 
promoting creativity, innovation and the creative city in particular.
136
  
 
This promotional activity has taken place against the relatively recent emergence of 
benign discourses of creativity, culture, investment, business and branding from 
development agencies,
137
 local authorities,
138
 advisory boards,
139
 and media sources.
140
 
                                                           
132
 There have been other major regeneration projects such as the Dublin Docklands, but Dublin has 
recently launched a major new cultural quarter in the North part of the centre city that will provide an 
alternative to Temple Bar (see Reilly, 2013). 
133
 Though the term Innovation Island was mainstreamed through the Innovation Taskforce and 
Innovation Ireland initiatives, it originated through the Industrial Development Authority in 2009. 
Available: www.idaireland.com [Accessed 4 June 2013].  See also Elliot (2009). See also the Innovation 
Alliance, between University College Dublin and Trinity College Dublin, aiming to develop a “world-
class ecosystem for innovation that will drive enterprise development in Ireland”. Available: 
http://www.innovationalliance.ie/ [Accessed 31 August 2012]. See also the Innovation Academy, offering 
a “certificate in Innovation and Entrepreneurship” Available: www.tcd.ie [Accessed 4June, 2013]. 
134
 Available: http://www.innovationdublin.ie/festival/2011/ [Accessed 20 June 2012]. 
135
 Dublin City Council’s focus on innovation (referencing the lexicon of the creative city) is 
demonstrated in a media statement from one of its directors, claming that “it is this kind of creativity we 
are trying to harness and release.” (The Irish Times, 2010b,n.p.).  
136
 These conferences include the Creative City Regions conference held in Dublin in October 2007 
sponsored by Dublin Regional Authority and the Dublin Employment Pact. Available: 
http://www.craigiecommunications.com/b.html [Accessed 3 September 2012]. Also, the conference 
Creating Futures: Building Ireland’s cultural and creative economy, The Institute of Art, Design and 
Technology, Dun Laoghaire, Wednesday, 29 October, 2008. 
137
 The Western Development Commission in particular. Available: www.wdc.ie. [Accessed 12th 
February 2010]. 
138
 Dublin City Council make reference to the creative city paradigm the most, followed by Limerick City 
Council, who have developed a Creative Limerick project, seeking to “enhance vibrancy and active 
frontages in Limerick City Centre and to provide active uses for vacant properties” in Limerick. 
Available: http://www.limerickcity.ie/Planning/PropertyManagement/CreativeLimerick/ [Accessed 3 
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As suggested, Ireland’s largest local authority, Dublin City Council, has been highly 
active in this regard, claiming that “releasing creative energy [in Dublin] is what it’s all 
about” (Irish Times, 2010a, n.p.),141 and refers to: developing “the engine of the Irish 
economy with a network of thriving spatial and sectoral clusters, a focus for creative 
talent and creative assets” (Dublin City Council, 2010, p. 7);142 needing to “create a 
vibrant place” (Dublin City Council, 2009, p. 18); and needing to “nurture, attract and 
retain creative people”(ibid., p. 23);  as well as outlining “what makes a creative city 
region?” (ibid., p. 12).143   
 
Other local authority documents claim that the arts are: “perceived as being increasingly 
important in giving a city the capacity to develop a profile, attract investment, deliver 
quality of life and hold on to [or retain] a talented and creative workforce” (Dublin City 
Council, 2005, p. 10), who
 “underpin city identity”; help cities “project themselves, 
develop profile and compete in the international arena for investment” and “maintain its 
[Dublin’s] attractiveness as a place to live, work and visit” (ibid., p. 64). These 
Floridian ideas of attraction, investment, talent and profile-building, alternate between 
                                                                                                                                                                          
September 2012]. See also Limerick City Gallery who has stated that it “seeks to develop its role as a 
primary visitor attraction in the context of a creative city”. Available: 
http://www.limerickcitygallery.ie/Events/LatestNews/LimerickCityCouncilseeksDirectorCuratorofLCGA
.html [Accessed 20 June 2012].Finally, Limerick is hosting the first National City of Culture in Ireland in 
2014. Available: www.limerick.ie/cityofculture/[Accessed 6
th
 March, 2013]. Sligo also has a creative 
industries initiative called Creative Sligo and Creative State North West. Available: 
http://www.creativestatenorthwest.com/perspectives/article/mary-mcauliffe [Accessed 23 September 
2013]. 
139
 Forfás is “Ireland’s policy advisory board for enterprise, trade, science, technology and innovation.” 
Available: http://www.forfas.ie/aboutus [Accessed 22 June 2011]. 
140
 See (McWilliams, 2006; Irish Times, 2008; The Independent, 2007). 
141 “If we just wait around for the next creative wave to come along, we will miss it – that’s not the way 
things happen. We have to compete at the leading edge with the most creative cities in the world. We 
have to go back to basics to a certain extent. We have found ourselves in a spot of bother and if we look 
within ourselves to our own creativity we might come up with sustainable solutions that are different and 
distinctly Irish.” “It’s about job creation – and we want to contribute to that by showcasing our potential 
as a location for foreign direct investment.” All quotes from Michael Stubbs, assistant city manager with 
Dublin City Council in 2011, in relation to Dublin Innovation week (Irish Times, 2010b, n.p.). 
142
 Available: http://dublincitydevelopmentplan.ie/visionS1.php [Accessed 3 September 2012]. 
143
 Available: 
http://www.dublincity.ie/Press/PressReleases/PR2009/Press_Releases_July_2009/Pages/DublinEconomic
DevelopmentActionPlan.aspx [Accessed 9 October 2012]. 
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an equivocation around culture’s usefulness to cities, suggested by the use of the 
equivocal term “perceived” (ibid., p.10), and more assertive terms such “underpin” 
(ibid., p. 64). 
 
Florida’s particular popularity in Dublin City Council may in part arise from his 
positive endorsements of Dublin and Ireland, as well as his appearances (physical and 
virtual) at conferences there.
144
 Like Finland, in the mid 2000s, Florida praised Ireland 
for being a “high-tech success story envied across Europe and around the world” 
(Florida, 2002, p. 300), and claimed its success depended on the 3 Ts of economic 
development (ibid.), and a major “lifestyle effort” (ibid., p. 301), a theory that did not 
hold with subsequent revelations around Ireland’s property-fuelled boom.145 Florida 
also lauded Ireland in relation to (his perception of) its sustained investment in higher 
education,
146
 its skill at “cultivating creative people” (Florida, 2004, p. 122), and its 
nurturing of “underlying creative capabilities” (Florida and Tinagli, 2004, p. 6). Despite 
the global recession, in 2011, Ireland ranked in Florida’s top 20 (out of 82 countries) on 
the Global Creativity Index,
147
 and in the top ten per cent in his Global Innovation and 
Technology survey (Florida, 2011a, n.p.; 2011b, n.p.). The attraction of the creative city 
model for Ireland’s local authorities, however, has also been linked to the limited 
financial autonomy of these bodies in Ireland (since local rates were abolished in the 
                                                           
144 
Florida appeared at the Dublin, Creative City Region conference in October 2007, as the keynote 
speaker, aiming to “identify initiatives which can be taken at national and at Dublin level to ensure that 
Dublin is a leading player in the global creative economy and society into the future.” Available: 
http://www.craigiecommunications.com/b.html [Accessed 3 September 2012]. 
145
 Ireland’s Celtic Tiger boom of the 1990s and 2000s is ultimately thought to have rested on inflated 
property prices. 
146
 More recently, Chairman of Goldman Sachs Peter Sutherland has been reported as saying that “Ireland 
was ‘deluding itself’ if it thought it had a top-quality education system” (O’Brien, 2011, n.p.). 
147
 The Global Creativity Index ranks 82 nations on Technology, Talent, and Tolerance, the three critical 
Ts of economic development” Available: http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-
economy/2011/10/global-creativity-index/229/ [ Accessed 6 November 2012].In 2011, Florida’s Global 
Creative Class index measured human capital as a “key dimension of economic progress” and was 
ascertained by the level of “high-skill, high-wage Creative Class jobs” in countries. Available: 
http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2011/10/worlds-leading-creative-class-countries/228/ 
[Accessed 6 November 2012]. 
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1970s) and their consequent “over-reliance” on lucrative urban development initiatives 
which might favour creative city branded initiatives (Lawton, Murphy and Redmond, 
2010, p. 281).  
 
5.5.3 Nationalism and early cultural policies 
On a national cultural policy level, like Scotland and Finland, nationalist cultural 
discourses have been a key factor in Ireland’s struggle for independence, the foundation 
of the state and the assertion of a distinct and independent Irish/Gaelic identity.
148
  
While the colonial legacy of 18
th
 century British cultural policies are embodied in the 
system of royal academies and schools, the national movement and the development of 
implicit national cultural policies gained prominence in the 19
th
 century, exacerbated by 
the Irish famine and the subsequent ravaging and depopulation of Ireland (to less than 
half of what it had been). The foundation of the socio-cultural Gaelic League 
(associated with the revival of the Irish language) and the Irish Literary/Celtic Revival 
of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, was also significant in terms of the development of 
an independent cultural and national identity, and formed the backdrop to independence 
in 1921.  
 
Early explicit cultural policies in Ireland, therefore, were based around a number of 
discrete nationalist initiatives, notably the drive to restore the Irish language which had 
been fragmented through colonialism (effectively implemented through, and equivalent 
to, an education policy) and like Finland, the development of a cult of [Irish] 
authenticity as a response to delegitimating and de-authenticating colonisation from 
                                                           
148
 As the historical development of nationalism and Irish cultural policy has been dealt with extensively 
in other books and is not the specific topic of this research, this introductory section is intended as an 
overview only. For more information on the history of cultural policy in Ireland, see (Kennedy, 1990) and 
Quinn (1998).  
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which the concept of nationhood had arisen in the first place (O’ Brien, 2007, p. 5). In 
1949, following the intense economic hardship of the 1930s and 1940s, an official state 
arts policy was proposed, leading in 1951 to the first Arts Act and the creation of An 
Comhairle Ealaíon/The Arts Council (henceforth called The Arts Council), modelled on 
the British Arts Council.  
 
This economically-difficult time was characterised by an inherent cautiousness (and 
clientelism)
149
 in policy which can be linked to Ireland’s post-colonialism and general 
conservatism,
150
 its lack of public support for the arts (and thus lack of interest from 
politicians), and the exclusion of the civil service and thus power-base from the arts 
policy process (having no ministry of its own) (Quinn, 1998, pp. 123- 126).
151
 However, 
the first formal cultural (arts) policy at government level was consolidated in 1993 with 
the establishment of a full cultural government department, instituted as the Department 
of Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht. The ministerial department is currently called the 
Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht and is effectively concerned with ‘high 
culture’, as well as the film industry. 
 
More recently, however, despite historic hardship and perceptions of Ireland as 
“conservative” (Florida, 2002, p. 301) and “one of the least cosmopolitan and tolerant 
nations in Europe” (Boyle, 2006, p. 411), the unprecedented “economic about-turn” of 
                                                           
149
 Clientelism refers to “client politics, characteristic of issues with distributed costs but concentrated 
benefits” (Jones, 2009, p. 29) 
150
 Conservatism in Ireland has been underlined by a number of authors (Merriman, 2005; O’Brien, 2007) 
and is particularly linked to the cautious reproduction of Britain’s political and administrative structures, 
as a legacy of colonisation (O’Brien, 2007, p. 5). More recently, in November 2012, ongoing debates on 
religious issues were highlighted in relation to the death of a woman at an Irish hospital who was refused 
a termination following complications that arose after a miscarriage. This underlines an enduring 
conservatism and link to the Catholic Church in Ireland. See Irish Times (2012b). 
151
The question of whether the place of the Arts Council outside of government (before the existence of 
the arts ministry) constituted benign neglect and allowed arts policy to develop independently (devoid of 
unnecessary government interference and led by skilled experts), or whether it lost critical policy 
expertise and visibility (as well as mandate), is moot. 
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the Celtic Tiger period in the late 1990s and 2000s (Hazelkorn and Murphy, 2002, p. 1) 
and consequent “rapid” integration of Ireland into the world economy, has contributed 
to a new “outward-looking post-colonial national identity” (Boyle, 2006, p. 411) and 
internationalism.
152
 This has resulted in a realignment of government priorities, from 
nationalism’s “utopian project of decolonisation” towards a wholesale “counter-utopia 
of globalised capital”, or a new economicism (Merriman, cited in O’Brien, 2007, p. 11).  
 
5.5.4 Industrial policy and cultural discourses 
As a result, Ireland’s industrial policies have gained increasing primacy in the desire to 
keep “moving up the value chain” (Kerr, 2007, p. 111). The knowledge economy (via 
the Smart Economy)
153
 and information society
154
 in particular, are at the centre of 
Ireland’s economic policies,155 and urge Ireland to “innovate, to adapt, to be creative”, 
to invest in “human and creative capital” as well as “world-class ambition and 
achievement” and underline the importance of the arts, cultural and creative industries 
in “engaging and attracting the business sector” (Government of Ireland, 2008, p. 80). 
Science and innovation discourses also promote what they refer to as the “less 
developed and understood” symbolic capacity of the arts (Government of Ireland, 2010, 
p. 31). This interest in the arts’ uses to science is demonstrated in references to: its 
                                                           
152
 It has been claimed that the “pursuit of an internationalisation agenda” ... is part of an “attempt to 
promote Dublin’s role in the European and global economy” (Lawton et al., 2010, p. 276). 
153
 See the Knowledge Society Division (as seen in the New Connections report from 2002 and 
Technology Actions to Support the Smart Economy in 2009), and Dublin as Knowledge City Region 
(2008) Available: http://www.dubchamber.ie/docs/policy-reports/knowledge-city-region.pdf [Accessed 
21 June 2012]. 
154 
See Implementing the Information Society in Ireland (1999) produced through the Department of the 
Taoiseach. Available: http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/upload/publications/238.pdf [Accessed 3 September 
2012], and initiatives such as the Information Society Commission.  Available: 
http://foi.gov.ie/Information-Society-Commission [Accessed 3 September 2012]. In addition, it has been 
claimed that this innovation strategy is an attempt to “leapfrog historic and geographic limitations of the 
earlier industrial revolution and jump-start Irish economic growth” .using Ireland’s “ ‘natural’ reservoir 
of creativity”... “to market Ireland as an ‘information gateway’, an English-speaking beachhead between 
the USA and Europe, with an emphasis on information distribution and cultural content products” 
(Hazelkorn and Murphy, 2002, p. 1). 
155 See Government of Ireland (2008); Minister for Arts, Sport and Tourism (2009); Forfás, (2007b); and 
Dublin City Council (2009). 
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“branding” capacity and its “innovative role in positioning Ireland in a new way”  (ibid., 
p. 83); helping “translate science to the wider public”; making “complex information 
more understandable” (ibid., p. 31); working with science to “re-position technology 
and innovation in innovative new ways in the public mind, and [conversely] helping re-
position artists, culture and creative minds into the centre of innovative businesses” 
(ibid., p. 77).  
 
The discourse of Ireland’s enterprise and science advisory board (Forfás) is particularly 
interesting in this regard and has been actively engaged in both general creativity and 
innovation, as well as particular creative city, discourses (citing both Richard Florida 
and Charles Landry repeatedly).
156
 This has resulted in documents urging the need for 
synergies around “collaboration, creative individuals and the urban environment” 
(Forfás, 2006a, p. 24) and the importance of “attracting and retaining mobile talent” 
and “creating innovative places” (Forfás, 2010a, p. 44). Other Forfás documents claim 
that: highly talented and creative individuals tend to gravitate towards places where 
there are attractive and challenging employment opportunities, reinforcing innovative 
potential ... with a critical mass of creative activity and workers, strong social diversity 
and tolerance, attractive neighbourhoods and cultural amenities [which] develop a 
marked advantage in the competition for talent (ibid., p. 45); “city creativity is nurtured 
not only through the diversity of its people but also through civic, cultural and sports 
infrastructure such as libraries and theatres and through the existence of a thriving 
creative arts sector” (Forfás, 2009a, p. 30); and that there is a “strong interdependence 
between the planning, development and creation of an attractive environment (the NSS) 
and enterprise development” (Forfás, 2010b, p. 6).  
                                                           
156 See for example Forfás  (2006a, p. 24; 2006b, p. 22; 2007a, p. 169, p. 263; 2007b, p. 22; 2009a, p. 6 , 
p30; 2009b; 2010a, p. 39, p. 44, pp. 116-119; 2010b, p. 1, p. 6).  
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Economic initiatives designed to increase investment in Brand Ireland using cultural 
identity discourses (and mobilised as a response to the global recession) have also been 
channelled through outlets such as the Global Irish Economic Forum, first initiated in 
September 2009.
157
 This gathering of Ireland’s international business diaspora, like 
many of Ireland’s policies, was primarily intended to “contribute towards the rebuilding 
of Ireland’s international reputation”, to leverage international investment and to “use 
Ireland’s cultural heritage to help rebuild its battered economy” (O’Brien, 2011, n.p.). 
The initiative, however, was notable for its explicit positioning of culture as a unique 
Irish asset needing to be maximised or “monetise[d]” (Businessman Dermot Desmond, 
cited in The Irish Times, 2010b, n.p.), and placed culture as central to Ireland’s 
economic recovery.  
 
Throughout the report from the first forum (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009), 
discourses of difference, uniqueness and harnessing occur in narratives describing 
Ireland’s “strong cultural identity” and how culture give’s Ireland a “significant 
advantage” and distinction from other countries (ibid., p. 29). Other discourses refer to: 
the need to “renovate” Brand Ireland (ibid., p. 49)so that it can be ready for the 
economic “upturn” (ibid., p. 5); the fact that Irish culture holds “a distinct and intrinsic 
value” … “known the world over” (ibid., p. 49); the need for Ireland to “portray the 
positives that others see” in its culture (ibid.); the need for culture to be “harnessed as a 
                                                           
157
 The stated aim of the forum was to “explore how the Irish at home and abroad, and those with a strong 
interest in Ireland, could work together and contribute to our overall efforts at economic recovery; and to 
examine ways in which Ireland and its global community could develop a more strategic relationship with 
each other, particularly in the economic sector.” Its key themes were: Ireland - the innovation island, 
Promoting brand Ireland through our global cultural profile and Ireland's image abroad: what is it now; 
how could it be improved and what role can new media play? Available: http://www.globalirishforum.ie 
[Accessed 28 June 2011]. 
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unique brand identifier” (ibid., p. 21); and the fact that culture gives Ireland a 
“competitive advantage in a globalised world” (ibid., p. 49).  
 
As such and like Finland (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 10), the forum 
actively disavowed the romantic model of the arts by asserting the “importance of arts 
and culture, not merely for art’s sake”, and stated that the arts are “no longer a luxury or 
a charity, but are a hugely important part of the economy” (Department of Foreign 
Affairs, 2009, p. 21). This statement appeals to those seeking a logical and accountable 
purpose for the public funding of culture, but also shows a naivety in inferring that the 
suggestion that the arts are not primarily luxury goods (i.e. a utilitarian approach to 
culture), is a novel one. Other discursive strands link culture to innovation, citing 
culture as helping Ireland “become a global centre for artistic and creative education, 
innovation and technology” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 9) and “fostering 
culture and the imagination generally and innovation beyond the realm of arts towards 
delivering the Smart Economy” (ibid., p. 21). 
 
Despite these discourses and their ultimate legacy in economic initiatives beyond the 
forum, counter discourses arose amongst a “number of [forum] speakers” who objected 
to the “view that Ireland should be ‘re-created’ as a brand, which would by nature be 
inauthentic” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 21). This viewpoint, however, 
was rejoindered by later assertions (by a member of the Irish Arts Council) of there 
being “no reason” for “apoplexy” at the link between the arts and branding [that had 
been made at Farmleigh], that Ireland’s arts reputation was “inextricably bound up” 
with its image, and that the “only power we [artists] have is to play an active role in 
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managing Ireland’s brand” as part of the “long tradition” of artists being “pressed into 
service” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.).  
 
This forum is also significant for leveraging the sign-value of celebrities, in particular 
the appointment of a three-year international Cultural Ambassador for Ireland in 2010 
(actor Gabriel Byrne),
158
 an unprecedented investment in international cultural 
showcases,
159
 and other cultural initiatives including a Certificate of Irishness and a 
facebook for the Irish diaspora.
160
 The most recent and well-publicised outcome of the 
forum has been The Gathering, a year-long tourism event for 2013 aimed at the Irish 
diaspora, “inviting anyone with a connection to [Ireland] our country to come and 
visit”.161 This event was implicitly modelled on Scotland’s Homecoming,162 and like 
Scotland is a response to political concerns about the “waning” of the diasporic 
attachment (and its promise of investment) to Ireland (Ancien, Boyle and Kitchin, 2009, 
p. 30). The event, however, has generated a degree of cynicism and negative publicity 
arising from comments made by those charged with promoting it (including the cultural 
ambassador) and concerned the packaging of an industrial event (aimed at foreign direct 
investment), as a cultural/tourism event, a situation that will be further discussed in 
Chapter Seven. Though these local authority, industrial and tourism discourses can be 
viewed as part of wider international (EU) narratives about culture and creativity, they 
also reflect the creative city’s genealogy and systems of dispersion in Ireland. 
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 See Fitzgerald (2011). 
159
 See O’Sullivan (2011).  
160
 The now defunct Certificate of Irishness was intended to offer Irish cultural citizenship to “up to 70 
million people of Irish descent around the world who do not qualify for citizenship” (Irish Times, 2010c). 
There was also the development of WorldIrish, a self styled “Facebook for the diaspora” which closed in 
2013. See (McCaughren, 2013). Forum initiatives also involved the Creative Dublin Alliance. Available: 
www.creativedublinalliance.ie [Accessed 3 September 2012], and a proposal for a global arts and culture 
university called the Cultural Odyssey. Available: http://irish.intuition.com/pages/about [Accessed 5 
March 2013].  
161 Available: http://www.thegatheringireland.com/Home.aspx [Accessed 20 June 2012].  
162
 Available: http://www.homecomingscotland.com/ [Accessed 20 June 2012]. 
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5.5.5 Irish cultural policy discourses 
This enthusiasm for culture, creativity and innovation within Irish industrial and 
scientific texts is not shared by the Irish Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht, 
as it is currently called (henceforth called the Department). This department produces a 
range of operational communications, business plans and strategy statements and has 
one designated arts plan from 2008.
163
 Within these documents, a number of themes and 
discourses emerge, these are: creativity (throughout all of the thematics); uniqueness, 
consistent with nationalist but particularly competitive themes (Department of Arts, 
Sport and Tourism, 2008a; Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011b); 
reputation-saving/building (Department of Arts Sport and Tourism 2008a; Department 
of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011b); and the contribution of culture to society and the 
economy (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2005, p. 3; ibid., 2008a, p. 6; 
Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011a, n.p.; Arts Council of Ireland, 2011, 
p. 4). To a lesser extent, other discourses within these texts comprise cultural diplomacy 
and “international political” objectives (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008b, 
p. 24); the (dualist or binary) contribution of culture to “quality of life issues which are 
a concomitant of economic prosperity” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2003, 
p. 4) and references to cultural democracy (access and participation).  
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 The nine strategy and business documents comprise: Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism Business 
Plan 2009; Department of Arts Sport and Tourism Statement of Strategy 2008 – 2010; Department of 
Arts, Sport and Tourism Arts and Culture Plan 2008; Department of Arts Sport and Tourism Business 
Plan 2008; Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism Departmental Business Plan, 1 October 2005 – 31 
December 2006; Department of Arts Sport and Tourism Statement of Strategy 2005 – 2007; Department 
of Arts Sport and Tourism Department's Business Plan 2004; Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism 
First Statement of Strategy 2003 – 2005; and Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism Departmental 
Business Plan 2003. 
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5.5.5.1 The discourse of rescuing Ireland’s reputation  
The discourse of culture in affirming the national brand, and in particular its capacity to 
salve and act as a panacea for lost reputation (as demonstrated in the post-recession 
Farmleigh initiative), is one of the driving forces of Irish cultural policy. This is 
expressed in (pre-recession) calls for the arts/culture to conserve and enhance Ireland’s 
international reputation, and (post-recession) descriptions of the arts’ ability and 
responsibility to re-frame the world’s perceptions of the financially immiserated 
country.
164
 Specifically, these discourses comprise the use of the arts to recover 
Ireland’s “national standing in major markets” (Department of Tourism, Culture and 
Sport 2011b, n.p.), to aid “reputational recovery” (ibid.), to re-build “Ireland’s 
international reputation” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. i), and to “enhance our 
[Ireland’s] ability to foster trade linkages and encourage international investment” 
(ibid., p. xxv). More recently and contentiously, this discourse (via the Arts Minister’s 
speech) has called on the arts to unequivocally “repair the damage” done to Ireland’s 
reputation by the latest economic downturn (Bonnar, 2011, n.p.), a claim which went 
beyond simple instrumentalism and caused a “frisson among” arts practitioners (ibid.). 
The significance of these discourses is that the sought-for reputation has to be recovered 
and repaired and is thus negatively charged from the outset, as well as explicitly linking 
this reputation to the industrial profile of the country, rather than the image of the 
country in general. 
 
5.5.5.2 National branding, success, competition and uniqueness discourses  
However, the discourse of reputation-salvage and damage-repair necessarily overlaps 
with claims of the uniqueness and importance of Ireland’s culture. Broader image-
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 Another perspective on the narrative of rescuing Ireland’s reputation could be an indirect attempt by 
the current Irish government (Fine Gael and the Labour Party), to distance itself and blacken the previous 
government (led by Fianna Fail). 
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management occurs through the discourse of Ireland’s distinction and in particular, its 
story-telling ability, claiming that art and culture act as “differentiators” and shapers of 
image (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008a, p. 4; Government of Ireland, 
2008, p. 80), secure Ireland’s “international reputation as a culturally vibrant place” 
(Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008a, p. 9), are part of Ireland’s “cultural 
branding” (ibid.) and “distinguish us [Ireland] as a people in the world” (Department of 
Arts Sport and Tourism, 2008c, p. 2).  
 
Equally, the arts are also highlighted as of central importance to Ireland, in references to 
the arts as: Ireland’s “most important area of national competence” (Arts Council of 
Ireland, 2009, p. 91); a “unique asset“ (Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 
2011b, n.p.); at the “very heartbeat of this country”; at the “core of our status, our well-
being as a society and our success as a nation” (Brennan, 2008, n.p.); helping Ireland to 
be “internationally recognised for innovation and excellence” (Moylan, 2010, n.p.) and 
key to Ireland’s “frontier breaching creativity” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 
2008c, p. 1). The arts in Ireland are also argued to be “world-class” (ibid.; Government 
of Ireland, 2008, p. 80) and Ireland is consequently a “world leader” in the arts 
(Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011b, n.p.).  
 
As indicated in Scotland, policy documents also locate creativity and culture as a 
competitive, specific and intrinsic feature of Ireland. This discourse comprises 
statements claiming that: “imagination, flexibility and creativity” are “most prevalent in 
societies such as ours that actively foster the arts” (Brennan, 2008, n.p.); that Ireland 
has an “innate creativity and innovative culture” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. 
xxviii); and is a “culturally vibrant place” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 
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2008a, p. 9). While these narratives partly embody the search for authenticity common 
to post-colonial countries (O Brien, 2007, p. 5), like Scotland, they also speak to 
discourses of competition and defensiveness, aiming to project the most creative, 
innovative, cultural, successful, and confident nation in the world (to the outside world). 
This message reinforces the profile of the country and sends out the right message to 
would-be investors or multinational companies, a factor which Florida championed and 
linked to Ireland’s former economic boom (Florida, 2002, pp. 300-301). The ultimate 
aim of these discourses, therefore, is to assert that Irish culture is more renowned, 
successful, different and better than other cultures, and that is it of central importance to 
the state.  
 
5.5.5.3 Culture and the economy discourses 
As such, arts and cultural policies in Ireland demonstrate significant policy attachment 
to economic objectives. This is suggested in framings of the arts as concerned with 
maximising “economic returns and employment” (as well as participation),165 and 
constituting “primary economic contributors, real businesses, enduring employers” 
(Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008c, p. 2). The use of the words real and 
enduring are defensive discourses that reveal the need to convince others (including 
within the Department) of the arts’ concrete economic outcomes (as an apparently novel 
observation), amidst fears of perceptions of the arts as somehow unreal, or, as one 
(culture) minister remarked, representing potentially “unstructured or illusive” 
businesses (O’Donoghue, 2002, n.p.). As might be expected given the prominence of 
the knowledge economy in Ireland, the Department has also referred to the “important 
                                                           
165 Available: http://www.arts-sport-tourism.gov.ie/aboutus/whatwedo/default.htm [Accessed 23 May 
2011]. 
 272 
role” of the arts in developing it (ibid.), and helping to reinforce Ireland’s “innovation 
offer” (Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011b, n.p.).  
 
This message has been re-communicated through The Arts Council, in discourses 
linking the arts with innovation, creativity and again, the knowledge (Smart) economy 
(Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. xxiii; 2010, n.p.; 2011, p. 3).  Like Scotland, however, 
Arts Council statements are perhaps necessarily (from a cultural sector legitimacy point 
of view) more equivocal, acknowledging pragmatically that while “economic 
consequences are not and should not be the main rationale for supporting the arts, an 
understanding of the economic impacts is an important component of the value of the 
arts, job creation and employment” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. i); and that “the 
arts on their own could never solve the unemployment problem, but can make a big 
contribution” (Moylan, 2010, n.p.).  
 
Less equivocal statements from the Arts Council, however, comprise claims that: 
“employers in innovative industries and businesses need creative thinkers who are 
culturally aware to drive their business forward” (Arts Council of Ireland,  2010, n.p.); 
the arts “bring renown to Ireland as a country where innovation and creativity are 
strongly supported” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2011, p. 3); the arts help “leverage the 
creativity of [Ireland’s] its workforce to develop its competitive advantage” (Arts 
Council of Ireland, 2009, p. 93); a “knowledge-based economy must leverage the 
innovation and creativity of its workforce” (ibid., p. xxiii); the arts are a “critical 
motivator of creativity and innovation” (Moylan, 2010, n.p.); a “component of 
innovation-led growth is the creative capacity of the economy” (Arts Council of Ireland, 
2009, p. xxiii); the arts are key to the “future prosperity of the Irish economy as we shift 
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to a more knowledge-based, services-oriented economic platform” (Arts Council of 
Ireland, 2009, p. xvi); and that (as above) a “strong knowledge-based economy must 
leverage the innovation and creativity of its workforce” (ibid., p. xxiii). There is also 
critical recognition that the exaggeration of economic outcomes from the arts 
undermines the “real contribution of the sector” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. viii), 
a statement which simultaneously affirms other potential economic evaluations. 
 
Again, like cultural policies in Scotland (in particular the former Scottish Arts Council) 
and Finland, the emphasis in these discourses is on making the economic (or extrinsic) 
case, while asserting the intrinsic case for the arts. This dual approach increasingly 
points to the conflicting and strategic containment of discourses of policy in general and 
in cultural policy in particular, and the (at worst) involuntary or (at best) pragmatic 
nature of cultural policymaking. These discourses also reveal the a priori assumption of 
economic development and capitalism as necessary and desirable, consistent with 
nominalism, rationalism and liberal democracies. 
 
5.5.5.4 Ireland, government agendas and instrumentalism 
More recently, the Council has increased its articulation of the “many ways in which the 
arts have and create value” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2011, p. 11). In particular, the 
Council has emphasised its close links or attachment to central government agendas in 
its plans to “engage with a range of government departments and public bodies to 
advance common objectives” (ibid.). The question of the arts in Ireland seeking 
common objectives with other government departments mirrors the “common cause” 
sought with other government portfolios by Scotland’s cultural policies (Cultural 
Commission, 2005, p. 2) and suggests a weakening of the traditional arms’ length 
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principle of the Council. However, these Arts Council objectives also reflect the needs 
of its parent ministry to “influence [and thus legitimate] other relevant public policy 
areas” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008a, p. 6), add “maximum value” to 
other government agendas (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008b, p. 24) and 
thereby help the state to “extract greater benefits” from the arts (Deenihan, 2011a, n.p.).  
 
5.5.6 The creative city and Irish cultural policy discourse 
In addition to a broad economic instrumentalism, narratives of rescuing Ireland’s 
reputation, success, competition and uniqueness, attachments to other government 
departments and the need for Ireland to “tap into the creativity that’s out there” 
(Deenihan, 2011b, n.p.), Ireland’s cultural policies demonstrate a limited use of discrete 
creative city concepts. In line with Ireland’s international investment-focus, those 
creative city discourses that occur centre on the discourse of attraction and Ireland’s 
attractiveness as a business and investment location, rather than a global location for 
mobile creative workers (seen in Scotland and more so Finland). 
 
5.5.6.1 Discourses of attraction, investment, harnessing and creativity 
Typical of this discourse, therefore, are claims that: culture is a “primary driver of 
Ireland’s global attractiveness as a centre of creativity and innovation and as a 
destination for tourism and business” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008c, 
p. 10); “profiling Irish creativity as a unique asset reinforces the innovation offer, 
leading to increased trade and investment” (Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 
2011a, n.p.); culture is an aid to “Ireland’s relative attractiveness as a destination for 
foreign direct investment” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. 93); culture is important to 
a “country’s brand for the purposes of its economic enhancement and development” and 
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is important for attracting “overseas investment”, “tourists”  and “export sales” (ibid., p. 
xxvi). Similarly, the metaphor of “harnessing”, though not present in cultural policy 
documents, occurs within industrial texts, in relation to harnessing “creativity, vision 
and connectedness” (Mc Sweeney, 2009, p. vi)166 and in foreign policy documents, in 
relation to harnessing the “asset” (of arts and culture) as a “unique brand identifier” 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 21). 
 
However, as Scotland has demonstrated, while discourses of uniqueness and reputation 
are suggestive of competitive identity and branding, they can also be attributed to other 
post-colonial national issues and the search for authenticity, rather than place-
development or regeneration (a discourse which is also lacking). Equally, the discourse 
of attraction is based on (the more traditional model of) attracting businesses rather than 
the emphasis on workers central to the creative city. Further, though culture is 
positioned as a competitive feature in cities which attracts investment, and though there 
is a general lexicon of creativity, innovation, and attraction, there are no explicit 
references to the creative city itself, or the creative classes. The lack of human capital 
discourses is especially surprising given the location of major knowledge economy 
businesses in Ireland and the central industrial policy of attracting foreign direct 
investment.
167
 Additionally, there are no discernable discourses on urban regeneration 
or place-development, or tolerance (the third T), and few references to technology (the 
second T). In this respect, while there is some evidence of the genealogy of the creative 
city in other economic narratives and related discourses of economics, creativity, 
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 The linking of harnessing and creativity is also seen in media references to how the employment that 
was available during the Irish boom both “harnessed and limited their [artists] creativity” (writer Claire 
Kilroy, cited in Moylan, 2010, n.p.). 
167
 See Irish Examiner (2013). 
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reputation, competition and innovation, there is no explicit materialisation of the 
creative city in Ireland’s national cultural policies.  
 
A recurring but surprising feature of many of these rationalising statements, perhaps, is 
their origin in The Arts Council. Though this may result from the more active nature of 
the Council in simply producing more texts and thus more material for analysis, as this 
body is a paradigm of traditional arts subsidy, typically aligned with autonomous 
cultural agendas (the arm’s length principle), it is arguably under less pressure to be as 
instrumental and rationalising as its parent, policy-making department. Nevertheless, as 
demonstrated in Scotland, the Council is not immune to pressure and its increasing 
adoption of instrumental discourses suggests escalating pressures to justify and 
legitimate public funding in the arts ministry and thus central government discursive 
terms, as was underlined recently in the UK (Higgins, 2013a, n.p.). 
 
Given the willingness of Ireland’s arts/cultural policies to attach themselves to Ireland’s 
finance/economic, tourism and foreign affairs ministries, its predisposition to branding 
and reputational-recovery discourses and the particular popularity of cultural discourses 
of creativity in industrial policy in Ireland,
168
 the relative absence of creative city 
discourse from Ireland’s cultural policies is curious. Equally, other factors underline the 
potential value of the creative city to Irish cultural policies and comprise Ireland’s: 
peripheral location (need for attention), close links with Europe, “outward-looking post-
colonial national” identity (Boyle, 2006, p. 411) and interest in cosmopolitanism (ibid., 
p. 412); increased multiculturalism, diversity and the return of a well-travelled diaspora 
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 Though this research has demonstrated evidence of Florida’s discursive reach into Smart and 
Innovation economy texts, as well as into publications by Forfás, a policy support agency (ACRE) has 
asserted that Florida’s ideas are “fairly far removed” and have had “little impact” on national economic 
policy in Ireland” (Lawton et al, 2010, p. 274).   
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(suggesting a receptivity to the discourse); focus on attracting knowledge/information 
economy workers consistent with creative class discourses (in reference to the location 
of Google, Facebook etc. headquarters in Ireland); tradition as a “major exporter of 
people” (ibid., p. 407), and, therefore, like Scotland, its interest in attracting new 
workers; active cultural tourism and regeneration history; increasing role for urban 
policy (despite the slowness of this agenda to develop); Anglophonic status (in light of 
its dissemination through English); FDI policies (as above);  and finally, Florida’s 
interest in, and links to the country. These factors have no doubt contributed to an 
interest in the creative city at local and industrial policy level (see 5.5.2), but do raise 
the question as to why a transfer has not occurred to Ireland’s cultural policies.  
 
5.5.6.2 The Irish exception 
A number of factors have contributed to this lack of attachment to the creative city in 
Ireland’s cultural policies. In contrast with Scotland, though the creative city is a 
national as much as a local development paradigm, there has been a general lack of 
interest in the city as an object of policy in Ireland (as a historically rural country), 
which has had a profound impact on the positioning of urban issues in its national 
policies (Lawton et al., 2010, p. 274). Also, despite Ireland’s current openness, it has 
been slow to absorb cultural influences (possibly demonstrated by the slow take up of 
the creative economy agenda),
169
 reluctant to bring in outside expertise and ideas 
through commissioning research (with the exception of the devolved agencies) and has 
been accused of an historic anti-intellectualism, which distrusts the dissemination of 
international ideas.
170
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 It is generally considered that Ireland’s interest in and adoption of modernism and the modern art 
movement, outside of literature, was ”relatively late” (Halsall, 2008, p. 18).  
170 This perception of anti-intellectualism in Ireland concerns reputed historical conflicts between the 
conservative forces (equated with anti-intellectualism) of nationalism and the Catholic Church (O’Dowd, 
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These factors underline the residual conservatism and clientelism alluded to earlier, 
which discourages policymakers from pushing boundaries (given their proximity to the 
voter and disinclination to be unpopular) and leads to “incremental” policy-making 
(Quinn, 1998, p. 26) where change is small and policies are resistant to paradigm shifts, 
new knowledges and discourses (Jones, 2009, p. 28). This conservatism is supported by 
limited references to international cultural policy dialogues in Ireland’s cultural policies 
(e.g., cultural rights, civil society, democracy, multicultural and interculturalism, etc.) as 
compared with Scotland and Finland,
171
 and a general lack of creative economy policy 
activity. 
 
However, there is another factor contributing to the apparent lack of interest in the 
creative city paradigm at cultural policy level. This factor is the political lack of interest 
in and historically weak status of the arts/culture department in Ireland following a 
history of “benign neglect” (Howlin, 2013, p.15). Although the former economic boom 
meant huge increases in the budget of the Department at that time,
172
 in the last ten 
years there has been little mention of culture or the arts in central government plans and 
strategies (e.g. Renewed Programme for Government, October 2009), little investment 
in research (none available in the Department’s website), and limited public and media 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1985, p. 20), with a predominantly upper-class liberal and literary Ireland (ibid., p. 6). Though O’Dowd 
makes a counter argument for anti-intellectualism in Ireland (1985), he goes on to say (Endnote #1) that 
“much of the evidence for anti-intellectualism is based on historians' and writers' accounts of intellectual 
disillusionment with post-Treaty Ireland. Drawing on these, Professor Chubb even elevates 'anti-
intellectualism’ as one of the seven pillars of Irish political culture”, equating intellectual with anti-
conservative (O’Dowd, 1985, p. 20). See also The Irish Times (2012e). 
171
 There are very few references to multiculturalism in cultural policy in Ireland. Instead there are 
references to multicultural “stakeholders” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008a, p. 20), the 
“changing multicultural dimensions of society” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2005, p9) and 
“today's multicultural society” (Department of Arts Sport and Tourism, 2008a, p. 30). 
172
 The Compendium of Cultural Policies in Europe states that between 2002 and 2007, Irish central 
government allocation to culture increased from €111,700,000, to €222,406,000. Available: 
http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/index.php [Accessed 25 September 2013]. 
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(particularly broadcast media) discourses on art or culture.
173
 Though recent years have 
seen an increase in references to culture in political manifestos,
174
 Irish national 
development and industrial plans have typically alternated between representations of 
culture as an explicit economic instrument (Government of Ireland, 2005) and as a 
romantic and exoticised entity (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009).  
 
However, the most explicit demonstration of how negatively the Irish cultural portfolio 
is viewed and how marginalised the ministry is, occurs in the shifting of ministerial 
nomenclature and negative media discourses of ministerial appointments. Like 
Scotland, frequent shifts in the responsibility and the name of ministries (Arts Versus 
Culture, Heritage, the Gaeltacht, the Islands, as well as Sport and Tourism), as well as 
the replacement of ministers, not only points to new government administrations and 
fears of elitism in relation to the terms used (culture v arts), but also registers a 
confusion and equivocation in relation to the role of the cultural portfolio within 
government.
175
 However, attitudes to being awarded the ministry go even further in 
making explicit the pessimistic perception of the cultural or arts ministry in Ireland, vis-
à-vis the career path of the politician. This is reflected in descriptions of the cultural 
portfolio as cast in “a negative light”, and those awarded it being handed a “poisoned 
chalice”, making it “the end of the political road” and the “last step before departure 
from Cabinet” (Bacik, 2008, n.p.).  
 
                                                           
173
 Despite intermittent meritocratic media coverage (Cullen, 2012; Fitzgerald, 2011), there is a general 
lack of critical broadcast and broadsheet discussion in Ireland. See also The Irish Times (2012e).  
174
 See for example Fine Gael/Labour Programme for Government (2011, n.p.), which lists Arts Culture 
and Sport under the heading of Progress. See also (Government of Ireland, 2010). 
175 
There have been seven ministers (including the current minister) for the Department since its 
foundation in 1993, and four who have spent less than a year in office between 2007 and 2011 (Seamus 
Brennan, Martin Cullen, Mary Hanafin and, most recently, Jimmy Deenihan). 
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In recent years, one minister’s negative reaction to her appointment was so extreme as 
to be likened to her having caught a “nasty disease” (O’Toole, 2010, n.p.) and widely 
interpreted (by both politicians and the public) as “a demotion” (Falvey, 2010, n.p.; 
O’Toole, 2010, n.p.; Stokes, 2010, n.p.). This response is also borne out by the career 
trajectories of six arts and culture ministers following their departure.  Of this group, 
none was awarded another ministry and three resigned from politics.
176
 In addition, the 
brief of Minister for (formerly) Social and Family affairs, which preceded three of the 
last six culture ministers, though financially significant, is also perceived as politically 
negligible and has been linked to the end of a politician’s career (Bacik, 2008).177 
Though it is hard to comparatively measure public statements concerning reactions to 
appointments within the culture ministry, the publicness of these claims is significant. 
This explicit disrespect for the office of the culture/arts ministry, therefore, when 
coupled with the dearth of cultural policies, the relative neglect of and lack of research 
into cultural policy, the omission of cultural policy in government plans, and poor 
cultural media coverage, point to a resistance in relation to culture and cultural policies 
in Ireland, or worse, an apathy. Whether this apathy is determined by, or reflected from 
the public, or from apathy at more senior and central government level, is difficult to 
know (Quinn, 1998, p. 25; Gray and Wingfield, 2010).  
 
                                                           
176 
The three ministers who resigned were Sile de Valera, Martin Cullen and John O Donoghue. Founding 
Minister Michael D Higgins (1993 – 1997), on retiring from the ministry following the coalition party 
loss in the general election of 1997(Labour, Fine Gael and Progressive Democrats), is the only ex 
arts/culture minister to have remained in politics. He became the Labour Party spokesperson on Arts, 
Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands, was re-elected to Dail Eireann in 2007 and 2011 and made President 
of the country in 2011. Sile de Valera, who occupied the ministry from 1997 – 2002, lost her seat in the 
general elections of 2002, became a Junior Minister and retired from politics in 2005. John O Donoghue 
(2002 – 2008) was appointed Ceann Comhairle or chairperson of the government, following the elections 
of 2008, and resigned in 2009. Seamus Brennan died shortly after leaving office. Martin Cullen (2008- 
2010) resigned from his ministerial office and as a TD in 2010. Mary Hanafin (2010 – 2011) withdrew 
from public life following losing her seat in the election of 2011.  
177
 Martin Cullen, Seamus Brennan and Mary Hanafin were all Ministers for Social and Family Affairs 
prior to their arts/cultural appointment. See Bacik (2008) for a discussion of Minister Seamus Brennan’s 
disappointment at being awarded the Ministry of Social and Family Affairs.  
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Nevertheless, as suggested above, this situation is clearly incongruous with government 
statements of how central culture is to Ireland and specifically: how “our strong cultural 
identity” holds “a distinct and intrinsic value”… “known the world over”;178 assertions 
of “Ireland's reputation as a cradle for the arts” (O’ Donoghue, 2005, n.p.); claims that 
culture and creativity are at the “core of our status, our well-being as a society and our 
success as a nation” (Brennan, 2008, n.p.); assertions that Ireland is a country where 
“creativity is seen as a crucial bedrock” (Cullen/Minister for Arts, Sport and Tourism, 
2009, n.p.) and media reports of the “importance attached by the State, and through 
them the people, to the arts” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.).  
 
 These discourses, therefore, when looked at alongside the pejorative statements on the 
culture ministry, show a disconnect between discourse and practice, implying a cynical 
reasoning on the part of the Irish Government in relation to its use of the arts/culture 
portfolio, whereby it claims culture is of central importance to the country on the one 
hand, and as only of importance in terms of delivering other ministerial agendas, and 
worthy of public disrespect, on the other. As such, despite Ireland’s international 
reputation for culture, its local authority and industrial discourses of culture and 
creativity, and its cultural policy assertions of Irish culture as world-leading and of 
central importance to the state and its success, cultural/arts policy in Ireland lacks 
particular traction and interest at government level.  
 
5.5.7 Ireland conclusions 
This section has shown that the dominant discourses in Ireland’s cultural policies are 
cultural branding and reputation-building, rather than any significant creative city 
                                                           
178
 Available: http://www.globalirishforum.ie/PressRel.aspx?yr=2012 [Accessed 31 July 2012]. 
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narrative, despite its popularity in municipal and industrial sectors and its potential fit 
with Ireland’s economic policies. Though there is acknowledgement of culture’s 
usefulness, Ireland’s conservatism and policy cautiousness, its lack of engagement with 
international cultural influences, and the particularly weak position of its culture 
department (as well as potentially its lack of commissioned research) may have 
accidentally resulted in relatively unattached cultural policies. Whether this lack of 
attachment has unintentionally benefited Ireland’s cultural policies or signals an 
uninterested and fairly un-dynamic ministry, is a moot point. 
 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
There are a number of conclusions to be drawn from the cases of Scotland, Finland and 
Ireland and their implications for wider cultural policy trends. Scotland’s attachment to 
the creative economy, together with its positioning of culture as a differentiator, an 
economic driver and Scotland’s own brand of competitive nationalism, within the 
context of a market and state macro discourse, is explicitly evident in its cultural policy 
documents. This presence of a competitive nationalist discourse in Scotland’s cultural 
policies exemplifies its broader nationalist agenda, the globalised competition for 
workers and investment, its ongoing demographic decline and the explicit role of 
Scottish cultural policies in making common cause with wider government objectives. 
Equally, the triumphalism evident in these discourses acts as defensive counter-
discourse in relation to the decline of Scotland as a centre of learning (Enlightenment) 
and industry, and desire to reclaim its former international reputation. The lack of 
confidence suggested by these discourses is indicated by Scotland’s legitimising 
leveraging of the past (tradition) and the future (modernity/progress) and its emphasis 
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on cosmopolitanism. Scotland therefore exhibits creative city discourse most explicitly 
in its place-development discourses (particularly strong in Creative Scotland), the 
promotion of culture as an identifier and culture as an attraction for new city workers 
and investment. 
 
The range and typology of cultural policy documents in Finland demonstrates a dualism 
that comprises both intrinsic and extrinsic narratives of cultural value, which leverage 
market and communicative discourses and Finland’s competitive society model of 
policy, with its social democratic legacy and high culture tradition. As part of these 
juxtapositions, discourses in Finland are also characterised by an acute awareness, 
though simultaneous embodiment, of, the deficits of instrumental discourses. This has 
resulted in five broad rationales in Finland: economic, image-management and 
international profile, social cohesion, citizenship (through civilisation and education), 
cultural rights and autonomous cultural value. These concerns place the Finnish cultural 
policy firmly within an industrial and competitive neoliberal framework, promoting 
public/private partnerships and managerialist concepts of professionalism within 
cultural practices. This chapter has also suggested that the sheer volume of reports and 
policy documents in Finland, is in part due to the central role of culture as a national 
brand and in promoting the idea of Finnishness against powerful neighbouring countries 
and is attributable to Finland’s relative geographical isolation in Europe. Finland 
exhibits creative city tropes most explicitly in relation to discourses of attraction, 
creative workers, investment and tolerance. 
 
Ireland’s cultural policies also operate through market and state discourses. These 
discourses are consistent with balancing industrial policy with identity politics (with 
 284 
little evidence of communicative ones), culture as a reputation-rescuer and economic 
driver, and aspects of creativity discourses (seen more in its industrial and science 
policies), but little discernable creative city or creative economy narratives. It was also 
demonstrated that in Ireland, science discourses maximise cultural associations with 
creativity, in the same way that in other countries, cultural contexts usually leverage 
industrial or scientific creativity. This factor suggests that Ireland’s explicit economic 
and industrial policies (such as the Smart Economy and Innovation Ireland reports) find 
more persuasive value in discourses of creativity, than cultural policy.
179
 Discourses of 
culture, attraction, and foreign investment, therefore, were found to be central to 
Ireland’s cultural policies. While this superficially aligns Irish cultural policies with 
creative city discourses, it is embedded in wider economic thematics and has a 
reputation and branding-focus primarily aimed at already-existing national investment 
agendas. This factor suggests a different origin for this discourse in Ireland. While Irish 
municipal contexts have welcomed the creative city and it has been claimed that “the 
creativity thesis has finally arrived on Irish shores” (Western Development 
Commission, 2011, p. 28), therefore, there is little to indicate any particular cultural 
policy interest in the creative city paradigm in Ireland. 
 
This chapter, therefore, has illustrated how the cultural policies of Scotland, Finland and 
Ireland underline the remarkable flexibility and usefulness of the creative city paradigm 
in meeting local and national contexts through its apparent balancing or strategic 
containment of different political-economic (system) and socio-cultural (lifeworld) 
legitimacies or mandates, despite those policies’ awareness of problems with the model. 
However, the weakness of the discourse in Ireland suggests that creative city discursive 
                                                           
179
 See Arts Council of Ireland (2010b). 
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transfer in Europe is not necessarily habitual.  In general, these cases have 
demonstrated: the wide range of uses for culture in government and use of cultural 
policies to address other (non-cultural) government portfolios; the pragmatic (and thus 
involuntary) need, rather than desire, for this alignment and consequent degree of 
cynical reasoning in case-making (evidenced by criticisms and endorsements of 
Florida); the lack of culture-focused cultural policies; and the need for cultural policies 
to appeal to multiple legitimacies within and without government. Having considered 
the individual and located cases of Scotland, Finland and Ireland, it is now necessary to 
consider the three sets of cultural policies together, their points of similarity and 
difference, discursive particularities, the rationales and imperatives behind the use of 
creative city discourses, and most particularly, the genealogy, trajectory and appeal of 
the discourse to cultural policy. 
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CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSING THE CULTURAL POLICY DISCOURSES OF 
SCOTLAND, FINLAND AND IRELAND: THE TRAJECTORY, GENEALOGY, 
FUNCTION AND APPEAL OF THE CREATIVE CITY  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The last chapter has detailed the three national cultural policies of Scotland, Finland and 
Ireland, outlining their individual policy contexts, general discourses, and localised 
creative city narratives. This chapter will take a more comparative and analytical look at 
the cases in order to consider how and why their cultural policies “came to take the form 
they ultimately did” given that they could always be otherwise (Hogan and Doyle, 2009, 
p. 3). The chapter will start by analysing the individual typologies, similarities and 
differences of the three cases and posit reasons for the trajectory, emigration (from 
industrial policy) and system of “dispersion” (Foucault, 1972, p. 41) of the paradigm in 
those countries, considering policy fit as well as genealogy. Following this, the chapter 
will consider why cultural policy is attracted to strategic paradigms like the creative city 
despite awareness of its shortcomings (and implications for trust amongst the 
stakeholders), the use and function of the paradigm within each individual country in 
terms of respective national agendas, and the role and usefulness of instrumentalism to 
cultural policymakers in general. The chapter will conclude by analysing the discursive 
particularities of the creative city in policy and its relationship to government need. This 
chapter, therefore, will demonstrate how the pressures on and dependencies of cultural 
policy, compel it to strategically deliver other (more powerful) policy agendas and that 
the reliance on discourses such as the creative city and instrumentalism more generally, 
is part of this defensive response.  
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6.2 Comparing the cases of Scotland, Finland and Ireland  
Before considering the policy trajectory of the creative city vis-à-vis cultural policy, 
there is a need to review and compare the level of attachment to the paradigm in the 
three cases. There are a number of convergences in respect of how culture is positioned 
(via the creative city paradigm) in Scotland and Finland and to a much lesser extent 
Ireland, whose cultural policy discourses are generally fewer and less diverse (as 
indicated in section 5.5.6.2). However, the attachment to the creative city in the three 
countries’ cultural policies can be summarised as follows:1 culture and creative workers 
drive economies and competition (Ireland, and in particular, Scotland and Finland); 
culture drives place-development (Scotland); culture attracts people (Scotland in 
particular but also Finland) and talent/human capital (Scotland, but Finland in 
particular); culture retains people (Finland); culture attracts business/investment 
(Ireland and Finland); and, finally, tolerance and diversity lead to innovation (Finland 
and Scotland).
2
  
 
Surprisingly perhaps, particularly given the key role of the knowledge economy, 
information society and IP agendas in all three countries, the importance of technology 
(as the third T of the 3 Ts acronym) is not dominant in any of the cases. In terms of 
secondary criteria, the creative industries appear as a central policy model in both 
Finland and Scotland (but not Ireland). Similarly, creativity (and innovation) discourse 
more generally is strongly present in Scotland and Finland, with the former straddling 
the semiotic/network (collective) and industrial model of creativity with the rhetorical 
                                                           
1 See Appendix for a table containing a summary of both creative city and broader discourses used in the 
three cultural policies. 
 
2 Though Scotland emphasises cultural diversity rather than tolerance, indicating various cultural 
expressions, it can be argued that this term indirectly suggests tolerance. 
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(artistic) or located (within Scotland) model of creativity. Despite reports to the contrary 
(European Parliament, 2006, p. 8), creativity discourse is not as dominant in Ireland. 
 
A key discursive feature in the three countries, but Scotland and Ireland in particular, is 
the explicit, though at times equivocal, acknowledgement of culture’s role (and primary 
role in relation to Scotland) as a deliverer of other government agendas. Typical 
statements from these cases express the need for cultural policy to: “influence” 
(Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008a, p. 6), “advance common objectives” 
(Arts Council of Ireland, 2011, p. 11); add “maximum value” (Department of Arts, 
Sport and Tourism, 2008b, p. 24) and make “common cause”3 with other government 
priorities and ministries (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 2). Though the range of uses 
for culture in Finland (branding, diplomatic, economic, and political) support policy 
aims for culture to be “successfully exploited” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 
16), discourses underlining the role of cultural policy in wider Finnish government 
objectives, do not materialise in the same way as in Scotland and Ireland. These 
statements, backed up by the various roles given to cultural policy in the three countries, 
support the view that cultural ministries depend on support from more powerful 
government ministries (e.g. Finance/Exchequer ministries) and colleagues, as suggested 
in media and policy discourses (Mundy, 2009; Higgins, 2013a, n.p.), and illustrated in 
Scotland’s disavowal of cultural policy having its own “policy objective” (McConnell, 
2003, n.p.). 
 
                                                           
3
 Making a “common cause” with government is also listed as a necessity for cultural policy in a recent 
cultural policy handbook offering arguments for culture in recessionary times (Mundy, 2009, n.p.). This 
booklet states that its arguments “help Ministers of Culture make common cause with those responsible 
for employment generation, social cohesion, security and education” and that “every country will have its 
own examples and statistics to back up the arguments” and can “develop new proposals based on them for 
restructuring and regeneration” (Mundy, 2009, n.p.). 
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Scotland and Finland share a narrative of internationalism and an outward-looking 
cosmopolitanism (a key Enlightenment narrative particularly present in Scotland), 
respectively using culture to: “raise the profile of Scotland at home and abroad” and 4 
project the image of a “vibrant, cosmopolitan, competitive country” (Scottish Executive, 
2004a, p. 1) and “build an image” of Finland (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 
49), “manage its brand” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 14) and use culture to 
“ arouse interest in Finland and Finnishness” (ibid.). Ireland’s discourse of culture as a 
way to repair the country’s reputation or escape the “economic morass” (Fanning, 2011, 
n.p.) echoes this discourse, but is more specific in its mission to recover Ireland’s 
“national standing in major markets” (Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 
2011b, n.p.) and “re-building Ireland’s international reputation” (Arts Council of 
Ireland, 2009, p. i) in order to “repair the damage” done to it.5 This focus on the 
branding of Ireland can be interpreted as a response to “geopolitical” shifts in Ireland’s 
hitherto “favourable image” (Fanning and Henry, 2012, n.p.) and is a serious dent in the 
country’s enduring belief (like Scotland) that it “punch[es] above [its] our weight on the 
global stage” (ibid.). 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, for historical reasons, Scotland and Ireland share a number of 
discourses of identity politics, most notably triumphalist expressions of how each 
country is culturally unique, successful and pioneering, or, respectively, “one of the 
world’s most creative nations” (Scottish Government, 2009c, section 4; Creative 
Scotland, 2011, p. 20) and a “world leader” (Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 
2011b, n.p.). This hyperbole reflects an “idealised” or essentialist tradition (Humes, 
                                                           
4
 Available: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/ArtsCultureSport/arts [Accessed 5 July 2013 and 
throughout the research period]. 
5Available: http://theatreforumconference2011.wordpress.com/ [Accessed 25 June 2011]. 
 
 290 
2011, n.p.) and can be conceived as a defensive “response to the destructive effects of 
colonialism” (Mulcahy, 2008, p. 22).  Equally, this representation of Scotland comprises 
a competitive nationalism and a drive to be seen as an entrepreneurial nation, reflecting 
fears and perceptions that it is, in fact, not entrepreneurial enough (Smith, 2013, p. 4). 
Given Ireland’s history, the lack of an explicit nationalist discourse in its cultural 
policies, other than in this entrepreneurial way, is notable, but speaks to general 
difficulties and slipperiness posed by expressions of nationalism in Ireland as a result of 
the extensive “political turmoil” there since the 1960s (O’Brien, 2007, p. 6), as well as a 
lack of policy more generally.  
 
Finland is equally interesting in this context. While there are indications of nationalism 
in the proposition for a cultural canon, when compared with Scotland and Ireland, there 
is little explicit championing of the difference or uniqueness of the country (and its 
culture), despite its own struggles with Sweden and Russia. However, Finland’s policies 
strongly emphasise the specific qualities (as perceived in Finland) of Finland, centring 
on its political and social histories, its education system and its particular ethos of 
civilisation, with the acknowledgement of culture’s role in projecting Finland and 
Finnishness. As a result, this qualitative discourse is no less promotional than the 
competitive nationalism of Scotland and Ireland, and may be linked to the spirit of 
Finland’s common culture in the context of its positioning between Sweden and Russia 
and the implicit message that it is a wholly separate country and culture. 
 
In conclusion, the combination of primary and secondary creative city discourses in 
both Scotland and Finland make it hard to determine conclusively whether it is more 
dominant in one country than another. Finland’s cultural policies, though they touch on 
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a wider range of individual creative city thematics than Scotland (explicit creative class 
and city references, attraction, human capital/talent, diversity and tolerance), do not 
have the same narrative of place-development or the volume of discourse of attracting 
workers as in Scottish cultural policies. 
 
These cases also demonstrate that despite claims of artists’ complicit participation in 
regeneration (Zukin, 1998; Malanga, 2004, n.p.), key dissenters to development 
processes and narratives are often, though by no means exclusively, artists and cultural 
workers.
6
 This is illustrated by the Finnish artists group Checkpoint Helsinki (see 5.4.2) 
as well as the Scottish artists’/cultural publication Variant,7 a central point of dissent in 
relation to urban entrepreneurialism in Scotland. These initiatives reveal not only 
ideological differences in relation to discourses of power, but the unwillingness of some 
artists to be co-opted into development processes which operate in their name, are 
antithetical to their values and do not contribute to their sustainability. As such, these 
groups also show that despite the potential for artists to gain from processes such as 
culture-led regeneration (through commissioning or studios), a critical issue where the 
ability to earn a living is so precarious, artists can have a heightened interest in social 
inequalities and in particular, the inequity of private development. 
 
In general therefore, it can be said that creative city discourses have had a significant 
impact on both Scotland and Finland, though with different emphases. Finland has a 
                                                           
6
 This was demonstrated in Hamburg’s Not In Our Name group - see Chapter One (1.2.2) footnote # 23. 
7
 Variant is a “free arts and culture magazine” based in Scotland, providing “in-depth coverage in the 
context of broader social, political & cultural issues.” It has been a key source of critical debate in relation 
to many of the issues presented by this research, but in particular the role of Creative Scotland. Variant 
has recently had to suspend the publication “for the first time since 1996” as a result of their unsuccessful 
funding application to Creative Scotland. Available: http://www.variant.org.uk/ [Accessed 14 December 
2012]. 
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wider range of discourses in its cultural policies (cultural rights, civilisation discourses, 
multiculturalism) than the other cases, as well as a greater variety of individual 
creativity discourses (explicit creative class and city references, creative welfare society, 
human capital, talent and tolerance). Equally, while an emphasis on the economic 
impact of culture and the discourse of investment and return is not new, these policies 
are notable for the explicitness, frequency and dominance of discourses of culture as an 
economic driver and attractor of investment (albeit with other secondary discourses), 
and more so, the lack of deviance between how creative city and other discourses occur 
in each country. Equally, the discourse of cultural policy as an adjunct policy or 
deliverer of other policy objectives is notable (Scotland and Ireland). Finally, the precise 
creative city terminologies and the collocation of particular concepts and words within 
the English versions of Finnish policies, show the importance and knowledge of the 
source texts (i.e. the creative city literature) to the translators and suggest a deliberate 
replication of the discourse. Having established that there has been a transfer between 
industrial discourses represented by the creative city, to putatively cultural discourses 
represented by cultural policy, it is necessary to consider the discursive modes deployed 
within the texts.  
 
6.3 The role of discourse: dualism, nominalisation and cynical reason 
Earlier it was suggested that a key function of discourse is to contain and thus disavow 
or nominalise potentially conflicting values (Shapiro, 1990, p.332 Fairclough, 2003, p. 
12). Equally, Habermas proposes that given the close relationship between the state and 
the economy, the management or reconciling of conflicting values or viewpoints in 
policy is of central importance to the state (Habermas, 1973, p. 13). These concerns are 
exemplified and addressed in the dualisms present in the cases, facilitating the 
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straddling of different positions whose singular exposure might potentially undermine 
the state and thus an extremely useful practice.  
 
This dualism has been particularly demonstrated in Scotland and Finland as follows: 
collective and individual (or located) models of creativity (Scotland and Finland); 
autonomous (where culture must be independent from market consideration) and 
instrumental (where culture should serve market values) discourses (Finland); economic 
development/trade and social welfare, capital, well-being, citizenship and democracy 
discourses (Finland); narratives invoking tradition/the past and innovation/the future 
(Scotland); assertions and disavowals of the arms’ length principle (Scotland); 
positioning  a country as attractive and competing to become more so (Scotland); and 
internationalism/cosmopolitanism and insular models of traditional cultures, as well as 
competitive nationalism (Scotland and Finland).  
 
These dualisms, therefore, reflect what has been described as “overt/covert” discourses 
(Shapiro, 1990, p. 333), designed in policy terms to “overcome what appear to many as 
disjunctures between professed and implemented policy” (ibid., p.332), or the gap 
between theory and practice. The implicit presentation of processes such as capitalism, 
the market, corporate investment, flexible accumulation, mobility (Nordic Innovation 
Centre, 2007, p. 11), globalisation and the pursuit of individual interests within creative 
city discourses and by extension cultural policy discourses, covertly supports both latent 
and blatant government policies in other policy areas, while being presented passively 
as self-evident truths devoid of government or human agency. This reflects a 
“nominalisation” (Fairclough, 2003, p.13), where concepts are staged as neutral 
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“regime[s]” of truth or thought (Foucault, 1980, p. 81), and become universalised 
“monuments” (ibid., 1972, p. 8). 
 
 As discussed earlier, though Ireland has been noticeably absent from much of these 
discourse comparisons (resulting from the dearth of policy and limited discourses to 
analyse), it shares one significant feature with Scotland and Finland. In all three cases, 
industrialism and capitalism are upheld by being presented as eternal and desirable to 
societies and therefore the electorate (and in the process legitimising), a key feature of 
liberalism (Held, 2006, p. 76) and neoliberalism. As a result, the usefulness or problem 
(depending on whether you agree with the state’s actions and ideologies or not) with 
these discourses, is not necessarily their irreconcilability or the dominance of one 
agenda over another, but their disavowal of the point of conflict in the first place (i.e. 
market versus communicative or lifeworld imperatives). 
 
These cases, therefore, show how cultural policy is used to reinforce key values of the 
state, which are self-evidently to support the market, capitalism and private sector 
investment, to speed up the rate of industrial change (movement of workers, 
development of industry, etc.), and to present these positions as public goods. This 
strengthens the view that culture should be “pressed into service” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.) 
to meet the states’ economic needs and that cultural policy exists to make “common 
cause” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 2) with those needs. The cases have 
demonstrated that these causes are: international profile and competition (all three 
cases); re-population (Scotland); recruitment of high value and mobile workers 
(Scotland and Finland); deindustrialisation (Finland); and reputation/branding (Ireland). 
These causes ultimately expose the “fundamental priorities” of cultural policymakers 
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(Vickery, 2011, p. 9) and reveal the lack of any one coordinating, dominant use, value 
system, or objective that is primarily cultural.
8
 The implications of this will be further 
developed in Chapter Seven. 
 
Another factor should be mentioned here. Using Sloterdijk’s concept of cynical reason 
(Sloterdijk, 1987), earlier it was argued that many of those policymakers using 
instrumental arguments for culture such as the creative city are aware of what they are 
doing (in making those arguments), and do not necessarily subscribe to the arguments 
being made, but are involved in a case-making “performance” (Paquette, 2008, p. 298).  
The criticisms of instrumentalism (Finland) and of the creative city (Scotland and 
Finland) in the cases, reflect this performance and show how aware the countries are of 
the problems and pitfalls of the paradigm, but how driven they are by the need to secure 
legitimacy and longevity. Florida also participates in this conceptual slippage, in terms 
of his awareness of problems with urban paradigms, ironically criticising “simplistic 
schemes that try to bolster a city’s ability to compete for talent by building latte bars” 
(Florida, 2007, p. 54) and underlining that “inequality is considerably worse in leading 
creative regions” (ibid., 2005, p. 171). 
 
This performance or slippage is designed to preserve the status quo, and allows 
policymakers and ultimately politicians to avoid making difficult choices (by choosing 
one policy above another) and thereby sustain the ministry and the livelihoods of those 
working there. This situation reflects the tendency for expediency, cynical reason and 
false consciousness to arise in the cultural sector in particular, driven by the pressures, 
weakness, dependencies and consequent structural instrumentalism of that sector, as 
                                                           
8
 See also, Jenkins (2011). 
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introduced in Chapter Four (4.4.13).These critical discourses ultimately represent a 
common mode of state representation in policy, whereby the policy “pre-empt[s] or 
respond[s] to modes of representation that are hostile or incompatible with the 
constructions it[they] desire[s]” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 334), despite actively engaging in 
those hostile practices. This dual disavowal/endorsement has serious implications for 
the delicate relationship between civil servants and politicians and will be further 
explored in Chapter Seven. 
 
This suggestion of cynical reason also reflects the difficulties of finding publicly or 
politically acceptable language, justifications or legitimations for cultural policies, that 
do not reference social, economic or tourism benefit, within a rationalised policy 
context and in the absence of consensus on what these policies are designed for and how 
they are valued. The positive/negative media discourses around culture also demonstrate 
the problem of finding acceptable terms to discuss investment in culture, whereby 
typically it is only the functional or social/economic stories about culture that are 
positively framed (Daily Record, 2008, n.p.; McMillan, 2011, n.p.), while other stories 
are framed in terms of wastes of money (BBC Newsnight, 2011, n.p; Reynolds, 2012, 
n.p.).  
 
This problem of articulation is shared by cultural practitioners and policymakers, 
underlined by the call for culture to be described in its “own terms” (Tusa, 2011, n.p.) as 
cited earlier.  Politicians have also noted that they “have enough reasons to support 
culture on its own merits to stop apologising for it by speaking only of it in terms of 
other agendas” (Tessa Jowell, cited in Gray, 2007, p. 206). In a similar vein, it has been 
claimed that “it is almost impossible to defend art honestly” (Jones, 2012, n.p.), and that 
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there is a “lack of concern with truth”, or to put it more bluntly, an excess of “bullshit” 
in cultural policy (Belfiore, 2008, p. 1), again pointing to Sloterdijk’s “enlightened false 
consciousness” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 6).  
 
As examples of cynical reason and in light of the need to get support from other 
government colleagues (Mundy, 2009, n.p.; Higgins, 2013a, n.p), these comments 
ultimately affirm the continuing external (public legitimacy) and internal pressures on 
cultural policy (government legitimacy). However, though the dualism and cynical 
reason involved in policymaking are somewhat involuntary, pragmatic and symptomatic 
of a compromised policy sector, they serve an important purpose in cultural policy, 
which is to create the conditions for its own survival.  As such, before a consideration of 
why instrumental discourses such as the creative city are also useful and persist in 
cultural polices, in reference to survival, it is necessary to evaluate how the creative city 
has arrived or been assimilated within cultural policy in the first place. 
 
6.4 The trajectory of creative city discourses 
In using discourse formation theory to consider the emigration (Foucault, 1972, p. 154) 
of the creative city paradigm to the discourse of cultural policy, a number of factors 
must be assumed.  These factors are: that the creative city (discourse) is an active force 
that shapes as well as reflects the world and depends for its currency on an ecology of 
related discourses (Foucault, 1972, p. 25); that the creative city (discourse) is an 
instrument and an effect of power which comes to stand for understandings of the truth 
(ibid., p. 8); that the creative city (discourse) comes into existence as a result of 
historical struggles with other competing discourses over which it has triumphed (ibid., 
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p. 36); and that creative city discourses carry particular knowledges that have been 
historically validated through the discourse (ibid., p. 35).  
 
6.4.1 Knowledge 
Firstly, within this broad framework, the key symbolism of the creative city within 
cultural policy is its constitution as a shaping instrument of power, and in particular, a 
dominant and influential knowledge or truth. This use of knowledge by the creative city 
overcomes other discourses by positing an irresistible proposition that equates economic 
development with the public and common good, in claims that culture makes a city a 
“better place” and creates a “more prosperous future” (Florida, 2002, p. xxx). The 
creative city also creates knowledge by developing new associations between creativity, 
culture, neoliberalism, globalisation, capitalism, competition and investment. This 
simple but persuasive message ultimately derives from the “genealogy” (Foucault, 
1980, p. 78) of urban development discourses (primarily urban and industrial 
development, but also cultural policy), and, as Chapter Five has demonstrated, is 
reflected and threaded through cultural policies on the one hand, and media reports on 
the other. 
 
The creative city’s key source of sustaining authority and “enunciative” power 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 55), however, lies in its knowledge and advocacy communities, 
comprising: think tanks, academics, policy networks, politicians, civil servants, 
analysts, and other interest and technocratic groups. In particular, the paradigm relies on 
the “expert language” (Tonkiss, 2004, p. 375) of the “thinktankerati” (e.g., Comedia, 
DEMOS, the Creative Class) who drive and influence policy discourses by making 
various “claims to knowledge” (Schlesinger, 2009b, p. 3). This focus on knowledge-
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production through discourses like the creative city, gives cultural policy a discrete 
“cognitive authority” which politicians find difficult to ignore (Vestheim, 2007, p. 228) 
and strengthens a policy sector often criticised for its weak methodologies and data 
systems (Selwood, 2002, n.p.).  
 
6.4.2 Simple paradigms 
Secondly, the creation of “policy-friendly” (Vickery, 2011, p. 2) “cognitive 
paradigm[s]” (Jones, 2009, p. 6) depends on simple discourses and stories (like the 
creative city) that allow for knowledge to be manipulated in any number of ways by 
policymakers (Jones, 2009; Vickery, 2011). As such, concrete (clear and easy to grasp 
as demonstrated in the 3 Ts) ideas and narrativity (which define a problem) tend to 
dominate policy model choices (ibid.). The need for a narrative to set out “explicit and 
implicit ideas about what is ‘wrong’ and how to put it ‘right’” (Jones, 2009, p. 15) is of 
particular interest. This is explicitly suggested in the creative city’s focus on the 
wrongness of older industrial models of development geared to production and manual 
labour, and the rightness of attracting mobile knowledge workers as a prelude to 
corporate investment. However, the emotional appeal of a dynamic, meritocratic model 
of urban and civic development, that showcases culture and creativity in society, 
cultivating the public sphere (at least in Landry’s case), and promoting tolerance and 
multiculturalism (demonstrated in Finland), is also alluring. In short, easy-to-follow 
narratives like the creative city are central to “policy influence” (Jones, 2009, p. 24). 
 
6.4.3 Flexibility, ideas market place and policy stickiness 
Thirdly, the paucity of ideas available in the policy “market place” (Parsons, 1995, p. 
172), as demonstrated in Ireland, also gives the creative city appeal. In addition to 
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simplicity, policy is susceptible to flexible and “malleable” concepts that can apply to a 
range of situations (Jones, 2009, p. 25), amply illustrated by the elasticity of the 
paradigm in its applications in Scotland and Finland. This underlines the use of the 
creative city as a blue-print or off-the-shelf policy template that fills a broader policy 
vacuum. These templates are self-sustaining, and, once embedded, create a “stickiness” 
(ibid., p. 24) that lead to “armoured policies” (Hogan and Doyle, 2009, p. 164) 
incapable of change. Since the struggle for power resides in the primary act of setting 
the agenda or the “discourse in which a problem is framed” (Parsons, 1995, p. 152), the 
stickiness of the blueprint is crucial to the success or sustainability of the 
discourse/policy. Time and familiarity are also key policy “virtue[s]” (Burstein, 1991, p. 
339) and offer another reason why the creative city, which has been around since the 
1980s, is a key policy influence. 
 
6.4.4 Bounded rationality  
Fourthly, the importance of the simplicity and familiarity of ideas also reflects bounded 
rationality theories of policy. These theories concern the attraction and adherence of 
policies that have “immediacy and impact” and use rule of thumb heuristics 
(3Ts=success), rather than nuanced or time-consuming ideas (Dye, 2008, p. 25). These 
policies are deemed to offer solutions that are “good enough” within the realms of goal-
directed rational behaviour and avoid inter-relationships between complex factors (H. 
Simon cited in Parsons, 1995, p. 278). While the importance of ready policy 
frameworks may have influenced the use of the creative city within Scotland’s post-
devolution situation, the creative city also fits its other policy needs. These needs 
include: the “interests of the dominant political” powers (Parson, 1995, p. 173); 
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“thought world[s]” that favour “certainty over accuracy” (Stevens, 2011b, p. 252); and 
again, a fit with the “story that was[is] already being told” (ibid., 2011a, n.p.). 
 
6.4.5 Other factors: language, shared consultants, the role of Richard Florida and 
the EU 
Fifthly, other factors have also impacted on the dispersion of the creative city within 
cultural policy. These factors comprise: the high number of creative city consultancies 
promoting the paradigm  (and as above, the dependence of policy on think tanks);
9
 the 
sharing of policy advisors and champions (and thus policy thinking) between Finland and 
Scotland,
10
 Scotland and Ireland,
11
 and Ireland and Scotland (allowing particular ideas to 
circulate);
12
 the dissemination of the model via the Anglophonic colonial network
13
  of the 
US (via early urban regeneration discourse and latterly Florida), Australia (via the 
Creative Nation strategy), and Canada; the dissemination powers of English as the lingua 
franca of the European Union;
14
and perhaps most significantly, the European Union 
itself.   
                                                           
9
 As before, there are a number of consultancies running creative city projects which suggest the 
likelihood of ideas being shared, including: think tanks such as Demos, Comedia, the Creative Class and 
consultancies such as Noema Research and Planning (http://www.noema.org.uk), Doors of perception 
(http://www.doorsofperception.com/working-with-john-thackara/), and Creative Cities 
(creativecities.org/) [Accessed 20 June 2010]. 
10 
Tom Fleming is the author of A Creative Economy Green Paper for the Nordic Region (Nordic 
Innovation Centre, 2007). He is also the creative economy advisor for Scotland (Knell and Fleming, 
2008). 
11
John Knell and Anne Bonnar have not only worked for the Scottish Government, but wrote about and 
appeared at the On with the Show Irish Theatre Forum Conference in Galway, Ireland in 2011. Available: 
http://theatreforumconference2011.wordpress.com/ [Accessed 25 June 2011]. 
12 
Francois Matarasso worked in both Scotland and Ireland in the late 1990s and early 2000s, advising 
Scotland’s nascent independent cultural policy and working as a consultant with the Arts Council of 
Ireland. 
13
Although the creative city movement is influential in regions such as Asia and there are non-English 
languages associated with the paradigm (German geographer Klaus Kunzmann, Italian Franco Bianchini), 
Florida and Landry have become better known within creative city discourses and write exclusively in 
English. See also Landry, Greene, Matarasso, and Bianchini (1996). 
14
 See The Internet World Stats on internet world users by language, which claim that English-language 
users dominate the web, representing 26.8 per cent of all users. Given the origination of the creative city 
within an English-language context (as well as its distribution through the colonial network of the UK, 
US, Canada and Australia) and the prominence of the web in the distribution of ideas, they may be a link 
between the spread of the creative city idea and the number of English speakers using the internet. 
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From a financial perspective, the role of the European Union (and Lisbon agenda as 
indicated earlier) has been paramount in impacting on discourses of national cultural 
policies (Power, 2009), and specifically regional development (Dowler, 2004). As a 
supported competence (where the EU can supplement or coordinate member state’s 
actions), rather than an exclusive or shared competence (where the EU has the legal 
right to make laws in an area exclusively or with the member state), EU cultural policies 
have constituted (and still constitute) a hugely significant source of funding for 
European cultural projects, and have been central in driving culture, creativity, 
innovation (see 4.3.4), competition and regional development discourses.
15
 Regional 
development has been particularly important, and forms a direct link with the creative 
city, the creative industries, cultural tourism, innovation, entrepreneurship, the 
information society and human capital.
16
  
 
Of these discourses, the European Structural Funds
17
 has dominated and impacted all 
three cases.
18
 These funds operated from the 1980s onwards through the wider 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Available: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats7.htm  [Accessed 10 August 2011]. See also O’Brien 
(2007). 
15
 A press release on the EU Work Plan for Culture 2011 – 2014 states the Cultural and Creative 
Industries as a priority and acknowledges culture “as a catalyst for creativity in the framework of the 
Lisbon strategy for growth, employment, innovation and competitiveness, and the promotion of culture as 
a vital element in the Union's international relations”. The press release goes on to report that culture can 
“contribute to the achievement of the objectives of Europe 2020” (smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth) and underlines the “horizontal role of culture”. Available 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/educ/117795.pdf [Accessed 10 
October, 2012]. 
16
 See The European Commission on Culture website. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/eu-
funding/culture-and-the-structural-funds_en.htm [Accessed 1 March 2013]. 
17
 The EU Structural Funds, which comprise the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the 
European Social Fund, came into being in 1986, with the Single European Act, representing an 
“integrated cohesion policy”. The first tranche of funding was released in 1989. Available:  
http://eustructuralfunds.gov.ie/background/ [Accessed 7 March 2012].  
18
 All three cases have benefited or been impacted by the Structural Funds. Finland’s policies are linked 
to these funds (Power, 2009, p. 449) and Scotland and Ireland were both key recipients of Structural 
Funds. Scotland was a partial priority in the first (1989 – 1993) round of funding and a key priority in the 
second (1994 – 1999) and Ireland was a key priority in both rounds.  
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European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which aimed to promote “economic 
and social cohesion by correcting the main regional imbalances and participating in the 
development and conversion of regions”.19 The funds promoted urban regeneration, 
tourism (including culture-led urban regeneration) and creative industries agendas 
(Evans, 2009, p. 1029) as part of wider international discourses of culture in urban and 
regional development. The Structural Funds’ aimed to make “regions more attractive, 
innovative and competitive places to live and work” (European Commission, 2006b, 
n.p) and focussed on the “attractiveness of region[s] and encouraging inward 
investment”, with an emphasis on information technology (European Commission, 
2010d, p. 28). This discourse explicitly recalls the discourse of the creative city.  
 
Critically, these funds were central to the sustainability of the European cultural sector 
in the 1980s, chiefly because of their extraordinary budgets, which far outstripped the 
EU’s cultural budget (Evans and Foord, 1999, p. 53) and as a result of pressures driven 
by the recession of the time.  The thematic of culture’s contribution to tourism (as a 
place differentiator) provided not only the “largest single block of finance” to culture 
between 2000 – 2006, but was key to shaping the broader “thinking” that was 
developing in Europe about culture’s “potential contribution to the economy and 
society” (European Commission, 2010d, p.28). In light of the financial clout and 
significant influence of the Structural Funds, the joint growth of the EU’s regional 
development agenda with the creative city paradigm, and the distinct similarity between 
the creative city and Structural Funds’ discourses and concerns, there is clear 
relationship between the two imperatives. While this relationship may simply be a 
                                                           
19
The ERDF fund addresses sustainability, the regeneration of economic sites and industrial areas 
suffering from decline, depressed urban and rural areas, local development and employment, as well as 
initiatives in education and health.  Available: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/job_creation_measures/l60015_e
n.htm [Accessed 10 October 2012]. 
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correlation, it is possible to speculate that the Structural Funds drove the development 
and popularity of the creative city within cultural policy thinking. 
 
The creative city paradigm, therefore, can be viewed as a specific cognitive paradigm 
and regime of truth, which is a recent manifestation of previously successful discourses 
of place-development and regeneration from the 1970s (as detailed in Chapter Three). 
The successful transfer of the paradigm into Scotland and Finland’s cultural policies, 
has been facilitated by its narrative and emotional appeal, its flexibility, simple format, 
familiarity, use of heuristics, ideological feasibility, shared champions, Anglophonic 
dissemination, and overall usefulness to, and congruence with, EU funding applications. 
These factors underline the importance of “a priori” discourses (Foucault, 1981, p. 52) 
and emphasise the falseness of apparent “silent births” (ibid., 1972, p. 154) in discourse, 
whereby the interplay of relations and characteristics of the creative city ensured and 
prepared its acceptance within cultural policy before it ever arrived. While this 
describes how the creative city has materialised within cultural policies, it is now time 
to consider why the creative city has had specific appeal to cultural policymakers 
beyond its simplicity, memorisability and stickiness. 
 
6.5 Policy function and fit with local contexts 
While it has been suggested that creative city discourses occur as part of broader 
ideological, economic and historic place-development discourses (coalescing in both 
cultural and urban policies), discrete creative city concepts in Scotland and Finland in 
particular, point to a specific fit with and purpose in those countries. In addition to 
fulfilling the technical needs of policy as described above, this research has suggested 
the a priori fit of the creative city with the geo-political and economic contexts of the 
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cases, comprising: liberal democracies with neoliberal approaches to markets and 
globalisation; post-industrialism (knowledge/innovation/information/open/creative 
economies); a geographically peripheral status on the edge of Europe that necessitates 
strong international brands and outward-looking images;
20
 a nationalism borne out of a 
colonised mentality rather than history
21
 accompanied by discourses of uniqueness, 
difference, success and triumph; and the attention Florida and Landry has paid to the 
countries.
22
 However, there are other more specific reasons for Scotland’s and Finland’s 
interest in the creative city as touched on in Chapter Five. 
 
6.5.1 Scotland’s emigration, regeneration initiatives and cities 
Like Ireland, contemporary political discourses of the Scottish diaspora have become 
both a story of loss (in terms of widespread emigration) and success (Kidd, 2011, p. 5) 
and have been central to Scotland’s economic, social and cultural policies of recent 
years (as suggested in Scotland’s The Homecoming). This concern with the Scottish 
diaspora arises from Scotland’s historically “high levels” of 19th and 20thcentury 
outward migration, de-population and “post-industrial decline” (Kidd, 2011, p. 5), and 
its more recent “premier position in the European league table of shrinking populations” 
(Ancien et al., 2009, p. 27) partly attributed to its geographically remote living 
conditions. Scotland’s ensuing emphasis on cities (Scotland also has a Minister for 
                                                           
20
 In the 2010 Country Brand Index compiled by Future Brand, out of the top 25 Country Brands, Finland 
scored 8
th
, followed by the UK at 9
th
, and Ireland at 17
th
. The determination of branding is based on 
“perceptions of five key dimensions: Tourism, Heritage and Culture, Good for Business, Quality of Life 
and Value System”. Available: http://www.futurebrand.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/11/CBI_BBC_2010_execsummary.pdf [Accessed 10 October 2012].  
21
 Scotland and Finland have been assimilated rather than colonised, but arguably have quasi post-
colonial mentalities driven by their ongoing relationships with former rulers. 
22
 Landry’s case studies of Glasgow as a creative city and Florida’s particular interest in Finland (and 
Ireland), as well as the “pervasiveness“ of Florida’s model internationally (Lawton et al., 2010, p., 267, p. 
270), have undoubtedly had an impact on the dissemination and receptivity to the model at policy level. 
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Cities) 
23
 and the “migration of skilled workers to Scotland” has been a “corner stone” 
of the former Scottish Executive’s economic policy (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 13) 
and precisely underlines the appeal of discourses of talent, residents, tourists and 
investment into cities.  
 
As such, emigration and the diaspora have been the focus of a number of social and 
economic reports commissioned by the Scottish government that centre on the theme of 
attracting human capital and highly skilled workers (Boyle, 2006; Rogerson et al., 2006; 
Ancien et al., 2009). Though this research has demonstrated that one of these reports is 
critical of the Florida model (Rogerson et al., 2006, p. 34), others are more approving 
(Ancien et al., 2009, p. 27). As such, these reports acknowledge the broader “reach of 
Florida into European urban and regional policy communities” in general (Boyle, 2006, 
p. 412), the “procurement of skilled labour” (ibid.) and the “importance of the creative 
class to economic growth” (Ancien et al., 2009, p. 27).  
 
The fears of failing to attract creative workers to Scotland are also demonstrated in 
thinly veiled media criticisms of Ireland’s favourable tax laws, luring away (and thus a 
threat to) Scotland’s mobile “talented” digital and gaming industry workers (Brown, 
2009, n.p.).The need for highly skilled human capital workers in Scotland to both 
replace a lost population and to bolster their economy was brought into sharp focus in 
the 2004 initiative, Fresh Talent (Rogerson et al., 2006). This report critically (though 
equivocally) examined Scotland’s “anxieties over demographic trends” and the outward 
migration of “talent” (ibid. p. 11) and referred to the need for Scotland to “reposition 
themselves in the global circulation of talent”, while cautioning against the 
                                                           
23
 At present, Nicola Sturgeon is Deputy First Minister (Government Strategy and the Constitution) and 
Cabinet Secretary for Infrastructure, Investment and Cities. Available: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/People/14944/Scottish-Cabinet [Accessed 10 October 2012]. 
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“applicability of the so-called ‘creative class’ to Scottish economic policy” (ibid., p. 33), 
asking “whether creative people really are able to exert a significant impact on 
economic structures” (ibid., p 34).24  
 
Creative city discourses were also charged with presenting “stuffy, conservative, 
insular, parochial, bureaucratic and stifling ‘working class enclaves’, ‘boring post-
industrial service centres’” in Scotland ... as “liberal, bohemian, multicultural and 
culturally cosmopolitan hubs” (Rogerson et al., 2006, p. 33). The concern with 
Scotland’s international image, together with its aspiration to be seen as modern or 
contemporary (in line with its Enlightenment legacy), has been subject to “much debate 
in Scottish economic policy circles” and again, speaks to fears over whether Scotland 
has the ability to attract and keep its “skilled talent” (ibid.). As the case showed, this 
underlines Scotland’s concern with presenting its cities as “cosmopolitan as well as 
metropolitan” (Boyle, 2006, p.  412).25 
 
These factors also help to explain Scotland’s intense city marketing and imagination 
exercises as outlined in Chapter Four, and its subsequent cultural policy narratives. In 
summary, the cultural policies of Scotland address a number of its national issues: its 
concern with emigration (and depopulation) and need to focus on cities and urban 
regeneration; its aspirations to be seen as a cosmopolitan and modern country (but one 
which values its heritage); its need for skilled labour; its need to assert its national 
                                                           
24
 This premise was also investigated in Boyle’s creative class study of early 21st century Scottish 
emigration to Dublin. This report concluded that Dublin’s atmosphere (and reputation as a fun city) was 
an important factor in emigration but not as important as job opportunities. Dublin also contrasted with 
the limited opportunities and perceptions of Scotland as a more conservative work place. See Boyle 
(2006). 
25
 Boyle cites the One Scotland, Many Cultures campaign of 2005. This campaign was replaced by a post-
2007 (and more insular/nationalist One Scotland) campaign. Available: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2006/09/14141401/4 [Accessed 2 August 2011] and Dueland 
(2011). 
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identity; its UK creative economy policy; and the importance of projecting an 
entrepreneurial country. These factors make the creative city paradigm extremely useful 
to cultural policy and the Scottish government. While the imperatives behind creative 
city discourses in Scotland’s cultural policies may originate from both social 
(emigration/depopulation) and industrial concerns (decline of industry and cities), 
Finland’s use of the discourse rests with its industrial policies, though as before, this 
closely aligns with the social benefits of the economy.  
 
6.5.2 Finland’s knowledge economy, creative industries, skilled labour and 
commercialisation 
As Chapter Five has demonstrated, Finland has become one of the most successful and 
competitive knowledge economies of Northern Europe, with a focus on innovation and 
the information society that is highly congruent with the creative city, but also a strong 
tradition of social cohesion. As a result, the emphasis on innovation and information (as 
part of the knowledge economy), together with deindustrialisation and the cultural and 
creative industries in Finland, has developed into a strong discursive triangle (Power, 
2009, p. 450) that is essentially designed to bolster Brand Finland. In addition, it has 
been claimed that the potential loss of international business and transfer of operations 
to Asian countries with “cheaper manpower” (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2007, p. 
13), namely China, has driven Finland’s interest in “dynamic and [in particular] high-
value labour” (Power, 2009, p. 450) and thus discourses of human capital.  
 
High value workers, therefore, are consistent with Finland’s economic policies, and 
represent sectors that tend to locate and settle in particular countries, rather than 
migratory low value jobs (ibid.). Further, these jobs are perceived as reconciling 
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Finland’s “environmental, social, wage and welfare standards” (ibid.), again aligning 
and legitimising competition, the economy and social equity. Finland’s “tradition of 
local self-government” (ibid., p. 451), its careful nurturing of its reputation for tolerance 
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b, p. 12), its small population, acute northern 
location, and consequent need to project its Finnishness alongside  an internationalism 
(like Scotland), also points to the usefulness of a discourse like the creative city. 
 
In summation, the creative city meets a number of Finland’s needs: the ideological fit 
with Finland’s social (projecting equity, tolerance, democracy) and economic 
(competition etc.) policies; the need for well-paid and sticky (hard to replace) 
knowledge workers; the need to keep businesses and investment in Finland; the need to 
further commercialise culture and the creative industries; and the need for a higher 
international profile that asserts Finland’s readiness for business and its autonomy from 
Sweden and Russia. This reconciling of potentially conflicting value systems, though it 
is a characteristic of policy in general, is also particular to Finland’s newly transitional 
state between welfarism and competitive neoliberalism. 
 
It has been demonstrated, therefore, that Scotland and Finland have strong reasons to 
embrace the creative city paradigm, as a way of discursively addressing or solving 
particular state problems. In contrast, despite sharing many of the contexts of both 
Finland and Scotland, it has been argued that Ireland’s cultural policies show a limited 
interest in the creative city paradigm, instead reflecting older but equally instrumental 
urban discourses of culture as a country’s unique identifier, and, as a consequence of the 
recent recession, a rescuer of Brand Ireland. 
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 In considering the three cases together, therefore, there are a number of deductions that 
can be made. These deductions are: that the creative city paradigm flourishes in 
particular situations (the neoliberal political-economic situation referred to earlier) and 
meets a number of shared national needs: post-industrial economies; high value and 
sticky jobs; creative industries agendas; branding and image-management; the 
repopulation of cities and countries; international investment; and a multicultural, 
diverse profile (necessitating discourses of tolerance). Additionally, Finland’s use of the 
paradigm demonstrates that language is not a barrier in relation to the dissemination of a 
predominantly English discourse (though this is also demonstrated through the creative 
city’s role in Asian countries).  
 
The creative city (and thus cultural policy) therefore, ultimately fulfils the ideological 
and hegemonic state needs of Scotland and Finland by specifically appealing to: central 
government ministries/interests/politicians (through extrinsic value discourses), the 
cultural sector (through intrinsic value discourses), and the public (through either 
intrinsic discourses or instrumental discourses depending on their interest in culture). 
While meeting national agendas reveals the local appeal of the creative city, 
instrumentalism in general has a much broader appeal and will be discussed next. 
 
6.5.3 The appeal of instrumentalism  
Although Chapter Three has outlined particular criticisms as well as successes in 
relation to the creative city, and Chapter Four has outlined a general critique of 
instrumental discourses, throughout the research a number of cultural policy advantages 
have become apparent in relation to adopting creative city discourses. Section 6.3 has 
underlined the ability of the creative city to contain conflicting discourses and thus help 
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to secure state legitimacy. This was followed by section 6.4 which demonstrated that the 
creative city represents a readily accessible policy story and format, and then section 6.5 
which showed that through cultural policy, the creative city addresses national 
ideologies and policy needs and meets specific government agendas. However, another 
benefit of the creative city lies in its role as an implicit cultural policy which appears to 
explicitly recognise the value of culture and to place culture centrally (in contrast with 
other implicit policies which may inadvertently impact on culture).  
 
Further, as with all instrumental or “attached” discourses (Gray, 2007, p. 203), Chapter 
Five has shown how the creative city offers other rational benefits and discrete 
functions associated with instrumentalism in general, including: leveraging the profile, 
visibility and political traction of a weak policy sector (Finnish Ministry of Education, 
2005, p. 32; Oakley, 2009a, p. 4); offering the potential to diversify and augment 
existing budgets and unlock funding in the private sector (Szántó, 2010, n.p.); projecting 
an Enlightenment prospect of progress, cosmopolitanism and the “promise of radical 
change”; and, ironically (in light of its emphasis on the economy and neoliberal 
credentials), offering a “cognitive as well as philosophical alternative to the 
development of the neo-liberal city” (Vickery, 2011, p. 2).26 Fourthly, the discourse of 
the creative city is perceived as presenting new opportunities to cultural practitioners 
(through funding schemes designed to achieve non-cultural outcomes) by directing them 
to particular areas of work (such as urban development) which they may not have 
pursued otherwise (Nisbett, 2012).  
 
                                                           
26
 Vickery claims that “anyone who remembers the 1970s would agree that British cities have radically 
changed for the better, and art and creativity has been a visible means of that change” (Vickery, 2011, p. 
6). 
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These benefits touch on one of the key factors behind instrumental arguments. This 
factor is, that in acknowledging the full extent of benefits or values that culture can offer 
(both intrinsic and extrinsic), the creative city delivers a comprehensive and tangible 
argument in support of culture, to a policy sector that is hard to understand. This 
rational argument is an important counterbalance to apparently anti-democratic (or 
unrepresentative), autonomous or romantic cultural discourses that are “remote, 
esoteric, and removed from life” (McCarthy et al, 2005, p. 38). As an instrumental 
discourse, therefore, the creative city offers the bureaucratic promise of objective and 
meritocratic decision-making through measurable outputs (O’Brien, 2012, n.p.), 
reducing potential accusations of cultural policy’s elitism, and its tendency to be overly 
concerned with “internal” preoccupations (Gray, 2007, p. 207).  
 
Similarly, the veneer of empiricism, objectivity, and therefore truth alluded to by the use 
of (economic) creativity discourses and statistics, confers a scientific and “positivist” (or 
measurable) quality to cultural policy, suggesting a “disinterested” and putatively 
neutral as well as evidence-based approach that also appeals to policymakers (Seale, 
2004, p. 80). The economicism implied by the paradigm ultimately responds to a 
doubting electorate who may see no value in culture but can appreciate the prospect of 
economic return. As a result, the creative city is a more persuasive advocate for culture 
than cultural policy alone, legitimating cultural policy to the state and the state to the 
public. 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has looked at what is happening, how, and why it is happening, in relation 
to the creative city as an embedded and apparently helpful discourse of cultural policy 
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in Scotland, Finland and (to a limited extent) Ireland. In order to do this, the chapter has 
compared three sets of cultural policies and has underlined the role of dualism and 
nominalisation in those policies. The chapter has also noted similarities in how creative 
city discourses are constituted in Scotland and Finland, despite different emphases, 
cultures and languages. However, the main conclusions of the chapter are that there are 
many factors contributing to the transfer of creative city discourses within cultural 
policy and equally, a number of compelling reasons as to its success and purpose in the 
cases (and in cultural policy in general).  
 
The main transfer factors were demonstrated to be: the ability of the discourse to carry 
and contain multiple ideologies and discourses (and how this allows politicians to avoid 
making difficult decisions) and thus support the authority of government (e.g. Finland’s 
combination of neoliberalism and welfare statism), its fit with readily assimilable policy 
templates (knowledge paradigm, simplicity, flexibility and heuristics), its international 
champions, its internet-friendly presence and its parallels with and strategic importance 
to EU funding discourses. More particularly, this chapter has demonstrated that the 
cultural policies of Scotland and Finland, despite reservations about the creative city 
paradigm, have local and strategic uses for it, based on discrete historical, political, 
social and economic factors in those countries. This chapter also established that these 
uses or the purpose behind using narratives like the creative city within cultural policies, 
is to solve or address central government (national branding/visibility and the need for 
high-value workers, etc.) rather than public or cultural problems.  
 
Finally, it has also been argued that the creative city confers other instrumental benefits 
in: offering cultural visibility; the promise of diversified funding; a meritocratic 
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alternative to elitist discourses; new opportunities for cultural practitioners; and most 
importantly, the appearance of quantifiable decision-making. This results in dual 
legitimation functions for the creative city (appearing to satisfy internal government and 
public needs), further explaining its apparent appeal within cultural policy. The 
significance of the creative city within the discourses of Scotland, Finland and Ireland, 
therefore, lies not in its specificity in those countries, but in what it indicates about the 
assumptions underpinning the nature and function of cultural policy, vis-à-vis the 
market and the state in those countries. The chapter, therefore, indicated that the 
weakness of the cultural policy sector (including practitioners) reflexively drives 
rational, instrumental discourses that seek to sustain cultural policies (and markets) by 
addressing other government portfolios, and are consequently benignly looked upon in 
those circles. In light of the awareness by policymakers of problems within the creative 
city paradigm, this welcome can be interpreted as indicating a degree of cynical 
reasoning. The precise implications of the creative city within cultural policy, therefore, 
in the context of the concept of colonisation, will be explored in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: IMPLICATIONS AND INDICATIONS FOR CULTURAL 
POLICY, PUBLIC POLICY, THE STATE AND DEMOCRACY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The last chapter has looked at how and why the creative city has transferred to cultural 
policy, arguing that the paradigm is a flexible and persuasive discourse that meets 
technical policy requirements, addresses national needs, offers a number of wider 
benefits for cultural policy and ensures the longevity of the state. In light of these 
positive characteristics and capacities, the question remains of whether the creative city 
paradigm, though flawed, is ultimately beneficial to cultural policy and part of an 
efficient government working pragmatically, visibly and democratically in the public 
interest through providing a balanced, meritocratic and accountable economic argument 
for the distribution of tax payers’ money towards cultural activities. In order to answer 
this question, it is necessary to consider the longer-term implications of the paradigm 
for cultural policy and its role as an expression of the reason of state.  
 
This chapter, therefore, will return to the broader impact of instrumental discourses on 
cultural policy in general (as detailed in Chapter Four) and the discrete impact of a 
discourse like the creative city in particular. This consideration will take place in the 
context of dominant ideologies and pressures on the cultural policy sector and existing 
critiques of the creative city. This will be followed by an outline of problems already 
inherent in cultural policy which further underline the inescapable and self-sustaining 
nature of cultural instrumentalism, and indicate its weaknesses and openness to 
domination by non-cultural narratives and colonisation. The chapter will then consider 
how colonisation has implications beyond cultural policies, illustrating the gap between 
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policy in theory as a legitimate and democratic arm of the state, and policy in practice as 
demonstrated through the strategic and obfuscated discourses of the three cases. 
Following this, there will be a consideration of how these revelations expose key 
criticisms of liberal democracies, models of democracy and governance more widely, 
and illustrate the complex relationship between the state and market in many Western 
countries. This chapter will conclude by returning to the question of how cultural policy 
is understood and variously described, returning to the fundamental question of why 
states support culture or what cultural policy is for. 
 
7.2 The problem of the creative city for cultural policy 
Notwithstanding established criticisms of the creative city that are necessarily of 
consequence to public policies for culture (social inequity, market-bias, unreliable 
methodologies, endorsement of the status quo, etc.: see 3.11), and new cultural 
criticisms posited by this research (lack of interest in and knowledge of cultural 
production and practitioners as detailed in 3.12), a further consideration of 
instrumentalism points to more specific difficulties for cultural policy in relation to the 
creative city. Earlier it was demonstrated that the core confusion around, and problem 
with, instrumentalism and thus discourses like the creative city, is largely embodied in 
ideology, the concepts of positive and negative uses for culture, and whether 
instrumentalism is a useful policy term (see 4.4.12).  
 
Notwithstanding the overlap between intrinsic and extrinsic characterisations  of 
cultural value, it has been demonstrated (see 4.4.12) that views of instrumentalism (and 
thus the creative city) can comprise: a fulfilment of the strategic nature of policy in 
general, conferring explicable and reasonable (economic and social) benefits on society 
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that strengthen cultural policy by underlining how it works to deliver other 
democratically elected government agendas (similar to attachment policies), and 
intrinsic cultural benefits, or artistic instrumentalism that recognise the individual, 
private and unique advantages (criticality, education etc.) conferred by culture. Both of 
these positions suggest the input of trust in the policy and thus policymaker and can be 
viewed as examples of positive instrumentalism.  
 
In contrast, other views comprise judgment on: the use of culture to fulfil extrinsic 
(economic and social) objectives which might be better served by other policy areas, 
and policies that have no regard to the nature of the (cultural) activity supported and 
which disavow the a priori nature of public and personal engagements with culture. 
Those who hold negative views of instrumentalism are particularly critical and cynical 
in relation to how instrumental approaches favour outcome-oriented, mainstream, 
uncritical and spectacular culture, which co-opts cultural practitioners into quantitative 
rather than qualitative outcomes. 
 
 In terms of cultural policy, cynicism or trust in policies might be judged or viewed in 
relation to the degree of non-cultural interest (in contrast to disinterest) on the part of 
the policymaker, or whether or not that policymaker has something to gain from the 
non-cultural outcome of policy discourses. Given that all policy will necessarily be 
interested, this term can be applied to cultural policy purely in respect of cultural 
outcomes. In terms of the cases, this understanding of gain can be viewed as the role of 
the policymaker in supporting urban development, investment or tourism, but also 
legitimacy or political gains for the cultural policy ministry. Scotland, Finland and 
Ireland’s linking of their policies to wider government agendas, while strategic, 
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indicates an interested outcome. Though the previous chapter has suggested that the 
creative city can be considered a positive example of instrumentalism in that it provides 
a clear rationale for funding culture and is simply a way to “construct a[nother] picture 
of cultural policy” (Røyseng, 2008, p. 5), the interested nature of the creative city in the 
cases (and thus the policymakers’ use of it), suggests a negative interpretation of 
instrumentalism that needs to be considered both generally and specifically.  
 
Firstly, instrumentalism as a persuasive discourse in cultural policy, as much as 
proposing non-cultural outcomes from culture, is bound to underperform if compared 
with economic or social policies/initiatives, leading to “unsubstantiated” claims 
(McCarthy et.al., 2005, p. 33; Hewitt, 2011, p. 33). In other words, the economic 
benefits of culture proposed through the creative city (operating in cultural policies) 
could never deliver in the same way as dedicated economic or industrial policies (Miles, 
2006, pp. 233-243; Szántó, 2010, n.p.). Also, key criteria for successful policy-driven 
investment suggest that there must be both a return greater than the original investment 
and that the economy or return generated, must not simply replace other economies (or 
cultural spending) or occur elsewhere in the public exchequer, but must be an additional 
or new (cultural) economy (Markusen and Gadwa, 2010, p. 381). From a cultural 
(economy) perspective, this calculation also needs to take into account the level of 
subsidy against foregone tax revenues (ibid.).  
 
Given the pragmatic view that “every pound spent on the arts is a pound forgone on an 
alternative public good or service” (Bakhshi, Freeman and Hitchen, 2009, p. 18), and 
that “it is not enough to show that the arts and culture can generate income and 
employment, because all economic activity does that” (Bille, 2006, p. 1059), it can be 
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argued that culture does not deliver economically in comparison to other sectors. This 
demonstrates the fundamental difficulty with placing value on culture in this way,
1
 and 
though investment or support of culture is comparatively small (in respect of other 
ministries), can lead to views of public funding on culture as “irresponsible“ (Gray, 
2007, p. 204). 
 
Secondly, there are wider problems with measurement and quantitative claims in 
cultural policies. Notwithstanding problems with evidence (as Chapter Two has 
outlined), the lack of systematic evaluation of the outcomes of instrumental cultural 
policies, either to confirm or negate their claims, by either central governments 
(monitoring cultural policies) or the cultural policy ministries (monitoring those it 
supports), is problematic for how seriously the cultural policy sector is taken. This is not 
helped by the lack of clarification over the desired outcomes of funding relationships 
which make cultural policies difficult to evaluate in the first instance (Reeves, 2002; 
Markusen and Gadwa, 2010, p. 379). Equally, these issues are further exacerbated by 
the lack of resources to which most cultural organisations have access, which would 
severely impact on their capacity to evaluate their economic impact, regardless of value-
systems attached to quantitative reasoning.  
 
Thirdly, some have questioned (Vickery, 2011, p. 3; Belfiore, 2012, p. 107) whether 
instrumental paradigms like the creative city, which depend on the mobilising concept 
of the economy, actively diversify or lead to increased funding for culture, as 
champions of public/private partnerships might suggest (Paquette, 2008, p. 303). This 
                                                           
1 This is demonstrated in the recent national campaigns for the arts in both Ireland and the UK,  much of 
whose work has concentrated on reinforcing economic arguments for supporting culture (or in their case 
the arts), though this is beginning to change. See www.ncfa.ie (Ireland) and www.artscampaign.org.uk 
(UK) [Accessed 4 June 2013]. 
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has been indicated by studies on the impact of the Structural Funds on other areas of 
funding, which demonstrated the inconclusive nature of research that seeks to link one 
source of funding to another (Evans and Foord, 1999, p. 81; Belfiore, 2012, p. 107). 
These difficulties are also underlined by general problems linking budgets and policies, 
particularly given the time lag between the arrival of new administrations and the 
allocation of budgets (Quinn, 1998, p. 45) and the typical policy process taking as “long 
as a decade” (Stevens, 2011b, p. 251).2  
 
Fourthly, because the problems listed above are driven by the endemic nature of case-
making in cultural policy and the view that “reality itself requires all policy decisions to 
be quantified” (Bakhshi et al., 2009, p. 18), 3 these difficulties can lead to exaggeration, 
which erodes communication and trust between the stakeholders of cultural policy.
 4
 
This exaggeration often derives from standardised calculations of the indirect effects of 
expenditure in one area of the economy (how to differentiate it from other potential 
factors), the questionable validity of the multiplier effect
5
 (Reeves, 2002 p. 43; Dowler, 
2004, p. 22; Nagle, 2006, p. 9), and the use of poor and inconsistent research 
methodologies and data sets (Reeves, 2002; Selwood, 2002; Finnish Ministry of 
                                                           
2
 Even where it could be proven that the central economic premise of the creative city delivered (via 
cultural policy), it is a fundamental conundrum of cultural subsidy systems that financial success can 
often have the reverse effect – allowing governments to consider reduced funding to cultural ministries or 
further withdrawal from state funding on the basis of a perceived lack of need. 
3
 The emphasis on evidence and measurement is demonstrated in the numbers of economic reports on 
culture produced in national (Scottish Executive, 2004b; Scottish Government, 2009a; Finnish Ministry 
of Education, 2009a) and EU cultural policies (European Commission 2006a; ibid., 2009; Kulturpont 
Hungary, 2011), and devolved cultural agencies (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, 2011). For information on 
research, see the Evidence Base for the Impact of Arts and Culture Policy (2008).  
4 
Recent economic impact statements from the arts community include figures from the wider creative 
industries, despite their exclusion from funding definitions of the arts. See Arts Council of Ireland (2009).  
5
  The Council of Europe stated the following in relation to the multiplier effect: The “arts and culture are 
‘labour intensive’ activities and generate economic multiplier effects in other service and manufacturing 
sectors” (EU Council of Europe, 1997, p. 241) by: providing “content” for the cultural industries and 
media”, creating jobs and contributing to the Gross Domestic Product, and creating other “locally 
significant economic effects”. The report also states that the arts/culture are “socially profitable”, create 
“stocks of ideas or images”, and can “enhance and so add value to the built environment” (EU Council of 
Europe, 1997, p. 238). 
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Education, 2009c; Gray, C. 2009). These nominally helpful formulae have been 
described as “optimistic” (EU Council of Europe, 1997, p. 63), have a “lack of concern 
with the truth” and more provocatively, as “bullshit” (Belfiore, 2008, p. 1). This 
amplification applies to assessments of numbers attending cultural events (prospectively 
or retrospectively) or to the spill-over economies generated from those events, making it 
difficult to distinguish between “simple incorrect information” (in the enthusiastic rush 
to extrapolate broader cultural statistics), wilful “mendacity” (Belfiore, 2008, p. 25), and 
endemic structural advocacy.  
 
However, though these factors are more likely to result in exaggeration than mendacity, 
and as suggested, though most cultural organisations do not have the resources to 
conduct these surveys in the first place (a factor pointing to the appeal of multiplier 
figures), these tactics again underline the “performance” (Paquette, 2008, p. 298) 
involved in making and interacting with cultural policy (see 4.4.13). These evidences 
also perpetuate the singular way in which culture is viewed, as well as feeding the 
unvirtuous cycle of instrumental expectation and cynical reason. This also leads to a 
cognitive dissonance around structural instrumentalism, whereby practitioners and 
policymakers may face the uncomfortable situation of viewing it as a negative 
proposition, alongside an appreciation of a role for it in policy. Nevertheless, the level 
of obfuscation involved in cultural instrumentalism creates a loss of trust (or good faith) 
between those attempting to realise cultural practices (cultural practitioners), and the 
forces influencing those practices in the first place (policymakers and politicians).  
 
There are other more specifically negative impacts suggested by the creative city, 
however. As suggested by Harvey (1989, 1990) and Rosler (2011a), the creative city, as 
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an urban development model necessarily favours prominent visual tropes and 
spectacular cultural activity in cities in order to maximise attention from corporations 
and tourists. While not wishing to overstate the point, the prevalence of particular kinds 
of “manufactured” culture (Hunt, cited in Miles and Paddisson, 2005, p. 838), in the 
sense of culture that may be bought and brought in, rather than emerging from a local 
culture, may limit public understandings of the wide variety of cultural forms in 
existence. This is because the reluctance to fund risk-taking and experimental culture in 
favour of tried-and-tested cultural and iconic brands with strong image-making 
capacities, is typically led by city promotion, tourism and exhibition, rather than an 
interest in cultural production.  
 
This was referred to in Chapter Three (3.11) as consistent with urban entrepreneurialism 
(Harvey, 1990), marketing and the simulacrum. As such, Chapter Four has indicated 
that Creative city-type initiatives are usually unconcerned with the processes of making 
(studios, workshops, amateur cultural events, etc.) and locally displaying (small 
galleries, theatres, community centres, etc.) culture and more concerned with seeking 
competitive identities through monumental sculptures, buildings and bridges.
6
 
Consequently, this focus on the tropes, rather than conditions, of culture and creativity, 
ironically (given the competitive and unique premise) reduces the particularity of a city 
(Rosler, 2011a, p. 11), so that “what is essential for cities is no longer art, or the people 
who make it, but the appearance of its being made somewhere nearby” (Rosler, 2011a, 
p. 6).  
 
                                                           
6 
Though the concept of spectacle in relation to cultural expressions is necessarily subjective, it can be 
argued that highly visualised and often monumental visual artworks exemplify this concept. See Chapter 
3 (3.4 footnote # 28). 
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The focus on spectacle and a concern with the surface of cultural life is compounded 
and exemplified by the romanticism Florida shows towards artists, as explained in 
Chapter Three. The paradigm’s lack of interest in the conditions of being an artist and 
Florida’s own admission that he has “only a cursory understanding” of them (Florida, 
2007, p. 41), is incongruous in terms of the basic premise of the creative city: that artists 
attract (and comprise) creative workers, businesses and investment and should be 
supported (though he equivocates in relation to this too). Even when appearing to 
explicitly place cultural provision (amenities) central to those amenities needed by cities 
and talent, citing the creative classes as “attracted more by cultural amenities than by 
recreational amenities and climate” (Florida: 2005, p. 99), Florida contradicts himself 
by positing that there is “no clear relationship between arts and culture and high-
technology industries or the ability to attract creative workers” (ibid., p. 71) and that 
“they [arts and culture] alone are not enough, as other amenities come into play” (ibid.). 
In Florida’s creative city, therefore, artists rarely appear outside of their signifying 
presence, whether as creative visionaries or even economic actors and aides to 
regeneration (like Landry, 2000 etc.). This lends credence to the view that the creative 
city paradigm “could not care less of the arts community in itself” (Paquette, 2008, p. 
298). 
 
The instrumentalism of the creative city also impacts on normative and bureaucratic 
understandings and mechanisms of cultural policy. This begins with the failure of the 
creative city to balance intrinsic (or artistic instrumentalism) and extrinsic instrumental 
cultural value, by reconciling the needs of the cultural practitioner, the politician, the 
policymaker and the public (Holden, 2006, p. 57), as a prerequisite to legitimacy 
(Vestheim, 2007, p. 230; DCMS, 2010, p. 18). Other accounts of cultural value, bound 
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up with cultural rights, sustainability, diversity and other intrinsic valuations (Reeves, 
2002, pp. 36-37; Throsby, cited in Keaney, 2006, p. 31) are also compromised by the 
predisposition of the paradigm to the corporatised culture referred to above. Similarly, 
the creative city compromises “cultural policy ethics” by eroding culture’s “freedom” 
(intrinsic value) and “responsibility” (community value) “ethic”, as posed by the 
International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies (Koivunen and Marsio, 
2008, p. 3).
7
 Since concepts of cultural value, cultural rights and cultural ethics are 
concerned with legitimacy, any undermining of these concepts, ironically, has 
implications for the legitimacy of cultural policy.   
 
As suggested in Chapters One and Three, the creative city also impacts on 
understandings of public goods in the context of “democratic conceptions of citizenship 
rights” (Bennett and Silva, 2006, p. 94) by promoting a neoliberal conflation of private 
and public goods. This is demonstrated by the dependence of urban development 
models on private investment and thus profits (proffered as the public good) through the 
“differential advantages they secure for some at the expense of others” (ibid., pp. 94 – 
95). Even the civic or community discourses of the creative city, suggesting social 
cohesion through the public sphere, present private goods as public goods in the 
following way: the presentation of culture as a “means of overcoming social exclusion” 
(ibid., p. 95) as suggested by Landry (see 3.5), is dependent on “assessing the benefits to 
society”... by “acting on the social to secure certain outcomes: neighbourhood renewal, 
reduced crime” etc. (Bennett and Silva, 2006, p. 95). This understanding of social 
cohesion ultimately results or aims to result in economic outcomes, representing a 
                                                           
7
 There are three ethics posited in Finland: a freedom ethic (the premise that creativity and art are 
“intrinsically valuable and therefore legitimate goals in themselves”), a responsibility ethic (“the cultural 
identity of a community, the safeguarding of cultural traditions, and the realisation of cultural rights”) and 
a benefit/instrumental ethic (Koivunen and Marsio, 2008, p. 3).  
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“different policy and civic calculus to equity discourses of cultural democracy” in 
cultural policies (ibid.).  
 
As a result, the creative city and the cynical reason it implies, poses a number of longer-
term problems for how culture is perceived in cities vis-à-vis cultural policy. These 
implications are (from a broadly instrumental perspective) that cultural policy: 
compares badly with dedicated economic and social policies; uses poor methodologies 
and untested claims (all leading to loss of trust); fails to diversify cultural funding; leads 
to exaggerated statistics and results in an over-promising on deliverables. Other 
negative impacts via the creative city comprise: the promotion of one form of 
spectacular culture (undermining the variety of work supported through policy); a lack 
of interest in cultural working spaces (eroding understandings of how culture is 
produced with sustainability issues for artists); an unhelpful romanticism towards artists 
(exoticising and distancing policy from them); an undermining of cultural value and, 
finally, the eroding of principles of cultural democracy and the nature of public goods. 
This activity necessarily has a de-legitimising impact on cultural policy itself.   
 
7.2.1 Existing problems in cultural policy 
Notwithstanding the negative implications for cultural policy in respect of the influence 
of an instrumental discourse such as the creative city, and as has been demonstrated, 
instrumental and attached benefit narratives are already endemic in cultural policy. As 
such and from the outset, cultural policy is compromised, under constant pressure to 
justify itself, predisposed to respond to conflicting mandates and thus to 
instrumentalistion and a degree of cynical reason. The shoring up of longer-term 
problems for cultural policy by the creative city, therefore, takes place in the context of 
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a policy sector already beset by issues and complexities, particularly affected by 
hierarchical discourses of cultural values and the primary legitimacy (from the public) 
and rationale of the sector itself. As has been suggested throughout this dissertation, 
these factors (instrumentalism, dualism and lack of policy clarity) reflexively point to 
one of cultural policy’s key and inescapable issues, that it is a disempowered and 
“marginal” policy area (Vestheim, 2007, p. 217).  
 
Firstly, despite the richness as well as usefulness of culture to ruling elites, and as 
demonstrated in Ireland (Falvey, 2010, n.p.; O’Toole, 2010, n.p.; Stokes, 2010, n.p.; 
Howlin, 2013, p. 15), research points to the fact that cultural ministries are “assigned 
little weight by voters” (Gray and Wingfield, 2010, p. 7) and are a “low priority” in 
government (Mundy, 2000, p. 11).
8
 Equally, people remain “less willing to spend 
money on culture than on other matters” (ibid., p. 5), culture is “never the focus of 
electoral choice” (ibid., p. 7), and cultural subsidy is routinely posited in the media as a 
“form of grand larceny” (Edgar, 2012b, n.p.) or an “insult to the bodily welfare” of 
citizens (Mundy, 2000, p. 11). Considering this research on the low status and the lack 
of international importance attached to cultural ministries (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2009c, p. 14), ministers’ needs for their colleagues’ support (Higgins, 2013a) 
and the use of terms such as demotion in respect of ministerial appointments (as in 
Ireland), the link between political and public views of and apathy towards culture may 
be reflexive (if judged by media reports and voter preference research). Thus, in an 
inversion of an earlier citation, there is a link between the lack of “importance attached 
by the State, and through them the people, to the arts” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.). Depending 
                                                           
8
 The difference in national commitments to cultural policy is acknowledged in Finland’s cultural policy, 
which claims that “culture is not given the same weight by all policymakers as we do here” (Ministry of 
Education, 2009a, p. 14). 
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on your perspective, therefore, culture is instrumentalised by governments and/or 
irrelevant to the public. 
 
Secondly, despite the limited access that culture gets to the media in general 
(Schlesinger, 2009a, p. 6), this hostility is reflected in conflicting media representations 
of culture which either wholly “support[s]” or conversely “attack[s]” art or artists 
(Holden, 2006, p. 42). These accounts result in confused reports of cultural value 
circulating within the public domain, which can be broadly categorised into approving 
narratives of cultural instrumentalism on the one hand, and disapproving accounts of 
autonomous or at least obscurely legitimised cultural projects, on the other. Examples of 
these reports include: egregiously framed descriptions of public spending on cultural 
projects which ask “why should people pay taxes” for the arts, especially “at a time of 
serious spending cuts?” (BBC Newsnight, 2011, n.p.) and narratives of “taxpayers” as 
“horrified to discover that their hard-earned cash is being spent” on (putatively 
wasteful) artistic projects (Reynolds, 2012, n.p.). These discourses often use “false and 
emotive” analogies contrasting cultural provision with urgent social services in accounts 
of resources being directed to “opera with the money needed to buy kidney machines or 
children’s hospitals” (Mundy, 2000, p. 11) and tend to end with the implicit or explicit 
question of why the state is “allowed to fund these things?” (Telegraph, 2012, n.p.).9 
Like policy, the singular or universal public as rhetorically constructed by the media 
(i.e. taxpayer, accountability etc.), is presented as consensual to these negative and 
hostile attitudes. 
 
                                                           
9
 This article went on to quote the director of Taxpayer Scotland as saying that "when we reach the point 
that nearly all of us are totally baffled, and probably in this case bored stiff, by an idea then we really do 
have to ask, ‘Why the state is allowed to fund these things?’"  (Telegraph, 2012, n.p.). 
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In contrast, approving media reports of culture are utilitarian and meritorious (and 
mostly economic), endorsing narratives of culture, regeneration and tourism. Examples 
of these reports comprise culture’s role in: giving a “significant long-term boost “ to a 
country’s “chronically weak economy” (McDonald, 2011, n.p.); lending a “sexy” edge 
to cities (Connolly, 2010, n.p.); working to rouse “people from a depression brought on 
by long-term unemployment and the current fierce economic crisis”; delivering  “joy, 
glamour, insight, image-building, international prestige and employment, on a scale no 
other sector can match for similar sums” (McMillan, 2011, n.p.); helping countries to 
turn a “bright, confident face” to the world” (Cullen, 2012, p. 10) and helping to create 
“funky towns”(Ward, 2002, n.p.). 
 
Given the particular role of the media in shaping the “world outside as a picture in our 
heads” (Parsons, 1995, p. 110), and its “key role in [policy] agenda setting” (ibid., p. 
113), these discourses, both positive and negative, are crucial to constructions of culture 
in the public imagination, which it is argued, is confused as to the nature of its value or 
purpose in society and the state. These discourses also hint at the lack of clear rationales 
as to why governments are allowed to support culture in a way that the media can 
understand. Since it has been suggested that “public opinion” (notwithstanding the 
difficulties of representing any one public) is “to the political market what consumer 
demand is to the economic market place” (ibid., p. 110), and vice versa (Fanning, 2011, 
n.p.), it holds that public attitudes to culture impact on government attitudes, whether 
negative or positive and that there is a reflexive connection between the two.  
 
Not surprisingly perhaps, outside of the media, policy-commissioned reports also carry 
positive accounts of culture, usually concerning the benign impact of (and attitudes to) 
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subsidised culture on the lives of the public.
 10
 These reports cite culture as having an 
“important role in the lives of many Europeans” (European Commission, 2007b, p. 9), 
claim that people have “very positive views” of culture/the arts (Arts Council of Ireland, 
2006, p. 10), and state that the “value of culture to the public is unlimited and infinitely 
expandable” (Holden, 2006, p. 10). These claims, produced from within cultural policy 
circles, are inescapably advocacy-oriented and clearly self-justificatory, as well as 
difficult to definitively evidence when confronted by conflicting research (as indicated 
above). As such, it has been asserted that “if culture was as important as many 
government speeches [or reports] make it sound, it would have a budget to match 
welfare or defence” (Mundy, 2000, p. 10), suggesting the prospect of cynicism again. 
Equally, though these accounts may appear to strengthen cultural policy, when viewed 
alongside contrasting accounts, they point to an embattled, defensive and misunderstood 
sector. 
 
Thirdly, notwithstanding tensions at play within cultural policies engendered by the 
dualisms and obfuscations around culture, other problems within cultural policy are 
more structurally or historically determined and contextualise the place of instrumental 
discourses (like the creative city) within cultural policy in general. During the 
development of the first European and “liberal humanist” (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, 
p. 29) models of (high) cultural policy (as expressed through the Arts Council model), 
egalitarian objectives were concerned with widening the “accessibility” (Quinn, 1998 p. 
103), “stimulation” and “practice” of the arts (as it was designated) (ibid., p. 117). 
These objectives, which remain key to many cultural policies, were part of the broader 
                                                           
10
 This has recently been demonstrated in the first ever UK Arts [vitality] Index, which purports to 
measure the vitality of the arts through financial indicators (public funding, earned income), interest in 
arts (from numbers of students studying and volunteers), combined reserves of funded arts organisations, 
participation levels (attendance and participation, digital attendance, adults and children), satisfaction 
reports and income and employment generated (National Campaign for the Arts, 2011, pp 13-14). 
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political project of democracy at the time and were thus concerned with the 
democratisation of culture (access to consume culture) and, later, cultural democracy 
(access to making culture).
11
 However, despite decades of effort on behalf of cultural 
practitioners, these concepts remain relatively aspirational, as implicitly indicated by 
reports (Arts Council of Ireland, 2006; European Commission 2007b), and particularly 
so when judged against participation in more industrialised cultural expressions 
(Higgins, 2012a, n.p.). In this respect, the project of making (high) culture accessible 
has been described as an unequivocal “failure” (During, 2007, p. 441). 
 
Fourthly, as a result of historic political territorialism and the deficits of these 
democratisation and democracy agendas, accusations of elitism and classism endure in 
relation to cultural policies (Eagleton, 2000; Lewis and Miller, 2003; McGuigan, 1996; 
Sennett, 2006; Oakley, 2009c). The use of “excellence” in artistic judgement, is a key 
hierarchical and difficult term to define, and has been linked to poor decision-making 
when contrasted with de-centralised and more diverse judgments (Frey, 2003, p. 127). 
Also, together with its concomitant cultural policy term “access” (Hesmondhalgh and 
Pratt, 2005, p. 7; Lee et al., 2011, p. 295), excellence continues to connote access to 
high culture in particular, rather than culture in general. As such, the “unacceptable” 
reluctance of cultural policy to define culture or the arts (Quinn, 1998, p. 236) links 
fears of elitism (despite practising high culture), ethnic biases (certain cultures promoted 
over others), and a lack of political accountability (ibid., p. 15, p. 194).  
 
                                                           
11 
These aims are partly demonstrated in the three case studies, respectively, in references to access and 
practice: promoting “access to and participation in” the arts (Ireland); maintaining “cultural rights” and 
ensuring “access” to culture (Finland), ensuring that “as many people as possible in Scotland and 
overseas are able to benefit from, be inspired by and enjoy” culture. All references from government 
websites respectively as indicated previously. 
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The concepts of cultural capital and cultural competence are also central to cultural 
policies, along with issues of class, classification, elitism and hegemony. Cultural 
capital describes the “act of deciphering, [and] decoding” that demarcates those who 
can reflexively consume high culture (prioritised in all three cases) and who know what 
it is, from those who don’t have the cultural confidence bestowed by education or class 
status, and have no engagement with it (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 2).
12
 Cultural capital, 
therefore, constitutes a “socially transmitted inheritance” (Bennett and Silva, 2011, p. 
430), and (via a Foucauldian perspective) set of skills “that can be enhanced through 
varied strategies of training and self cultivation” (ibid., p. 431). These terms reflect the 
equation of social with cultural divisions, and further underline the a priori, elitist 
nature of cultural production. This situation refers to the financial ability of many 
cultural practitioners to withstand (by subsidising) the precarity of working in the 
cultural sphere (McRobbie, 2004; Lorey, 2006), in contrast to those who cannot afford a 
cultural career. Cumulatively, these biases reflect a range of hierarchies, political 
struggles, and issues of class and hegemony, demonstrating that the sentiments or 
discourses of funding and subsidy may be egalitarian, but the practises and 
consequences may not.  
 
Fifthly, biases are also at play in the perceived superiority of traditional over newer 
media (O’Regan, 2001, p. 2), an historic suspiciousness of technology and the wider 
creative industries (despite strategically leveraging these discourses more recently in 
cultural policy) and a lack of balance between producers’ and consumers’ intellectual 
property rights (suggestive of capitalism’s pressures on cultural policy). As Chapters 
                                                           
12
 Though Bourdieu is widely understood to have pinpointed key difficulties with the hierarchical 
deployment of culture in societies and vigorously espoused “democratic civil entitlement” to culture, he is 
also criticised for compounding these hierarchies by avoiding questions of “universality that such policies 
attributed to the canonical works of the Western art tradition” (Bennett and Silva, 2011, p. 431). 
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Four and Chapter Five have outlined, this is reflected in equivocation over “rhetorical” 
and located (in either individuals or individual countries) models of creativity and 
“networked” or collective models (Stapleton, 2002, p. 12).  
 
Sixthly, despite the struggles for power embodied in these criticisms, for some, the 
greatest issue for cultural policy lies in its political failure, or inability to engage with 
the political issues of the day (e.g. immigration, multiculturalism, citizenship) 
(O’Regan, 2001, p. 8) and that it is simply too weak a sector to “mobilise huge masses 
of people in political actions” (Vestheim, 2007, p. 217). Given the critical role of culture 
in politics and thus the potential role for cultural policy, this failure is viewed as 
particularly egregious. Despite this, others perceive the socio-political expectations of 
cultural policy as inevitably leading to problems (Eagleton, 2000, p. 59) and these 
imperatives as calling to mind paternalistic and “chilling image[s] of art workers 
managing the underclass” (Hewitt, 2011, p. 33). The discourses of democracy, 
citizenship, and civil society employed by cultural policies, therefore, further underline 
the function of those discourses to legitimate cultural policy, rather than any willingness 
to engage in the political arena. 
 
Seventhly, despite discourses to the contrary, democratic public representation and 
participation within cultural policy decisions is generally poor (Gray, 2010b). To date, 
though democratically elected politicians are theoretically responsible for policy-
making, the common practice, at least in Western European countries, is for cultural 
policy to be made by non-elected civil servants (albeit in relation to political 
imperatives), often with the assistance of (also non-elected) cultural experts. In addition, 
the lengthy policy-making process can supersede the sitting of elected governments in 
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office and requires the perseverance of civil service personnel to see policies through to 
conclusion. This demonstrates the importance of non-elected civil service staff to the 
policymaking process. The primacy of the civil servant (who may or may not have any 
expertise in culture), the (common) lack of interest (as indicated in Ireland) and 
expertise of the minister, and the perceived specialism or technocratic needs of culture, 
compounded by a general level of public apathy for culture (if indicated by electoral 
preferences as above), work to remove the public from cultural decision making. This 
leads to what has been described as a general deficit of democracy in cultural policy 
(Gray, 2010b, p. 8). The lack of public involvement in cultural decisions is driven both 
by structural policy issues (which apply to all policy areas), but also, more damningly, 
an endemic fear of populist cultural policy decisions translating as anxieties over the 
public making the wrong decisions. 
 
Finally and eighthly, the poor position of cultural policy academically as suggested by 
its usual exclusion from general policy handbooks, also indicates its marginal or 
misunderstood role as an area of legitimate academic enquiry. Given the place of 
endorsement, territorialism and discourse in discipline reproduction, this omission 
mitigates against cultural policy being taken seriously as an intellectual academic 
discipline. Cumulatively, these factors illustrate the vast range of problems confronting 
a policy sector that is highly compromised by its: weak status in government; 
predisposition to exaggerate statistics; failure to democratise culture; endemic 
elitism/classism; biases towards traditional media; apoliticism, and general lack of 
democratic decision-making.  In particular, the see-sawing of public and media opinions 
on culture, which are either wholly approving or wholly disapproving, when considered 
in light of these other factors, once again points to the complexities of culture, confusion 
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over what culture is, and uncertainty over why the state is “allowed” to support it 
(Telegraph, 2012, n.p.) in the first place. These factors also raise the question as to what 
cultural policy is deemed for if not to bend itself to the “purposes” of others (O’Regan, 
2001, p. 28). 
 
7.2.2 The problem of mandate  
In re-raising the topical question of what cultural policy is for, the question of a singular 
mandate for cultural policy arises again. This reference to mandate suggests a coherent 
articulation of a cultural policy problem, or issue to be solved by culture, rather than the 
multiple instrumental mandates referred to earlier. As suggested in Chapter One, a 
number of problems, including the chaotic post-World War II foundation of European 
cultural policies, have been linked to difficulties with its mandate (Quinn, 1998, p. 97). 
Given the importance (to the success, coherence and future of the policy) of how 
policies are initially defined (Parsons, 1995, p. xv, p. 87, p5; Hogan and Doyle, 2009, p. 
151), the lack of clarity over cultural policy’s purpose has a negative legacy for the 
sector. More recently, however, the problem with cultural policy’s mandate is revealed 
by the political and public apathy referred to above. From the public’s perspective, this 
apathy can be characterised by an instrumental acceptance (of cultural policy), which is 
merely acquiescence, rather than active public consent which is actively and knowingly 
given (Held, 2006, p. 190). 
 
As such, the consideration of a missing mandate for cultural policy opens up a key area 
of analysis in relation to the creative city’s relationship to cultural policy. From a policy, 
social science or bureaucratic point of view, the three cases of Scotland, Finland and 
Ireland demonstrate the lack of any one identifiable or sui generis cultural policy 
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rationale which addresses a coherent public issue. Instead, these policies address a 
multitude of disparate state issues. As a result, their cultural policies lack the necessary 
(cultural) problem, public concern, persuasive “causal story" (Burstein, 1991, p. 331), or 
“reason” (McGuigan, 2005, p. 235) around which all policies must coalesce (Parsons, 
1995, p. 141). Though policy problems are discursively and deliberately “’constructed’ 
in order to justify solutions” (ibid., p. 180), the lack of a clear policy problem, 
constructed or not, is significant if compared with other, weightier or harder policy 
areas (vis-à-vis government priority), with more easily identifiable problems (such as 
the economy or health).   
 
Even an area like education, which is often compared to culture (and shares the same 
portfolio in many European ministries), is viewed as more readily, if not 
unquestioningly, accepted as a “public good” than culture (Holden, 2006, p. 12). It can 
also be argued that comparatively, cultural policy differs from education policy in terms 
of its highly political and resistant genealogy, its chaotic and extra-ministerial 
foundations, and as suggested in relation to perceptions of the public good, its greater 
instrumentalisation.
13
 This is not to argue that cultural policies are uniformly thought to 
have no value, or that all cultural policies should share one aim. Rather, if cultural 
policy was equal to other government sectors and connected with the public, it would 
have a greater sense of meta purpose, which might go some way to responding to 
McGuigan’s call for it to offer something “meaningfully better” (McGuigan, 2009, p. 
299). The apparent lack of this purpose, problem or rationale, therefore, has a hugely 
negative impact on the cultural policy sector. It is contended, therefore, that cultural 
                                                           
13
 See Collini (2012). 
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policies in the main, have no recognisable or coherent foundational principle to which 
public support can gravitate. 
  
7.2.3 Colonisation by the creative city 
While cultural policy may already have a number of issues, therefore, of which the 
creative city is an inescapable symptom, there are longer-term problems for cultural 
policy associated with dominant instrumentalism. The nature of these problems centres 
again on structural instrumentalism in cultural policy and its role in colonisation 
(Habermas, 1987). In Habermas’s view, colonisation takes place when the balance 
between the lifeworld and the system is breached or imbalanced (Habermas, 1987, p. 
318). As suggested in Chapter Two, the competition, place-development, corporate 
investment and human capital discourses represented by the creative city clearly reflect 
dominant neoliberal ideologies and thus the quantitative needs of the economy, the state 
and capitalism (or the system), rather than the qualitative social and communicative 
needs of the public (or the lifeworld). In this respect, the cultural policy texts of 
Scotland and Finland represent a rationality that judges culture on the basis of 
“standards of efficiency” (Røyseng, 2008, p. 7) and thus creative city discourses 
represent a colonisation.  
 
The inevitability of this colonisation can be demonstrated if a number of premises are 
accepted: that neoliberalism privileges the freedom of the market and therefore its 
systems and policies privilege the economic over the socio-cultural; that culture, as well 
as policy (and thus cultural policy) is primarily representative of the socio-cultural 
lifeworld which provides the framework through which communication takes place in 
society (Habermas, 1987, p. 135); that the creative city is primarily representative of the 
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rationalising and dominating political-economic system, or the state, economy and 
capitalism (ibid., p. 318); and that the historical model of cultural production lends itself 
to dependence on and thus subservience to elites. If these premises are agreed, it can be 
extrapolated that the dominance of cultural policy by the instrumentalising market-
oriented creative city, is firstly inevitable, and secondly, can be viewed as a form of 
systemic “colonisation” (ibid., p. 196).  
 
In light of the legitimising role of the lifeworld in relations between the state and 
electorate, and in particular the role of culture in the lifeworld, the colonisation of 
cultural policy has significant repercussions for not only cultural policy, but also the 
state. These implications include: the erosion of “presuppositions” needed for 
productive and “meaningful” communication in society (Habermas, 1987, p. 131); the 
downgrading of “freedom of expression” (Vestheim, 2007, p. 229); and the failure of 
the state to resolve “problematic situations” (Habermas, 1987, p. 125) and “chronic 
antagonism[s]” in society (Eagleton, 2000, p. 6). However, the colonisation of cultural 
policy also undermines its own discourses of the public sphere and democracy  
(Eagleton, 2000, pp. 6-7; McGuigan, 2004, p. 59; Mokre, 2006; Mulcahy, 2006, p. 328; 
Vestheim, 2007, p. 217;),
14
 the “common good” (Mokre, 2006, p. 308), and, as 
demonstrated in Scotland and Finland, civil society (Scottish Government, 2008; 
Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b).  
                                                           
14 
This concern with democracy is replicated in arts projects,  many of which explore issues of agency, 
activism and democracy, and include: Cork Caucus: on art possibility and democracy, a one-year project 
in 2005 developed by the National Sculpture Factory, Cork, Ireland, aiming to “provide ways in which 
the ambition of art to intervene in social life and political thinking could begin to be realised” 
(www.corkcaucus.org); Becoming Dutch, a two-year project developed by the Van Abbe Museum in 
Eindhoven in 2006, concerned with asking “whether art can offer alternative examples of thinking about 
how we can live together today” (http://www.becomingdutch.com/events); What keeps mankind alive?, 
conceived by curators WHW for the 2009 Istanbul Biennial project and named after a Bertolt Brecht 
song, concerned with rethinking the past, and asking how “art today harbours new potential in articulating 
the age-old relationship between art for social change and aesthetic gestures.” Available: http://universes-
in-universe.org/eng/bien/istanbul_biennial/2009)[Accessed 25 November 2012]. 
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To illustrate this, just prior to Scottish devolution, in keeping with the legacy of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, the resurgence of nationalism through the SNP’s legitimation 
programme, and the influence of New Labour in Scotland, Scotland’s cultural policies 
have linked culture to “democratic renewal” (Matarasso, 1998, p. 1), “engaging citizens 
with civic life” (Scottish Government, 2008, p. 8), encouraging “responsible citizens” 
(Scottish Executive, 2006a, p. 31) and improving citizenship (as indicated in the cultural 
performance measurement) (Scottish Government, 2009a). Similar discourses occur in 
Finland which posit culture as a “dynamic part of democracy, good governance, human 
rights and civil society programmes” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 68), 
creating “actively participating citizens” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b, p. 23), 
and one of the “pivotal definers of humanity and citizenship” (Finnish Ministry of 
Education, 2010a, p. 17). The colonisation of these cultural policies by the creative city, 
negates, disavows, undermines and renders hollow these cultural policy discourses 
(Chapter Three). Conversely, however, it should also be noted that although these 
discourses are driven by legitimation,
15
 they can also be viewed as a sincere political 
response to the growth of neoliberalism and perceived erosion of civil society (and 
lifeworld) agendas since the 1980s (Hewitt, 2011).  
 
Nevertheless, there are complications with this analysis that were touched on in Chapter 
Two. Cultural policy, though it is symbolically representative of culture (if not 
practically) and therefore the lifeworld, is also a function of the state, and is thus 
representative of the system that is colonising it. This is not to disavow the a priori role 
of policy as a discourse working in symbolic meaning-creation, and therefore part of the 
                                                           
15
 The use of civil society discourses by NGOs standing as a trope for “governance and democratization” 
(Spurk, 2010, p. 15) was particularly prevalent in the 1990s and specifically linked to funding 
applications (p. 14). 
 339 
lifeworld. Similarly, as the creative city is a mode of implicit cultural policy and 
operates in a quasi-cultural field of symbolic meaning, it is also representative of the 
lifeworld. This demonstrates the interdependence and difficulty with separating these 
concepts, but potentially highlights the slippage (or colonisation) that occurs between 
system and lifeworld under neoliberalism, similar to that of the collapse in divisions 
between the public and private as critiqued by Habermas (Habermas, 1989, p. 27).  
 
Similarly, if the cultural policies of Scotland, Finland and Ireland are inherently 
instrumental and quantitative in terms of their broader economic discourses, and cultural 
policy is generally dominated by economic and social narratives and pressures, these 
policies are already colonised and thus there is nothing lost. However, these policies are 
in turn colonising those that depend on their support by using these narratives and 
operating their imperatives, resulting in structural instrumentalism. The creative city, 
therefore, further colonises an already historically colonised sector, and is merely the 
latest coloniser, undermining the original “radical” hopes for the paradigm (Vickery, 
2011, p. 2). 
 
As a result, both the creative city and cultural policy simultaneously legitimate 
(lifeworld) and colonise (system), which speaks to both the conflicting (the state’s and 
the public’s) mandates and political uses for culture and the dependence of the state on 
both public support and the market (illustrating Foucault and Habermas’s different 
understandings of legitimacy). Consequently, there are a number of ironies and 
paradoxes to contend with: cultural policy (and possibly the creative city) has been 
colonised and has been so for a long time and both cultural policy and the creative city 
represent aspects of the lifeworld and the system, are colonisers and operate as 
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justifications and legitimations for the state. This means that both paradigms ultimately 
de-legitimate policy and the state, undermining meaningful communication and trust in 
policy.   
 
These factors suggest that despite criticisms and perceptions of both the creative city 
and cultural policy, their economic rationales, interests, influences, themes and 
approaches are closely aligned: instrumentally or transformatively deploying culture in 
the service of extrinsic (economic and social) objectives; being complicit in the 
colonisation of culture and both justifying and undermining the state and its relationship 
with the public. This ultimately suggests that cultural policy is historically, 
contemporaneously and structurally counterproductive (depending on its purpose), 
cannibalising, instrumental and colonisable. This situation necessarily suggests a 
Habermasian loss of legitimacy for cultural policy, public policy and thus the state. The 
next question that must be asked, therefore, is whether the creative city’s colonisation of 
cultural policy represents a crisis of legitimacy, involving a voluntary withdrawal of 
support for government and, via cultural policy, a failure of the necessary trust and 
public faith in the political system (Habermas, 1973, p. 46), a simple legitimacy loss, or 
business-as-usual. 
 
7.2.4 Problems of legitimacy and examples from the cases 
It has been suggested earlier that ongoing problems within cultural policy arise from its 
historical lack of mandate or policy problem and suggests a particular need for 
legitimacy. Later it was suggested that this legitimacy comes from two sources, within 
government (more powerful ministries) and without (the public). However, since the 
support needed by cultural policy from within government is directed at politicians and 
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ministries who are essentially concerned with re-election, this research has posited that 
internal government legitimacy ultimately serves external public legitimacy. Since 
Habermasian legitimacy concerns issues specific to public trust and uses the term crisis 
(in contrast with Foucault, for whom legitimacy is about longevity), there are two 
potential problems with the specific attribution of a crisis of legitimacy. In light of dual 
legitimation sources for cultural policy, its lack of an identifiable public mandate 
(evidenced by the shifting rationales), as well as the fragmented public support for 
subsidised culture (as evidenced by research), the loss (or lack) of legitimacy may or 
may not come from the public, and cannot constitute a crisis, as there cannot be a 
withdrawal of mass input of loyalty if an unsupportive public and sceptical central 
government never invested their loyalty or legitimacy in the first place.  
 
Nevertheless, economic models such as the creative city, which blur the boundaries 
between public and private benefit, can be said to pose legitimacy problems if not 
crises, which create issues for not only the cultural sector affected by the colonising 
rationales, but also for the state. Examples of the impact of economic if not creative city 
colonisation on cultural policy, with potential legitimacy problems for the state, have in 
fact, already been referred to in the cases. Scotland offers two cases to consider. The 
first of these cases concerns Glasgow Life (see 5.3.1) and comprises allegations of 
corruption and criticisms of its operation as a “private company” (Gordon Nesbitt, 2011, 
p. 15). The specific charge at Glasgow Life was that it was involved in the unorthodox 
tendering out of services to a private corporation with links to its board and the board of 
Creative Scotland in 2009, in a process that was described as “odd” and “uneven” and 
subject to blatant vested interests (ibid., pp. 15-16). Though Glasgow Life refuted this 
accusation, the critical media attention it received and the debate it caused in cultural 
 342 
circles (ibid.) undermined both Scotland’s cultural governance as well as the Scottish 
Government.  
 
The second example of a legitimacy crisis comprises the gradual collapse of Creative 
Scotland and resignation of its first Chief Executive following its perceived disconnect 
with public cultural values in favour of government economic values, and the 
subsequent  campaign of highly public criticism and scrutiny. This crisis followed the 
sustained withdrawal of trust in Creative Scotland from the arts community in 
particular, with “embarrassing” reputational implications for the Scottish Government 
(Miller, 2012, n.p.), particularly given the lengthy gestation process from which the 
body originally emerged.  
 
Similarly in Ireland and as suggested in Chapter Five (5.5.4), Ireland’s major cultural 
tourism event, The Gathering (2013) made negative headlines with damaging 
reputational consequences for the country. The Gathering was primarily designed to 
leverage international investment through the diaspora who it urged to “work together to 
contribute to our overall efforts at economic recovery” (Slattery, 2009, n.p.) and to 
restore the “reputation of Ireland as a business-friendly State” (ibid.). Despite these 
statements, this event was packaged as a cultural initiative, with multiple references to 
high culture on its website, as well as homespun discourses of welcome, Irishness, 
belongingness and aims to showcase the “very best of Irish culture, tradition, business, 
sport, fighting spirit and the uniquely Irish sense of fun”.16  
 
                                                           
16
 Available: www.thegathering.com [Accessed 5 March 2013]. 
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Ironically, problems with the event came to prominence through the highly publicised 
comments of Ireland’s former cultural ambassador (actor Gabriel Byrne) who publicly 
described The Gathering as a naked “shakedown” of the Irish diaspora, the milking of 
tourists for a “few quid” (Irish Times, 2012c, n.p.) and a “scam” (Coyle, 2013, p. 3). 
The debate caused by Byrne’s statements in relation to the cynical presentation of an 
economic event, as a tourism or cultural event,
17
 was added to by comments from the 
head of Ryanair, who renamed the event, “the Grabbing” (ibid). These statements 
confirmed a stereotype of Ireland as a provincial country attempting to lure international 
visitors and businesses by hawking what the creative city championed as its “authentic 
cultural assets” (Florida, 2002, p. 302). This incident not only undermined public 
perceptions of the event, but from the state’s perspective, had the potential to undermine 
Brand Ireland, and the (new at the time) Irish Government. Given the importance of 
national branding to investment, as seen in all three cases, the potential for these cases 
to negatively impact the governments of Scotland and Ireland, is significant.  
 
7.3 Colonisation and public policy 
This reputational impact on governments (as demonstrated above), arising from too 
close a link between the state and the market, has wider implications if creative city 
discourse is judged against the principles of public policy as discussed in Chapter Four 
(see 4.4.4 and 4.4.5). That chapter demonstrated that policy originates from and is 
primarily about “the public” (Dewey, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. xv), as well as: the 
reconciliation or balance of public and private interests (Parsons, 1995, p. 16); the non-
profit imperative (ibid., p. 6); the use of reason and knowledge; and the application of 
                                                           
17 
The Gathering can be described as an implicit cultural policy in relation to the events it aims to 
influence and its work on the “culture of the territory over which it presides” (Ahearne, 2009, p. 143). 
The current Arts Minister commented that his “Department and the national cultural institutions which 
operate under its aegis are very pleased to support and participate” in the Gathering. Available: 
http://www.kildarestreet.com/debates/?id=2012-03-06.21.0 [Accessed 18 February 2013]. 
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various problem-solving techniques (Moran et al., 2006, p. 4). Chapter Four also 
detailed how policy acts at a symbolic level as part of government legitimacy 
apparatuses and ideological tools, capable of manipulating and distorting information 
(Parsons, 1995, p. 14-15) as much as communication. The history of policy as both 
positive and negative, therefore, is embodied in these two apparatuses of decision-
making and legitimising, and aligns with Habermas and Foucault’s different 
understandings of legitimacy (necessary v coercive) and discourse (productive v 
coercive) as demonstrated in Chapter Two (2.5.2).  
 
Specifically, the positive or first model of policy can be viewed as part of a wider and 
transformational policy spirit or principle, concerning the duty of governments towards 
their collective citizens, despite those governments’ alignments with the often 
competing force of the market. Policy in this light can be viewed as contributing to: “the 
democratic or political capacities of people” (Parsons, 1995, p. 614); the “progressive 
democratization of mankind” (ibid., p. 616); the “sphere or domain of life which is not 
private or purely individual, but held in common” (ibid., p. 3); and (as influenced by the 
Utilitarians) “the greatest happiness for the greatest number” (ibid., p. 45). This view is 
exemplified and amplified in citations from the “early days” of the social sciences 
(ibid., p. 612), in particular the views of mid-20
th 
century US political scientist Harold 
Laswell. Lasswell described public policy as helping people to reach “a fuller 
realisation of human dignity” (Lasswell, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. 384), as well as 
aiding “enlightenment, the fuller development of individuals in society, and the 
development of consent, consensus, social awareness and legitimacy” (Parsons, 1995, p. 
613).  
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Like Habermas’s theory of communicative reason and discourse ethics (1987), 
Lasswell’s interpretation of policy can be viewed as a 19th century paternalism or even 
governmentality, rooted in improving and civilising discourses based on rationalism and 
a disavowal of the issue of equity (ibid., p. 46). However, Lasswell’s emphasis on 
representation, education and spirit can also be viewed as opening out a wider space of 
policy discourse beyond policy as a technical, distorting or manipulative mechanism 
(though it may also be this), and echoes the positive aspects of modernity referred to 
earlier (Calhoun, 1992, p. 40). This view of policy places emphasis on the 
knowledgeable citizen (as much as knowledgeable government), positing policy as a 
form of public education (through the state), helping citizens to be better informed and 
their relationship to the state more productive, in contrast to policy as “simply the 
delivery of goods and services” (Parsons, 1995, p. 613). This model, therefore, 
resembles Habermas’s model of communicative reason, emphasising the 
transformational capacities of policy, rather than the pragmatic solving of issues that 
“clog up” the state’s agenda (Quinn, 1998, p. 15).  
 
While avoiding an idealised paradigm of policy as predicated on Habermas’s discourse 
consensus, this view of policy offers a broad philosophical framework which can be 
argued to underpin the four key tenets of policy above (public spirit/balance of 
public/private interests, not-for-profit imperative, technical and knowledge base, and 
claim for legitimacy). While the creative city underlines the perpetually colonised status 
of cultural policy and notwithstanding the use of policy to distort (aligning with 
Foucault’s interpretation of discourse), this philosophical and practical policy 
framework helps consider the gap between policy in principle or at least the aspirations 
of policy, and policy in practice. 
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7.3.1 Compromising the principles of public policy 
Firstly, it has been demonstrated that the creative city conflates public and private 
interests by focusing its benefits on private investment and development in cities. This 
activity directly challenges the balancing of public/private interests in the service of a 
common good and the welfare of the collective population (Parsons, 1995, p. 16), and 
furthers the slippage in understandings of the private and the public (Schlesinger, 2009a, 
p. 2), as criticised by Habermas (Habermas, 1989, p. 21). This is illustrated by the 
cases’ discourses of: attracting “international partners and new talent” (Scottish 
Government, 2008, p. 5); benefiting “significantly Scotland’s business and enterprise 
sectors” (Scottish Government, 2010b, p. 1); contributing to “investments and capital” 
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 31); and aiding “foreign direct investment” 
(Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. 92).
18
  
 
Secondly, in presenting these economic development discourses, cultural policy is 
effectively positing private goods (investment, developments, etc.) as self-evident 
public goods arising out of public policy, which again underlines the ideological nature 
of “public good“ (Hewitt, 2011, p. 20). This obscures, in plain sight, the “elite” (private) 
investor benefits (Sennett, 2006, p. 293) that arise from investment and development in 
cities (and that are implied by public goods), sustains the “status quo and the powerful” 
and works “against change and the powerless” (Edelman, cited in Parsons, 1995, pp. 
180- 181). In this way, cultural policies provide “ideological cover” for state-sponsored 
and market-oriented gentrification (Peck, 2007, n.p.) and understandings of the public 
good.  
                                                           
18Both Finland and Ireland also discuss private investment (Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 34; Arts 
Council of Ireland, 2009, p. xxvii). 
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Similarly, the universal and singular public targeted by private commercial 
developments typical to regeneration (i.e., public coffee shops, meeting squares, etc.), 
represent a commercial public only, or a private interpretation of the public. Since 
“public spaces” are “always plural”, “striated and hegemonically structured”, if they are 
only open to those who wish to trade (i.e., buy or sell something), rather than those who 
wish to engage in a productive conflict, or agonistic and non-consensual public sphere 
(Mouffe, 2007, p. 158), they cannot be called public spaces. These developments, 
therefore, flatten unknowable publics (who are not allowed to enter putatively public 
spaces) and counter publics (or those offering an alternative to a normative public), 
compressing and making “impossible” a more inclusive and dynamic public sphere 
(Fraser, 1990, p. 68), as well as restricting democratic engagement (ibid., p. 80). 
Equally, these spaces question the identity of the public, given that the identity of a 
space is a “function of its public, and reciprocally the identity of the public is at stake in 
the way the public space is constructed” (Mouffe, 2007, p. 160).  
 
Thirdly, the creative city paradigm clearly contests the function of public policy as an 
alternative to, or a regulation of, the market that is unconcerned with profitability 
(Parsons, 1995, p. 6). Again, the privatisation of cultural activity, as demonstrated in 
Glasgow Life and Creative Scotland, as well as the investment discourses of the cases, 
and the general commodification of culture, clearly implies the drive for profitability 
(rather than sustainability) and thus the support of capitalism. National or local authority 
partnerships with the private sector, therefore, have also been described as substituting 
transient, unpredictable and risky “private resources for [non-risky] state responsibility” 
(Raunig, 2005, p. 17).  
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Fourthly, the creative city ironically challenges the role of knowledge and expertise in 
public policy (Moran et al., 2006, p. 4). Though the appeal of creative city discourse lies 
partly in its function as a putative knowledge paradigm (as suggested earlier), and while 
knowledge is contingent and ideological, criticisms of its methodology and conclusions 
(lack of rigour, confusion between causation and correlation) raise the question as to 
whether the creative city can be said to constitute knowledge at all (Malanga, 2004, 
n.p.). Worse, however, the presence of elite, academic, industrial (non-public, expert) 
and private business interests in policy, actively represses public participation and 
knowledge–creation in policy (Parsons, 1995, pp. 167-168). This is due to the 
suffocating impact of expertise (and knowing better) on public involvement, agenda-
setting, debate, and decisions, which narrows the range of policy options, and introduces 
a “one dimensionality” in policy debates (ibid., p. 396), as well as, again, degrading the 
public sphere.  
 
Fifthly, the means-ends rationality and rhetorical devices (such as Florida’s 3 T’s) used 
by the creative city constitute limiting and “predefined goals” (McGuigan, 2004, p. 52), 
which can shut down open, deliberative or communicative processes, leading to an 
“uncritical acceptance” of means-end values (Oakley, 2004, p. 68). Further, the 
formulaic approach of the creative city, despite its flexibility to meet various state needs 
(as demonstrated by the case studies), ironically stretches understandings of reason and 
knowledge in policy (Parsons, 1995, p. 611).  
 
Taken together: the support of the market (capitalism) at the expense of the public and 
electorate; the disavowal and distortion of understandings of public/private interests, 
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goods and spaces; the active pursuit of profit through culture; the misuse of knowledge 
and suppression of public input into policy; and the rational erosion of deliberative 
processes, undermines policy as a function and legitimation of the state, a core function 
of policy (Parsons, 1995, p. 612). Further, if policy is viewed as having at least the 
potential for positive (as well as negative) impact, the creative city’s colonisation of 
cultural policy necessarily disables its capacity to be part of the “progressive 
democratization of mankind” (Parsons, 1995, p. 616) and to represent the “fuller 
development of individuals in society” (ibid., p. 613). 
 
 In summary, this colonisation challenges policy’s capacity to uphold the 
“communicative rather than instrumental rationality of democratic societies” (Parsons, 
1995, p. 615) by destabilising key public policy principles. While cultural policy may 
already be problematic and colonised, therefore, its colonisation by the creative city in 
particular, results in a broader and deeper colonisation of public policy in general, and a 
disavowal of policy per se. Ironically, what was intended as a legitimation strategy, 
delegitimates governments with repercussions for political-ideological systems. 
 
7.3.2 Exposing issues in liberal democracies and models of democracy  
The colonised cultural policies of Scotland and Finland not only demonstrate how 
cultural policies undermine core policy principles, pointing to legitimacy issues within 
their states, but also reflect historical and contemporary problems with models of 
democracy. As such, though democracy is usually benignly interpreted and invoked, 
there are deep criticisms of the basis on which it is upheld. Positive models of 
democracy typically describe it as comprising: participation and representation, 
legitimacy, balancing the rights of the individual and rights of the collective, resolving 
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conflict, nurturing knowledgeable and informed citizens (Held, 2006, p. 275), and 
conferring concepts of fairness, equality, (good) governance, and the good life (or life 
worth living). While it has been demonstrated that the creative city clearly challenges 
these descriptions of democracy (and therefore could be viewed as undemocratic), it is 
more useful to consider the criticisms of democracy in order to further understand the 
role of the paradigm in public policies. 
 
There are many criticisms of democracy, each of which (as above) could be applied to 
the creative city model, these are : its incapacity or unwillingness to effectively 
determine how the people (or public) are constituted and who or what is representative 
of them (Held, 2006, p. 1) as indicated by the creative city’s conflation of private space 
with public terminology; its “indistinction between the public and private” (Ranciere, 
2006, p. 55); and the invariable hegemony of property (owners) and the middle classes 
(Held, 2006, p. 206, p. 177) rather than the “struggle against privatisation” that 
democracy promises (Ranciere, 2006, p. 55).
19
 This view of cultural policy as revealing 
the deficits of democratic models extends equally to criticisms of liberal democracies 
which focus on the aggregation of the public good as the sum of private preferences 
rather than collective benefit (Held, 2006, p. 246) and again, view those who challenge 
the security or property of the market [as] actively threaten[ing] the “public good” 
(Held, 2006, p. 76). By underlining the gap between policy in principle and practice, 
and embodying key problems with democracy, the creative city essentially underlines 
the flawed (and obfuscated) governance model used by most Western countries, 
including the three cases. 
 
                                                           
19
 Other criticisms of democracy consist of how to ensure the appropriate conditions for and articulation 
of participation in rule and how to ensure “knowledgeable and informed” citizens to ensure a quality of 
participation (Held, 2006, p. 275). 
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7.3.3 Underlining relationships: the state, market, private property, legitimacy, the 
common good and good governance 
As referred to in Chapter One, the privileging of private property and private ownership 
of the means of production has historically been linked to utilitarianism (Held, 2006, p. 
77) but constitutes one of the fundamental criticisms of democratic models. As such, 
privatisation is one of the key ideological issues in contemporary political economy and 
theories of the state. As a proponent of liberalism, the utilitarian tradition is a key 
challenger to the power of the state, advancing a limited state intervention into the 
market, while promoting maximum freedom to the private sector (ibid., p. 76).  The 
advantages conferred on the private sector by the state arises from its dependence on the 
generation of wealth by private corporations (as pursued through the policies of 
Scotland and Finland), which, as Habermas contends, leads to the need for legitimacy in 
the first place (Habermas, 1973, p. 11). In Habermas’s view, class-dominated systems 
implicitly privilege the market and the “appropriation of socially produced wealth” 
(ibid., p. 20), and are therefore challenged to “resolve the problem of distributing the 
surplus social product inequitably and yet legitimately” (ibid., p. 96). This helps to 
obscure the uneven distribution of wealth via the complex role of the state and 
capitalism in relation to the public and the market (Foucault, 1994, p. 201). 
 
In order to understand the reflexive bind between the state and the market vis-à-vis the 
colonised cultural policies of Scotland and Finland, it is necessary to briefly consider 
the nature of their (the state and market) relationship. While the economy is understood 
as a legitimate area of public concern (Fraser, 1990, p. 73), views are divided between 
those who charge the state with regulating and monitoring corporations and the market 
(on behalf of the electorate), and liberals who believe in a hands-off or laissez-faire 
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approach. Max Weber, a key critic of rationalism sided with the former approach, 
believing that in the absence of monitoring bureaucrats, the state would “fall prey” to 
“powerful private interests” (such as landholders and capitalists) who would “not have 
the national interest as their prime concern” (Weber, cited in Held, 2006, p. 133).  
However, as the three cases show, the state and its civil servants (via politicians) also 
push the boundaries of market co-operation/regulation. 
 
The close relationship between states and markets in the twentieth century also arises 
out of the link between (and discursive appeal of) capitalism and democracy. This link 
has roots in the “social compromise between capital and labour” that followed World 
War II, where huge wealth was created in tandem with increased social benefit, 
stability, and the welfare state (Harvey, 2005, p. 16). This created an enduring and 
benign view of democracy as a facilitator of consumer capacity and choice, bringing the 
concepts of state, market and democracy together. The state’s vested interest in capital 
accumulation, or capitalist-friendly decision making (and thus its closeness to the 
private sector and property development), however, is not simply a question of 
democracy or providing for the public, but is fundamentally a consequence of ensuring 
its own welfare and longevity (Offe, cited in Held, 2006, p. 176). Since the state 
depends on international investors to finance its administration, it essentially depends on 
the markets as represented by investors. As the cases of Scotland and Finland show, 
their states are engaged in servicing the needs of their economies by providing the right 
kind of workers, by engineering education systems and labour law to create these 
workers; by generating tax regulations that favour private companies; and by facilitating 
taxation and banking to make it easier for corporations to locate. In other words, these 
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processes help secure the capitalist “structural prerequisites of reproduction” 
(Habermas, 1973, p. 21). 
 
The closeness of states and markets (and the market colonisation of the former) has 
been emphasised by the recent international recession, and specifically, the “public 
bailout of private capitalism” and investors in the EU (Streeck, 2011, p. 25). This 
specific colonisation revealed how states were operating as private “debt-collecting 
agencies on behalf of a global oligarchy of investors” (ibid., p. 28). Similarly, the 
requirements of international bailout mechanisms such as the IMF and EU, further 
increased the dependency of the state on the market, as well as decreasing national 
sovereignties, most particularly in Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal (ibid., p. 26). In 
addition to colonisation, this situation demonstrates the erosion of democracy (however 
contested) that ensues from too close a relationship between the state and the market, 
resulting in the state’s inability or unwillingness to “mediate between the rights of 
citizens and the requirements of capital accumulation” (ibid., p. 25).20 This relationship 
makes it difficult for those outside “political and financial elites” to decode the balance 
of interests in policy, and, in particular, to “identify their own” (ibid., p. 28). Further, 
the situation underlines how citizens’ “interests and demands are incommensurable with 
those of capital owners” (ibid., p. 29). 
 
As indicated by Habermas (1973, p. 96), however, and critical to these cultural policies, 
in order to secure or maintain legitimacy and thus “mass electoral support” (Held, 2006, 
p. 194), the state’s embrace of capitalism (and markets) must appear neutral (as 
                                                           
20
 The case of a country indebted to international banks and investors, equating sovereign debt with 
private debt, has been highlighted many times in recessionary Ireland. Most specifically, this conflation of 
public and private debt concerns the state’s assigning of promissory notes to cover and indemnify the 
huge debts incurred by (now defunct) private banking institutions, who the Irish state deemed essential to 
the health of the Irish economy. See (Regan, 2012). 
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indicated in the dualist discourses of the three cases) and sustain the “accumulation 
process without undermining either private accumulation or the belief in the market as a 
fair distributor of scarce resources” (Held, 2006, p. 177). The cases of Scotland and 
Finland exemplify this in their benign narratives of culture, citizenship and the public 
sphere in juxtaposition with private investment discourses, which are designed to 
prevent a “focus on the contradictions of capital” (Calhoun, 1992, p. 30).  
 
This understanding of the obfuscated relationship between the state and the economy 
posits the “contradictory imperatives” and legitimacy needs of the state as both 
intervening and providing longevity for capitalism on which it depends (for taxes) and 
thereby working “in the service of the ruling class” (Bennett, 1998, p. 5), while 
simultaneously maintaining the facade of even-handedness (to the public collective 
interest) (Held, 2006, p. 177). This represents once more how discourse works as 
“containment in the face of anomalies and contradictions”, particularly in relation to 
state policy (Shapiro, 1990, p. 333) and demonstrates the contradictory imperatives of 
policy, covertly championing the economy and capitalism while maintaining equity and 
citizenship discourses.  
 
The close relationship between the state and the market as seen in cultural policies (also 
maintained by the market which needs the state as a financial partner and provider of a 
secure and stable business environment) highlights tensions between models of 
democracy, capitalism and those who criticise the separation of the public sphere from 
the state. However, the implication of these factors (conflating public and private 
interests, compromising understandings of the people, privileging private above public 
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interests, the hegemony of the middle classes) goes beyond models of democracy, to the 
concept of the common good, government, and governance (see 4.4.2).  
 
As Chapter Seven (7.3.1) has demonstrated, the creative city also disrupts collective 
rather than individual understandings of the common good (Foucault, 1994, p. 210)
21
  
by equating economic development with the public (and common) good. Also, while the 
creative city may partly meet the rationalist and efficiency aims of both government and 
governance, the paradigm abjures UNESCO’s model of good governance (albeit 
contested), comprising: participation (diminished through the exclusiveness of the 
creative city), transparency (undermined through the conflation of public and private), 
equity (as before) and inclusiveness.
22
 In this light, and bearing in mind Chapters Five 
and Six, colonisation by the creative city not only delegitimates cultural policy and 
highlights many of its problems, but undermines public policies more widely, reflecting 
critical problems in democracy, challenging benign views of government as “society’s 
better self” (McGuigan, 2004, p. 35), and eroding collective (Aristotelian) 
understandings of the common good and governance. 
 
7.4 What is cultural policy for?: returning to the question of mandate 
Before concluding this chapter, it is necessary to return to the question that continues to 
be raised in this research and particularly within the last three chapters. While it has 
been demonstrated that the state and private sector get to decide what constitutes 
cultural policy in the first place, via narratives, constructions, and the endorsement of 
                                                           
21
 See also section 4.4.2. The private sector and individualist focus of the creative city paradigm supports 
the liberal conception of the common good, as predicated on, and determined by, individual rights and 
liberties, rather than the reverse, which stresses the dependency of individual freedoms on the a priori 
exercise of civic and public services or duties, representing a collective concept of the common good 
(Skinner, 1992). 
22
 See Chapter Four (4.4.2.  footnote # 21). 
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value systems (i.e. the state’s role is to prop up capitalism), questions around the 
purpose of cultural policy, or what cultural policy is for, remain. It has been argued that 
the contested, complex and amorphous character of culture, the limiting of definitions of 
cultural policy to activities rather than purposes (and activities that other sectors deliver 
better) and the wide range of uses for culture in cultural policies, is central to this 
question. As such, Chapter Four has shown that typical definitions of cultural policy 
describe the benefits of culture and thus what cultural policy does, whether that be 
forming and governing subjects (O’Regan, 2001), regularising and promoting cultural 
practices (ICCPR), and/or intervening in cultural activity more generally (Cunningham, 
2003), rather than what cultural policies are designed for in the wider sense of electoral 
mandate.
23
 
 
However, in addition to the shifting nature of culture and the lack of explicit purpose in 
these definitions, other factors have emerged throughout this dissertation which also 
highlight and inform this question. These factors are: the function of discourse and thus 
policy as a strategic system of communication, power, and state legitimation (Chapter 
Two); the general (Chapter Three) and particular (local) uses for culture and cultural 
practitioners in the cultural policies of Scotland, Finland and Ireland (Chapters Five and 
Six); the shifts in (non-cultural) uses and rationales for culture (Chapter Four); the 
limited nature of public good or market failure rationales to explain the state funding of 
culture (Chapter Four); the dichotomous and confused (positive and negative) media 
accounts of cultural investment (Chapter Six); the “performance” (Paquette, 2008, p. 
298) ; the lack of sincerity and the presence of cynical reason involved in funding 
relationships (Chapters Four and Six); the lack of an identifiable cultural policy problem 
                                                           
23 The question of what cultural policy is for is the same question asked of universities and education, 
particularly in the context of neoliberal market functionalities. See Collini (2012). 
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or public mandate (this chapter); the questionable validity of economic or social 
arguments for cultural policy if judged on their own terms (this chapter); the dualisms 
and paradoxes involved in arguments for culture; the creative city’s simultaneous 
legitimation and delegitimation of policy and the state (this chapter); and finally, the 
state’s obfuscated relationship with the market (this chapter).  
 
These contexts demonstrate the lack of consensus, lack of trust, confusion and crisis of 
ideas in cultural policies in general (Szántó, 2010), at least in terms of how to represent 
the greater value or putative purpose of culture in societies. The covert nature of 
cultural policy discourses in particular, as demonstrated in the research, also points to a 
reluctance on the part of governments to make cultural policy “subject to public 
validation” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 336), recalling both cynical reason (Sloterdijk, 1987) and 
a lifeworld/system imbalance (see 2.5.1). In this context, it is not surprising that cultural 
policy has no clear mandate, is a weak sector that is perpetually colonised and has 
sustained legitimacy problems (both within and without). 
 
Equally, while it has been said that “most parties, conservative as well as radical and 
socialistic/social democratic ones, accept the viewpoint that the nation state and the 
regional and local government bodies should support culture” (Vestheim, 2007, p. 218),  
this does not explain why. While it may not be realistic for all policy texts to set out 
their respective founding principles, it might reasonably be expected that a coordinating 
policy principle would underpin or at least be inferred from individual policies. This 
lack of articulacy has been touched on repeatedly in relation to claims about cultural 
policy’s inability to find the “necessary language” (Tusa, 2011, n.p.), though, again, 
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there is no consensus over what “necessary” means in a sector divided between 
pragmatic and romantic views of instrumentalism.  
 
However, this research has demonstrated the extreme pliability of culture to 
governments, and consequently the various uses to which culture is put by ruling elites. 
The dissertation has also illustrated the local needs that culture addresses for countries, 
most particularly in relation to the economy (Scotland, Finland, Ireland), declining 
populations, workers (Scotland), globalisation (Finland) and reputation (Ireland). While 
these goals arguably represent the state’s rather than the public’s problems/needs (i.e. 
the cases’ discourses of attracting investment through cultural symbolism speaks to 
governments’ support of capitalism) and in that sense are not mandated, they can be 
viewed conversely as the sui generis reason or purpose behind cultural policy. This 
situation suggests that cultural policy is not only used to deliver other government 
agendas, but that its’ a priori purpose and role in government, is to deliver other 
government agendas. As section 6.2 has outlined, this claim is supported at the highest 
echelons of political representation, highlighted in comments by Scotland’s former First 
Minister Jack McConnell, who asserted that cultural policy should not have any policy 
objective of its own (McConnell, 2003, n.p.). 
 
Further, if various discourses in cultural policy, including those in Scotland, Finland and 
Ireland (encouraging foreign direct investment, attracting highly educated workers and 
branding countries), are viewed not as legitimising culture, but as legitimising the 
state’s involvement with capitalism, or the actions of various states, through culture, 
this would explain the apparent lack of consensus on cultural policy and its role in 
delivering other agendas, however inadequately.  As such, if other policy sectors can 
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deliver economic, social or diplomatic agendas better or more directly than culture, the 
maintaining of cultural policy as a separate sector is redundant. This also suggests that 
discourses of market failure and public goods, as well as rationales, measurement and 
evidence (size and impact of sector, public interest), though described as a “matter of 
survival for the cultural sector” (DCMS, 2010, p. 13), are effectively “displacement” 
(Belfiore, 2012, p. 107) discourses, and are immaterial in terms of advocacy and 
funding. This is a profound situation in the context of the time and effort spent on 
research and in appealing to and justifying cultural policies. 
 
All three sets of cultural policies, therefore, have shown that the state’s complicit 
relationship with, and democratic legitimation of, capitalism and the market, is part of 
the survival of those states and constitutes the purpose of cultural policy, a factor 
consistent with theories of hegemonic cultural capital.
24
 Like many contradictions 
pointed to during the course of this research and as indicated earlier (see 7.2.3), this also 
suggests that cultural policy, like the creative city, works apparently 
counterproductively (depending on how you view its purpose) and structurally to 
colonise and be colonised, impacting on relationships amongst its stakeholders. In short, 
debates about instrumentalism and the role of culture in society and discussions in 
relation to the public funding of culture, raise the question of whether these terms can be 
interrogated or even matter, if there is either no agreement about the purpose and 
desired impact of cultural policy in the first instance, or if its purpose is indeed only to 
deliver other sectoral agendas.  
 
                                                           
24
 There are many instances of the closeness of government, politicians and the media, recently 
exemplified by revelations concerning the UK’s News of the World (News International) mobile phone 
message hacking in July 2011. Available: http://www.ft.com/indepth/leveson-phone-hacking [Accessed 6 
March 2013].  
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Though it has been claimed that all policy is instrumental and strategic (Gray, 2007, p. 
205) and legitimates government, and in this respect cultural policies are no different, as 
Chapter One outlined at the start of the thesis, this is usually achieved by addressing a 
self-evident public need (Burstein, 1991), in the particular policy sector area. This 
research has therefore demonstrated that while cultural policies reflect a range of state 
rather than public needs, the result of this is that there is no self-evident requirement for 
cultural policy other than to meet wider government agendas. As such, this effectively 
makes cultural policy a comparatively different area of government activity, despite 
policy’s attempts to bring it into line with other areas by increased evidence-building, 
and argumentation. 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has underlined the potential problems for cultural policy and the state 
arising from its use of instrumental discourses such as the creative city. It showed how 
the colonisation of cultural policy by the creative city arises from structural 
instrumentalism and, therefore, is endemic, creating long-term issues for an already 
problematic, colonised and colonising sector lacking an identifiable public mandate. 
Specifically, the chapter demonstrated that the creative city presents both general and 
specific problems for cultural policy. The chapter recalled the general problems caused 
by cultural instrumentalism, which included: the addressing of objectives which might 
be better served by other policy areas, a disregard for cultural content, and the 
prioritisation of outcomes ahead of processes. In addition, the chapter outlined the 
particular problems caused by the creative city: the spectacularisation and simulation of 
culture (reinforcing a limited view of what culture might constitute), the exaggeration of 
economic impacts (and erosion of trust between policy stakeholders) and the ignoring of 
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the practical terms and needs of cultural production (thus eschewing sustainability 
issues).  
 
However, as was suggested in Chapter Four, it was also demonstrated that cultural 
policy is deeply flawed (lacking consensus on culture, lacking a policy problem and 
mandate, an excess of rationalism, dualism, apathy, biases, a lack of democracy and a 
lack of status). Further, it was suggested that cultural policy is instrumentalising and 
colonising those it supports, reflecting the structural and cyclical impact of colonisation 
and in particular, the precarious relationship between the state, the market, and the 
public/electorate. Though putatively legitimising cultural policy, therefore, the creative 
city creates an imbalance between the demands of the system, over those of the 
lifeworld which raises the prospect of a legitimacy problem for cultural policy.  
 
The chapter further underlined how the colonisation of cultural policy by the creative 
city undermines the benign principles of public policy in general, with serious 
ramifications for the state beyond cultural policy. These implications are that the 
creative city, through policy, upholds stringent criticisms of models of democracy, by 
emphasising how the state privileges capital and private property, conflates and distorts 
concepts of the public and private (goods), supports the market at the expense of the 
collective good, implicitly presents capital accumulation as desirable and 
unquestionable and uses policy to confuse and obfuscate economic agendas. This 
situation represents the profound contradiction in contemporary capitalist states, that of 
the dualist position of the state vis-à-vis its appeal to the public for its legitimacy on the 
one hand, and its dependence on the private sector for its longevity on the other, or the 
democratic legitimation of capitalism. These factors also point to the historical 
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continuum of culture and cultural policy’s role in state and ruling power legitimation. 
This is especially significant as both the creative city and cultural policy purport to 
enhance democracy and participation by deploying anti-colonising (or communicative 
and civil society) discourses (which may or may not be covert attempts to obscure the 
inherent contradictions of the discourse), in spite of the broader legitimising function of 
policy.  
 
Ultimately, it was demonstrated that the weakness of cultural policy as a sector, as 
reflected in the many definitions of and uses for culture, and thus its lack of a coherent 
public mandate (and presence of multiple conflicting mandates), creates many of its 
problems. Together, the chapters have demonstrated that these weaknesses originate in 
the shifting and contested (and political) nature of culture and its lack of a tangible 
public policy problem to solve, pointing to a general confusion over what cultural policy 
is for other than to deliver other more important government agendas. The problems 
caused by and reflecting this weakness were demonstrated to be: transient rationales for 
culture in cultural policy; dualisms; public and political apathy for cultural policy; the 
delivery of other government agendas as the de facto and primary role of cultural 
policy; the erosion of trust amongst cultural policy stakeholders and structural (cultural) 
instrumentalism coupled with colonisation.  
 
Despite being designed to legitimate the state, therefore, (negative) instrumentalism, as 
demonstrated by the colonisation of Scotland’s, Finland’s and Ireland’s cultural policies 
(by the creative city), both undermines trust amongst the stakeholders of cultural policy 
and delegitimates the state. Instrumentalism also erodes the normative models of 
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democracy on which the discourses of cultural policy and the state depend, once again 
revealing culture to be inadvertently complicit with capitalism. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CULTURAL 
POLICY 
 
8.1 Introduction  
This dissertation presented a case for analysing the text-based discourses of cultural 
policy vis-à-vis the framework of the creative city paradigm, in order to explore and 
expose key characteristics, pressures and imperatives in the cultural policy sector. Of 
equal importance to this research was a consideration of what was at stake in the 
relationship between cultural policy and the creative city, which was demonstrated to 
be: the purposes, rationales and mandate of cultural policy and the impact of this on the 
status and legitimacy of culture ministries; the relationships between cultural policy 
stakeholders and the effect of this on cultural policy and its value systems; and the 
state’s balance between public and private interests and the legitimacy of the state itself. 
 
In order to answer the question of what constituted the relationship between a popular 
model of urban development and explicit cultural policy, three investigations were 
conducted. These investigations comprised: a survey of the historical and genealogical 
connections between the two paradigms, a discourse analysis of three sets of cultural 
policies, and an examination of what occurred, how and why it occurred and the 
meanings generated from that. Following the claim that difficulties within cultural 
policies lead to legitimacy deficits and perpetual and problematic argumentation (of 
which the creative city was one example), this dissertation established a number of key 
factors. Firstly, the research established the historical, conceptual and discursive links 
between explicit cultural policy and the narrative of the creative city. Secondly, using 
discourse analysis and Foucauldian discourse formation theory in relation to policy texts 
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produced between 2000 and 2010 in Scotland, Finland and Ireland, the dissertation 
demonstrated the overlapping and emigration of creative city discourses to the cultural 
policies of Scotland and Finland. Thirdly, using Habermas and Sloterdijk, the research 
analysed what this revealed about the state of cultural policies in general and what the 
implications of this were in respect of wider public policy, the state and models of 
democracy.  
 
8.2 Main outcomes/findings 
As a result, this research demonstrated that key features of creative city discourses were 
particularly present in the cultural policies of Scotland and Finland (and less so in 
Ireland) and that it operates as a legitimation device within those policies. The 
legitimation of cultural policy to the electorate by the creative city depends on providing 
tangible rationales for investment into culture based on its role as an important 
economic generator. In legitimating cultural policy to the public, the creative city 
legitimates the state, in the ultimate service of state longevity, though given the 
dominance of system (political-economic) imperatives in the creative city, this is 
counterproductive.   
 
Specifically, within cultural policy, the creative city operates as an unquestioned and 
elite form of knowledge, claim or truth about culture, whose persuasiveness is 
dependent on a range of policy fits and socio-cultural and political-economic ideologies 
and discourses. This factor is a key feature of the successful integration of the creative 
city into, and traction within, policy in general. This dissertation also showed that the 
appeal of the creative city is equally driven by its role as an apparently disinterested and 
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meritocratic paradigm, pointing to the importance of renewing the supply of supportive 
or legitimising discourses to cultural policies in ways that the public can understand. 
As such, while contested as a term, the putatively democratic and often quantifiable 
nature of instrumentalism, through the creative city, was demonstrated and 
acknowledged to be useful to policymakers in raising the profile of and legitimising 
culture to other government departments, as well as to a lesser degree, aspects of the 
electorate. In addition to legitimising the actions of the state, instrumentalism works to 
counteract accusations of elitist autonomous discourses of culture’s intrinsic value and 
again, points to the value of a paradigm like the creative city.  
 
The local or individual fit of the creative city paradigm within each country (responding 
to different state problems), also showed that the paradigm, like culture, has the 
flexibility to meet a range of local and national (non-cultural) needs and that in the 
absence of any meta cultural rationale, delivering other government agendas can be 
understood as constituting the primary function of cultural policies. As such, 
instrumental discourses such as the creative city (as a generator of private wealth) can 
also be posited as a simulacrum of the searched-for cultural policy problem, further 
highlighting the lack of cultural purpose in cultural policy. This meeting of needs 
further ensured the transferability of creative city discourse, and highlighted the 
adaptability of the paradigm to liberal democratic policies in particular. 
 
In addition, given the shared geographic and peripheral situations of the three cases on 
the northern fringes of Europe, it can be homologously extrapolated that the creative 
city particularly appeals to countries struggling to assert an internationalism, visibility 
and strong identity (especially those looking to promote themselves as cosmopolitan 
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hubs of the knowledge economy). It can also be deduced that the creative city appeals to 
countries with few natural resources and small populations that depend on securing and 
maintaining renewed supplies of workers and residents.  
 
However, it was equally demonstrated (through the creative city), that cultural policy 
discourses are often contradictory, and have to appeal to dual expectations and multiple 
mandates from cultural policy stakeholders, as well as indicating a political 
unwillingness to be tied to one policy discourse rather than another. These discourses 
also deploy devices such as strategic containment and nominalisation to create 
particular regimes of thought that support and obfuscate state ideologies, particularly 
that of its relationship with the market. In addition, as an expression of these policies, 
the presence of the creative city in cultural policy simultaneously demonstrates and 
embodies key criticisms of and problems within liberal democracies in general.  
 
It was deduced, therefore, that there is a structural receptivity in cultural policy to 
instrumental (usually economic) discourses due the vacuum of purpose within the sector 
and the need for the state to justify its actions through policy.  The structural nature of 
instrumentalism in cultural policy particularly arises from the hierarchical and thus 
unequal relationship between the funder and the funded, driving an involuntary cycle of 
cynical reasoning in that relationship. As such, in considering the (lack of) agency and 
traction available to cultural policymakers as well as practitioners, a case was made that 
instrumentalism of any kind is rarely truly voluntary, and arises from the need, rather 
than desire, to attach cultural projects to whichever source of funding or influence offers 
the most chance of success (power, finance, status). This potentially causes more 
problems than it solves by creating a cycle of (often) inauthentic narratives in both 
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policies and funding applications, which compromise value-systems, exaggerate 
deliverables, and divert scarce resources of time and money to poor or culturally-
secondary outcomes.  
 
From this analysis, using Habermas’s concept of colonisation, it was possible to 
extrapolate that all three sets of policies were colonised and made colonisers by the 
political-economic system (which leads to them colonising those they encounter), 
following the imbalance between system and lifeworld imperatives, through the creative 
city paradigm and ultimately the reason of state. As indicated by cynical reason, this 
colonised and colonising behaviour of cultural policy undermines trust in the sector by 
fostering a culture of “performance” amongst the policy stakeholders (Paquette, 2008, p. 
298), as well promoting discordant discourses of capitalism and commodification, 
alongside civil society, democratic and intrinsic discourses of cultural value.  
 
The creative city paradigm, therefore, exacerbates an already difficult situation and 
points to the potential for a future Habermasian crisis of legitimacy for cultural policy 
and the state (as was hinted at in examples from the cases), despite the paradoxical fact 
that this colonisation and possible crisis, was caused by a discourse designed to 
legitimate. However, it was concluded that the presence of the creative city in cultural 
policy might not represent a crisis of legitimacy, given that as a policy sector without a 
self-evident purpose, it is in permanent crisis. Nevertheless, as suggested, the cases 
demonstrated that the economic colonisation of cultural policy, arising from structural 
instrumentalism, fundamentally undermines relationships between cultural policy 
stakeholders and causes identifiable (via the cases) legitimation problems for both 
cultural policy and the state.  
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It was ultimately claimed that it is the richness, immersive, multi-functionality and 
horizontal nature of culture as central to all expressive life, which contributes to the lack 
of clarity around the policy role for culture. This situation makes it difficult to 
administer culture and separate the cultural from the non-cultural, though the strategic 
outcome of this is also linked to the inherently instrumental nature of all policymaking. 
It also revealed that the creative city aligns with the strategic approach of cultural policy 
and operates as a mode of implicit cultural policy (operating within explicit cultural 
policy) that ultimately challenges and weakens it.  
 
In summation, therefore, this research demonstrated that various discourses such as the 
creative city are used by cultural policies to justify and legitimate (to a range of 
different constituencies), not just those policies, but also the actions and ideologies (in 
this case capitalism and neoliberalism) of the individual state, as well as offering a rare 
insight on how cultural policies are used to solve (at least symbolically), as well as 
obfuscate, individual national problems and agendas. As such, this dissertation has 
illustrated the profound pressure and role of cultural policies to: make “common cause” 
(Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 2) with government; deliver other ministers’ 
(McConnell, 2003, n.p.); and political “colleagues” (Higgins, 2013a, n.p.) objectives; 
and to be effectively “exploited” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 16). This 
dissertation, therefore, revealed how normative discourses in cultural policy (i.e. the 
creative city) can demonstrate structural deficits and a lack of clear mandate within it, 
highlighting the assumed nature of capitalism in European liberal democratic policies, 
and inconsistencies in democratic capitalism and the actions and reason of the state. 
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8.3 Contributions to knowledge 
This research has built the case for a new consideration of the discursive and theoretical 
relationship between the general field of explicit cultural policy and the specific 
construct of the creative city urban policy paradigm, via individual cultural policy cases. 
This investigation has led to a better understanding of both cultural policy and the 
creative city, but cultural policy in particular. Specifically it demonstrated that though 
the discourse of public policy is already an established area of inquiry (Shapiro, 1990; 
Cataldi, 2004; Jones, 2009), as has been shown (Barbieri, 2012), there is particular 
value in excavating the discourses of the apparently marginal policy area of culture to 
reveal legitimation mechanisms for not just cultural policies, but local problems and 
state ideologies. This excavation also demonstrated that the purpose of cultural policy is 
to address other government agendas, in the absence of any other public or cultural 
mandate and by way of legitimising state activity. The research also underlined new 
connections as well as positing new trajectories and genealogies between creativity 
discourses, cultural policy and the creative city.  
 
The research demonstrated that the creative city paradigm is a dominant and colonising 
discourse (along with others) that flexibly meets the needs of (Scottish and Finnish) 
national agendas, and is a counter-productive justificatory regime for cultural and public 
policy. The research showed that instrumentalism in cultural policy is cyclical, 
structural, self-perpetuating and fosters cynical reason amongst cultural policy 
stakeholders. This ultimately pointed to the reflexive and restrictive nature of cultural 
policy’s conflicting and/or unidentified public mandate, low status, and consequent 
drives for and facilitation of legitimacy in government. This uniquely highlights, with 
 371 
the help of Habermas’s system and lifeworld concepts, if not the involuntary nature of 
attaching non-cultural state agendas to cultural policy, at least a compromised agency.  
 
However, this research equally established the closeness and interdependency of the 
state and the market via the covert presentation of capital (via investment and 
development) and flexible accumulation present in cultural policy, as desirable and 
natural, and economic progress as a self-evident public good (rather than an ideological 
position). As suggested above, this research also revealed that cultural policies 
effectively operate as industrial and urban development policies (along with 
environmental, foreign and social policy) which have come to constitute cultural policy 
per se. While there are beneficial aspects to this horizontality in government (visibility, 
promoting values, apparent relevance), it ultimately undermines the independence, 
status and potential of cultural policy to address specifically cultural issues. 
 
 In this way, the policy success of the creative city raises important questions to do with 
both the unrealised potential of cultural policy and the role of the state vis-à-vis its 
ability to “mediate between the rights of citizens and the requirements of capital 
accumulation” (Streeck, 2011, p. 25). These issues, and in particular the private sector 
discourses in cultural policies, were not revealed, but were in effect, as discourses, 
hiding in plain sight, or existing in a “public form” particular to discourse (Foucault, 
1984, n.p.). The public form of cultural policy discourse, therefore, effectively called to 
attention the “incommensurable” interests and demands of citizens and capital owners 
(Streeck, 2011, p. 29).  
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This research therefore brings new issues to light (the structural colonisation of cultural 
policy by the creative city paradigm), and insights to an old problem (legitimacy, 
cultural policy, the state and capitalism), with a view to a deeper understanding of 
fundamental principles of cultural policy and the state. Ultimately this research argues 
that means-end and dualist rationalism in cultural policy, starts out as a strategy of 
survival based on the state’s complicated but complicit relationship with capitalism and 
the lack of mandate within cultural policy, but has the potential to end up as a politics of 
extinction
1
 in revealing the putatively undemocratic nature of that relationship. Having 
investigated the colonising and legitimising paradigms of the creative city and cultural 
policy, the question remains of whether something can be salvaged from both 
paradigms. 
 
8.4 Future directions 
This research did not intend to posit a new model or norm for cultural policy by calling 
to attention its deficits and its exposure of wider state issues. Given the lack of 
consensus as to what cultural policy is for in the first place (though this research has 
deduced this to be a vehicle to deliver other government agendas), a normative view of 
cultural policy is not only undesirable but also unrealistic. Rather, the aim behind this 
research was to interpret the meaning of cultural policy as is. What the cases revealed 
was the influence of neoliberalism on cultural policy and that of instrumentalism, but a 
particularly negative or one-dimensional, contradictory and cynical instrumentalism, of 
which the creative city was but one example.  
 
                                                           
1 This term arises from environmentalism and was coined by Lewis Regenstein for his book, ‘The Politics 
of Extinction’ (Macmillan Press), 1975, concerning the threat to various animal species from instrumental 
legislation. 
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However, by analysing policy literature and discourses of culture, and looking at 
democratic principles in respect of colonisation, a number of additional insights about 
cultural policy can be posited. Though it might be assumed, both conceptually and 
etymologically, that culture and policy (and thus cultural policy) concern culture and the 
public (as contested as the public is), embodying public policy and democratic norms, it 
was demonstrated that neither culture nor the public are driving factors of cultural 
policy. Instead, this research argued that what drives cultural policy is ultimately the 
legitimation of the state, as a response to confusions over what cultural policy is for and 
the broader alignment of the state with the economy and capitalism.  
 
Cultural policy, therefore, only represents the public insofar as the state needs 
legitimation from the public to survive. As such, while the research aimed to consider 
the benign attributes of the creative city paradigm (cultural visibility, tangible outcomes 
etc.) in the context of both the narrow and wider imperatives driving it within cultural 
policies, by charging it in respect of reflexive colonisation and legitimacy loss for 
cultural and public policy, the research ultimately aligned itself with a view of the 
paradigm as an example of negative instrumentalism. This raises the question of 
whether anything can be salvaged from the creative city model.  
 
To answer this question, the visibility and branding appeal of the paradigm must be 
considered. Despite the implications of the creative city for public policy and models of 
democracy, the creative city, as a cultural as well as urban development model, has 
arguably worked, and as demonstrated, has been perceived to work as a more effective 
and rational cultural advocate than explicit cultural policy itself. In line with 
observations that the tourism sector is often the most visible champion of culture in 
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cities (Garcia, 2004, p. 316), creative city activity, as described though the cases of 
Scotland, Finland and Ireland, widens the debate about the way culture is understood 
and valued in societies and governments. Equally, culture and urban regeneration 
narratives are easier for media sources and politicians to grasp than more autonomous 
cultural policy rationales. The creative city paradigm, therefore, underlines the capacity 
of culture to work across and prove its value to other sectors, calling to attention its 
central role in all aspects of life. 
 
In this respect there may be room for reclaiming at least the “promise of radical change” 
engendered by the creative city (Vickery, 2011, p. 2). There may also be value in 
considering the potential role for cultural policy in creating the “social conditions” for 
creativity rather than prescriptions for it (ibid., p. 13) and greater clarity around the 
state’s interest in and purpose for culture. A new role for the creative city paradigm in 
policy, therefore, might be to work with a renewed and purposeful (or mandated) 
discrete cultural policy sector, rather than replacing or dominating it and, in particular, 
move away from its singular commodification and competition mode.  
 
This would also provide a template for other government policy portfolios or causes to 
actively engage with culture, complementing, though separate to, cultural policy. It 
might be more useful to consider urban development narratives as more generally 
beneficial for culture within an urban rather than cultural policy context, leaving room 
for explicit cultural policy to offer something different. Without proposing a silo-based 
approach to policy and recognising the value of cross-sectoral co-operation and 
acknowledgment of culture’s values across government, this proposes leaving the 
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(amended) creative city within industrial policy and culture (primarily) within cultural 
policy. 
 
Nevertheless, as argued above, it is unclear how the creative city project can be re-
realised along the lines described, given how deeply entrenched its branding is, but, 
more so, the inevitable imbalance of power between it as representative of the system 
and explicit cultural policy as primarily driven by the lifeworld. It might also be argued 
that a renewed role for creativity in societies was the basis for the paradigm in the first 
instance. This research, therefore, contends that in spite of potentialities embedded in 
the creative city, as it is currently interpreted, it has negative implications for both 
cultural and public policy, regardless of where it is placed. Though it may be possible 
for the creative city paradigm to deliver a series of benefits that could separately meet 
cultural policy, urban tourism and heritage policy objectives (in addition to its industrial 
objectives), the extent of reconsideration that would need to take place could be viewed 
as a new policy model.  
 
In considering the difficulty of mandate, purpose and apathy in governments towards 
culture, the question turns again to what is wanted from cultural policy other than its 
subservience to other policy sectors, if it is not to become “obsolete or irrelevant” to the 
public/s (Pratt, 2005, p. 41). Given this dissertation’s suggestion that cultural policy is 
in perpetual crisis, and in light of the contested nature of culture, is it possible to salvage 
or recover an unidentifiable object (i.e., cultural policy)? The research has shown that 
opinion is divided between those who see long-term risk for culture (and thus 
deliberative possibilities) in relation to instrumentalist rationales (McGuigan, 2004) and 
those who see both good and bad instrumentalisms, viewing it as a democratic and 
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pragmatic necessity (in terms of the function of government) and something to be 
managed in balance with other (intrinsic) cultural valuations (Belfiore, 2012).  
 
This disagreement over instrumentalism points to what is a fundamental dilemma in 
cultural policy discourses of instrumentalism, which is that it is: “no good trying to 
relate all the value of arts and culture to monetary valuations, and equally unhelpful to 
try to justify the arts as some kind of special case, different from all other spending 
priorities and subject to unique criteria” (Selwood, cited in DCMS, 2010, p. 13). The 
implication of this position is that cultural policies need a balanced range of 
instrumental arguments, those that stress the economic outputs of culture and those that 
stress the putatively intrinsic values of culture. 
 
 However, this suggestion of balance arises precisely because arts and cultural policies 
are different to other more self-evident areas of government, by virtue of their multiple 
legitimacy discourses and servicing of other more important government agendas. 
Equally, other factors pointing to the dissimilarity of cultural policy to other policy 
areas comprise: culture’s complex, contested, subjective, and shifting nature; cultural 
policy’s exceptionally difficult foundation period and extra-ministerial construction; its 
lack of an identifiable cultural or public problem that needs solving, and consequently 
its lack of public mandate. It is these issues and vacuums, which lead to “monetary 
valuations” and instrumentalism in the first place (Selwood, cited in DCMS, 2010, p. 
13). In this respect, cultural policy is a different policy area, rather than a special case.  
 
Equally, this dissertation does not argue for a singular consensus on what culture vis-à-
vis the state is for, an unrealistic and potentially limiting proposition. In the absence of 
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any consensus between the public, the government and practitioners on what is wanted 
from culture, however, the question returns to whether an appropriate instrumentalism, 
or a balance of instrumentalism, can co-exist with what has been called the “proper 
independence” of culture (EU Council of Europe, 1997, p. 54), assuming “proper 
independence” refers to intrinsic value and that this kind of value can withstand 
economic imperatives. The difficulty seems to lie in what are seen as antidemocratic 
and elitist discourses of culture’s intrinsic value on the one hand, and approaches to 
culture solely as a “means of production” (Vuyk, 2010, p. 183) and social panacea, on 
the other, which, as we have seen, ironically works against the state.  
 
Notwithstanding the intention of this research not to posit a new vision for cultural 
policy, in moderating (but not obliterating) arguments in respect of instrumental, 
secondary or extrinsic values for culture, there is a case for a more effective assessment 
of balance in cultural policy rationales. In particular, it is proposed that more convincing 
articulations and qualitative research into non-economic and social benefits of culture, 
while instrumental, might offer equilibrium and a more comprehensive picture of the 
whole value of culture, in concert with more typical quantitative social and economic 
research and cultural rationales. A clearer mandate from publics as to what cultural 
policy might be, could also open up the field of cultural policy as embodying collective 
rather than individual principles. With this in mind, greater clarity and public 
expressions of this clarity, if not the elusive “necessary language” (Tusa, 2011, n.p.) or 
authenticity from governments, might at least create a wider understanding of why the 
state “is allowed to fund these things” in the first place (Telegraph, 2012, n.p.), and 
indeed what these “things” are. 
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Though there is little doubt that a consensus on the individual discourses of 
instrumentalism might be achieved (which might secure Habermas’s ideal legitimacy), 
particularly in light of the essentially ideological nature of discourse, a number of 
factors might improve the clarity, trust, sincerity, potential of and mandate for cultural 
policies. These factors include the need for: recognition that cultural policy is a different 
policy area from others and that this is a strength and a challenge to the sector; mutual 
respect and greater understanding between cultural policy stakeholders; increased 
dialogue between those making cultural policies and those affected by them; more 
public debate on cultural policy in general; balanced instrumental rationales and more 
effective articulations of non-economic and social values from policymakers (and 
researchers); a shift from cultural policy meeting wider government agendas to 
predominantly (but not exclusively) cultural issues; and, more significantly, the need for 
increased sincerity as to why the state chooses to support these activities. At its 
simplest, what could be proposed for cultural policy, admittedly provocatively, is less 
“bullshit” (Belfiore, 2008) and “cynical reason” (Sloterdijk, 1987). Equally, the 
principles of policy (if normative and problematic) as discussed earlier (fairness, 
representation, expertise, knowledge, democracy, legitimacy, dignity, social awareness), 
like Habermas’s ideal public sphere, still hold an ideal against which a (re)consideration 
of cultural policy might take place.  
 
Though it could be argued that the prevalent naturalisation of capital accumulation 
negates the proposal for a radical cultural politics, whether instrumental, non-
instrumental, economic or non-economic, there are more philosophical ways to consider 
this issue. One  potential model for cultural policy is Terry Eagleton’s suggestion of an 
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“ethical” cultural policy approach (Coleridge, cited in Eagleton, 2000, p. 7),2 
underlining the capacity of the sector to “fit us for political citizenship by liberating the 
ideal of collective self buried within each of us” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 7). This approach, 
though touching on the legitimising civil society discourses discussed earlier, is less 
about creating culture (which is produced regardless) and more about facilitating 
agonistic dialogue on the nature of identity and the fundamental question of “how to 
live with each other” (Mokre, 2006, p. 308). The political nature of this task, however, 
in light of the desire for governments to be re-elected, mitigates against this happening 
and secondly, even if the will was there, how to liberate our collective selves is another 
question. 
 
8.5 Final conclusions 
To conclude, this research has asserted that investigating the discourses of the creative 
city paradigm in respect of cultural policy reveals problems within cultural and public 
policies, as well as models of governance and democracy. Though the research 
indicated difficulties with identifying the specificities of the creative city paradigm, 
within the surfeit of other strategic discourses in cultural policy, it did establish a 
theoretical and discursive connection and extrapolated from that. This extrapolation 
demonstrated that the structural weaknesses and consequent endemic instrumentalism 
and colonisation of cultural policy unambiguously point to the question of whose 
interests are represented and served by policies and the state. Equally, this research 
builds on existing scholarship on policy and discourse and provides data for additional 
studies into creative city and regeneration discourses in wider European cultural policies 
in particular, a hitherto underexplored area. In general, this dissertation points to the 
                                                           
2 Poet Samuel Coleridge is also credited with stating that we need to be men before we can be citizens 
(Eagleton, 2000, p. 7). 
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need for further mining of discourse in cultural policies (such as imperatives behind 
civil society discourses) to facilitate the generation of policies that are more “overt and 
thus subject to public validation” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 336). Since the nature of this work 
was qualitative and interpretive, these suggestions and interpretations necessarily 
remain open to challenge, but, it is hoped, have progressed debate about the complexity 
and pressures of working in such a simultaneously useful and marginal policy area.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Creative City Discourse Analysis Criteria Comparative Chart 
 
 Scotland Finland Ireland 
 
PRIMARY CRITERIA 
  
 
 Primary Thematics    
1 Explicit endorsements of 
creative city paradigm,  
associated authors and 
branded concepts of the 
‘creative class’ and the 
‘creative city’ 
Yes 
Creative city, creative class 
and Florida 
 
(Cultural Commission, 2005; 
Scottish Government, 2009a) 
Yes 
Creative city, creative class, 
Florida and Landry 
 
(Ministry of Education, 2005; 
2006b; 2007; 2010b; Nordic 
Innovation Centre, 2007) 
No 
2 Culture/cultural/creative 
workers drive economies 
and competition  
 
 
Yes 
(Scottish Executive, 1999; 
Cultural Commission, 2005; 
Scottish Executive, 2006b; 
Scottish Government, 2008; 
2009a,b,c; 2010b; Creative 
Scotland, 2010c; 2011) 
Yes 
(Ministry of Education, 2005; 
2006b; 2009b; 2009c; 2010b; 
Nordic Innovation Centre, 
2007) 
Yes 
(O’Donoghue, 2002; 
Department of Arts Sport and 
Tourism, 2008b; 2008d; Arts 
Council of Ireland, 2009; 
2011; Moylan, 2010; 
Department of Tourism, 
Culture and Sport, 2011a; 
2011b) 
3 Culture drives 
regeneration and place-
Yes, very strong. Culture as 
USP (via competitive 
No Culture as USP (via 
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development by making 
places unique 
 
nationalism) 
 
(Cultural Commission, 2005; 
Scottish Executive, 2006a,; 
Scottish Government, 2008; 
Creative Scotland, 2010a; 
2011) 
competitive nationalism) 
(Arts Council of Ireland, 2009; 
Department of Arts Sport and 
Tourism, 2008a; 2008b; 
Brennan, 2008; Moylan, 2010; 
Department of Tourism, 
Culture and Sport, 2011b) 
4 Places need to attract 
creative people (talent/ 
human capital/creative 
class) to attract business 
and international 
investment and drive 
competition 
 
 (Florida’s 3 T’s) 
Yes 
 
 
 
(Scottish Executive, 1999;  
Scottish National Party, 2007; 
Scottish Government, 
2009a,b,c; 2010a; Creative 
Scotland, 2011) 
Yes, very strongly (via human 
capital)  
 
 
(Ministry of Education, 2005; 
2006b; 2009b; 2009c; 2010b; 
Nordic Innovation Centre, 
2007) 
 
Specifically attracting 
investment and business, not 
creative workers 
(Department of Arts, Sport and 
Tourism, 2008b; Arts Council 
of Ireland, 2009; Deenihan, 
2011b; Department of 
Tourism, Culture and Sport, 
2011a) 
     
5 Associated lexicon: 
Attraction 
Yes – very strong 
 
See # 4 
Yes – very strong 
 
See # 4 
Yes – very strong 
See # 4 
6 Associated lexicon: 
Talent 
Yes 
 
 
See # 4 
Yes – very strong (via Human 
capital) 
 
See # 4 
No 
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7 Associated metaphor: 
Harnessing 
Yes, but not as strong as other 
lexicons 
 
(Scottish Government, 2010a; 
Scottish Executive, 2006a). 
Yes, but not as strong as other 
lexicons 
 
(Ministry of Education and 
Culture, 2010b). 
Yes, but not as strong as other 
lexicons 
(Department of Foreign 
Affairs, 2009, p21). 
 
8 Places need to be 
tolerant (diverse/open) 
to attract creatives  
 
(Florida’s 3 T’s) 
Diversity rhetoric 
 
(Scottish Executive, 2006b; 
Scottish Arts Council, 2009) 
Yes, very strong (via  tolerance 
discourses) 
(Ministry of Education, 2006b; 
2009b; 2009c; 2010b) 
No 
9 Technology is needed to 
drive competitiveness 
(and is a knowledge 
economy trope) 
 (Florida’s 3 T’s) 
No References to importance of 
information technology and 
technology and content, but not 
significant 
No 
 SECONDARY 
CRITERIA 
   
 Creativity/innovation 
rhetorics 
Yes – very strong Yes, with local variant of 
creativity welfare society 
Present but not strong 
 Creative industries Yes Yes 
No 
 Culture and creative 
economy 
Yes Yes Not strong 
 Other themes and 
features 
   
   Creative economy  Creative economy   Creativity discourse 
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(creative industries) 
 Creativity discourse 
(general) 
 Past/tradition V 
present/modernity/cosmop
olitanism  
 Competitive nationalism 
and identity  
 Government agendas and 
instrumentalism 
 Place-development 
 Attraction discourse: 
Scotland as wanting to be 
more attractive and 
Scotland already being 
attractive 
 Criticism and 
endorsement of Florida 
 
 
 (creative industries) 
 Creativity discourse 
(general) 
 Creativity welfare society 
 Internationalism and 
multiculturalism/diversity 
 Cultural rights 
 Civilisation and civil 
society 
 Common culture/national 
pride 
 Dualism and intrinsic vs 
extrinsic discourses 
 Creative city 
equivocation: Criticism 
and endorsement of 
Florida 
 Attraction of workers and 
investment  
 Human capital 
 Tolerance 
 
(general) 
 Social and economic 
contribution, well-being 
and cultural democracy 
 Competitive 
nationalism/uniqueness 
 Reputation building/repair 
 Culture as an economic 
driver 
 Government agendas and 
instrumentalism 
 Attraction and investment 
 
 
 
 
